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ABSTRACT
This study empirically investigated four aspects of the financial reporting system in Oman: (1) the 
perception of corporate report users and auditor groups of the various elements of annual 
corporate reports, (2) the informational needs of corporate reports' users, (3) current reporting 
practice, and (4} determ inants of the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure in annual 
corporate reports. The first stage of the research focused on the first two aspects, which were 
examined via a questionnaire survey administered to seven major user groups: individual 
investors, institutional investors, government representatives, financial analysts, accountants, 
auditors, and regulators. Additionally, during this stage, similarities and differences in the 
perceptions of three auditor groups w ere investigated. The second stage of this study focused on 
the other two aspects, which were measured through an examination of 111 Omani corporate 
annual reports. The study also conducted interviews with 27 professional users in order to 
understand and confirm the findings of the first and second stages of the research.
The study revealed that different user groups relied heavily on information obtained from the 
financial analysis of annual corporate reports, especially the financial statements. The usage and 
importance of individual report sections was broadly consistent with that in developed countries. 
User groups differed in their views of the importance of individual sections of the management 
discussion and analysis section and the corporate governance report. Regarding auditor groups, the 
study found that the views of auditors from the Big four audit firms differed significantly from the 
views of auditors from international affiliated and local audit firms.
Regarding the informational needs of different stakeholders, users highly rated and demanded 
some of the information presented to them in the questionnaire, namely, price earnings ratio, 
comparison of a company's actual performance with competitors', gross profit margin, trend 
analysis on profitability, profit forecast and future cash flows.
The second stage of the research revealed that Omani listed companies complied with mandatory 
disclosure requirements. However, these provided low amounts of voluntary disclosure. Comparing 
users’ demand list of information with companies' supply list, the study revealed an information 
gap between what external users demanded and what companies disclosed in their reports.
Using multiple regression analysis, the study was able to identify main causes of variations in the 
level of annual disclosure. It was found that companies' compliance with disclosure requirements is 
influenced by company size and auditor type. Regarding voluntary disclosure, large listed 
companies, companies audited by Big four audit firms, and companies in the industrial sector 
disclosed more information in their annual reports than other companies. On the other hand, debt 
ratio, current ratio, return on equity, and ownership structure had no significant association with 
either the level of mandatory or voluntary disclosure.
Employing interviews, the study was able to understand and explain the questionnaire and 
regression analysis findings. One main finding was that users of reports believed that companies 
were complying with disclosure requirements. However, interviewees were dissatisfied with the 
quantity and quality of voluntary disclosure. Another im portant finding was that auditors have 
control over the disclosure since they might prepare the annual reports as claimed by some of the 
interviewees. Finally, the study indicated that establishing a professional body to oversee and 
govern the accounting profession in Oman is a necessity to improve the quality of the financial 
reporting system.
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
Thank you Allah for granting me this educational experience and for helping me, guiding 
me, and giving me a loving and caring family.
Having completed this thesis, I would like first to thank my supervisors, Professor Mike 
Jones and Dr. Yusuf Karbhari, for providing instructive comments and evaluation at every 
stage of the thesis process. I would also like to thank Professor John Doyle for helping me 
solve some of the statistical problems.
In addition to the instrumental assistance aforementioned, I have received important 
assistance from my family and friends. My husband, Abdullah Al-Rawahi, provided ongoing 
support throughout the thesis process, as well as technical assistance. I am very lucky to 
have him as my husband. I would also like to acknowledge the support received from my 
parents, Abdullah Al-Kalbani and Hoda Ali, who instilled in me the confidence and drive to 
pursue my PhD. I would like to thank them for always being there for me and for their 
constant love and encouragem ent
I would also like to thank my daughter, Ghufran, for being so patient while I have spent 
untold periods of time working on my thesis. This thesis is dedicated to her. May Allah 
bless her and guide her all through her life.
Finally, I would like to thank my friend, Nadia Al-Alawi, for helping me to obtain essential 
information throughout the thesis process.
T A B L E  OF C O N T E N T S
DECLARATION......................................................................................................................................................................................... I
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................................................................................... II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................................................................................................................................Ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS.........................................................................................................................................................................IV
LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................................................................................ XVI
LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................................................................................................XX
CHAPTER 1 :  INTRODUCTION
1.1  I n t r o d u c t i o n ..................................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Ba ck gr ou n d  t o  t h e  St u d y ........................................................................................................................................... 3
1.3 Im p o r t a n c e  of  t h e  F inancial R e p o r t i n g  Sy s t e m ..............................................................................................4
1 .4  P ur po se s  of  t h e  St u d y ................................................................................................................................................... 6
1 .5  Co n t r i bu t i on s  of  t h e  St u d y ........................................................................................................................................7
1 .6  Justifi cati ons  f o r  t h e  St u d y .......................................................................................................................................9
1 .7  R esearch  Me t h o d o l o g y .............................................................................................................................................1 0
1 .8  T h e  Research 's Q u est io ns .......................................................................................................................................... 1 2
1 .9  O utli ne  of  t h e  T h e s i s ...................................................................................................................................................13
CHAPTER 2 : THE OMANI ECONOMY, CAPITAL MARKET AND FINANCIAL 
REPORTING SYSTEM
2 .1  In t r o d u c t i o n .................................................................................................................................................................. 1 5
2 .2  O ma n  as  an  Emerging  E con omy ................................................................................................................................1 5
2 .3  L egal  System  in Om a n ................................................................................................................................................. 1 7
2.3.1 Oman's Business Environment..................................................................................................17
2 . 3 .1 .1  Ministry of Commerce and industry..............................................................................1 7
2 .3 .1 .2  Oman Chamber of Commerce Industry......................................................................... 1 7
2. 3 .1 .3  Central Bank of Oman........................................................................................................1 8
2 . 3 . 1 . 4  Oman Development Bank................................................................................................ 1 8
2 . 4  O mani  Securities  M a r k e t ......................................................................................................................................... 1 8
2.4.1 Capital Market Authority (CMA)...............................................................................................19
2.4.2 Muscat Securities Market (MSM)..............................................................................................19
2.4.2.1 Features of Muscat Securities Market............................................................................20
2.4.3 Muscat Depository and Securities Registration Company...................................................20
2.5 R e g u l a t i o n s  G o v e r n i n g  t h e  F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  S y s te m  in O m a n ......................................................21
2.5.1 General Regulations of Business Forms and Structure........................................................ 21
2.5.1.1 The Commercial Companies Law (4 /1 9 7 4 )...................................................................22
2.5.1.1.1 Joint Stock Company................................................................................................ 22
2.5.1.1.2 Rules Governing the Invitation to Subscribe to a Joint Stock
Company................................................................................................................... 22
2.5.1.1.3 Investors'Rights.......................................................................................................22
2.5.1.1.4 Rules Governing the Preparation of Annual Reports of Joint Stock
Companies................................................................................................................ 23
2.5.2 Stock Market Regulations......................................................................................................... 23
2.5.2.1 Capital Market Law............................................................................................................. 23
2.5.2.1.1 Code of Corporate Governance.............................................................................. 24
2.5.2.1.2 Foreign Capital Investment Law........................................................................... 24
2.5.2.1.3 Disclosure Regulations............................................................................................25
2.5.2.1.4 Punishment System................................................................................................. 27
2.6 S p e c i a l  F e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  O m a n  S e c u r i t i e s  M a r k e t ....................................................................................... 28
2.6.1 Omani Market Compared to Other GCC M arkets...................................................................28
2.7 S u m m a r y  a n d  C o n c l u s i o n ..................................................................................................................30
C hapter 3 : THEORETICAL APPROACH AND IMPLICATIONS OF THEORIES AND 
MODELS FOR THIS STUDY
3.1  In t r o d u c t i o n ...................................................................................................................................................................3 1
3 .2  F inancial  D isclosure in T h e o r y ..............................................................................................................................3 1
3.2.1 Agency Theory.............................................................................................................................31
3.2.2 Signalling Theory....................................................................................................................... 36
3.2.3 Stewardship Theory...................................................................................................................37
3.2.4 Market Myopia Theory.............................................................................................................. 38
3.2.5 Stakeholder Theory....................................................................................................................39
3.3  T heoreti cal  D isclosure  M o d e l s ........................................................................................................................... 4 1
3.3.1 Discretionary Disclosure Models............................................................................................. 41
3.3.2 Cheap-Talk Models......................................................................................................................45
3 . 4  I mporta nce  of  Co r p o r a t e  F inancial D i sclosure ...........................................................................................4 6
3.4.1 Costs and Benefits of Financial Disclosure............................................................................ 46
3.4.2 Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Financial Disclosure................................................47
3.4.3 Importance of Voluntary Disclosure....................................................................................... 48
3.4.4 Motives for Voluntary Disclosure............................................................................................ 48
3.5  IMPLICATIONS OF DISCLOSURE MODELS AND THE LITERATURE FOR THIS STUDY...........................................4 9
3. 6  Su mm ar y  a n d  Conclusi on ............................................................................................................................................5 0
CHAPTER 4  : LITERATURE REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE STUDIES
4 . 1  INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................................................. 5 2
4 .2  Li t e ra t ur e  R e v ie w  on  D i sclosure  Survey  St u d i e s ...................................................................................... 5 2
4.2.1 Survey Studies on the Importance o f Annual Reports as a Whole.....................................53
4.2.2 Survey Studies on the Importance o f a List of Disclosure Items.........................................62
4 .3  E mpi ri cal  St u di e s  on  t h e  Im p o r t a n c e  of  t h e  M anagement  D iscussion and  Analysis
R e p o r t ................................................................................................................................................................................ 6 7
4 . 4  Empi ri cal  St u d i e s  on  Co r p o r a t e  Governance  D isclosures .....................................................................6 8
4 . 5  L i t er at u re  R e v i e w  on  D isclosure  Indi ces’ St u d i e s .....................................................................................7 6
4 . 6  Summa ry  a n d  Co ncl us io n ........................................................................................................................................1 0 2
CHAPTER 5 : DEVELOPMENT OF STUDY QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
5.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n ................................................................................................................................... 103
5.2 R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t i o n s  R e l a t e d  t o  P r i m a r y  D a t a  C o l l e c t i o n  S t a g e  ( Q u e s t i o n n a i r e
S u r v e y ) .............................................................................................................................................103
5.2.1 What are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of the Objectives of
Financial Reporting in Oman? (RQ1)...................................................................................103
5.2.1.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding the 
Purpose of Financial Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reports? (H I)................... 104
5.2.2 What are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of the Importance of
Different Sources o f Corporate Information? (RQ2).........................................................105
5.2.2.1 Is There Consensus among Annual Reports' User Groups and Auditor Groups 
Regarding the Importance of Different Sources of Corporate
Information? (H2)............................................................................................................. 105
5.2.3 What Are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of the Importance of the
Various Annual Report Sections? (RQ3)..............................................................................106
5.2.3.1 Is There Consensus Among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding the 
Importance of Omani Annual Reports' Sections in Making Investment 
Decisions? (H3).................................................................................................................. 106
5.2.4 What Are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of the Usefulness of the
Management Discussion and Analysis Report Sections in Making Investment 
Decisions? (RQ4)...................................................................................................................... 106
5.2.4.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding the 
Usefulness of the MD&A Report Sections? (H4).......................................................... 107
5.2.5 What Are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of the Nature of the 
Information Included in the Management Discussion and Analysis Report?
(RQ5)..........................................................................................................................................107
5.2.5.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditors Groups Regarding the 
Nature of the Information included in the MD&A report? (H5)...............................107
5.2.6 What Are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of Achievement of the
Code o f Corporate Governance? (RQ6)........   108
5.2.6.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding 
Achievement of the Code of Corporate Governance? (H6)........................................108
5.2.7 What Are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of the Importance of the
Corporate Governance Report's Sections? (RQ7).............................................................. 108
5.2.7.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding the 
Importance of the Corporate Governance Report's Sections? (H7)........................ 109
5.2.8 What Are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of the Importance of a
List of Voluntary Items? (RQ8)..............................................................................................109
5.2.8.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding the 
Importance of a List of Voluntary Items? (H8)............................................................110
5.2.9 What Are the Perceptions of Professional User Groups of the Importance of a List of
Mandatory Disclosures? (RQ9).............................................................................................110
5.2.9.1 Is There Consensus among Professional User Groups Regarding the 
Importance of a List of Mandatory Items? (H9).......................................................... 110
5.3 R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t i o n s  R e l a t e d  t o  t h e  S e c o n d a r y  D a t a  C o l l e c t i o n  S t a g e ...............................I l l
5.3.1 To What Extent Do Omani Listed Companies Comply with Mandatory Disclosure
Requiremen ts?(RQl 0)............................................................................................................ I l l
5.3.2 To What Extent Do Omani Listed Companies Disclose Voluntary Information in
their Annual Reports? (RQ11 ) ...............................................................................................I l l
vii
5.3.3 Do Current Levels of Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure in Omani Annual
Reports Reflect the Informational Needs of Users? (RQ12)............................................. 112
5.3.4 Do Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosures in Omani Annual Reports Correlate
Significantly with Each Other? (RQ13)........................................................................ .......112
5 .3 .4 .1  D o  M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e s  a n d  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e s  C o r r e l a t e  S i g n i f i c a n t l y
w i t h  E a c h  O t h e r ?  ( H 1 3 ) ......................................................................................................................... 1 1 2
5.3.5 What Are the Effects o f Company Attributes on Current Levels of Disclosure in
Omani Annual Reports? (RQ14)...........................................................................................113
5 . 3 .5 .1  S t r u c t u r e - R e l a t e d  V a r i a b l e s .............................................................................................................. 1 1 3
5 . 3 .5 .1 .1  C o m p a n y  Si z e  ( H 1 4 ) .................................................................................................................. 1 1 3
5 . 3 .5 .1 .2  C o m p a n y  G e a r i n g  L e v e l  ( H 1 5 ) .............................................................................................1 1 5
5 .3 .5 .1 .3  C o m p a n y  L i q u i d i t y  p o s i t i o n  ( H 1 6 ) ...................................................................................1 1 6
5 . 3 . 5 . 1 . 4  C o m p a n y  O w n e r s h i p  s t r u c t u r e .......................................................................................... 1 1 7
5 .3 .5 . 1 . 4 . 1  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  S h a r e s  H e l d  b y  S h a r e h o l d e r s  W h o  O w n  1 0 %  o r  M o r e  o f  
t h e  C o m p a n y ' s  S h a r e s  ( H 1 7 ) ...........................................................................................1 1 8
5 .3 .5 .1 .4 .2  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  S h a r e s  H e l d  b y  M i n o r i t y  S h a r e h o l d e r s  ( H 1 8 ) ......................1 1 8
5 .3 .5 .1 .4 .3  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  G o v e r n m e n t  I n v e s t m e n t  ( H 1 9 ) ..................................................... 1 1 9
5 . 3 . 5 . 1 . 4 . 4  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  I n v e s t m e n t  ( H 2 0 ) ....................................................1 2 0
5 .3 .5 .1 .4 .5  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  S h a r e s  H e l d  b y  M a j o r  F o r e i g n  I n v e s t o r s  ( H 2 1 ) .................. 1 2 0
5 .3 .5 .2  P e r f o r m a n c e - R e l a t e d  V a r i a b l e  ( H 2 2 ) ..........................................................................................1 2 1
5 .3 .5 .3  M a r k e t - R e l a t e d  V a r i a b l e s : ...................................................................................................................1 2 2
5 . 3 . 5 . 3 . 1  I n d u s t r y  S e c t o r  ( H 2 3 ) ................................................................................................................1 2 2
5 .3 .5 .3 .2  A u d i t o r  T y p e  ( H 2 4 ) ....................................................................................................................1 2 3
5.3.6 A Model for Disclosure Evaluation.........................................................................................124
5 .4  Su mm a r y  a nd  Conclusi on ........................................................................................................................................ 1 2 5
CHAPTER 6 : RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
6.1  INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................................1 2 6
6.2  St age  I: Q u estionnaire  Su rv e y .............................................................................................................................1 2 6
6.2.1 Questionnaire Design.............................................................................................................. 127
6.2.2 Parts of the Questionnaire............................................  128
6.3  P ri mary  Da t a  Collection  M e t h o d ....................................................................................................................1 2 9
6.3.1 Individual Investors.................................................................................................................130
6.3.2 Institutional Investors............................................................................................................. 130
6.3.3 Government Representatives.................................................................................................. 130
6.3.4 Regulators................................................................................................................................. 130
6.3.5 Financial Analysts.....................................................................................................................131
6.3.6 Auditors......................................................................................................................................131
6.3.7 Accountants............................................................................................................................... 131
6.3.8 Summary of the Distribution and Collection of the Questionnaire..................................131
6 . 4  Q u est ionnai re  R eliability  and  Generalisability  t e s t s ...........................................................................1 3 1
6 . 5  List  of  Ma n d a t o r y  It e m s ........................................................................................................................................ 1 3 2
6 .6  St age  II: Secondary  Da t a  Collection  M e t h o d ............................................................................................ 1 3 3
6.6 .1 Extent o f Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reports..............................................................133
6.6.2 Construction of Disclosure Indices.........................................................................................133
6 .6 .2 .1  I n d e x  o f  M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e ..........................................................................................................1 3 4
6 . 6 .2 .2  I n d e x  o f  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e ............................................................................................................ 1 3 5
6 .6.3 Scoring Methods and Calculation o f Disclosure Index....................................................... 135
6 . 6 .3 .1  W e i g h t e d  a n d  U n w e i g h t e d  S c o r i n g  M e t h o d s ............................................................................ 1 3 6
6 .6.4 Secondary Data Sample.......................................................................................................... 137
6. 7  Stati sti cal  T ests’ Ap p l i c a t i o n ............................................................................................................................1 3 8
6.7.1 Statistical Tools Used in Stage I o f the Research............................................................... 138
6.7.2 Statistical Tools Used in Stage II........................................................................................... 140
6 . 8  St age  III: Qualitative  Da t a  Collection  M e t h o d ...................................................................................... 1 4 2
6.8.1 The Selected Interviewees....................................................................................................... 144
6. 9  In t e r v i e w  A nalysis .................................................................................................................................................... 1 4 9
6 . 1 0  Su m ma r y  a n d  Co nclusi on ........................................................................................................................................1 4 9
CHAPTER 7 : USERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE IN MAKING INVESTMENT DECISIONS
7.1 INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................................................... 1 5 0
7.2 D e mo g ra p hi c  P rofile  of  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t s ...................................................................................................1 5 0
7 .3  T he  Use of  A nnual  Re p o r t s  in Om a n ............................................................................................................... 1 5 1
7.3.1 Objectives of Financial Reporting in Oman......................................................................... 152
7 .3 .1 .1  A n a l y s i s  o f  U s e r s ’ R a t i n g s  o f  D i f f e r e n t  D i s c l o s u r e  O b j e c t i v e s ........................................ 1 5 2
7 .3 .1 .2  A n a l y s i s  o f  L e v e l  o f  C o n s e n s u s  A m o n g  a n d  B e t w e e n  D i f f e r e n t  U s e r  G r o u p s
R e g a r d i n g  P u r p o s e s  o f  F i n a n c i a l  D i s c l o s u r e .............................................................................1 5 4
7.3.2 Importance of Corporate Information Sources in Oman...................................   155
7.3.2.1 Analysis of Users' Ratings of the Importance of Different Corporate 
Information Sources.........................................................................................................155
13.2.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups
Regarding the Importance of Different Corporate Information Sources..............158
7.3.3 Comparison o f this Study's Results with Previous Studies' Regarding the Use of
Annual Reports........................................................................................................................162
7.4 U s e r s '  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s '  S e c t i o n s ..................................... 163
7.4.1 Analysis of Users' Ratings of the Importance of Annual Reports'Sections.....................163
7.4.2 Analysis of Level o f Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups in Oman
Regarding the Importance o f Annual Reports'Sections...................................................166
7.4.3 Comparison of this Study's Results with Previous Studies' Results Regarding the
Importance of Annual Reports'Sections..............................................................................169
7.5 T h e  U s e f u l n e s s  o f  S e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  M a n a g e m e n t  D is cus s i on  a n d  A n a l y s i s  R e p o r t ............... 170
7.5.1 Analysis of Users'Ratings of the Usefulness of the MD&A Report Sections.....................170
7.5.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups
Regarding the Usefulness of MD&A Sections..................................................................... 173
7.5.3 Comparison o f this Study's Results with Previous Studies' Results Regarding the
Usefulness o f the MD&A Report Sections............................................................................176
7.6 N a t u r e  o f  MD&A I n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  t h e  C o d e  o f  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e ..............................176
7.6.1 Nature of MD&A Information in Omani Annual Reports.................................................. 176
7.6.1.1 Analysis of Users' Perceptions of the Nature of MD&A Information..................... 176
7.6.1.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups 
Regarding the Nature of MD&A Information..............................................................178
7.6.1.3 Comparison of this Study's Results with Previous Studies' Results Regarding
the Nature of MD&A Information..................................................................................179
7.6.2 Users' Perceptions of Achievement of the Code of Corporate Governance in
Oman.........................................................................................................................................179
7.6.2.1 Analysis of Users' Perceptions of Achievement of the Code of Corporate 
Governance in Oman.........................................................................................................180
7.6.2.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups in 
Oman Regarding Achievement of the Code of Corporate Governance...................181
7.7 U s e r s '  R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  R e p o r t ' s  S e c t i o n s  in
MAKING INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN OMAN......................................................................................... 181
7.7.1 Analysis of Users'Perceptions of the Importance of Corporate Governance Report's
Sections..................................................................................................................................... 182
7.7.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups
Regarding the Importance of Corporate Governance Report Sections..........................185
7.7.3 Comparison of this Study's Results with Previous Studies' Results Regarding the
Importance of Corporate Governance Report Sections.....................................................188
7.8  Users ' Rati ngs  of  t h e  Im p o r t a n c e  of  a  List  of  Voluntary  D isclosure  It e m s ..............................1 8 8
7.8.1 Analysis of Users'Ratings of the Importance of a List of Voluntary Disclosure
Item s..........................................................................................................................................189
7.8.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups
Regarding the Importance of a List of Voluntary Disclosure Items................................ 195
7.8.3 Comparison of this Study's Results with Previous Studies' Results Regarding the
Importance of a List o f Voluntary Item s ............................................................................. 203
7.9  Sugge st ed  Voluntary  It e m s ................................................................................................................................. 2 0 4
7 . 1 0  Analysis o f  Level of  Consensus  A mo n g  a n d  B e t w e e n  A u d i to r  Gr o u p s  Regarding  t h e  
P u r p os es  of  F inancial  D i s c l o s u r e ....................................................................................................................2 0 4
7 . 1 1  Analysis o f  Level Consensus  Among  a n d  Be t w e e n  A u d it o r  Gr o u p s  Regarding  t h e  
Im po r t a n c e  of  D i ff er en t  Sources  of  In f o r m a t i o n ..................................................................................2 0 6
7 .1 2  Analysis o f  Level o f  Consensus  Amo ng  a n d  B e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  Gr o u p s  Regarding  t h e  
Im p o r t a n c e  of  Annual  Re p o r t s ’ Se c t i o n s ....................................................................................................2 0 7
7 .1 3  T h e  A n a l y s i s  o f  L e v e l  o f  C o n s e n s u s  A m o n g  a n d  B e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e  
U s e f u l n e s s  o f  t h e  MD&A S e c t i o n s  in  M a k i n g  I n v e s t m e n t  D ec is io ns  in O m a n ........................... 2 0 8
7 . 1 4  A n a l y s i s  o f  L e v e l  o f  C o n s e n s u s  A m o n g  a n d  B e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e  
N a t u r e  o f  t h e  I n f o r m a t i o n  I n c l u d e d  in  MD&A R e p o r t ........................................................................ 2 1 0
7 . 1 5  A nalysis o f  Level of  Consensus  Amo ng  a nd  B e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  Gr o u p s  Regarding  
Co m p a n i e s ' Achi evement  of  t h e  Co r p o r a t e  Governance  Code  in Om a n .........................................2 1 1
7 . 1 6  Analysis  o f  Level of  Consensus  A mong  a nd  B e t w e e n  A u d it o r  Gr o u p s  R egarding  t h e  
Im po r t a n c e  of  Co r p o r a t e  Governance  R e p o r t  Secti ons ......................................................................2 1 2
7 . 1 7  A nalysis of  Level of  consensus  A mong  and  B e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  Gr o u ps  R egarding  t h e  
Im p o r t a n c e  of  a  List  of  Vo luntary  It e m s ..................................................................................................... 2 1 3
7 . 1 8  P rofessi onal  Users ' P e rcepti ons  of  t h e  Im p o r ta n ce  of  a  List  of  Ma nda t or y  D isclosure
in Maki ng  Inv es tme n t  D ecisions  in O m a n ...................................................................................................... 2 1 5
7.18.1 Analysis of Users'Ratings of the Importance of Mandatory Item s................................. 215
7.18.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between User Groups Regarding the 
Importance of a List of Mandatory Items............................................................................218
7.18.3 Comparison of this Study's Results with Previous Studies' Results................................218
7 . 1 9  Su mm a ry  a n d  Co nclusi on ........................................................................................................................................ 2 1 9
CHAPTER 8 : THE EXTENT OF AGGREGATE DISCLOSURE IN OMANI ANNUAL 
REPORTS
8 .1  In t r o d u c t i o n ................................................................................................................................................................ 2 2 1
8 .2  M easuring  t h e  Ex t e n t  of  M a nd a t o r y  D isclosure  in Omani  Annual  R e p o r t s ............................ 2 2 1
8.2.1 Degree of Compliance with Disclosure Requirements...................................................... 221
8 . 2 . 1 . 1  Overall Corporate Compliance with Mandatory Disclosure........................................... 2 2 1
8 . 2 .1 .2  The Disclosure of Mandatory Items in Omani Annual Reports.....................................2 2 3
8.3  M e asuring  t h e  Ex te nt  of  Vo lunt ary  D isclosure  in Omani  Annual  R e p o r t s ............................. 2 2 8
8.3.1 Overall Voluntary Disclosure in Omani Annual Reports..................................................228
8 .3 . 1 . 1  Omani Corporate Disclosure of Voluntary Items..................................................................2 3 1
8 . 3 . 1 . 2  Disclosure of Voluntary Items in Omani Sectors...................................................................2 3 3
8 . 4  D escri pti ve  Stati st ics  of  Overall  A ggregate  D isclosure in t h e  Omani  Annual
Re p o r t s ...........................................................................................................................................................................2 3 7
8 .5  T h e  Association  B e t w e e n  Level of  M a nd a t o r y  D isclosure  and  Voluntary  D isclosure
in O mani  Co r p o r a t e  R e p o r t s ...............................................................................................................................2 3 9
8 .6  Su m ma r y  a nd  Conclusi on ........................................................................................................................................ 2 4 1
CHAPTER 9 : POSSIBLE EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR VARIATIONS IN THE LEVEL 
OF DISCLOSURE IN OMANI ANNUAL REPORTS
9.1  In t r o d u c t i o n .............................................................................................................................................................. 2 4 3
9 .2  D es cr ip ti on  of  t h e  Conti nuo us  In d e p e n d e n t  Va r i a b l e s .........................................................................2 4 3
9 .3 D e scri p ti on  of  Categori cal  In d e p e n d e n t  Va r i a b l e s ............................................................................... 2 4 5
9 .4  Da t a  Ex a mi n at i on .......................................................................................................................................................2 4 7
9.4.1 Graphical Examination of Data.......................................................................   247
9.4.2 Outliers.....................................................................................................................................248
9.4.3 Assumptions of Multivariate Analysis.................................................................................248
9 .4 . 3 . 1  Normality....................................................................................................................................................... 2 4 8
9.4.3.2 Homoscedasticity.............................................................................................................250
9.4.3.3 Linearity............................................................................................................................ 250
9. 5  Co rre l at io n  Amo n g  Va r i a b l e s ............................................................................................................................2 5 1
9 . 6  M ulti pl e  R egression  M odels  and  A nalysis   .......................... ............................................................... 2  5 4
9.6 .1 Un weighted Mandatory Disclosure Index Regression Model............................................ 255
9.6.2 Weighted Mandatory Disclosure Index Regression Model.................................................257
9.6.3 Unweighted Voluntary Disclosure Index Regression Model.............................................. 258
9.6.4 Weighted Voluntary Disclosure Index Regression Model...................................................260
9.6.5 Overall Unweighted Disclosure Index Regression Model...................................................261
9.6.6 Overall Weighted Disclosure Index Regression Model.......................................................263
9 .7  D i scussion o f  Regressi on  M odel s ' R e s u l t s ...................................................................................................2 6 4
9.7.1 Company's Size.......................................................................................................................... 265
9.7.2 Company's Performance..........................................................................................................265
9.7.3 Company's Gearing Level........................................................................................................ 266
9.7.4 Company's Current Ratio ........................................................................................................ 266
9.7.5 Government Ownership...........................................................................................................266
9.7.6 Institutional Ownership..........................................................................................................267
9.7.7 Major Shareholders.................................................................................................................. 267
9.7.8 Minority Ownership.................................................................................................................267
9.7.9 Foreign Ownership .............................................................................................................. 268
9.7.10 Sector Type................................................................................................................................ 268
9.7.11 Auditor Type............................................................................................................................. 268
9 . 8  Su m ma r y  a nd  Co nclusi on ........................................................................................................................................2 7 0
CHAPTER 10  : THE INTERVIEW RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
10.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n ............................................................................................................................................................. 272
10.2 F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g  P a t t e r n  in  O m a n ..........................................................................................................272
10.3 P u r p o s e  o f  F i n a n c i a l  D i s c l o s u r e .....................................................................................................................273
10.4 I m p o r t a n c e  o f  C o r p o r a t e  I n f o r m a t i o n  S o u r c e s .................................................................................... 2 74
10.5 I m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  M a n a g e m e n t  D is c u s s io n  a n d  A n a l y s i s  R e p o r t  a n d  t h e  N a t u r e  o f
i t s  I n f o r m a t i o n .........................................................................................................................................................275
10.5.1 The Nature of Information Included in the MDScA Report.............................................. 275
10.6 C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  I s s u e s  in O m a n .........................................................................................................277
10.6.1 Corporate Report Users' Perceptions of the Corporate Governance Report.................277
10.6.1.1 Importance of the Corporate Governance Report...................................................278
10.6.2 Achievement of the Code of Corporate Governance..........................................................279
10.6.3 The Importance of the Corporate Governance Report's Sections...................................280
10.6.4 Current Performance of Corporate Governance within Omani Listed Companies 280
1 0 . 7  F inancial St a t e m e n t s ’ It e m s ............................................................................................................................. 2 8 1
10.7.1 Voluntary Disclosure of Policies Pertaining to Employee Training Safety and 
Environment Measures..........................................................................................................282
10.7.1.1 Importance of Safety and Environmental Issues......................................................282
10.7.2 Issues on Importance of a Company's Income Statement and Balance Sheet..............283
1 0 . 8  A u d i t  F i rm  Classification  a nd  Quality  of  F inancial R e p o r t i n g .................................................... 2 8 5
1 0 . 9  Fa ct ors  Influencing  Vo lun ta ry  D i sclosures ........................................................................................... 2 8 6
1 0 . 1 0  T h e  O mani  A ccounting  P r o f e s s i o n ................................................................................................................ 2 8 8
1 0 . 1 1  Ot h e r  Co r p o r a t e  Governance  Is s u e s ...........................................................................................................2 8 9
1 0 . 1 2  Su m ma r y  a nd  Conclusi on .....................................................................................................................................2 9 0
CHAPTER 1 1 :  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1 1 . 1  In t r o d u c t i o n .............................................................................................................................................................2 9 2
1 1 .2  A chi eve me nt  of  t h e  St u d y  O b j e c t i v e s ..........................................................................................................2 9 2
1 1 .3  Co r p o r a t e  R e p o r t  Users ' P e r cept io ns  of  Omani  Annual  R e p o r t s ................................................ 2 9 3
11.3.1 Differences in Auditor Groups' Perceptions........................................................................297
11.3.2 Users' Perceptions o f the Importance of Mandatory Disclosure..................................... 298
1 1 . 4  D i sclosure  P ractice  in O m a n ............................................................................................................................. 2 9 8
1 1 . 5  Fac t or s  Explaining  Va ri at i ons  in Co r p o r a t e  Levels of  D is cl o su re .............................................3 0 1
1 1 . 6  In t e r v i e w  F i n d i n g s ................................................................................................................................................. 3 0 3
1 1 . 7  St u d y  Li m i t a ti o n s ....................................................................................................................................................3 0 6
1 1 . 8  R esearch  Co n t r i b u t i o n s ...................................................................................................................................... 3 0 8
1 1 . 9  Fu t u r e  Re s e a r c h ......................................................................................................................................................3 0 9
1 1 . 1 0  Research  Co n cl u si o ns .......................................................................................................................................... 3 1 0
BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................................................................ 31 4
APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE 2 0 0 5  (CHAPTERS 6 & 7 ) ................................................................................................. 333
APPENDIX B: LIST OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE (CHAPTERS 6 & 7 ) ........................................................................ 346
APPENDIX C: SCORING SHEETS OF INDICES OF MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES AND 
SAMPLE OF LISTED COMPANIES IN OMAN (CHAPTERS 6, 8  & 9 ) ..................................................................................347
APPENDIX D: QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS (CHAPTER 7 ) ................................................................................................. 354
APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW SCHEDULE (CHAPTERS 6 & 1 0 ) .............................................................................................. 358
xiv
APPENDIX F: DATA EXAMINATION AND REDUCED REGRESSION MODELS USING MARKET 
CAPITALISATION RESULTS (CHAPTER 9 ) ..............................................................................................................................362
APPENDIX G: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS OF TOTAL ITEM
DAT AT SET (CHAPTERS 8 & 9 ) ................................................................................................................................................... 37 6
APPENDIX H: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF ONLY TRANSFORMED DEPENDENT VARIABLES BASED ON 
NORMAL SCORES (CHAPTER 9 ) ................................................................................................................................................. 389
xv
LIST OF T A B L E S
T able  2 .1 :  F ori gn  In v est men t  By In dustry  (R elative  Sh are% ) ....................................................................1 6
T able  2 .2 :  F oreign  In vestmen t  By Count ry  Of  O rigin  ( R elative Share  % ) ............................................ 1 6
T able  2 .3 :  In v est men ts  In O mani  Sectors  (Relatives  Sh are  % ) ....................................................................2 0
T a b l e  3 . 1 : S u m m a r y  o f  A n a l y t i c a l  M o d e l s  o f  A g e n c y  T h e o r y ................................................. 3 6
T a b l e  3 . 2 : S u m m a r y  o f  D i s c r e t i o n a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  M o d e l s  o f
F i n a n c i a l  R e p o r t i n g ...........................................................................................................................................4 4
T a b l e  3 . 3 : S u m m a r y  o f  C h e a p - T a l k  D i s c l o s u r e  M o d e l s  o f  F i n a n c i a l
R e p o r t i n g .....................................................................................................................................................................4 5
T a b l e  4 .1 :  E m p i r i c a l  S t u d i e s  o f  U s e r s ' P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f
A n n u a l  R e p o r t s  a s  a  W h o l e .........................................................................................................................5 7
T a b l e  4 .2 :  E m p i r i c a l  S t u d i e s  o f  U s e r s ' P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f
a  L i s t  o f  D i s c l o s u r e  I t e m s ............................................................................................................................ 6 4
T a b l e  4 . 3 :  E m p i r i c a l  S t u d i e s  o f  t h e  U s e f u l n e s s  a n d  E x t e n t  o f  t h e
M a n a g e m e n t  D i s c u s s i o n  a n d  A n a l y s i s  R e p o r t ............................................................................ 7 0
T a b l e  4 . 4 :  E m p i r i c a l  S t u d i e s  o f  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  a n d  D i s c l o s u r e ...................7 2
T a b l e  4 . 5 :  E m p i r i c a l  S t u d i e s  o f  t h e  E x t e n t  o f  d i s c l o s u r e  i n  C o r p o r a t e
R e p o r t s .......................................................................................................................................................................... 8 0
T a b l e  5 . 1 : S u m m a r y  o f  a  S a m p l e  o f  P r e v i o u s  S t u d i e s  U s i n g  Co m p a n y  S i z e
a s  a  M e a s u r e  o f  E x t e n t  o f  D i s c l o s u r e ............................................................................................ 1 1 4
T a b l e  6 . 1 :  D i s t r i b u t i o n  a n d  C o l l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e s ...................................... 1 3 1
T a b l e  6 .2 :  C r o n b a c h ' s A l p h a  v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e .................................................1 3 2
T a b l e  6 . 3 : D i s t r i b u t i o n  a n d  C o l l e c t i o n  o f  t h e  M a n d a t o r y  I t e m s  L i s t ......................1 3 3
T a b l e  6 .4 :  I n t e r v i e w  - M a n a g e r s  o f  P u b l i c  L i s t e d  C o m p a n i e s ...............................................1 4 6
T a b l e  6 .5 :  I n t e r v i e w  - O t h e r  R e s p o n d e n t  G r o u p s ........................................................................... 1 4 7
T a b l e  6 . 6 : A n a l y s i s  P r e s e n t i n g  t h e  P e r i o d  o f  E x p e r i e n c e  o f  P a r t i c i p a n t s
i n  I n t e r v i e w  S u r v e y ......................................................................................................................................... 1 4 8
T a b l e  7 .1:  D e m o g r a p h i c  P r o f i l e  o f  t h e  R e s p o n d e n t s ................................................................... 1 5 1
T a b l e  7 .2:  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  t h e  S e t  o f  P u r p o s e s  o f
F i n a n c i a l  D i s c l o s u r e ...................................................................................................................................... 1 5 2
T a b l e  7 .3:  U s e r s ' R a t i n g s  o f  F i n a n c i a l  D i s c l o s u r e  P u r p o s e s ................................................ 1 5 3
T a b l e  7 .4:  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  D i f f e r e n t
I n f o r m a t i o n  S o u r c e s .......................................................................................................................................1 5 6
T a b l e  7 . 5 : U s e r s ' R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  D i f f e r e n t  S o u r c e s  o f
I n f o r m a t i o n  W h e n  M a k i n g  I n v e s t m e n t  D e c i s i o n s ................................................................ 1 5 7
T a b l e  7 . 6 : L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  U s e r  G r o u p s  a n d  
b e t w e e n  E a c h  P a i r  o f  U s e r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  
I m p o r t a n c e  o f  D i f f e r e n t  S o u r c e s  o f  I n f o r m a t i o n  w h e n  M a k i n g
I n v e s t m e n t  D e c i s i o n ........................................................................................................................................ 1 6 1
T a b l e  7 .7 :  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  A n n u a l
R e p o r t s ' S e c t i o n s ...............................................................................................................................................1 6 3
T a b l e  7 .8:  U s e r s ' R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s '
S e c t i o n s .......................................................................................................................................................................1 6 5
T a b l e  7 . 9 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r , a n d  D i r e c t i o n  o f , D i f f e r e n c e s
a m o n g  U s e r  G r o u p s  a n d  b e t w e e n  e a c h  p a i r  o f  U s e r  G r o u p s  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e i r  R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ’ S e c t i o n s ..............................1 6 8
xvi
T a b l e  7 . 1 0 :  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  U s e f u l n e s s  o f  M D & A
R e p o r t  S e c t i o n s ...................................................................................................................................................1 7 1
T a b l e  7 . 1 1 :  U s e r s ' R a t i n g s  o f  U s e f u l n e s s  o f  M D & A  R e p o r t ’s S e c t i o n s ........................1 7 2
T a b l e  7 . 1 2 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r , a n d  D i r e c t i o n  o f , D i f f e r e n c e s
a m o n g  U s e r  G r o u p s  a n d  b e t w e e n  E a c h  P a i r  o f  U s e r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  
t h e i r  R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  U s e f u l n e s s  o f  M a n a g e m e n t  D i s c u s s i o n  a n d
A n a l y s i s  R e p o r t  S e c t i o n s ........................................................................................................................... 1 7 5
T a b l e  7 .1 3 :  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  N a t u r e  o f  M D & A
I n f o r m a t i o n .............................................................................................................................................................1 7 7
T a b l e  7 . 1 4 : U s e r s ' R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  N a t u r e  o f  M D & A  I n f o r m a t i o n .....................................1 7 8
T a b l e  7 .1 5 :  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  A c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t h e
C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  C o d e ....................................................................................................................1 8 0
T a b l e  7 . 1 6 :  U s e r s ’ P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  A c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t e
G o v e r n a n c e  C o d e .................................................................................................................................................1 8 1
T a b l e  7 .1 7 :  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f
S e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  R e p o r t .................................................................... 1 8 2
T a b l e  7 . 1 8 : U s e r s ’ R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e
R e p o r t s  S e c t i o n s ................................................................................................................................................ 1 8 4
T a b l e  7 . 1 9 : L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  U s e r  G r o u p s  a n d  
B e t w e e n  E a c h  P a i r  o f  U s e r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  
I m p o r t a n c e  o f  D i f f e r e n t  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  R e p o r t  S e c t i o n s
i n  M a k i n g  I n v e s t m e n t  D e c i s i o n ..............................................................................................................1 8 7
T a b l e  7 . 2 0 :  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f
a  S e t  o f  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  I t e m s .............................................................................................. 1 8 9
T a b l e  7 . 2 1 :  U s e r s ’ R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  S e t  o f  V o l u n t a r y
D i s c l o s u r e  I t e m s ................................................................................................................................................. 1 9 1
T a b l e  7 . 2 2 :  R a n k i n g  b y  M e a n  V a l u e s  o f  U s e r s ' R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e
o f  a  S e t  o f  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  I t e m s ....................................................................................... 1 9 4
T a b l e  7 .2 3 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e  a m o n g  U s e r  G r o u p s  a n d  
b e t w e e n  E a c h  P a i r  o f  U s e r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  
I m p o r t a n c e  o f  a  S e t  o f  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  I t e m s  i n  M a k i n g
I n v e s t m e n t  D e c i s i o n s  i n  O m a n ................................................................................................................ 1 9 8
T a b l e  7 . 2 4 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  
A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  P u r p o s e s  o f
F i n a n c i a l  D i s c l o s u r e .......................................................................................................................................2 0 5
T a b l e  7 . 2 5 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  
A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  T h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f
D i f f e r e n t  I n f o r m a t i o n  S o u r c e s  i n  O m a n ......................................................................................2 0 7
T a b l e  7 . 2 6 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  
A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  T h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e
o f  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ’ S e c t i o n s ................................................................................................................... 2 0 8
T a b l e  7 . 2 7 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  
A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  U s e f u l n e s s
o f  M D & A  S e c t i o n s .............................................................................................................................................. 2 0 9
T a b l e  7 .2 8 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n
A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  N a t u r e  o f  M D & A  
I n f o r m a t i o n .............................................................................................................................................................2 1 1
xvii
T a b l e  7 . 2 9 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  
A u d i t o r  g r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n  o f  C o m p a n i e s '
A c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  C o d e  i n  O m a n .......................................... 2 1 1
T a b l e  7 . 3 0 : L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  
A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f
C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  R e p o r t  S e c t i o n s ......................................................................................2 1 2
T a b l e  7 .3 1 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  
A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e
o f  a  L i s t  o f  V o l u n t a r y  I t e m s ...................................................................................................................2 1 4
T a b l e  7 .3 2 :  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  a
L i s t  o f  M a n d a t o r y  I t e m s .............................................................................................................................2 1 6
T a b l e  7 .3 3 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  U s e r s ’ R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e
o f  a  L i s t  o f  M a n d a t o r y  I t e m s ................................................................................................................. 2 1 7
T a b l e  8 .1 :  D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  O v e r a l l  I n d e x  o f  M a n d a t o r y  I t e m s  D i s c l o s e d
i n  O m a n i  R e p o r t s ................................................................................................................................................ 2 2 2
T a b l e  8 .2 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  D i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  U n w e i g h t e d  a n d
W e i g h t e d  M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e  I n d i c e s ' S c o r e s ............................................................... 2 2 3
T a b l e  8 .3 :  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  t h e  I n d e x  V a l u e  f o r  E a c h  o f  t h e
M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e  I t e m .....................................................................................................................2 2 4
T a b l e  8 .4 :  D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e  i n  D i f f e r e n t  S e c t o r
O m a n i  L i s t e d  C o m p a n i e s ’ A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ...................................................................................2 2 6
T a b l e  8 .5 :  D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  O v e r a l l  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  i n  O m a n i
A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ................................................................................................................................................... 2 3 0
T a b l e  8 .6 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  B e t w e e n  U n w e i g h t e d  a n d  W e i g h t e d  
V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  I n d i c e s ' S c o r e s  U s i n g  W i l c o x o n  S i g n e d
R a n k s  T e s t ................................................................................................................................................................ 2 3 1
T a b l e  8 .7:  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  I n d e x  V a l u e  f o r  E a c h  V o l u n t a r y
D i s c l o s u r e  I t e m ................................................................................................................................................... 2 3 2
T a b l e  8 .8:  D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  i n  D i f f e r e n t  S e c t o r
O m a n i  L i s t e d  C o m p a n i e s ............................................................................................................................... 2 3 5
T a b l e  8 . 9 :  D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  O v e r a l l  A g g r e g a t e  D i s c l o s u r e  i n  O m a n i  A n n u a l
R e p o r t s ........................................................................................................................................................................2 3 8
T a b l e  8 . 1 0 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  B e t w e e n  U n w e i g h t e d  a n d  W e i g h t e d  
V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  I n d i c e s ' S c o r e s  U s i n g  W i l c o x o n  S i g n e d
R a n k s  T e s t ................................................................................................................................................................2 3 9
T a b l e  8 . 1 1 :  C o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  I n d i c e s ’ S c o r e s  o f  U n w e i g h t e d
M a n d a t o r y  a n d  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  i n  O m a n i  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ...................... 2 4 0
T a b l e  8 . 1 2 :  C o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  I n d i c e s ' S c o r e s  o f  M e a n - W e i g h t e d
M a n d a t o r y  a n d  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  i n  O m a n i  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ...................... 2 4 0
T a b l e  8 . 1 3 :  C o r r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  I n d i c e s ' S c o r e s  o f  M e d i a n - W e i g h t e d
M a n d a t o r y  a n d  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  i n  O m a n i  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ...................... 2 4 0
T a b l e  9 .1:  D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  D e p e n d e n t  a n d  I n d e p e n d e n t
V a r i a b l e s ................................................................................................................................................................... 2 4 5
T a b l e  9 .2:  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  D i f f e r e n t
S e c t o r  O m a n i  L i s t e d  C o m p a n i e s ' M a n d a t o r y  a n d  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e
i n  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ............................................................................................................................................. 2 4 6
T a b l e  9 .3 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  M a n d a t o r y  
a n d  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  L e v e l s  i n  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s  o f  O m a n i  L i s t e d  
C o m p a n i e s  a u d i t e d  b y  B i g  f o u r  a n d  N o n - B i g  f o u r  A u d i t o r s .......................................2 4 6
xviii
T a b l e  9.4A: A s s e s s m e n t  o f  N o r m a l i t y  o f  U n t r a n s f o r m e d  D a t a ..........................................2 4 9
T a b l e  9 .4B:  A s s e s s m e n t  o f  N o r m a l i t y  o f  T r a n s f o r m e d  D a t a ................................................ 2 5 0
T a b l e  9.5:  C o r r e l a t i o n  a m o n g  D e p e n d e n t  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e s ....................... 2 5 3
T a b l e  9.6:  C o r r e l a t i o n  a m o n g  C a t e g o r i c a l  Va r i a b l e s ............................................................... 2 5 4
T a b l e  9 . 7 : F u l l  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  o f  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f
U n w e i g h t e d  M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  Ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s ................................. 2 5 6
T a b l e  9.8:  R e d u c e d  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  o f  T r a n s f o r m e d  i n d e x  o f
U n w e i g h t e d  M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  Ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s ................................. 2 5 7
T a b l e  9 . 9 : F u l l  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  o f  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f
W e i g h t e d  M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e  on  F i r m  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ....................................... 2 5 8
T a b l e  9 . 1 0 : R e d u c e d  R e g r e s s i o n  Es t i m a t e s  of  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f
W e i g h t e d  M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e  on  F i r m  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ....................................... 2 5 8
T a b l e  9 .1 1 :  f u l l  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  o f  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f
U n w e i g h t e d  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  Ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s ...................................2 5 9
T a b l e  9 .1 2 :  r e d u c e d  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  of  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f
U n w e i g h t e d  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  Ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s ...................................2 6 0
T a b l e  9 .1 3 :  f u l l  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  o f  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f
W e i g h t e d  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .........................................2 6 1
T a b l e  9 . 1 4 :  r e d u c e d  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  o f  t r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x
o f  W e i g h t e d  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  Ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s ..................................2 6 1
T a b l e  9 .1 5 :  F u l l  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  o f  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f
O v e r a l l  U n w e i g h t e d  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ..........................................2 6 2
T a b l e  9 . 1 6 : R e d u c e d  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  of  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f
O v e r a l l  U n w e i g h t e d  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ..........................................2 6 3
T a b l e  9 . 1 7 :  f u l l  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  o f  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f  O v e r a l l
W e i g h t e d  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  Ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s ...................................................................... 2 6 4
T a b l e  9 . 1 8 :  r e d u c e d  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  of  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f
O v e r a l l  W e i g h t e d  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  Ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s ................................................2 6 4
T a b l e  9 .1 9 :  s u m m a r y  o f  R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s  a n d  t h e  S i g n i f i c a n c e
S i g n s ................................................................................................................................................................................2 7 1
xix
LIST OF F IGURE S
F i g u r e  1 .1 : S t r u c t u r e  o f  T h e s i s ............................................................................................................................ 1 4
F i g u r e  3.1: A gency  Th e o r y  O v er v i e w . ...........................................................................................................................33
F i g u r e  3 .2:  T i e r e d  Co r p o r a t e  I n f o r m a t i o n : C o n t e n t  a n d  A c c e s s .............................................4 6
F i g u r e  5 .1 : A  M o d e l  f o r  D i s c l o s u r e  E v a l u a t i o n .................................................................................. 1 2 4
XX
C H A P T E R  1 : I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 Introduction
Globalisation's rapid advance has had a profound influence on the economic position of all 
countries. New m arkets and wealth have been created in developing economies through the 
attraction of global mobile capital to such developing markets. In addition, there have been 
significant increases in investm ents in corporations and stock markets, particularly in newly 
established stock markets. This has caused a growth in capital m arkets worldwide and led to 
an increasing need for adequate financial reporting. The financial reporting system in any 
country is a reflection of the corporate governance in that country since transparency and 
adequate disclosure are im portant elements of the Code of Corporate Governance.
Corporations are defined as "legal entities separate from  any o f the individuals or groups who 
participate in or contribute resources to them" (Blair, 1995, p.2]. This separation between 
ownership and control leads to information asymm etry between managers and shareholders 
and the need for an adequate financial reporting system both domestically and 
internationally. Recently there have been many corporate failures in developed and 
developing economies, which have been blamed mainly on lack of disclosures and im proper 
accounting practices. W hittington (1993, p.311] stated that financial reporting is "an 
important element o f  the system o f corporate governance, and some failures o f  corporate 
governance may therefore be due to inadequate financial reports".
Inadequate financial reports reflect an information gap between the demand and supply of 
accounting information. There are a num ber of disclosure theories and models used to explain 
a company's disclosure behaviour and the needs of corporate report users. Based on agency 
theory, there is information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Financial 
reports are one of the means to reduce information asymmetry and to monitor managers. 
Recently, stew ardship and stakeholder models have been developed to explain the influence 
of various stakeholders on m anagem ent decisions to disclose information or not. A num ber of 
studies have examined the information gap in developed and developing capital markets by 
investigating the perceptions of reports ' user groups (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004b; Hodge, 
2003].
The efficacy of capital m arkets depends on sound corporate accounting and reporting 
practice. Published annual reports are one of the elements of reporting practice in an 
economy. The analysis of annual reports has become a main issue domestically and
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internationally since they are the media used by corporations to m arket themselves. 
According to Inchausti (1997, p.45), accounting information is subject to two different 
external influences: m arket pressures and pressure from regulatory bodies. Market pressure, 
such as competition, influences the quality of reporting. Also, to ensure the quality of 
reporting practices, the governm ent intervenes to force companies to provide useful 
information to m arket participants through different types of regulation. W hittington (1993) 
identified two forms of regulation: self-regulation and public sector regulation. He defined 
self-regulation as the regulation done by professional bodies in the interests of facilitating the 
work of their members, and public sector regulation as the regulation done by the 
government. However, the self-regulation approach cannot offer shareholders protection 
because it is likely to suffer from lack of enforcem ent and independence (Whittington, 1993).
Reporting practices are also determ ined by internal factors related to a company's attributes 
and corporate governance practices. A company's sector, performance, size, and type of 
auditor affect the quality of reporting systems. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.739), 
ownership by large investors influences companies' reports. Many research studies (Ang et 
ah, 2000; Hossain and Taylor, 2007b; Lakhal, 2005) have examined the impact of corporate 
governance and a company's characteristics on the quality of reporting practices.
However, the implications of results obtained from prior studies conducted in developed and 
developing countries cannot directly be generalised to listed companies in Oman because 
each economy has its unique culture and features, such as legal system, accounting standards, 
corporate governance, and enforcem ent of laws. Although Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries have a similar religion and culture, there are differences in their legal systems and 
the im plem entation and enforcem ent of laws which govern corporate governance and 
disclosure standards. Additionally, a num ber of GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain have their own accounting standards in addition to International Accounting 
Standards (IASs), whereas Oman follows IASs and does not have an accounting profession 
body. Evaluation of the quality of the financial reporting system in any country involves the 
consideration of external and internal factors. External factors are the country's environment, 
legal system, code of corporate governance, and m arket and political forces. Internal factors 
are a company's culture, internal operations, and management attitudes. In addition, an 
awareness of the im portance and usefulness of adequate reporting practices in a country is 
important. The aforem entioned factors accordingly make each country's study findings 
unique compared to others.
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The aim of this chapter is to present the context and outline of the thesis. The following 
section explains the background to the study. Section 1.3 discusses the im portance of the 
financial reporting system. Section 1.4 reveals the purpose of the study. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 
focus on the contributions and justifications for the study, respectively. The research 
methodology is detailed in section 1.7. Section 1.8 presents the research questions. The final 
section outlines the structure of the thesis.
1.2 Background to the Study
During 1998, the GCC countries, including Oman, were adversely affected by the Asian 
financial crisis. In Oman there was a decline in oil prices which, in turn, affected the growth of 
non-oil activities and overall economic growth. According to Chabrier (1998), Middle East 
countries faced vulnerabilities similar to those in Asian countries: overly rigid exchange rate 
pegs, weakness in regulations and supervision of financial systems, and insufficient 
transparency. Sugisaki (1998) revealed that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Interim 
Committee had suggested a num ber of mechanisms to overcome the negative consequences of 
the financial crisis in GCC countries. Two main mechanisms recom m ended by the IMF w ere to 
increase transparency and develop and dissem inate internationally accepted standards, 
including corporate governance.
In Oman, the governm ent decided on economic diversification and harm onisation with 
regional and international economic environments. A num ber of private and government 
companies also became public companies. Moreover, to ensure accountability, transparency, 
and good governance of public companies, the government restructured the capital m arket 
and established the Capital Market Authority to govern listed companies and set disclosure 
regulations. The Code of Corporate Governance was introduced in 2002 and amended in 
2003. Agency theory argues that a sound and strong capital m arket exerts pressure to orient 
corporations' decisions towards stakeholders' interests which acts as an external monitoring 
device of m anagem ent actions (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
A num ber of theories discuss problems arising from the separation of ownership and control 
in public companies, such as agency, signalling, stakeholder, and m arket myopia theories. Two 
general hypotheses have been developed from these theories. First, there are differences in 
the demand and supply of accounting information because of the conflict between managers' 
and various stakeholders' interests (see disclosure models developed by Newman and 
Sansing, 1993, and Stocken and Verrecchia, 2004). Second, m anagers have discretion over 
disclosure and thus decide the level of m andatory and voluntary disclosure in corporate
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reports. This discretion leads to the problems of information asym m etry and moral hazard. 
Information asymm etry results because corporate managers have more information about 
the value of the corporation than outside investors do [Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 166), 
leading to the moral hazard problem. This problem arises when m anagers use the position of 
superior information to maximise their self-interest at the expense of investors since 
investors cannot observe the m anagers' behaviours (Beaver, 1989, p.39). Discretionary 
disclosure models present a num ber of internal and external factors that affect managers' 
decision to fully disclose or not: competition, company size, profitability, ownership structure, 
and political costs. These factors either encourage or discourage managers from fully 
disclosing information in their reports.
As global competition between capital m arkets increases, good governance and a quality 
reporting system become im portant issues for capital markets. In Oman, the subject of 
corporate governance and transparency has recently become a m atter of concern to 
regulators in the capital m arket due to some corporate failures on account of im proper 
accounting and auditing practices. Decision-makers are trying to improve the quality of 
financial reporting practices in Oman in order to become well recognised and compete among 
other capital m arkets in obtaining foreign funds. The following section highlights the 
importance of the financial reporting system..
1.3 Im p ortan ce o f  th e  F in an cia l R ep ortin g  System
A financial reporting system is a formal system for providing publicly available information 
(Thomas, 1991, p.54). There are a num ber of economic consequences of financial reporting 
practices disclosed by Beaver (1989, p.17): (1) the distribution of wealth among individuals;
(2) the allocation of risk among individuals; (3) the allocation of resources among firms; (4) 
the use of resources devoted to the production, certification, dissemination, processing, 
analysing and interpretation of financial information; and (5) the use of resources in the 
development, compliance, enforcement, and litigation of regulations.
The quality of a financial reporting system is a function of both the quality of accounting 
standards governing financial disclosure and regulatory enforcem ent or corporate application 
in an economy (Kothari, 2000, p.92). Charkham (1995, pp.360-1) contends that an adequate 
financial reporting system should contain certain elements: (1) an adequate and timely flow 
of relevant information from management, (2) reports ' users m ust be able to understand, and
(3) m ust be in a position to influence and willing to exert influence. Additionally, Hossain and
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Taylor (2007a) argue that disclosure depends on m anagement attitudes and the financial 
reporting environment.
An efficient reporting system is an im portant prerequisite for a good corporate governance 
system. Belkaoui (1988, p.173) claims that rate of growth and development of a nation's 
economy in both the private and public sector is tied to a certain extent to the adequacy of the 
accounting system and the accounting development process in th a t country. According to this 
view, an adequate financial reporting system is crucial for the economic growth and 
development of emerging markets. However, Whittington (1993, p.313) argues that three 
systematic problems might affect a country's corporate governance practice: (1) imperfection 
in the financial reporting process which will lead to imperfection in the effectiveness of the 
corporate governance system; (2) failure in the monitoring process by shareholders; and (3) 
monitoring costs. The above-mentioned problem s dem onstrate a financial reporting system 's 
impact on the quality of corporate governance practices in a country.
A major line of research investigated the perceptions of the users and preparers of the 
corporate report with regard to the quality of disclosed information (Benjamin and Stanga, 
1977; Cooke, 1989; Wallace, 1988; Collett and Hrasky, 2005). These studies revealed an 
information gap betw een w hat repo rt users perceive to be im portant and w hat companies 
disclose in their reports.
Another major line of research investigated the influence of a company's attributes and 
corporate governance practices on corporate disclosure. Such research showed that the 
extent of disclosure was strongly correlated with a company's size, profitability, listing status, 
audit committee, and ownership structure (Owusu-Ansah, 2005). La Porta etal. (1999) also 
found that the dom inant form of controlling ownership in the world is by families and that 
dispersion of ow nership is associated with good shareholder protection. This emphasises the 
im portant role of adequate financial reporting system in ensuring good corporate governance 
practices and thus the quality of the capital market.
As the securities m arket grows, the need for adequate financial reporting systems and thus a 
sound corporate governance code becomes greater. Also, the need to understand the demand 
and supply of information in an economy becomes essential in order to set appropriate 
regulations and disclosure requirem ents, especially in developing markets.
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1.4 Purposes o f the Study
The main purpose of this research is to investigate financial reporting practice in Oman. It 
aims to ascertain the informational needs of annual reports' users and w hether the preparers 
of corporate reports are aw are of those needs. Also, the current study investigates the 
differences in perceptions of various auditor groups (i.e. Big four, international affiliated, 
local) of reporting objectives and system. In addition, this research empirically examines the 
factors that affect the quality and extent of disclosure in Omani annual reports. In particular, 
the study analyses company attributes such as size, performance, liquidity, gearing level, 
industry, auditor type and ow nership structure, and correlates them with the levels of 
disclosure. The objectives of this study are therefore:
1. To identify the informational needs of corporate report users by investigating the 
perceptions of individual investors, institutional investors, financial analysts, 
governm ent representatives, regulators, accountants, and auditors of reporting 
objectives and the im portance of information sources, annual report sections, and a list 
of voluntary disclosures through a questionnaire survey and interviews.
2. To discover differences in perceptions of various auditor groups regarding reporting 
objectives and the im portance of information sources, annual report sections, and a list 
of voluntary disclosures through a questionnaire survey.
3. To identify professional users' views of the importance of a list of m andatory 
disclosures through a questionnaire survey and interviews.
4. To m easure the extent of both m andatory and voluntary disclosure of Omani listed 
companies and w hether the current disclosure reflects users' needs through statistical 
analysis of secondary data.
5. To m easure the correlation betw een m andatory and voluntary disclosures in Omani 
annual reports through statistical analysis of secondary data.
6. To identify which factors (i.e. size, performance, liquidity, gearing level, industry, 
auditor type and ownership structure) determ ine the levels of aggregate disclosure of 
Omani listed companies through statistical analysis of secondary data.
The results of this study will help corporate managers concentrate on the information 
demanded by various annual report users and thus improve the quality of their annual 
reports. Moreover, this study will enable regulators and managers to perceive actual levels of 
disclosure in annual reports. As for investors, they will be able to discern any information gap 
between their needs and w hat is actually currently disclosed in Omani reports. This study will 
also help investors to invest in companies that have certain attributes which could produce
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higher returns. The study's findings will help regulators identify the information gap in 
current reports and thus improve disclosure requirem ents. Further, this study's results may 
be used by decision-makers to improve the overall reporting system in Oman.
1.5 Contributions o f the Study
In Oman, since the capital m arket is faced with increasing competition from both regional and 
foreign capital markets, there is an urgent need to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the rules governing the securities m arket and the reporting system in order to gain a 
competitive edge and attract foreign funds. Corporate reports will have to be made 
transparent and provided on a timely basis in order for various stakeholders to make 
appropriate decisions. Also, disclosure levels will have to come up to the standards that are 
accepted by global capital markets. This will lead to efficient and effective corporate 
governance and investor protection practices. A comprehensive study of the current annual 
corporate report situation in Oman is therefore necessary and will contribute to the 
accounting literature since it will be the first of its kind to be conducted in the country.
An examination of the perceptions of corporate report user groups and m easurem ent of the 
extent of disclosure in Omani corporate reports is im portant for the following reasons. First, 
the rules governing financial reporting practice in Oman's Securities Market are still 
developing and progressing since the Code of Corporate Governance was only recently 
introduced in Oman. The role of the reporting system in the investm ent decision process is 
therefore important.
Second, as in o ther emerging m arkets, listed companies in Oman face global competition 
when attem pting to attract foreign investments. In order to raise reporting standards and 
thus the efficiency of Oman's capital market, an examination of the actual extent of disclosure 
in reports and the perceptions of reports ' users will help regulators make appropriate 
adjustments in regulations governing the reporting system.
Third, because the Omani capital m arket is not well developed, there is no benchm ark for the 
minimum disclosure levels with which regulators and companies' stakeholders can compare 
current levels of disclosure and thus determ ine the quality of annual reports. This study's 
findings may be used by regulators to set this benchm ark and also help various interested 
parties to get to know the status of the reporting system in Oman compared to that in other 
developed and developing capital markets.
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Fourth, the study investigates the perceptions of m ost of the parties involved in the financial 
reporting system, such as regulators, preparers, and users, including governm ent 
representatives and auditors. Few prior studies (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004b; Wallace 
1988) have investigated the perceptions of governm ent officials, however, in the case of Oman 
it is a necessity because governm ent plays an im portant role in the securities m arket as a 
major shareholder. Moreover, this study's findings will help regulators see similarities and 
differences in the views of various parties and thus consider these views in their setting of 
disclosure requirem ents.
Fifth, this study investigates the perceptions of various auditor groups with regard to the 
quality of financial reporting. This study examines the views of auditors from the Big four 
audit firms, international affiliated and local audit firms. In Oman, listed companies are 
required to be audited by registered firms; Big four and international affiliated audit firms. 
Therefore, investigating similarities and differences in the views of various auditors will 
reveal the quality of published annual reports since they prepare and audit Omani annual 
reports. It will also help regulators assess their term s and rules for registering auditing firms. 
Moreover, the perceptions of various parties will reflect the reality and convey an accurate 
picture of capital m arket transactions and be more reliable th a t statistical m easures of 
different company attributes. Prior studies have focused only on the impact of audit firm size 
on the extent of disclosure.
Sixth, the study investigates the perceptions of various parties of the im portance and the 
nature of the information included in the management discussion and analysis report 
(MD&A). Previous research (Barron and Kile, 1999) has m easured the importance of the 
MD&A report from the perceptions of only professional user groups. This is the first study in a 
GCC and Middle East country to m easure the importance of the MD&A report. This study 
reports similarities and differences between reports' user groups. An examination of the 
importance of information disclosed in the MD&A report is essential because Omani listed 
companies are required to disclose this section in their annual reports. The findings of this 
research will help regulators and managers assess the quality of current MD&A disclosure and 
consider other parties' views as to w hether or not to increase the quantity of information in 
this report.
Seventh, listed companies in Oman are required to disclose the corporate governance report 
in their annual reports. They are also required to audit this report in order to ensure 
companies' compliance with the code of corporate governance. Investigating the importance
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of the information disclosed in the corporate governance report is therefore worthwhile. 
Since regulators set minimum disclosure requirem ents w ithout investigating other parties' 
views of the usefulness of these requirem ents, any similarities or differences in the 
perceptions of regulators and other parties should be of interest.
Eighth, this study investigates the internal and external factors that impact on the level of 
disclosure in Omani annual reports through statistical analysis and interviews. Interview 
findings will help interested parties to better understand the views of other parties. Moreover, 
they will help regulators to understand the internal and external determ inants of 
management motives for the disclosure of m andatory and voluntary information.
Also, this study's findings may be used to explain some companies' non-disclosure because of 
competitive disadvantage since the listed companies compete w ith unlisted companies in the 
same industry. Finally, study results may provide investors, managers, and regulators with 
valuable information that can be utilised to produce optimal disclosure policies. In Oman 
there is a lack of communication between regulators and m arket participants regarding the 
applicability of disclosure requirem ents to listed companies and w hether such requirem ents 
are in the best interests of these companies or not. Accordingly, this study may contribute to 
the harm onisation of interested parties' efforts to establish good corporate governance 
practices and a high quality reporting system.
1.6 Justifications for the Study
Corporate annual reports play an active role in the growth and development of capital 
markets and the overall economy of a country. Therefore, attention paid to the quality of 
Oman's financial reporting system is extremely im portant because it contributes to the 
development and success of the capital m arket in order to compete with developed markets.
Financial reporting system restructures in Oman have commenced recently as part of the 
overall program m e of developing an efficient capital market. This is in order to attract foreign 
funds and become well recognised among global capital markets. Regulators require 
companies to follow International Accounting Standards (IASs) w ithout considering these 
standards' applicability to Omani listed companies. Therefore, more disclosure rules are 
required to regulate business transactions that are unique to the Omani culture. Moreover, 
there is an increasing move tow ards privatisation in Oman. As the num ber of listed companies 
increases, the need for efficient and effective disclosure requirem ents becomes greater in 
order to satisfy the needs of various stakeholders.
Although the corporate governance code has been effectively applied in Oman, companies are 
still operated in the traditional ways, in that they focus more on satisfying major shareholders 
and try  to increase their welfare. In Oman, m ost listed companies are owned and controlled 
by families, large institutional investors, and government. Regulators try to protect minority 
shareholders through the investor protection law that states th a t internal trading of 
information is not allowed and tha t all information should be published to all shareholders. 
Because the Omani capital m arket is in the development stage, many disclosure issues still 
need to be addressed. There is a growing need for adequate financial reporting and high 
quality annual reports to a ttract foreign investm ents and obtain foreign financing. A listed 
company's annual reports are considered the w indow through which foreign and domestic 
investors can assess and evaluate the success of that company. The Capital Market Authority 
in Oman is faced with the challenge of ensuring listed companies produce high quality reports. 
This will only be successfully achieved over time and through research.
This study notes the absence of empirical investigation of the information needs of various 
m arket participants, the extent of disclosure in corporate annual reports, and the effects of 
internal and external factors on disclosure levels in Oman, and attem pts to provide such 
missing empirical findings. Few studies conducted in Oman have explored the impact of 
different corporate governance aspects on companies' disclosure and share price and 
companies' compliance with IASs (Shankaraiah and Dabbeeru, 2002; Al-Busaidi, 2005). This is 
the first study in Oman to attem pt to investigate the perceptions of various parties, including 
auditors. It also m easures the compliance of companies with domestic m andatory disclosures 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Additionally, it empirically examines 
the impact of a company's attributes on the level of disclosure and stakeholders' perceptions 
of the internal and external factors that impact on disclosure levels. If there is evidence that 
there is an information gap betw een the demand and supply of corporate information, this 
suggests that regulators should aim at changing and improving disclosure requirem ents. 
Moreover, if there is evidence th a t companies comply only with the minimum disclosure 
requirem ents and do not provide voluntary information, this intim ates that regulators should 
m onitor auditing practices in Oman because auditors play an im portant role in preparing 
Omani annual reports and thus affect the quality of financial reporting.
1.7 Research M ethodology
This study was carried out in three stages. However, before carrying out the first stage, the 
literature review on report users' perceptions of the importance of annual report sections and
objectives was reviewed and the main annual report sections w ere identified. The literature 
on the extent of disclosure was also reviewed and seven factors were identified: company 
size, ownership structure, performance, liquidity, gearing level, type of auditor, and industry 
type. In order to achieve the first and second objectives of the thesis, prim ary data analysis 
was carried out in the first stage in the form of a questionnaire survey adm inistered to 405 
users and 95 auditors of corporate reports. Many prior studies had used a questionnaire 
survey, for example, Firth (1978), Anderson (1981), Abu-Nassar and Rutherford (1996), and 
Solomon etal. (2002). The sampled respondents w ere selected from different sources, such as 
trading halls, annual shareholders' guide, the Capital Market Authority, brokerage companies, 
and auditing firms. Descriptive statistics and non-param etric tests w ere used to measure the 
different responses.
In order to m easure the quality of disclosure in Omani annual reports, secondary data 
analysis was carried out during the second research stage, as in previous studies by 
researchers including Cooke (1989) and Hooks et al. (2002). In this stage, two issues were 
measured: (1) the level of m andatory and voluntary disclosure in Omani annual reports, and
(2) the effect of seven company attributes on the extent of disclosure. A sample of 111 annual 
reports of Omani listed companies for the year 2004 was collected from the Muscat Securities 
Market website. Other information relating to the sampled companies, such as registered 
auditing firms, was collected from the Muscat Securities Market shareholders' guide (2005). 
To measure the level of m andatory and voluntary disclosure in Omani annual reports, 
descriptive statistical analyses w ere undertaken. The seven main company attributes 
identified acted as independent variables, w ere then regressed against levels of m andatory 
disclosure, voluntary disclosure, and overall disclosure, namely: total assets, m arket 
capitalisation, return  on equity (ROE), current ratio, debt ratio, industry, type of auditor, 
percentage of shares held by major shareholders owning 10% or more, percentage of shares 
held by minority shareholders, percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders, 
percentage of shares held by governm ent institutions, and percentage of shares held by 
foreign investors. Descriptive analyses w ere undertaken for all dependent and independent 
variables, and correlations w ere identified betw een the variables. Then linear regression 
analysis was used to estim ate the coefficient and the direction of relationships between the 
dependent variable and independent variables in each of the disclosure models.
To provide a better understanding of the financial reporting environm ent in Oman, interviews 
were carried out in the third stage of the research with 27 professional users of corporate 
reports. Interviewees w ere selected from questionnaire respondents who were willing to be
11
contacted further. Interviews w ere used as an explanatory methodology to illuminate 
questionnaire findings and annual report analyses.
1.8 The Research's Questions.
In light of the stated nature, purposes and objectives of the research, the following questions 
were formulated to better understand the needs of various users of reports, to help the author 
discover the levels of disclosure in Omani reports, to identify the factors that affect disclosure 
levels in order to improve the reporting system in Oman, and to help regulators formulate 
policies suitable and applicable to the Omani business environment:
1. W hat are the perceptions of annual reports' user groups of the objective of financial 
reporting in Oman?
2. W hat are the perceptions of reports ' user groups of the im portance of different 
sources of information in making investm ent decisions in Oman?
3. W hat are the perceptions of reports ' user groups of the im portance of Omani annual 
reports ' sections in the decision-making process?
4. W hat are the perceptions of reports ' user groups of the usefulness and nature of 
information provided in the m anagem ent discussion and analysis report when 
making investm ent decisions in Oman?
5. W hat are the perceptions of reports ' user groups of the extent of information 
disclosed in the corporate governance report in order to achieve the code of 
corporate governance?
6. W hat are the perceptions of reports ' user groups of the im portance of information 
disclosed in the corporate governance report in making investm ent decisions in 
Oman?
7. W hat are the perceptions of reports' users of the im portance of a list of voluntary 
information in making investm ent decisions in Oman?
8. W hat are the perceptions of auditor groups of the purpose of reporting and the 
im portance of various information sources, annual reports' sections, management 
discussion and analysis report, corporate governance report, achievement of the 
code of corporate governance, and a list of voluntary disclosure items?
9. W hat are the perceptions of professional user groups of the im portance of a list of 
m andatory disclosure requirem ents in making investm ent decisions in Oman?
10. To w hat extent do Omani listed companies comply with m andatory disclosure 
requirem ents set by the Capital Market Authority in their annual reports?
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11. To w hat extent do Omani listed companies disclose additional information in their 
annual reports?
12. Do Omani listed companies' current m andatory and voluntary disclosure practices in 
annual reports reflect users' needs?
13. Do Omani companies' m andatory and voluntary disclosure practices correlate 
significantly with each other?
14. W hat are the effects of seven company's attributes, namely, size, performance, 
liquidity, gearing level, ownership structure, type of auditor and industry, on the 
current level of disclosure in Omani annual reports?
1.9 Outline of the Thesis
The thesis consists of eleven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study's background, 
objectives, contribution, research questions, and methodology. In Chapter 2, an overview of 
the Omani economy, capital m arket and financial reporting system is presented. Chapter 3 
contains disclosure theories and models on the determ inants of the financial reporting 
system. The usefulness of annual reports as a whole, and the im portance of a list of 
information items are discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 also reviews the literature on 
disclosure indices' studies. Chapter 5 explains the developm ent of the research questions and 
hypotheses.
Chapter 6 focuses on the study methodology, which consists of three parts: (1] the 
questionnaire survey, (2) secondary data collection, and [3] sem i-structured interviews. In 
Chapter 7, questionnaire survey findings based on hypotheses developed with respect to 
reports' users' perceptions are presented. Chapter 8 explains secondary data analysis findings 
pertaining to the level of m andatory and voluntary disclosure and the correlations between 
these disclosures. Chapter 9 presents findings in respect of disclosure regression models and 
the correlation among dependent and independent variables. The analyses of interviewees' 
responses are presented in Chapter 10. Chapter 11 concludes the study, presenting a 
summary of the study's results, the implications for theory and practice, the study's 
limitations and suggestions for further research. Figure 1.1 illustrates the structure of the 
thesis.
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Figure 1.1: Structure o f  Thesis.
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C H A P T E R  2 : T H E  O M A N I  E C O N O M Y ,  C A P I T A L  M A R K E T  A N D
F I N A N C I A L  R E P O R T I N G  S Y S T E M
2.1 Introduction
Oman is a 1,000-mile-long (1,700-km] coastal plain at the south-eastern tip of the Arabian 
Peninsula lying on the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman. It is the second largest country in 
Arabia; with an area of 300,000 square km. Muscat is the capital of Oman, w here 55% of the 
population lives. The total population in Oman was 2.5mn at the end of 2005, w ith 33.4% of 
the population below the age of 14 and 83% below the age of 39 years (Global Investment 
House, 2006b]. The country is divided into 59 districts (Wilayats] which are divided into eight 
regions. Its currency is the Omani Rial (OMR].
The following section describes the Omani economy while section 2.3 discusses the legal 
system in Oman. Section 2.4 highlights the Omani Securities Market. Regulations governing 
the financial reporting system in Oman are detailed in Section 2.5 and section 2.6 explains the 
special features of the Omani Securities Market. Section 2.7 summ arises and concludes the 
chapter.
2.2 Oman as an Emerging Economy
Oman enjoys a stable political, economic and social system, which is enhanced by the excellent 
relationships betw een the Sultanate and neighbouring countries. His Majesty, Sultan Qaboos, 
encourages m arket-oriented policies and private sector development as the mechanism for 
prosperity and growth (Ministry of Information, 2002].
Oman's prim ary economic sources are services (54.8%], oil and gas (42.1%], and agriculture 
(3.1%]. Oman became a m em ber of the World Trade Organisation in 2002. Consequently, it 
has been continually amending its financial and commercial practices to comply with 
international standards. Gross Domestic Product was $11.8 billion in 2005. The Omani 
economy depends on revenues from the following sectors: (1] petroleum, (2] gas, (3] 
agriculture and fishing, (4] industrial, (5] services, (6] telecom, (7] tourism, (8] banking, (9] 
insurance, and (10] real estate.
The Omani economy also depends on the foreign investment. In 2005, the foreign investm ent 
reached a total of RO. 1, 126,400,000. Overall there are 6 main countries that invest in and 
contribute to the Omani economy: (1] UK, (2] USA, (3] India, (4] Netherlands, (5] United Arab
Emirates, (6) France, and (7) others. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present the foreign investments by 
industry and country of origin, respectively, for years 2004 and 2005.
TABLE 2.1: Forign Investment By Industry (Relative Share%)
' Oil and Gas ' 46.4 45.0
Financial Intermediation 14.5 15.3
j * Utility and Construction 8.4 10.0
Trade 3.8 4.3
f  Manufacturing
iSk,...- - , . . . ... - :
18.0 15.3
Real Estate 3.6 2.7
' Other ' 5.4 ' ' ' ' '
Total 100.0 100.0
* Source: Ministry of National Economy and Ministry of Commerce and Industry (2007:19)
TABLE 2.2: Foreign Investment By Country Of Origin (Relative Share %)
UK 35.5 41.3
UAS 9.4 10.6
r India 7.2 8.0
Netherlands 5.3 4.9
United Arab Emirates 14.6 8.0
France 3.5 3.4
Others 24.5 23.8
Total 100.0 100.0
. Source: Ministry of National Economy and Ministry of Commerce and Industry (2007: 22)
The Omani governm ent is moving tow ards privatising its utilities and is trying to reduce 
unemployment by encouraging the replacem ent of expatriate w orkers with local people. This 
process is known as Omanisation. The governm ent is also placing greater emphasis on 
tourism and liquid natural gas. The total labour force had increased from 0.3mn in 1980 to
0.66mn in 2005 (Global Investm ent House, 2006b). By 2020, Oman is expected to have 
financial stability, more private sector participation, a diversified economic base, a well skilled 
Omani workforce and a global economy.
According to the Institute of International Finance (2006b), Oman has fairly limited oil 
resources com pared to other countries in the region and has been recently diversifying its 
economic base, developing the private sector and creating employment for the rapidly
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growing local workforce. Oman was the second GCC country after Bahrain to sign a free trade 
agreement with the United States (IIF, 2006b), which will expand trade with the United States 
and benefit the Omani economy.
2.3 Legal System in Oman
The basis for all laws in Oman is Sharia law. In addition, separate bodies have been 
established to deal w ith m atters, such as arbitration in commercial disputes (where Sharia 
law cannot be applied) (Ministry of Information, 2002). In the Omani legal system there are 
four types of court: (1) Supreme Court; (2) Appeal Court; (3) Preliminary Court; and (4) 
Courts of Summary Jurisdiction (Ministry of Information, 2002). The Majlis Al-Shura is the 
Council of Oman which provides a force for political and social stability, while at the same 
time guaranteeing the rights and freedom of individuals.
2.3.1 Oman's Business Environment
The business environm ent in Oman is regulated by a num ber of governmental bodies. These 
are the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
the Ministry of Economy, the Central Bank of Oman, the Oman Development Bank and the 
Muscat Securities Market. The objectives of these main governmental bodies are discussed 
below.
2.3 .1 .1  M in istry  o f  C om m erce an d  in d u stry
The Ministry was established by Royal Decree num ber 40 /74  in 1974. It consists of 6 
departments, namely, tourism, industry, commerce, minerals, planning, and standards and 
specifications. It is responsible for regulating companies through the Commercial Companies 
Law.
2.3.1.2 Oman Chamber of Commerce Industry
The Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) was established by Royal Decree on 15 
May 1973, in order to stimulate the country's economic activity by active and continuous 
participation in the im plem entation of various development plans aimed at diversifying the 
inflow sources of the national income. The OCCI provides a num ber of services to industry and 
government, such as up-to-date information and accurate data based on research, thus 
creating an aw areness of quality, the economic and industrial environment, and consumer 
protection.
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2.3.1.3 Central Bank of Oman
The Central Bank of Oman was established by Royal Decree in December 1974 with 
provisions defined in the Banking Law of 1974 to promote m onetary and financial stability, 
foster a sound and progressive financial sector, and achieve sustained economic growth for 
the benefit of the nation. Over the years, the Central Bank of Oman has developed a regulatory 
framework, which aims to prom ote a sound banking system. It acts as the depositary agency 
for the governm ent of the Sultanate of Oman.
2.3.1.4 Oman D evelopm ent Bank
The Oman Development Bank is an Omani shareholding company established under Royal 
Decree No. 18/97. This bank provides financial assistance to small and medium projects in the 
fields of industiy, agriculture, animal resources, fisheries, tourism, and education. Its main 
sources of funds are international borrowing, government loans and equity. It also manages 
grants and loans from the governm ent to craftsmen.
2.4 Omani Securities Market
The first Omani joint stock company was established during the period 1971-1981 in an 
unregulated market. During that period, the absence of a regulated m arket resulted in 
negative practices: (1} brokers and speculators controlled prices for their interest, (2) there 
was a lack of information concerning the position of companies, (3) media organs did not 
publish share prices, and (4} there was injustice and harm to one party of a transaction as the 
other possessed and benefited from information (MSM, 2001, p.5).
In order to keep pace with international developments and to achieve the government's vision 
of a solid economy recognised internationally it was necessary to have a strong financial 
sector based on well-established financial firms. Therefore, a stock exchange called the 
Muscat Securities Market (MSM) was set up according to Royal Decree 53/88  issued on 21 
June 1988. The decree set the legal fram ework for the establishm ent of the m arket as an 
independent organisation to regulate and control the Omani Securities Market and to 
participate with other organisations in setting up the infrastructure of the Sultanate's 
financial sector. The first day of regulated securities trading in Oman started with the trading 
of a generous Royal grant as His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said issued directives to purchase 
shares in joint stock companies in the interests of charitable organisations in Oman. That was 
a unique event not only in the history of the MSM but also in the history of securities m arkets 
all over the world (MSM, 2001, p.8-9).
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After the capital m arket crisis in 1998, the MSM was restructured to afford more protection to 
investors by issuance of Royal Decrees 80 /98  and 82/98. Royal Decree 80/98, dated 9 
November 1998, issued the new Capital Market Law which provided for the establishm ent of 
three separate entities: the Capital Market Authority, Muscat Securities Market, and the 
Muscat Depository and Securities Registration Company.
2.4.1 Capital Market Authority (CMA)
The Capital Market Authority is a governmental authority which aims at enhancing the 
efficiency of the capital market, regulating its processes, establishing the professional code of 
conduct and discipline among all dealers in securities. Its main tasks are organising, licensing, 
and monitoring the issue and trading of securities. It also supervises the operations of the 
MSM, the Muscat Depository and Securities Registration Company, and all companies 
operating in the securities field (MSM, 2001]. As a continuing process in the development of 
the securities market, the Capital Market Authority has developed a website to provide 
information and financial data related to the performance of the Muscat Securities Market and 
all listed companies directly to investors.
2.4.2 Muscat Securities Market (MSM)
The Muscat Securities Market (MSM) is an exchange where all listed securities are traded. The 
exchange is a governmental entity, financially and administratively independent from the 
authority but subject to its supervision. The board of directors is elected from among 
members of public (governmental commercially oriented) corporations, listed companies, 
intermediaries, and the Central Bank of Oman. The MSM undertakes the following activities: 
(1) registering and trading securities; (2) settling transactions; (3) publishing trading 
information and data. Securities are traded in the prim ary and secondary markets. These 
securities are shares, bonds issued by joint stock companies, bonds issued by the government, 
treasury bonds and bills. The secondary m arket is divided into three sub-markets: regular, 
parallel, and third markets. Currently, there are 165 listed companies in the MSM with 15 
authorised brokerage firms. The companies are divided into three sectors: services, banking, 
insurance and industrial. Table 2.3 presents the investm ents in each of the above sectors by 
Omanis and non-Omanis in the year 2004.
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TABLE 2.3: Investments In Omani Sectors (Relatives Share %)
Sector Omanis GCC Citizens Other Arabs Foreigners Total
|^BpdcesN. / 72.46 10.99 0.99 15.56 100
Banks 83.90 8.54 0.31 7.25 100
< Insurance 88.02 11.08 0.18 0.72 100
Industry 88.20 8.65 0.97 2.18 100
*Source: Capital Market Authority (2005)
2.4.2.1 Features of Muscat Securities Market
The Omani stock m arket works as per the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) and G30 recom m endations.1 It has an electronic trading system that 
allows for the execution of purchasing orders that are made in rem ote places and achieves 
justice and transparency in transactions. There are trading screens through Reuters' news 
agency and an MSM website on the Internet. In the MSM, foreign investors can invest in listed 
companies or investm ent funds w ithout prior permission. However, the percentage of foreign 
investment is low compared to the Omani investm ents (see Table 2.3). There are a num ber of 
reasons behind these low percentages as stated by Al-Anani (2007): (1) the liquidity of the 
capital m arket is less compared to other GCC markets, (2) low activity of the prim ary market,
(3) concentration of ownerships, and (4) few companies traded daily vary from 40 to 50 
companies. Moreover, short-term  investments and low levels of disclosure and transparency 
in corporate annual reports are considered as the main obstacles to attract foreign investm ent 
in Oman and other GCC m arkets (Al-Talib, 2007).
2.4.3 Muscat D epository and Securities Registration Company
Royal Decree 82/98 , dated 25 November 1998, established the Muscat Depository and 
Securities Registration Company as a closed joint stock company. This company is the sole 
provider, in the Sultanate, of the services of registration and transfer of ownership of 
securities and safe keeping of ownership documents (depository). It is linked through an 
electronic system to the MSM for easy data transfer.
1 G30 stands for Group of Thiry that was established in 1978as a private, non-profit, international body composed of 
very senior representatives of private and public sectors and academia. The recommendations involve: 1) trade 
comparison on trade date plus 1; 2) trade comparison for indirect participants; 3) central depository; 4) netting; 5) 
delivery versus payment; 6) same day funds; 7) trade date plus three rolling settlement; 8) securities lending; 9)use of 
ISO standards 7775 and 6166.
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2.5 Regulations Governing the Financial Reporting System in Oman
There are regulations2 governing the financial reporting system in Oman depending on the 
form of business. Each business type has its own establishm ent regulations and reporting 
regulations. This research focuses on listed companies and thus is concerned with regulations 
governing such businesses and their disclosures. The following sub-sections are the 
regulations governing the business structure and reporting system of listed companies.
Omani companies are required by the Royal Decree NO. 53 of 1996 to prepare their financial 
statem ents in accordance with IASs. The first law to regulate the accounting and auditing 
system in Oman was issued by the Royal Decree NO. 77 of 1976 and then amended by Royal 
Decree NO. 21 of 1988. Regarding the audit profession in Oman, the first audit law was issued 
in 1985 and then am ended in 1989. Per this law, listed companies should have at least one 
auditor who shall be appointed by the ordinary general meeting and shall be persons licensed 
to practice accountancy and auditing profession in accordance with the provisions of the law. 
The auditors shall ascertain that the balance sheet and profit and loss statem ent conform to 
the books and records of the company and those books are kept in conformity with the 
generally accepted principles of accounting.
For listed companies, there are two main disclosure standards. The first requires companies 
to prepare financial statem ents in accordance with International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS)/ International Accounting Standards. These statem ents shall include all 
required information to fairly reflect the financial position of the company and its 
performance during the relevant financial period. Any changes in the accounting policies of 
the company shall be disclosed in the financial statements. Also, companies have to comply 
with the Capital Market Authority (CMA) disclosure requirem ents. The second standard states 
that where there is a conflict between any of the IFRS/IAS and the legislation applicable in 
Oman, the legislation of Oman and the requirem ents set out by CMA shall prevail and the 
company shall disclose such conflict and its impact on the financial statements.
2.5.1 General Regulations of Business Forms and Structure
There are different forms of business in Oman, which are regulated by the different 
governmental bodies discussed above and companies' law. As previously mentioned, only 
those laws governing listed companies are discussed in detail.
2 Regulations: Commercial Companies Law, Capital Market Law, and Oman Central Bank Law.
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2.5.1.1 The Commercial Companies Law (4 /1 9 7 4 )
The Commercial Companies Law was published in the Official Gazette Supplement No. (56) 
issued in 1974 and has been amended several times. It defines five business forms and 
structures in Oman: general partnership, limited partnership, joint stock companies, limited 
liability companies, and joint venture (IPR, 1999). All Omani companies are regulated by the 
Commercial Companies Law. However, listed companies have to comply with both the 
Commercial Companies Law and the Capital Market Authority Law. The financial year of 
companies corresponds to the calendar year.
2.5.1.1.1 Joint Stock Company
A Joint Stock Company should not be established w ithout the authorisation of the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, who m ust also approve the company's m em orandum  and articles of 
association. The capital should not be less than 500 thousand Omani Riyals for companies that 
are not offering their shares for public subscription and not less than 2 million Omani Riyals 
for companies offering their shares for public subscription. The nominal value of each share 
should not be less than O.R. 1. All joint stock companies are required by MSM Law to be 
members of the Muscat Securities Market. In addition, the Commercial Companies Law 
requires joint stock companies with capital in excess of O.R. 500,000, or companies that 
increase their capital, to offer at least 40% and no more than 70% of their shares to the Omani 
public. The liability of shareholders is confined to the nominal value of their shares in the 
registered capital.
2.5.1.1.2 Rules Governing the Invitation to Subscribe to a Joint Stock Company
The invitation to subscribe m ust be announced in two daily new spapers after the approval of 
the issue by the Capital Market Authority. The subscription m ust remain open for 30 days, and 
is renewable for a period not exceeding further 30 days, with the approval of the Capital 
Market Authority.
2.5.1.1.3 Investors' Rights
The CMA (2005) states that the ultimate authority in a public joint stock company lies with its 
shareholders. Shareholders should monitor the company's performance through financial 
statements, contact its m anagem ent in order to keep abreast of development, attend general 
meetings, take part in voting and decision-making and discuss with directors all aspects of the 
company's business and results (CMA, 2005). There are a num ber of rights to which 
shareholders are eligible. One is access to the financial statem ents of the company and board
of directors and auditors' reports during business hours at the company's location. A 
shareholder has the right to sue m em bers of the board of directors for damage caused by their 
illegal acts or by any fraud or negligence in the performance of their duties. If the case is 
successful, the shareholder should be reim bursed for legal costs and expenses from the sums 
adjudged and any balance should be paid to the company. Shareholders also have the right to 
request the court to annul any resolution of the general meeting if it infringes the company's 
law or articles of association or internal regulations (CMA, 2005].
2.5.1.1.4 Rules Governing the Preparation of Annual Reports of Joint Stock Companies
The board of a joint stock company should prepare the balance sheet and the profit and loss 
account after audit within three m onths from the end of the financial year. Copies should then 
be sent to the Capital Market Authority and to the Secretariat of the Commercial Register at 
least 21 days before the holding of the annual ordinary general meeting. The board should 
publish the balance sheet, the profit and loss account, and a summary of the board of 
directors' report in one of the local daily new spapers within one month from the approval of 
the above reports by the annual ordinary general meeting.
Joint stock companies should have a t least one auditor. The auditor should ensure that the 
balance sheet and the profit and loss account statem ent conforms with the company's books 
and records, and that such books are in compliance with generally accepted principles of 
accounting.
2.5.2 Stock Market Regulations
This section discusses the regulations governing the activities and disclosure of companies 
listed in the Muscat Securities Market.
2.5.2.1 Capital Market Law
The Capital Market Law was issued by Royal Decree No. 80 /98  in 1998. In 2001, the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry issued the executive regulations of the Capital Market Law (CMA, 
2005]. All listed companies are required to comply with International Accounting Standards 
and the Capital Market Law. In this section, four im portant regulations will be discussed: the 
code of corporate governance, Foreign Capital Investm ent Law, disclosure requirem ents, and 
punishment system.
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2.5.2.1.1 Code of Corporate Governance
The code of corporate governance was introduced in June 2002 and amended in 2003. It 
applies to all listed companies. The code ensures that the governance structure of public 
companies in Oman provides a basis for efficient functioning with a view to providing 
equitable treatm ent to all stakeholders. The code also maximises the value creation accruing 
to improved operational and financial performance (CMA, 2005).
The code of corporate governance discusses m andatory issues relating to the following areas: 
(1) the election of independent directors, (2) the functions of board of directors, (3) the role 
of the audit committee in the company, (4) the reporting of Management Discussion and 
Analysis to shareholders in the annual report, (5) the reporting of corporate governance 
practices in the company, (6) the auditing of the corporate governance report to certify tha t it 
is free from any m aterial m isrepresentation, (7) the rules for related party transactions, (8) a 
system for rotating auditors every 4 years, (9) the composition of the board of directors, (10) 
the adequacy of the company's internal control systems, and (11) the functions of the 
company's management.
2.5.2.1.2 Foreign Capital Investm ent Law
The Foreign Capital Investm ent Law of 1994 provides the legal fram ework within which 
foreigners may invest and carry out business in Oman (IPR, 1999).
As one of the m ost progressive countries in the Middle East, the Sultanate has worked at 
creating the right climate for new investm ents by developing a free, competitive economy 
with equal opportunities for all, and shaping regulations that encourage enterprise. IIF and 
Hawkamah (2006b) reported that Oman does not limit the foreign investm ent in companies 
whereas other GCC countries limit it in their companies. Opening the m arket to foreign 
investment is expected to improve standards in listed companies, due to higher expectations 
from foreign investors (IIF and Hawkamah, 2006a). The following are some of the reasons 
behind investm ents in Oman (CMA, 2005):
1. Tax exemptions for 5 years (sometimes renewable for a further 5 years) for industrial 
enterprises which contribute to Oman's economy.
2. Foreign investors are able to hold 49% of equity, which may be increased in mitigating 
circumstances.
3. A diverse economy which encourages privatisation of infrastructure and services.
4. Price stability, with an inflation rate of not m ore than 1% since 1992.
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5. Stable currency with full convertibility.
6. No personal income tax and no foreign exchange controls.
7. Tax and im port duty exemptions.
8. Interest free long-term loans to partly foreign owned industrial and tourism  projects.
2.5.2.1.3 D isclosure Regulations
The following are some of the disclosure rules that listed companies and funds should comply 
with in preparing financial statem ents (CMA, 2005):
1. All audited and unaudited accounts, w hether quarterly, semi-annual, or annual, m ust 
be in compliance with International Accounting Standards, and include all 
information in the proforma. Annual audited financial statem ents m ust disclose and 
explain all significant variations betw een the annual and quarterly accounts.
2. All audited and unaudited accounts m ust include, and fairly present, all material 
information, relevant to understanding the company's financial position and 
perform ance during the period. All changes in accounting policies between periods 
m ust be clearly disclosed.
3. W here the use of the proform a would clearly conflict with the requirem ents of 
International Accounting Standards, the company should inform the CMA of this 
conflict and should follow International Accounting Standards.
4. The CMA recom m ends tha t w henever the directors and officers are aware of material 
developments that may affect company results, audited or unaudited, they should 
disclose the same to the public in a fair and timely m anner pursuant to the disclosure 
rules on material information issued by the CMA. This move will deter and prevent 
illegal insider transactions based on undisclosed information.
5. Listed public joint stock companies and funds are required to disclose the statem ent 
of the first three quarters and compare them with the same period of the previous 
year. They are also required to submit and publish the unaudited financial statem ent 
for the fourth quarter to prevent use of undisclosed information and to avoid undue 
delay until the annual results are published in April, which is the time for 
dissemination of the first quarter's results.
6. The time limit for submitting unaudited accounts is 30 days from the end of the 
quarter. However, those companies which hold subsidiaries and present 
consolidated unaudited accounts may subm it these up to 45 days from the end of the 
quarter. The time limit for submitting half yearly audited accounts is 45 days.
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7. All companies are required to file their financial statem ents to the Information 
Centre of the MSM on a floppy disk together with two copies approved by the Board 
of Directors, with a signature indicating the statem ents are identical to the contents 
of the floppy disk. These shall include the directors' report and unaudited financial 
statem ents with accompanying notes. The contents of the annual report should 
include the directors' report, the corporate governance report, the auditor's report 
on the corporate governance report, the m anagem ent discussion and analysis report 
(MD&A}, and the auditor's report on the annual financial statement.
8. The financial statem ent m ust be published in two daily newspapers, one of which 
should be Arabic daily, on or before the date of filing the statem ents to the MSM. The 
published statem ents should include the balance sheet, income statem ent, and an 
adequate summ ary of the Board of Directors' report.
9. In accordance with International Accounting Standard 24 and the disclosure 
requirem ents of the CMA, the financial statem ent m ust include a separate note on 
related party transactions, w hether or not there is a balance for such transactions at 
the end of the financial year.
10. An additional separate note to the published financial statem ents m ust be provided 
during the financial period. An advertisem ent m ust be published in the daily 
new spapers informing shareholders to collect their funds within one month of the 
date of accrual.
11. Companies are requested to include a meaningful discussion of all those subjects 
mentioned in the proforma for the chairman's report, omitting to discuss only those 
subjects which are clearly not applicable to them, and also include a statem ent to the 
effect that they are in compliance with their respective internal regulations and 
control systems.
12. Companies' annual reports should contain the MD&A report, in addition to the 
directors' report. It should contain a discussion of the following matters: industry 
structure and development; opportunities and threats; analysis of segment and 
product wise performance; outlook; risks and concerns; internal control systems and 
their adequacy and a discussion on financial and operational performance.
13. There should be a separate report on corporate governance in the annual reports of 
companies, highlighting non-compliance with any requirem ent. This report should 
also contain a descriptive report of how the company has applied the principles of 
corporate governance. The company should obtain a certificate from its auditors that
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its corporate governance report is free from any material m isrepresentation. Thus 
certificate should be attached to the report.
2.5.2.1.4 Punishm ent System
There are financial penalties imposed on listed companies in the case of non-compliance with 
disclosure regulations. First, if the company failed to send all the un-audited quarterly 
financial statem ents and the accompanying report through the electronic system during the 
statutory period, it has to pay OR. 1000. Second, any deficiency in the un-audited quarterly 
financial statem ents and the accompanying report of a company sent through the electronic 
system, the company has to pay OR. 500. Third, a company's failure to send all the audited 
annual financial statem ents and the accompanying reports sent through the electronic system 
during the statu tory  period will have to pay OR. 1,500. Fourth, a company has to pay OR. 750 
in two cases: (1) deficiency in the audited annual financial statem ents and the accompanying 
notes sent through the electronic system an d /o r (2] failure to publish the audited annual 
financial statem ents and summary of directors' report in the daily newspapers during the 
statutory period. Fifth, any deficiency in the published financial statem ents will result in a 
payment of OR. 350. Finally, a company has to pay OR. 500 when there is a default in timely 
disclosure of m aterial information.
Moreover, the Capital Market Law defines a num ber of penalties that will be imposed on listed 
companies in the case of infringement of the regulations (CMA, 2005). First, any person who is 
proved to have dealings in the Market on the basis of unrevealed information or has spread 
rumours will be punished by im prisonm ent for a period of not less than three months and a 
penalty of not less than OR. 10,000 and not exceeding OR. 50,000. Second, any person who 
knowingly submits incorrect statem ents, declarations or information aiming to affect 
investors' decisions will be punished by im prisonm ent for a period of not less than three 
months and a penalty of not less than OR. 10,000 and not exceeding OR. 30,000. The same 
punishm ent will apply to members of the board of directors, staff of the company concerned, 
the auditor, the authorised signatory of the interm ediary company, and the underwriter. 
Third, any person who breaches the provisions of the Capital Market Law will be punished by 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years and a penalty of not less than OR. 5,000 
or either of these. Fourth, any person who, individually or in collusion with other persons, 
carries out any dealings in securities aiming at stabilising the value of a certain security will 
be punished by im prisonm ent for a period of not less than three months and a penalty of not 
less than OR. 3,000 and not exceeding OR. 10,000. Fifth, all the founders of a joint stock
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company, auditors and any entity tha t has participated in the preparation of the prospectus 
for a public subscription will be punished by im prisonm ent for a period not exceeding two 
years and a penalty of not less than OR. 10,000 and not exceeding OR. 50,000 or any of the 
above, if there was false information knowingly included in it. Finally, the infringing party 
may be banned from practising his business or prohibited from practising the activity, being 
the subject m atter of the offence, for a period not exceeding three years.
2.6 Special Features of the Oman Securities Market
The Omani capital m arket is one of the m ost accessible, progressive Arab stock m arkets and 
the best regulated and m ost transparen t capital m arket in the Gulf region. Indeed, the CMA 
and the MSM have achieved global recognition from many international finance organisations. 
In 1999 the Sultanate's Stock Market was included in the global index of the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). The CMA is also an active member in many international and Arab 
financial organisations.
2.6.1 Omani Market Compared to Other GCC Markets
By 2002, separation between supervisory and executive functions had only taken place in 
Oman and the UAE (Arab Monetary Fund, 2003). Other GCC countries' markets, i.e. Saudi and 
Kuwaiti markets, had not yet separated these functions. Later, Naser etal. (2005) indicated 
that 'Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait have formal well-established stock markets compared to 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Omani investors have significantly different views from those in 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait regarding economic instability. This is because Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait depend more on oil production as a major source of income than other GCC countries 
(p.285).
By the end of 2005, only Oman and Kuwait complied with GCC economic convergence criteria 
while remaining GCC countries w ere below the necessary level of foreign exchange reserves 
(IIF, 2006a). At the end of the first quarter of 2006, the Omani m arket stood above the other 
GCC m arkets in term s of year-to-date growth, with 9.8% growth registered. Market 
capitalisation at the above period was US $ 12.88bn (Global Investm ent House, 2006a). 
Among GCC markets, Omani listed companies w ere reported to have constituted 60% of the 
top regional price gainers at the end of March 2006, while Saudi companies represented 10% 
of the top regional price gainers and 100% of the top regional price losers (Global Investment 
House, 2006a).
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Global Investm ent House (2006b] reported that the MSM is more stable in term s of attractive 
valuations than other GCC markets. Also, the MSM has displayed less volatility, and is known 
for transparency and a good regulatory environm ent compared to other GCC markets. 
Although the Omani m arket lacks in liquidity, it has proved resilient to the downward trend 
being experienced in the GCC region as a whole (Global Investm ent House, 2006b].
Comparing the corporate governance framework in GCC countries, IIF and Hawkamah 
(2006b, p .l] indicated that with the exception of Oman and to a lesser extent Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, corporate governance frameworks of GCC countries do not m eet the threshold 
sought by international investors. In addition, Oman is the only GCC country with a code of 
corporate governance for listed companies (IIF and Hawkamah, 2006b; Al-Talib, 2007]. 
Moreover, Oman has an independent regulator and stock exchanges (similar to the FSA in the 
U.K.] while other GCC countries have less regulatory structures (IIF and Hawkamah, 2006b, p. 
4]. The IIF-Hawkamah survey revealed that Oman appears to have the strongest corporate 
governance fram ework in the region, with corporate governance requirem ents complying 
with 70% of the Institute of International Finance's (IIF] guidelines, followed by Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia (50%] (IIF and Hawkamah, 2006b, p.5].
Regarding the quality of enforcement, the IIF-Hawkamah survey indicated that Oman has high 
enforcement of m andatory rules, while other GCC countries have weak enforcement of laws. 
Moreover, Oman is the only GCC country which complies with all IIF guidelines with regard to 
financial disclosure and audit committees (IIF and Hawkamah, 2006b]. The IIF-Hawkamah 
survey also revealed that Oman is highest compared to other GCC countries with regard to 
compliance with accounting and auditing guidelines and board of directors' structure 
guidelines.
In summary, the IIF and Hawkamah (2006b, p.17] survey concluded that "Oman is the only 
country in the GCC to ge t an overall score o f 3.5 out o f a possible 5, the highest among GCC 
countries. The high score is attributed to Oman being the first country in the GCC to adopt a code 
o f corporate governance in 2002 and fo r  being the firs t country in the GCC to establish an 
independent capital market regulator. However, there is room fo r  further improvement in Oman. 
The corporate governance fram ework o f the country complies with roughly two-thirds o f IIF 
guidelines. An area that needs strengthening is minority shareholder protection".
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2.7 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has summ arised the economy and described the capital m arket in Oman. It has 
also explained the disclosure regulations and corporate governance practice. Oman's capital 
m arket is progressing in term s of disclosure regulations. Listed companies are following IASs 
and disclosure regulations set by the CMA. Implementation of the Code of Corporate 
Governance in Oman is the highest among GCC countries and some developing economies.
To conclude, Oman has a unique culture which affects its business environment. Moreover, 
the financial reporting system in Oman is highly rated by well recognised international 
organisations. The findings of prior studies conducted in other GCC countries cannot therefore 
be generalised to the Omani capital m arket and m arket participants, and thus the need to 
investigate the quality of Omani reports increases.
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C H A P T E R  3 :  T H E O R E T I C A L  A P P R O A C H  A N D  I M P L I C A T I O N S  OF
T H E O R I E S  A N D  M O D E L S  F O R  T H I S  S T U D Y
3.1 Introduction
Published annual reports are an im portant elem ent of stock markets. They provide useful 
information about listed companies to various groups of decision-makers, such as investors 
and creditors. But do decision-makers rely on these reports to make their decisions? This 
question has been addressed by several empirical studies that have varied in their findings as 
a result of examining different cultures, groups and variables. Another im portant question 
that has been investigated in prior studies has been the extent of disclosure in published 
reports and the causes of variation in disclosure levels. In order to address the above 
questions in the current study, the researcher used a num ber of theories: (1) agency, [2) 
signalling, (3) stew ardship, (4] m arket myopia, (5) stakeholder, to develop the hypotheses of 
this study and explain its findings. Additionally, discretionary disclosure and cheap-talk 
models were used to understand and explain the extent of disclosure in the current Omani 
annual reports. The following section discusses financial disclosure in theory while section 3.3 
focuses on theoretical disclosure models. Section 3.4 explains the importance of corporate 
financial disclosure. The implications of disclosure models for this study are discussed in 
Section 3.5, and section 3.6 summ arises and concludes the chapter.
3.2 Financial Disclosure in Theory
Accounting is created to communicate information about a certain entity. Management in 
organisations selects the appropriate accounting methods to convey information to different 
stakeholders. Because of this hum an selection, financial accounting theories have been 
developed to explain the reasons for the selection of accounting methods and the am ount of 
information disclosed to stakeholders. Through communication devices, such as annual 
reports, managers try  to influence the decisions of the public. In the current study, financial 
disclosure, m anagem ent behaviour and stakeholders' behaviours are explained within the 
context of agency, signalling, stewardship, m arket myopia, and stakeholder theories. The 
following subsections discuss the theories and disclosure models that have been used to 
establish the hypotheses in this study.
3.2.1 Agency Theory
Agency theory suggests that the separation of ownership and control in diffuse ownership 
corporations leads to agency costs because of the conflicts of interest between the principal
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and agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). An agency relationship, as defined by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p.308), is "a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making authority to the agent". They developed a theory of 
ownership structure (positive agency theory) based on work done in contracting (principal- 
agent) theory developed by Coase (1937) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972). They provided a 
new definition for the firm, stating that it is: "one form  o f legal fiction which serves as a nexus 
for contracting relationships (p.311)".
Agency theory is divided into two types of theory: principal-agent and positive agency theory. 
These theories share the unit of analysis, which are the contract and the assumptions about 
people, organisations and information. However, they differ in the mathematical rigour 
applied, dependent variables and style (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.59). Agency theory is concerned 
with resolving two problems: (1) the conflict of interests between the principal and agent as it 
is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify the agent's actions; and (2) the problem of 
risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). Spremann (1987) indicated that the reasons why principals cannot 
monitor agents are the delegation of decision-making, managerial discretion, and hidden 
characteristics.
There are two agency relationships identified by agency theory. The first is the owner- 
manager relationship, in which the m anager acts as an agent for the owner and makes 
pertinent decisions. The second is the bondholder-m anager relationship, in which the 
bondholder acts as a principal and the m anager as an agent on behalf of the owner. Thus, 
agency costs are imposed on the ow ner who will try  to limit the rights of the bondholders to 
reduce these costs and maximise his own wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Based on the 
Antle (1982, 1984) model, there is also the auditor-agent relationship in which an 
independent auditor is also an agent of the ow ner by verifying the firm's financial reports in 
return for an optimal contract.
The agency structure is applicable in a variety of settings, such as regulatory policy, 
ownership structures, voluntary disclosure and other expressions of self-interest. Figure 3.1 
presents an overview of agency theory.
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Figure 3.1: Agency Theory Overview.
Key idea Principal-agen t re la tionsh ip s should  reflect efficient o rgan isa tion
a ' •. , r .
of in fo rm ation  and  risk -bearing  costs.
~ Unit o f analysis Contract between principal and agent
Human assum ptions Self-in terest, B ounded rationality , Risk aversion.
O rganisational assum ptions . Partial goal conflict among participants
Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion
Information asymmetry between principal and agent
Inform ation assum ption In form ation  as a pu rchasab le  com m odity.
Contracting problem s Agency (moral hazard3 and adverse selection4)
• • • • - '■ - Risk sharing. >
Problem  dom ain R elationsh ips in w hich th e  principal and  ag en t have p a rtly
differing goals and  risk  p references (e.g., com pensation ,
regulation , leadersh ip , im pression  m anagem ent, w histle-b low ing,
vertical in teg ra tion , tran sfe r pricing).
Source: E isenhardt (1989:59)
The solution to the agency problem is the optimal contract between the principal and agent to 
motivate the agent to act in the best interests of the principal and share in the outcome of his 
actions (Antle, 1982; 1984; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Holmstrom, 1979; Jensen 
and Smith, 1985; Milde, 1987; Mirrlees, 1974; 1976; Penno, 1984; Ross, 1973; 1974; Spence 
and Zeckhauser, 1971; Stiglitz, 1975; Wilson, 1968]. This solution was pointed out in early 
work by Alchian and Demsetz [1972]. They defined the relationship of each team m em ber to 
the owner of the firm as a “quid pro quo" contract (p.782).
Ng (1978] investigated w hether a m anager and an owner of a firm have opposing preferences 
for alternative financial reporting m ethods using agency theory. He found the manager would 
prefer to select a method that overstates the performance and, at the same time, provides less 
information to the owner. In contrast, the ow ner would prefer a more informative reporting 
method which does not overstate the performance of the firm.
Ball and Foster (1982] discussed the various ways that shareholders can m onitor managers: 
financial statem ents, board of directors, corporate lenders, security analysts, physical 
production reports, and m arket share details. Ball and Foster (1982] also argued that within 
the firm itself, individual managers can serve as m onitors for each other.
Watts and Zimmerman (1986] used positive agency theory to explain the managerial 
incentives behind voluntary disclosure. They argued that managers can persuade the m arket
3 Moral hazard arises when there is a lack of effort on the part of agent. This is because an agent may not put forth 
agreed-upon effort (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.61).
4 Adverse selection is misrepresentation of the ability by the agent. This is because principal cannot completely verify 
these skills or abilities either at the time of hiring or while the agent is working (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.61).
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that they are engaged in less insider trading of shares by disclosing additional information 
which, in turn, will have a positive impact on the firm's value. However, Dye (1984) argued 
that insider trading5 might improve the welfare of investors and managers by offering 
contracts contingent only on the firm's earnings, and that the m anager's compensation will 
vary based on his private information. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) also pointed out that 
managers under-produce information in the absence of regulation (voluntary disclosure) by 
not taking into account the value of information to nonshareholders when deciding the 
quantity of information to produce. Moreover, managers will not disclose private information 
if the costs of disclosure exceed the m arket value of information (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986). This indicates voluntary disclosure will vary from one firm to another based on 
managers' incentives to disclose or not.
Similarly, Bushman and Indjejikian (1995) concluded in their model that equal access to 
information is not achieved because insiders may disclose some of their information and thus 
reduce overall information asymm etry6 in the market. The insider in this model uses his 
information advantage to extract trading profits and discloses the minimum am ount of 
information necessary to influence other traders. This might explain the impact of large 
investors in Oman on the levels of disclosure in corporate reports.
The relationship between the financial reporting system and m anagement disclosure was also 
examined by Stocken and Verrecchia (2004). They argued that when the information 
asymmetry is small, the m anager chooses a precise financial reporting system, but when it is 
widened, he m anipulates the financial report to convey non-financial information to investors. 
Moreover, the variance in voluntary disclosure and the choice of reporting system depends on 
the usefulness of the financial information generated by the system. Verrecchia (2001) also 
argued that firms can reduce the information asymmetry component of the cost of capital by 
preparing financial statem ents using a more transparent set of accounting procedures within 
a set of standards or listing on securities exchanges that attract the greatest analyst or 
investor following (p.165).
Agency theory has also been used to explain corporate governance issues. Hart (1995) argued 
that corporate governance issues arise w herever contracts are incomplete and agency 
problems exist. However, he indicated that the theory does not by itself provide a role for 
governance structure because contracts specify all parties' obligations. In order to improve
5 Insider trading is inside trading of a firm’s shares by managers (Dye, 1984).
6 Information asymmetry arises because managers have more information about their companies than other investors 
and parties such as analysts and regulators do.
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the governance structure, there should be at least one large shareholder in the firm and the 
firm should be engaged in a debt contract (Hart, 1995). Debts are part of the governance 
structure (Williamson, 1996). They are used to constrain managem ent by limiting how 
inefficient they can be (Hart, 1995).
Williamson (1963) examined the impact of managerial discretion on business behaviour in his 
model. He concluded that the average rate of return  in firms w here there is a conflict of 
interests between m anagers and shareholders fall below that of firms in which management 
interests are more nearly those of shareholders. His conclusions can be used to better 
understand the corporate governance problems tha t arise in public firms.
Grossman and Hart (1986) investigated the ownership of assets from the agency point of 
view. They concluded that when residual rights are purchased by one party they are lost by a 
second party and this creates distortions. Distortions prevent a party from getting the ex post 
return required to com pensate for h is /h er ex ante investment because of the incompleteness 
of the contract.
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the legal protection of investors and concentration of 
ownership are elements of good corporate governance. They argued that large investors 
represent their own interests which may not agree with the interests of other investors and 
employees. On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) stated that the presence of large 
shareholders is im portant for m onitoring and evaluating the performance of m anagem ent and 
that they are compensated for this role through dividends. They also indicated that any 
transaction resulting in an increase in the proportion of the firm's shares owned by a large 
shareholder should be reflected in a higher m arket price of the shares and therefore raise his 
expected profits and those of the small shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
In this study, agency theory is used to explain differences in the perceptions of different 
stakeholders and the incentives behind disclosure in Omani annual reports. Annual reports' 
preparers influence the current financial reporting system by choosing the accounting 
methods and thus influence the decisions of investors. Since there is a conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders, it is expected that their views on the financial reporting 
system and disclosure in public Omani annual reports will differ. Further, since managers 
control the reporting of a firm, especially the private information, it is expected that the level 
of disclosure will vary from one company to another. Also, the level of disclosure can be 
explained using signalling theory discussed in the following section. Table 3.1 summarises the 
analytical models of agency theory.
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T ab le  3.1: S u m m ary  o f  A n a ly t ica l  Models o f  Agency  Theory.
S tu d y  (By D ate  O rd e r)  F in d in g s
Wilson (1968) T heo ry  p red ic ts th e  m odes of delegating  th e  decision  p rocess to  p ro fessional 
m anagers  th ro u g h  payoff contracts . The risk  sh a rin g  p rob lem  arise s  w hen  th e  
princ ipal and  agen t have d iffe ren t a ttitu d es to w ard s risk.
Ross (1973) An agency  p rob lem  arises  b ecau se  th e  principal c an n o t m o n ito r th e  agen t's  a c t  T he 
so lu tion  th e re fo re  involves th e  choice o f optim al fee schedule to  m otive th e  ag en t to  
choose th e  a c t th a t  th e  p rinc ipa l m o s t desires.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) Agency th eo ry  focuses on th e  conflicts of in te re s t be tw een  principals and  agents, and  
exam ines th e  effect o f th e  agency re la tionsh ip  as w ell as th e  m on ito ring  and  bonding  
m echan ism s aim ed a t m itigating  ag en ts’ actions. The firm  is v iew ed  as a legal fiction 
w hich  serves as a nexus fo r con trac ting  relationsh ips.
H olm strom  (1979) C ontrac ts can b e  im p ro v ed  by c rea ting  add itional in fo rm ation  o r  by  using  o th e r 
so u rces o f in fo rm ation  a b o u t th e  agen t's  action.
W atts and Z im m erm an (1986) M anagers use p riv a te  in fo rm ation  to  increase th e  firm 's m a rk e t value. W hen 
d isclosing inform ation , m anagers do n o t consider p o ten tia l investo rs w hich re su lts  in 
th em  u n d e r  p roducing  inform ation .
Bushm an and  Indjejikian In s id e rs  u se  p riv a te  in fo rm atio n  advantage to  ea rn  excess trad in g  p ro fits  an d  m ay
(1995) in fluence v o lu n ta iy  c o rp o ra te  disclosure. V olun tary  d isc losu re  reduces bo th  th e  
in s id e r’s sh a re  o f to ta l p ro fits  an d  th e  to ta l size o f trad in g  profits.
Shleifer and  Vishny (1997) Legal p ro tec tio n  o f in v es to rs  and  concen tra tion  o f ow nersh ip  a re  co rp o ra te  
g overnance  m echanism s th a t  he lp  investo rs to ge t th e ir  m oney back.
Stocken and  Verrecchia (2004) Financial re p o r ts  a re  p ro d u ced  to  induce  in v estm en t level and  m axim ise m anagers ' 
payoff. T hus, m anagers m an ip u la te  th e  re p o r ts  to  convey bo th  financial an d  non- 
financial in fo rm ation  to  in v es to rs  to  help  th em  m ake in v es tm en t decisions.
3.2.2 Signalling Theory
Signalling Theory has been developed to explain information asymmetry in the job market. 
Spence (1973) argued that employers do not have sufficient information about the productive 
capabilities of job applicants a t the time they hire them. However, an applicant's educational 
level signals some information to the employer about that individual that helps in 
determining h is/h er wage.
This theory shows how information asymm etry can be reduced by the party with more 
information signalling it to uninformed parties (Morris, 1987). Signalling theory is similar to 
agency theory in that it recognises the separation of ownership and control and monitoring 
costs. The difference between both theories is that signalling theory assumes that signalling 
costs are inversely related to quality (Morris, 1987). Morris (1987) argued that better quality 
firms may disclose more information by choosing accounting policies that allow their superior 
quality to be revealed in order to differentiate themselves from poorer quality firms. On the 
other hand, low quality firms will choose accounting policies that hide their poor quality from 
the m arket and thereby avoid a reduction in the price of their shares.
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Franke (1987) argued that signalling is costly only if the signal is associated with a loss in 
welfare generated by the distribution of claims in a perfect m ark e t On the other hand, 
signalling can be costless through outside-rationality. Franke (1987) pointed out that the 
supply of securities is perceived by investors as a quality signal. Therefore, a larger supply is 
interpreted as a signal of lower quality so that investors will lower their offer price (adverse 
selection).
According to Ross (1979), m anagers signal good news, bad news or stay quiet. The 
classification of information depends upon its impact on the firm's m arket value. He 
contended that managers have incentives to disclose good news to raise their firm's value and 
distinguish it from firms with bad news. Moreover, firms with no information signal no news 
regarding their ability to m aintain their current levels, such as stability in earnings, and to 
distinguish themselves from firms receiving adverse news. Finally, Ross (1979) concluded 
that the central message of incentive-signalling theory is that competition in the m arket forces 
managers to disclose their private information.
In this study, this theory will help in explaining the relationship between companies' 
attributes and the extent of disclosure in Oman. For instance, if there is a positive relationship 
between a company's performance and disclosure this suggests that managers had a good 
performance year and w ant to signal the good performance to their stakeholders through the 
disclosure of additional information. Moreover, signalling theory provides an explanation for 
m anagers' emphasis on good rather than bad news, especially in the m anagement discussion 
and analysis report. The theory suggests that managers might decide not to disclose bad news 
because of the impact of bad news on a company's share price. This theory also explains the 
effect of competition in Omani industries on the level of disclosure. Also, the importance of 
signalling information through sources other than corporate reports can be explained using 
stewardship theory explained in the following section.
3.2.3 Stewardship Theory
Based on this theory, authority is delegated to those who are required to exercise 
stewardship over the assets of the company, ensuring their safe keeping and adequate 
performance (Tricker, 1984, p.124). According to Tricker (1984, p.127), managers owe 
responsibility to groups other than shareholders and employees, such as customers, suppliers 
and the public generally.
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Beaver (1989, p. 39) argues that managers use the position of superior information to 
maximise their self interest a t the expense of investors, since investors cannot observe 
managers' behaviour. Thus, financial reporting is used to evaluate the stewardship of 
management. Other principals or investors feel that they are at a disadvantage due to the 
inside information that managers have. Public disclosure is an im portant way to reduce this 
problem (Beaver, 1989, p.40), thus proving the importance of disclosure and how it might 
affect stakeholders' decisions.
In Oman, one of the main corporate sources is meetings with companies' management. The 
stewardship theory provides an explanation for the importance of information obtained 
directly from management. Based on this theory, major shareholders will gain access to inside 
information through meetings with management. Additionally, this theory explains the 
relationship between main shareholders' ownership and the level of disclosure in Omani 
annual reports. In this study, a negative relationship is expected between major shareholders 
and the level of voluntary disclosure because major shareholders already have access to 
companies' information and disclosing additional information might negatively affect their 
wealth if the minority shareholders come to know too much. This relationship can also be 
explained through m arket myopia theory discussed in the following section.
3.2.4 Market Myopia Theory
Market Myopia Theory contends there should be an explicit recognition of groups other than 
shareholders that have a long-term association with the firm and thus an interest in its long­
term  success (Keasey et al., 1997, p.8-9). This theory argues that managers' decisions are 
affected by m arket pressure and thus are of short-term  interest (Charkham, 1995; Skyes, 
1994).
According to Blair (1995, pp.32-33), separating equity holders from management through the 
financial m arkets raises three problems. First, managers might spend resources that benefit 
them at the expense of shareholders. Second, large shareholders might take unfair advantage 
of other shareholders if they are given enhanced control rights. Finally, using accounting 
measures of performance can provide misleading information.
Market Myopia Theory also explains the motives behind m andatory and voluntary disclosure. 
Gray and Roberts (1989) pointed out that a combination of m arket and political pressure 
encourages voluntary information. They highlighted that companies under m arket pressure 
and those with good news to report, disclose voluntary information to improve their image
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and performance (p.118). Moreover, the impact of m arket and political pressure on disclosure 
is supported by the significance of corporate size, profitability, industrial sector and capital 
structure as variables to explain voluntary disclosure (Gray and Roberts, 1989, p. 136).
Similarly, Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) argued that the diversity in accounting reporting and 
disclosure standards reflects the particular environment in which these standards are 
developed. They also commented that an understanding of the environmental factors that 
shape accounting practices is im portant for reports' users to properly evaluate accounting 
information and make rational economic decisions (p.76). All of the above studies emphasise 
the relationship between financial reporting and the decision-making process.
Market Myopia Theory explains the impact of large shareholders on the decision-making 
process of other investors in Oman. This theory also highlights the impact of market, 
regulations and companies' attributes on m anagement decisions to disclose voluntary 
information. Based on this theory, Omani listed companies might provide voluntary 
disclosure because of the high dem and for information in their industry in order to gain 
competitive advantage. The impact of large shareholders and regulations are also explained 
through stakeholder theory discussed in the following section.
3.2.5 Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholders are defined as "all o f  those groups and individuals that can affect, or are affected, 
by the accomplishment o f organisational purpose" (Freeman, 1984, p.25). Based on this theory, 
managers are responsible for identifying the strategic issues that affect each stakeholder and 
to understand how to set up, implement and monitor strategies for dealing with that 
stakeholder group. Freeman (1984, p. 92) also argued that a major shareholder may have an 
economic effect on the firm by affecting its profitability or stock price. Further, the firm's 
actions may affect the economic well-being of a particular stakeholder when that stakeholder 
has marketplace power.
Sternberg (1997) commented that 'stakeholder' serves as a convenient label for the various 
groups and individuals that organisations need to take into account when pursuing their 
business objectives. She also defined the main doctrine of stakeholder theory by stating that:
"...businesses should be run not fo r  the financial benefits o f their owners, but fo r  the benefit o f  all their 
stakeholders. It is an essential tenet o f stakeholder theory that organisations are accountable to all 
their stakeholders, and tha t the proper objective o f m anagement is to balance stakeholders' competing 
interests" (p.4).
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However, she argued that this theory is incompatible with business or corporate governance 
for a num ber of reasons. First, this theory denies that a corporation should be accountable to 
its owners. Second, it does not provide any standards against which companies' agents can be 
judged. Third, this theory rules out the goal of business which is maximising long-term owner 
value. Finally, under this theory trusteeship is impossible because the obligation to balance 
stakeholder benefits overrides the specific obligations that trustees have to their assigned 
beneficiaries.
Turnbull (1997a} criticised Sternberg's (1997) argum ents by presenting empirical evidence 
from around the world tha t did not support her objections to the theory. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to more carefully consider stakeholder theory, especially since it highlights the 
importance of considering the views of different stakeholders and how the stakeholders affect 
organisations. Turnbull (1997a) argued that information is power and that the distribution of 
information through various channels creates a division of power with checks and balances to 
manage conflicts of interests (p.17). This explains the existence of the various sources of 
corporate information such as corporate reports, stockbrokers' advice, meeting with 
company's management, and sector information and their importance in Oman. Since report 
users have different abilities and skills to obtain and in terpret corporate information, this 
resulted in having various sources of information in the Omani capital market. For instance, 
individual investors do not have access to a company's management and might not have 
interest in meeting the managem ent because of their short-term  investm ent objectives and 
thus will obtain information from sources other than the company's m anagem ent such as 
stockbrokers, sector information and Muscat Securities Market issues that serve their short­
term  investm ent interests. The availability of various information sources will manage the 
conflict of interests betw een individual investors and other investors such as institutional 
investors which have long-term investm ent objectives.
Kothari (2000) argued that because managers and board directors are not large blockholders, 
they represent m anagem ent w ithout large ownership and this thus creates a demand for 
timely disclosure in order to m onitor management and reduce information asymmetry. 
Kothari (2000) also indicated that financial statem ents are influenced by the payout 
preferences of the agents of labour, capital and government.
Based on stakeholder theory, it is necessary to investigate various stakeholders' perceptions 
of the importance of companies' financial reporting systems in making decisions. In Oman, 
there are eight different stakeholders: (1) major shareholders, (2) institutional investors, (3)
government institutions, (4) individual small shareholders, (5) financial institutions, (6) 
brokerage companies, (7) regulators, and (8) auditing firms. This theory explains differences 
in the perceptions of various stakeholders of financial reporting practice. It also explains the 
selection of each stakeholder group pertaining to the source of information, annual report 
sections, and voluntary items. For example, individual shareholders might select a company's 
annual reports and brokers' advice to obtain information about a company compared to 
meeting with m anagem ent because these investors have no personal access to that company.
3.3 Theoretical Disclosure Models
Theoretical disclosure models are part of disclosure theories. They explain and provide 
examples about a phenom enon or a relationship that is described in a theory. Disclosure 
models provide useful insights into some of the factors that might affect the level of disclosure 
in public report.
3.3.1 Discretionary Disclosure Models
Discretionary disclosure models explain the factors that influence m anagement decisions to 
not fully disclose information to uninformed parties. Verrecchia (2001} argued that 
information asymm etry is the result of an entrepreneur's inability to commit to a policy of full 
disclosure because of the presence of proprietary costs, risk sharing and agency costs (pp.166 
and 171}.
One such factor is the company's competitive position in the industry. Managers might decide 
to disclose a certain am ount of information based on disclosure costs. They fear that if they 
provide private information to uninformed parties, competitors and potential entry 
companies will take advantage of it and therefore damage the company's competitive 
position. These models contradict the assumptions of full disclosure theory.
Full disclosure theory was developed by Grossman (1981} and Milgrom (1981}. Their theory 
suggests that managers will try  to influence decision-makers by selectively providing data 
relevant to their decisions. In Milgrom's (1981} model, managers provide full disclosure about 
the firm's prospects in order to increase its share price and maintain the value of the products 
it sells. When managers withhold information, interested parties assume they are hiding bad 
news. When uninformed parties detect any withholding of information and when the 
communication betw een managers and uninformed parties is costless, then, in response, 
managers' best strategy is one of full disclosure. Similarly, Grossman's (1981} model
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concludes that full disclosure is the only solution for sellers of high-quality products when 
disclosure is costless to distinguish themselves from sellers of poor-quality products.
Akerlof (1970) investigated the relationship betw een quality and uncertainty by elaborating a 
model in the automobile industry. In his model, he tried to explain the effects of asymmetry 
information in the m arket for used cars. According to Akerlof s (1970), an asymmetry in 
available information develops because the sellers of used cars have more knowledge about 
the quality of the cars than the buyers. Therefore, good quality cars and poor quality cars will 
be sold at the same price since it is impossible for the buyer to tell the difference between 
them. Akerlof (1970) emphasised the point tha t dishonesty in business is a serious problem 
since dishonest dealings drive honest dealings out of the market.
The discretionary disclosure model explains observations of nondisclosure by presenting 
factors that might impede the ability of the uninformed party to observe the actual price in the 
market. For instance, Bain (1949) developed a theory of limit pricing. He argued that potential 
entrants to a m arket might consider the curren t price of established companies as an 
indicator of post-entry profitability. Established firms might hold down the actual price in 
order to "bluff' the potential entrant away from the industry in order to protect the demands 
for their outputs and their own profits. However, this model does not include established 
firms and the en tran t as strategic agents (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). The new limit pricing 
model contends that an established firm might influence another firm's perceptions of the 
profitability of entering that firm's m arket by lowering its prices (p.443). Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982) concluded that the en trant w ith complete information will recognise the 
incentives for limit pricing policy and so predict the behaviour of established firms. Thus its 
decision to enter the industry will not be affected. The aforementioned models confirm the 
existence of information asymmetry in the m arket and the effects of holding or releasing 
private information to uninformed parties.
Disclosure-related costs w ere also examined by Verrecchia (1983) who offered an 
explanation for why m anager exercise discretion in disclosing information. He showed that 
managers exercise discretion by choosing the point, or the degree of information quality, 
above which he discloses w hat he observes, and below which he withholds his information 
(p.179). Verrecchia (1983) refers to this as the threshold level of disclosure which is 
positively associated with the proprietary cost of disclosure. Managers for certain 
observations are motivated to withhold information because of traders ' inability to in terpret 
the withheld information as unambiguously 'bad news'. Also, their choice of threshold level of
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disclosure depends upon traders' expectations. If the value of disclosure exceeds the 
threshold, managers voluntarily disclose it. Verrecchia (1983) confirmed that the nature of 
competition determ ines the level of disclosure. He also concluded that when the proprietary 
cost of disclosure is higher than its benefits, traders in the m arket will be less likely to react 
negatively to the non-disclosure of information. Similarly, Dye (1985a) concluded that 
competition and high proprietary costs are behind the non-disclosure of strategically valuable 
information.
Richardson (2001, p.233) defined information quality as the "precision o f management's 
information". He extended Verrecchia's (1983) model to prove that the threshold level of 
disclosure does not necessarily vary with information quality. Richardson (2001) argued that 
precise information increases the cost of disclosure which, in turn, reduces litigation as 
uncertainty is lowered. In addition, as managers provide more precise information, they 
decrease the threshold level of disclosure at certain levels bu t then a further increase in 
precision may result in an increase in the threshold to prevent competitors gaining access to 
this information (Richardson, 2001, p.239).
Some studies have investigated the possibility that managers might not have additional 
information to disclose (Jovanovic, 1982; King and Wallin, 1991; Vives, 1984). In these 
studies, disclosure depends on the type of news, w hether it is favourable or unfavourable, and 
on the cost of entry, w hether it is high or low. Darrough and Stoughton (1990) concluded that 
since low entry costs lead to a higher entry probability, full disclosure ensues under 
competitive pressure. This is because disclosing unfavourable news deters potential entrants 
from entering into the market, even if this might negatively impact on the firm's m arket value. 
Similarly, Feltham and Xie (1992) contended that a manager will prefer to reveal good news 
to the capital m arket and bad news to the product market. Full disclosure will definitely occur 
if only one of these m arkets is of concern to the manager, or if the response of one m arket 
clearly dominates the other. However, partial disclosure exists when the manager has a 
relatively balanced concern for the response of both markets (p.69). Feltham and Xie (1992) 
concluded, unlike Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1985a), that disclosure policy is not 
characterised by a single threshold that divides the nondisclosure and disclosure sets.
Wagenhofer (1990) developed a model that reflects a firm's disclosure strategy based on 
maximising the firm's net m arket price and off-putting both opponents from taking an 
adverse action and the imposition of political costs. He argued that the decision to disclose 
voluntary information depends upon the nature of the firm's information, the level of
potential risk of adverse action taken by a potential competitor and its associated proprietary 
costs, and the level of potential political costs.
Martin (1999] surveyed the empirical testing of discretionary disclosure theory. She 
compared the archival and experimental tests of discretionary disclosure, and concluded that 
previous studies reported conflicting results. However, the existence of partial disclosure 
thresholds was consistent in both types of test. Her survey results supported the partial 
disclosure equilibrium of W agenhofer (1990]. A summary of disclosure models of financial 
reporting relevant to this study is presented in Table 3.2.
Discretionary disclosure models w ere used to explain the m anagers' incentives behind the 
voluntary disclosure in Omani annual reports. These models concluded that managers' 
decision to disclose additional information depends on its proprietary costs and report users' 
expectations. This is also confirmed and explained by cheap-talk models discussed in the 
following section.
T a b l e  3 .2 :  S u m m a r y  o f  D i s c r e t i o n a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  M ode ls  o f  F inanc ia l  R e p o r t in g .
Akerlof (1 9 7 0 ) The ex istence  o f in fo rm ation  a sy m m etry  in th e  m ark e t resu lts  in low  quality  goods 
p u sh ed  o u t as h igh qua lity  goods, d riv ing th e  m ark e t o u t of existence.
Grossman (1981) Econom ic agen ts of h igh-quality  item s follow full d isclosure policy to  d istinguish  
them selves from  agen ts o f poor-quality  items.
Milgrom (1981 ) Firm s disclose good new s and  w ithhold  bad  new s. C onsequently, firm s a re  forced to 
app ly  full d isc lo su re  stra tegy .
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) Limit p ricing  th e o ry  concludes th a t using a pricing  policy to  d e te r  en try  m ay involve 
less, th e  sam e, o r m ore e n try  th an  occurs in th e  full in fo rm ation  case.
Verrecchia (1983 ) M anagers exerc ise  d isc re tion  in releasing  in fo rm ation  o r  w ithho ld ing  it, w hich is 
assoc ia ted  w ith  p ro p r ie ta ry  costs.
Dye (1985a) M anagers d isclose all o f th e ir  non -p ro p rie ta ry  inform ation , good and bad, to  p rev en t 
th e  p rice o f th e ir  firm s' secu rities  from  falling. Investo rs a re  uncerta in  ab o u t th e  kind 
of in form ation  held  by m anagem ent, w h e th e r it is bad new s o r no t
Darrough and Stoughton  
(1990)
The h ig h er th e  com petition  in an  industry , th e  h igher th e  v o lun ta ry  d isclosure. F irm s 
w ith  favourab le  new s d iscourage e n try  by p rovid ing  no  inform ation . This benefits  th e  
firm  itself, b u t th e  s tak eh o ld e r and  po ten tia l e n tra n t lose out.
W agenhofer (1990) T here is alw ays full d isclosure equilibrium  b u t firm s p re fe r p artia l d isclosure 
equilibrium . D isclosure s tra teg y  depends upon  th e  type  of inform ation, level of 
political cost, and th e  likelihood of a rival firm.
King and W allin (1 9 9 1 ) The in fo rm ed n e ss-d ep en d en t d isc lo su re  m odel p red ic ts  th a t  th e  level o f non ­
d isclosure increases as th e  p rob ab ility  th a t th e  m anager has no in form ation  increases.
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3.3.2 Cheap-Talk Models
The Cheap-talk model or principal-agent model was developed by Crawford and Sobel [1982). 
They argue that a better informed sender influences the actions and decisions of a receiver by 
sending a possibly noisy signal based on his private information. Unlike the signalling models, 
this model is based on the assum ption that the sender's reporting of private information is 
costless and that the choice of signalling rule and the receiver's choice of action are 
strategically simultaneous. A summary of the Cheap-talk model is presented in Table 3.3.
A major problem that is central to the cheap-talk model is the credibility of the sender's 
information. This problem has been examined by a num ber of studies (Gigler, 1994, Newman 
and Sansing, 1993). Gigler (1994) pointed out that when voluntary disclosures are not 
believed they are ignored, and there is no reason for a firm to disclose private information 
when it is not credible. He argued tha t proprietary costs are the solution to the voluntary 
disclosure credibility problem. A m anager's incentives to credibly disclose private and perfect 
information depends upon the different users of the information and their actions.
Fischer and Stocken (2001) modelled a communication game where the sender privately 
observes imperfect, non-verifiable information about a random variable. They concluded that 
if the firm wishes to maximise the investor's information it has to choose to restrict the 
information it transm its to analysts by disclosing summ ary or coarse information. In response 
to the claim that an analyst's stock report is less credible, their analysis suggested that the 
analyst's access to additional information may not mitigate, but may aggravate, the 
deleterious effect caused by the investm ent banking relationship between the analyst's 
employer and the firm being analysed.
T a b l e  3.3: S u m m a r y  o f  C h eap -T a lk  D i s c lo s u r e  M o d e ls  o f  F inanc ia l  R e p o r t in g .
Crawford and Sobel (1982) B etter-in fo rm ed  agen ts choose d isclosure stra teg ies based  on p riv a te  in form ation  and 
un in fo rm ed  p arties  m ake decisions based  on agen ts’ signals th a t affect th e  w elfare of 
both.
Newman and Sansing (1 9 9 3 ) T he m odel p red ic ts  th a t  th e  p re sen ce  o f m ultip le  u se rs  affects th e  in fo rm ativeness of 
d isclosure. As e n try  costs increase, th e  firm  sends a  noisy  m essage w hich  contains 
im precise  in fo rm ation  to  induce  th e  e n tra n t to  stay  o u t
Gigler (1994) P ro p rie ta ry  costs c rea te  th e  possib ility  of vo lun tary  d isc losu res by supply ing  credib ility  
to  th ese  d isclosures.
Fischer and Stocken (2 0 0 1 ) T he firm  reduces th e  qua lity  o f its d isc losu re  to  sell-side analysts in o rd e r  to  m axim ise 
th e  a m o u n t o f in fo rm ation  th ese  an a ly s ts  d isclose to  investors.
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3.4 Importance of Corporate Financial Disclosure
"Disclosure is the process through which an entity communicates with the outside world" 
(Chandra, 1974, p.733). Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (1999, p.11) stated 
that the objective of financial reporting is "to satisfy the information needs o f users with respect 
to decision-making and accountability". Figure 3.2 presents the four tiers of corporate 
information as identified by ICAS (1999).
F i g u r e  3 .2 :  T ie r e d  C o r p o r a t e  I n f o r m a t io n :  C o n te n t  a n d  Access .
M andatory  d isc lo su re C om plete R egulation
V oluntary public d isclosure Com plete Com pany
Selected  p riv a te  d isc losu re : com pany  m eetings w ith  ana ly s ts  an d  
m ajo r investo rs , one-to -one  m eetings, s ite  v is its  [regu la tion  define  
p a ra m e te rs  fo r con ten t)
Privileged u se rs  only C om pany
U ndisclosed p riva te  in form ation None Com pany
S ource: ICAS (1 9 9 9 :3 3 )
Although annual reports are perceived to be im portant by m ost user groups in previous 
literature, they have limitations. Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(1998, p.10) states that annual reports are limited because they focus on past events and 
financial performance. It also adds that annual reports give a primarily historical perspective 
and so provide limited information about strategic strength or any other future-oriented 
matters.
3.4.1 Costs and Benefits of Financial Disclosure
Benefit-cost analysis is "a set o f  procedures fo r  defining and comparing benefits and costs" 
(Zerbe and Dively, 1994, p.2). Zerbe and Dively (1994) report benefit-cost analysis to be 
useful in making decisions. Moreover, they argue that information has the quality of a public 
good that can be used by many people at once.
Holland (1997) indicated that the costs and benefits of financial disclosure change through 
time because of external factors, such as m arket pressure from analysts, institutional 
investors and the media to increase the disclosure, which, in turn, increases all the 
communication costs. Also, m ore precise and less costly information leads to greater 
disclosure (Bushman and Indjejikian, 1995).
There are costs associated with disclosing information voluntarily in corporate reports. Gray 
and Roberts (1989) identified two types of voluntary disclosure cost: direct costs and indirect
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costs. Direct costs are data collection, processing, production and auditing costs. Indirect costs 
are litigation costs, costs associated with allegations of incomplete or inaccurate information 
and competitive disadvantage (ICAS, 1999)
According to Kothari (2000, p.92), the benefits of financial disclosure are that they: (1) reduce 
information asymmetry among informed and uninformed m arket participants; and (2) lower 
the cost of capital by shrinking bid-ask spreads, enhancing trading volume, and diminishing 
stock-return volatility.
3.4.2 Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Financial Disclosure
Regulation has been described by W hittington (1993, p.318) as “a natural consequence o f the 
underlying features o f the market fo r  accounting information, which are, in turn, determined by 
the system o f corporate governance".
Healy and Palepu (2001) contended that by creating minimum disclosure requirem ents, 
regulators reduce the information gap between informed and uninformed users and the 
processing costs for financial statem ents users by providing a common accepted language that 
managers can use to communicate with investors. Foster (1986) claimed that m andatory 
disclosures are the result of regulatory forces, while voluntary disclosures are more likely to 
be the result of m arket forces.
Malone etal. (1993) argued that regulators in some instances put companies at an economic 
disadvantage by requiring a uniformity of disclosure. Dye (1985b, p.546) pointed out that by 
imposing more reporting requirem ents, accounting boards do not necessarily increase 
investors' knowledge of a firm's value. He identified two reasons for this: (1) m andatory and 
voluntary disclosures are sometimes substitutes when an increase in m andatory disclosure is 
offset by a reduction in voluntary disclosure, and (2) firms may be able to select accounting 
techniques and so will be able to choose which information they reveal.
Financial disclosure is influenced by a firm's disclosure position, corporate strategy, 
legislation, specific disclosure issues faced by the firm, external consultants and advisors, and 
the structure of the firm (Gibbins et al., 1990, p. 130). The quality of disclosure is also 
influenced by the degree of accounting standards' enforcement. Kothari (2000) stated that 
weak enforcement of shareholder protection and accounting standards negatively impacts on 
the growth of capital m arkets and thus reduces the demand for timely public disclosure and 
the disclosure quality as a whole.
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3.4.3 Importance of Voluntary Disclosure
Voluntary disclosure, as defined by Gray and Roberts (1989, p.117], is: “information in excess 
o f legal requirements/accounting standards/stock exchange rules". Kothari (2000, p.100] 
indicated that voluntary disclosure arises from the fact that there is a cross-sectional variation 
in the demand for public disclosure as a function of the nature of investm ent and the financing 
decisions of a corporation. Holmstrom (1979] maintained that voluntary disclosure is 
im portant because it allows a more accurate judgm ent of the performance of managers. In 
addition, voluntary disclosure is a significant indicator of financial performance and status, 
although in many instances it fails to confirm that of quantitative financial statem ents (Smith 
and Taffler, 1995].
3.4.4 Motives for Voluntary Disclosure
Managers have discretion over the information to be disclosed in corporate reports and 
private meetings (Holland, 1997]. Reporting discretion allows managers to convey useful 
information that otherwise would not be communicated (Stocken and Verrecchia, 2004]. 
Bhojraj etal. (2004, p.925] concluded that firms are expected to provide voluntary disclosure 
as long as the expected benefits exceed the associated costs.
There are a num ber of motives for providing voluntary disclosure. The main reason is to 
reduce the information asymm etry problem and thus reduce the firm's external financing cost 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001]. Also, there are m arket pressures on large companies to disclose 
more information because they are more visible in the m arket (Gray and Roberts, 1989]. 
Cooke (1992] indicated that companies that seek foreign funds are likely to disclose 
additional information. Also, m anagers facing an impending decline choose to increase 
disclosures regarding short-term  performance in order to fulfil m arket demand for 
information and to appear as a high disclosure firm with positive future prospects (Miller, 
2002]. Other reasons for providing voluntary disclosure are to reduce contracting costs 
associated with stock compensation for new employees and legal actions against inadequate 
and untimely disclosures (Skinner, 1994].
Corporations might decide not to disclose voluntary information for a num ber of reasons. 
First, they are sensitive to the potential legal liability of their future forecasts (Pava and 
Epstein, 1993]. Second, they may feel that some disclosures could cause competitive 
disadvantages (Nicholls and Ahmed, 1995]. Verrecchia (2001] argued that in the presence of 
costs an d /o r uncertainty, m anagers might elect to disclose or withhold information about the 
firm's value despite the fact that stakeholders in terpret withheld information rationally.
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Based on the above discussion, the quality of corporate governance in a specific country is 
determined by the quality of the different aspects of the corporate governance structure, such 
as disclosure, transparency and the independence of the board of directors.
3.5 Implications o f Disclosure Models and the Literature for this Study
Mandatory disclosures are the reporting requirem ents imposed by accounting standards' 
boards. Dye (1985b) argued that accounting standards' boards might require certain 
accounting procedures to increase public disclosure, but they have little information on 
specific factors which might influence a firm's accounting policy. To overcome this problem, 
accounting boards require full disclosure (Dye, 1985b). However, Dye (1985b) points out that 
any analysis of m andatory disclosure is flawed if it ignores voluntary disclosures, since the 
latter are capable of providing the same information contained in detailed financial reports, 
without imposing the burden of such disclosures uniformly across all firms (Dye, 1985b, 
p.562). Accordingly, it is im portant in this study to evaluate the extent of m andatory and 
voluntary disclosures and the relationship betw een these disclosures in Omani financial 
reports in order to understand and m easure the quality of the reporting system in Oman.
Analytical models of disclosure show there are multiple users with conflicting objectives. 
Early theoretical w ork provided evidence that disclosure serves different users' interests. For 
instance, Darrough and Stoughton (1990) indicated that while voluntary disclosure provides 
strategic information to potential competitors, it can be helpful to the financial m arket in 
valuing the firm more accurately (p.219). They argued that managers have to consider the 
tradeoffs between the impact on entry behaviour as well as financial m arket reaction when 
deciding disclosure level. This therefore leads to the hypothesis that different users in Oman 
will have different opinions based upon self-interest.
Moreover, disclosure models imply that investors use other sources to gather information 
about a firm to make a decision. Dye (1985a) highlighted that investors receive a continuous 
stream of information about each firm. In this study, disclosure models lead to the hypothesis 
that different information receivers have different perceptions of the importance of different 
information sources.
Newman and Sansing's (1993) model indicated that the presence of multiple users with 
conflicting interests affects the informativeness of a firm's disclosure. They also contended 
that these users observe the firm's messages and interpret them  according to their 
expectations (p.93). This suggests that in Oman a manager's incentives to reveal all or some of 
the private information might be based upon the possible uses of disclosure. Regarding the
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nature of information disclosed in the firm's qualitative reports, Feltham and Xie (1992) 
stated that "a key characteristic o f the reporting o f private management information is that 
managers do not always report information and they reveal, or withhold, both "good" and "bad" 
news (p . 4 7 Similarly, Skinner (1994) argued that managers voluntarily disclose earnings 
information for two reasons. First, when their firms are doing well, managers disclose good 
news to distinguish themselves from those doing less well. Second, managers disclose bad 
news to reduce the expected legal and reputation costs associated with failing to disclose bad 
news in a timely manner. Accordingly, this leads to the hypothesis in this study that the 
usefulness of different information disclosed in MD&A and corporate governance reports will 
be perceived differently among various users based on their perceptions of the incentives for 
the disclosure of good or bad news.
Martin (1999) argued that a m anager reveals private information only if the value of 
disclosure exceeds the costs of providing such information. If the benefit of disclosure does 
not exceed this cost, he withholds (p.153). Further, the manager will have the incentive to 
provide good news to the capital m arket to maximise the firm's value and communicate bad 
news to an en tran t to deter his or her entry (Feltham and Xie, 1992). Newman and Sansing 
(1993, p.106) concluded that firms in industries with very low or very high entry costs will 
make more informative disclosures than firms in industries with moderate entry costs. This 
means that in Oman the extent of voluntary disclosure will vary from one firm to another and 
sometimes managers will decide not to disclose because the cost of disclosing exceeds the 
benefits of disclosure. This also applies to m andatory disclosure. Factors influencing the 
disclosure of private information will be discussed in Chapter 9.
3.6 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, the theories and models on which this study is built have been discussed. 
Agency theory, signalling theory, and shareholders' theories explain the relationship between 
the company and its shareholders and the reasons for managers' incentive to disclose or not 
to disclose information to their shareholders. Also, these theories explain why regulators 
require companies to disclose a certain level of information in their annual reports. The 
present study extends the literature in the corporate disclosure area by focusing on the 
informational needs of different user groups and auditor groups, and the extent of disclosure 
in the annual reports of listed companies in an emerging economy.
Based on the above discussed theories and disclosure models, the study hypotheses have 
been developed. Moreover, the theories and models will later be used to explain the study's
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findings. In the questionnaire stage, disclosure theories and models will explain the reasons 
for any differences or similarities between reports' user groups regarding different aspects of 
annual reports. Also, these theories will be used in the secondary data analysis stage to 
explain the information gap in the annual reports of Omani listed companies. Additionally, the 
disclosure theories and models offer explanations for the relationship between a company's 
characteristics and extent of disclosure. Finally, in the interview stage, justifications given by 
interviewees can be linked to these theories and models in order to support an d /o r better 
understand them.
C H A P T E R  4 : L I T E R A T U R E  R E V I E W  OF D I S C L O S U R E  S T U D I E S
4.1 Introduction
Empirical studies of corporate disclosure are classified into four main types: (1] disclosure 
content, (2) disclosure indexes, (3) timing of disclosure, and (4} responses to questionnaires 
or interviews about corporate disclosure (Ball and Foster, 1982, pp.195 and 198). This 
chapter presents a literature review of studies of users' perceptions of the importance of 
annual reports and disclosure indices' studies related to this study and used to develop the 
hypotheses. The following section (4.2) presents both survey and interview studies on users' 
perceptions of financial reporting. Section 4.3 highlights some prior studies that have 
investigated the importance of the managem ent discussion and analysis report. Some 
previous research on corporate governance is discussed in section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents a 
review of disclosure indices' studies while section 4.6 highlights the literature on explanatory 
factors for disclosure levels. Finally, Section 4.7 summarises and concludes the chapter.
4.2 Literature Review on Disclosure Survey Studies
Questionnaire surveys investigating corporate financial reporting are the m ost frequently 
used research methodology in the accounting literature. In this approach, respondents are 
asked to rate on a Likert-scale the importance of financial reports' items to their decisions. 
Respondents are selected from the population related to the research objective. For instance, 
Baker and Haslem (1973) sent 1,623 questionnaires to individual investors with five 
American stock brokerage firms and asked them  to determine their sources of information on 
a 5-point likert-scale. Baker and Haslem (1973) found 46.8% of respondents relied on 
stockbrokers and 15.6% on advisory services. Only 7.9% relied on financial statements.
Earlier studies in the accounting literature have focused on assessing the objectives of 
publishing annual reports and the limitations of the published statem ents at that time. For 
example, in 1968, the Accountancy Research Foundation in Australia reported that 
professional readers believed that annual reports provided information about the profitability 
and financial security of companies. However, they suggested that improvements needed to 
be made in the presentation and terminology of these reports to suit non-professional 
readers.
The conflict between the efficient capital m arket hypothesis and investor survey research 
findings has been investigated by Hines (1982). He concluded that annual reports are an 
im portant input to shareholders' long-term investm ent decision-making since they confirm or
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deny previously received information and tha t short-term  m arket reaction is not an adequate 
indication of the usefulness of annual reports.
4.2.1 Survey Studies on the Importance of Annual Reports as a Whole
Questionnaire surveys have been used previously to study the importance of annual reports 
as a source of information compared to other sources of corporate information. Also, they 
investigated the im portance of various sections of corporate reports in making investm ent 
decisions. Some of the studies targeted a single group of reports ' users (Anderson and 
Epstein, 1995]. Other studies have focused on m ore than one user group (Al-Razeen and 
Karbhari, 2004a]. Table 4.1 provides a summary of prior studies that have investigated users' 
perceptions of the importance of annual reports as a whole.
Table 4.1 presents some studies tha t investigated the importance of annual reports objectives 
and sections. For instance, Most and Chang [1979] surveyed the usefulness of annual reports 
to three groups of investors in the U.S.: individual; institutional; and financial analysts. They 
sent 2,034 questionnaires to those groups. Their response rate was 27.7%. Most and Chang 
(1979] found that long-term capital gains and a combination of dividend income and capital 
gains were the m ost im portant investm ent objectives for individual and institutional 
investors. Regarding the im portance of information sources, they reported that corporate 
annual reports are the m ost im portant source for 46.8% of individual investors, 47.8% of 
institutional investors and 82.6% of analysts. Moreover, 27.3% of financial analysts viewed 
corporate press releases to be of less importance. This study also reported that income 
statement, summ ary of operations for the last 5 or 10 years and statem ent of changes in the 
financial position are the m ost im portant financial statements. The balance sheet, statem ent 
of accounting policies and footnotes are also very im portant for institutional investors and 
analysts compared with individual investors who viewed the above first two items as 
im portant and footnotes as slightly im portant (Most and Chang, 1979].
Empirical studies varied in their findings of the importance of reports because of the 
differences in the culture, educational level, experience, and age. For example, Anderson 
(1981] tested the usefulness of annual reports to institutional investors in Australia by 
sending 300 questionnaires. The respondents ranked equal combination of dividend income 
and capital gains as the most im portant investm ent objective and the corporate reports as the 
main source of information. However, forty of the institutional investors considered 
company's visits to be of a maximum importance which is consistent with the above studies. 
Anderson (1981] argued that the visits provide the investors with additional information,
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enabling them to earn above the normal profits. In comparison to other studies (Lee and 
Tweedie, 1977, see table 4.1], selected investors read mostly balance sheet, profit and loss 
statement, notes to the accounts, and chairman's address to make a decision. Anderson 
(1981] found that 72.4% of the respondents desired the provision of additional information 
on the reports such as, management, accounting policies, future prospects, and company 
operations and 69.1% favoured it even if it reduced earnings and ultimately dividends.
A num ber of studies have investigated the importance of corporate financial reporting in 
different countries. For example, Anderson and Epstein (1996] studied the quality of 
corporate financial reporting in the US, Australia, and New Zealand. Their survey revealed 
that investors in the US relied more on their analysis of annual reports to make an investm ent 
decision than Australian and New Zealand investors, who relied more on stockbrokers' advice 
in making decisions. In questioning the readership of report's sections, profit and loss account 
was the m ost section read by investors in all three countries. Surprisingly, Australian 
investors ranked balance sheet first in term s of difficulty followed by the statem ent of cash 
flows. This confirms the earlier finding that Australian investors do not consider annual 
reports to be the prim ary source of information (Anderson, 1981]. Finally, Anderson and 
Epstein (1996] suggested that corporate communication should be improved in term s of 
quality and quantity of disclosures, audited m ore carefully and simplified so that investors 
will be able to understand it and use it to evaluate company's performance.
In addition to the above studies, table 4.1 shows studies conducted in less developed 
economies, investigating the im portance of annual reports as a whole. For example, Abu- 
Nassar and Rutherford (1996] conducted a research in Jordan to determ ine users' perception 
such as institutional shareholders, bank loan officers, stockbrokers, academics, and individual 
shareholders of the external financial reports. They found that the individual shareholders 
made low use of the annual reports compared to institutional investors and bank loan officers. 
Although m ost of the respondents made a great use of annual reports, they spend relatively 
little time reading it. The reason behind this was lack of credibility (Abu-Nassar and 
Rutherford, 1996]. The study revealed that income statem ent and balance sheet were the 
mostly read and understood annual report's sections. These findings are consistent with the 
results of studies conducted in developed capital markets (Anderson, 1981; Gniewosz, 1990]. 
The quality of financial reporting was questioned in this study. Most of the respondents 
indicated that financial reporting in Jordan was m oderately useful but with two major 
weaknesses; lack of comparability and lack of reliability. In addition, annual reports were 
ranked first in this study as a major source of information followed by visits to companies
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(Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1996). On the other hand, bank loan officers ranked visits to 
companies first. Arguably, they did not perform  any statistical tests to determ ine w hether 
their respondents w ere homogenous or heterogeneous.
In the Gulf region, Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004) investigated the perceptions of the same 
303 users about the importance of annual reports ' sections using the same questionnaire. The 
investigated sections are board of director's report, auditor's report, balance sheet, income 
statement, statem ent of retained earnings, cash flow statem ents, and note the financial 
statem ents (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004). Similar to previous findings (Most and Chang, 
1979; Lee and Tweedie, 1981; Anderson and Epstein, 1995), this study reported that the 
whole sample regarded income statem ent to be the most im portant section (4.854) followed 
by the balance sheet, auditor's report and notes the financial statements. Board of director's 
report was considered to be the least im portant section except for government officials (Al- 
Razeen and Karbhari, 2004). This ranking contradicts the findings of some of the previous 
studies (Lee and Tweedie, 1977; Anderson, 1981; Epstein and Pava, 1993). Moreover, Al- 
Razeen and Karbhari (2004) found that auditor's report was highly rated by government 
officials. They argued that the reason behind the attached high importance is auditors are 
regarded as guardians of the public against malpractice in the society. Using bivariate 
analysis, Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004) found that individual investors and governm ent 
officials on one hand, and the other groups on the other hand, significantly differ in their 
rating of the importance of cash flow statem ents (p<0.005).
Interviews and observations have also been used in the accounting literature to study 
corporate financial reporting. For instance, Lee and Tweedie (1977) interviewed 301 private 
shareholders of one of the largest U.K. companies. The authors tested the respondents' 
understanding and readership of annual reports in relation to their background. A positive 
significant relation was found between perceived understanding and num ber of 
shareholdings (p<0.01) and accounting experience (p<0.00). Regarding the annual report, 
chairman's report was the most understood and read section by the respondents (74%) 
compared to the profit and loss account and balance sheet (28%). Lee and Tweedie (1977) 
reported that 72% of the sample shareholders believed that the disclosed information was 
sufficient. The authors argued that the respondents’ lack of understanding might be the 
reason behind the respondents’ satisfaction of the current reporting practice. They found that 
one third of respondents believed that the report's language was too technical in nature. Lee 
and Tweedie (1977) recommended that the p resent reporting system should be simplified 
and more accounting education is needed for private shareholders.
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Studies conducted in both developed and developing countries reported similar findings (see 
Table 4.1): (1) the reliance on annual reports, company's announcements, and visits to 
companies to make decisions; and (2) usage of the balance sheet, profit and loss accounts, and 
notes to the financial statem ents to make investm ent decisions. Recent studies conducted in 
developed and developing countries have indicated that the importance of the director's 
report has declined over time. Overall, a direct comparison between developed and 
developing countries is not applicable because, first, survey studies' findings depend on 
respondents' preferences; second, there are many external factors, such as legal obligations, 
that might affect the findings of such studies; and, third, the accounting literature proves that 
the importance of annual reports and corporate reports' sections and information varies from 
one developed country to another (Anderson and Epstein, 1996).
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T able 4.1: Empirical  Studies of  Users’ Perceptions of  the Importance  of  Annual Reports  as a Whole.
Study (by Evtuit Sam ple size  Sam ple so u rce  M ethodology D ep en d en t In d e p e n d e n t S um m ary  o f s tu d y  re su lts
d a te  o rd e r )  an d  ap p lied  v a riab le  v a riab le
te s ts
Baker and
Haslem
(1973)
Informational 
needs of 
individual 
investors
851 American
individual
investors
Customer lists of 
5 stock brokerage 
firms.
Questionnaire, 
arithmetic mean 
and standard 
deviation
Individual investors rely mostly on stockbrokers 
(46.8%) followed by advisory services (15.6%). 
Few respondents (7.9%) rely on financial 
statem ents.
Lee and
Tweedie
(1975)
Accounting
Information:
An
Investigation of 
Private 
Shareholder 
Understanding
374 UK Private 
shareholders
Small British 
Public company
Questionnaire, 
frequency 
distribution, 
significance tests
The aim of financial reporting is to make the 
board of directors accountable to shareholders 
and to show the value of companies. 68% of 
respondents understood the information 
contained in annual reports and 59% believed it 
to be relevant to their investment decisions.
Lee and
Tweedie
(1977)
Private 
shareholder 
and corporate 
report
301 UK Private 
shareholders
One of the largest 
UK companies
Analysis of
Interview data,
frequency
distribution,
Spearman’s
coefficient of rank
correlations
Overall weighted  
index of 
understanding
Number of 
shareholdings, 
accounting experience, 
readership, portfolios, 
occupation, investment 
decisions, financial press
74% of respondents understood accounting 
information and 53% used it in making decisions. 
Positive relationship between perceived 
understanding and num ber of shareholdings and 
accounting experience. Chairman's report most 
understood section followed by profits and loss 
account and balance sh ee t
Most and 
Chang(1979)
How useful are 
annual reports 
to investors?
562 investors: 
222 individuals; 
173 institutional; 
and 167 financial 
analysts
Florida office of a
national
stockbrokerage
firm
1976
Questionnaire,
frequency
distribution
Importance of
financial
statements
Size of investment 
portfolio, education and 
training in accounting 
and business 
administration
Long'term capital gains and dividend income 
were the most important investment objectives. 
Annual reports were considered to be the most 
important source, of Information. Income 
statement, balance sheet and footnotes were 
most important annual reports* sections for 
institutional investors and analysts. Importance 
of financial statements increases with size of 
portfolio and with education and training in 
accounting and business administration.
Lee and
Tweedie
(1981)
Institutional 
investor and 
financial 
information
231 UK
institutional
investors,
including
stockbrokers.
1975-1976 Times 
1000, Members of 
the Issuing 
Houses
Association, Stock 
Exchange Official 
Year Book
Interview data 
analysis, frequency 
distribution, 
Kendall’s
coefficient of rank 
correlations, chi 
square test
Overall weighted  
index of 
understanding
Inflation accounting 
matters, traditional 
reporting practice, 
readership,
shareholdings, portfolio 
valuation, investment 
decisions, investment 
experience, use 
experience, accounting 
experience,
96% of institutional investors understood 
reports but only 87% use them in decision 
making. Profit and loss account and balance sheet 
w ere more frequently read by institutional 
investors than stockbrokers who read mostly the 
chairm an’s and director's reports. Investors' 
experience in investments negatively impacts on 
their use of accounting information. A significant 
inverse relationship was found between 
readership and understanding of annual reports.
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Study (by Event Sam ple size  Sam ple so u rce  M ethodology D ep en d en t In d e p e n d e n t Sum m ary  o f s tu d y  re su lts
d a te  o rd e r )  an d  ap p lied  v a riab le  v a riab le
te s ts
Anderson
(1981)
Usefulness of 
accounting and 
other
information 
disclosed in 
corporate 
annual reports 
to institutional 
investors in 
Australia
188 Australian
institutional
Investors
Share register of 
15 Australian 
companies
Questionnaire,
frequency
distribution
Dividend income and capital gains were the most 
important investment objectives. Corporate 
report was the main source of information. Also, 
company's visits were viewed as of maximum 
importance. Profit and loss accounts, balance 
. sheet, footnotes, and the chairman’s reports were 
read to make decisions. More disclosure is 
required in management reports, accounting 
policies and future prospects.
Chang, Most 
and Brain 
(1983)
Utility of 
annual reports
4000 individual 
investors, 900  
institutional 
investors, 900  
financial analysts 
U.S., U.K. and New 
Zealand
Master list of US 
individual 
investors, 
directories, 
financial analysts’ 
directory 
Share registers of 
3 large public UK 
companies 
Registers of New 
Zealand public 
corporations
Questionnaire, 
Student-Newman- 
Keuls multiple 
range test, t-test
Annual reports w ere the most im portant source 
of information for US respondents. In the UK, 
individual investors selected newspapers, 
institutional investors selected annual reports 
and analysts highly rated  communication with 
management. In New Zealand, individual 
investors relied on newspapers in making 
decisions compared to institutional investors 
who relied on stockbrokers’ advice. Annual 
reports were used by New Zealand analysts. 3 
basic financial statem ents were the most 
im portant parts of annual reports for all 
respondents, except for New Zealand analysts. 
Institutional investors and analysts' groups were 
homogenous compared to individual investors 
who were heterogeneous.
Gnlewosz
(1990)
Share
investment 
decision 
process and 
information 
use
Australian 
institutional 
investors and 
analysts
A leading
Australian
Company
An exploratory case 
study; direct 
observations, tape 
recording, analysis 
of company’s 
documents
Annual reports were the most Important source 
of Information. Annual Reports were used to 
confirm information obtained from other 
sources, evaluate accuracy of forecasts, and to 
establish financial performance trends.
Epstein and 
P ava(1993)
Shareholders' 
use of 
corporate 
annual reports
246 US 
shareholders
A professional list 
company with 
over 3 million 
shareholders
Questionnaire, chi- 
square test, 
frequency 
distribution, z- 
statistics 1973 and 
1991
Readership of
financial
statements
Usefulness of financial 
statements
Shareholders (52.7%) believed annual reports to 
be of m oderate use and only 21.3% considered 
them to be useful. They considered the balance 
sheet, income statem ent, and statem ent of cash 
flows to be useful. A significant relationship was 
found between readership and usefulness of all 
three financial statem ents.
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Study (by Event Sam ple size  Sam ple so u rce  M ethodology  D ep en d en t In d e p e n d e n t S um m ary  of s tu d y  re su lts
d a te  o rd e r )  an d  ap p lied  v a riab le  v a riab le
te s ts
Abu-Nassar
and
Rutherford
(1995)
Preparers' 
attitudes to 
financial 
reporting
83 Jordanian 
listed companies
Amman Financial 
Market, published 
articles
Questionnaire,
frequency
distribution,
Spearman rank
correlation
coefficient,
Spearman
correlation
coefficient two-
tailed test
Disclosure 
voluntary index 
(25 items) 
Weighted
Firm size Most im portant report users w ere management 
followed by individual and institutional 
Investors. Company chairman and finance 
d irector w ere found to be involved in disclosure 
decisions. Regulatory bodies, Amman Financial 
M arket and auditors' proposals w ere found to 
influence disclosure practice. Cost of preparation 
was considered the main cost of voluntary 
disclosure. Improved image and reputation were 
the m ost significant benefits of voluntary 
disclosure. Firm's size was positively correlated 
w ith benefits o f stability of share price and 
negatively with perceived preparation costs and 
competitive disadvantage.
Anderson 
and Epstein 
(1995)
Usefulness of 
annual reports
436 Australian
individual
shareholders
Share registers of 
4 large Australian 
companies
Questionnaire,
frequency
distribution
Individual investors relied mostly on the advice 
of stockbrokers and financial newspapers. Few 
(14.4%) only relied on the analysis of annual 
reports to make decisions. The most useful 
sections were performance by business segment
Abu-Nassar
and
Rutherford
(1996)
Importance of 
financial 
reports in less 
developed 
countries
224 Jordanian 
external users: 
Individual, 
institutional 
investors, loan 
officers, 
stockbrokers, 
academics
Questionnaire, 
mean values, 
Cronbach's 
coefficient Alpha 
test, Kruskal-Wallis 
test
Individual investors made low use of annual 
reports compared to  institutional investors and 
loan officers. Annual reports w ere considered to 
be a m ajor source of information followed by 
visits to companies. Income statem ent and 
balance sheet w ere most im portant sections.
Anderson 
and Epstein 
(1996)
Usefulness of 
corporate 
annual reports 
to shareholders 
in Australia, 
New Zealand, 
and the United 
States: An 
International 
Comparison
246 US
Shareholders, 436  
Australian 
shareholders, 251 
New Zealand 
shareholders
Professional list 
company, Share 
registers of 
Australian and 
New Zealand
Questionnaire, 
frequency 
distribution, chi- 
square statistic
More US investors relied on the analysis of 
annual reports than investors in Australia and 
New Zealand who relied on stockbrokers’ advice. 
Profit and loss account was the most read section 
in the 3 countries. More disclosure needed for 
balance sheet, income statem ent and pending 
litigation
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Bartlett and
Chandler
(1997)
Corporate 
report and 
private 
shareholder: 
Lee and 
Tweedie 
twenty years 
on
76 UK private 
shareholders of a 
large multi­
national
pharmaceuticals
company
1994
Times Top 100 
(1994)
Companies House
Questionnaire, 
mean scores, Mann- 
Whitney U tests 
and Kruskal-Wallis 
H tests, Chi-square 
tests, Pearson’s 
correlation
A decline in readership of balance sheet, profit 
and loss account, and chairman's re p o r t More 
than half of respondents indicated need for 
summary reports instead of full annual reports.
Barker
(1998)
Market for 
information* 
evidence from 
finance 
directors, 
analysts and 
fund managers
40 UK finance 
directors, 74 
analysts, 39 fund 
managers.
FT-SE 100 stocks 
per sector, ASB, 
FT’s Lex articles, 
annual reports, 
Extel survey
Questionnaire, 
participant 
observation, semi­
structured 
interviews, 
descriptive 
statistics, Kendall's 
coefficient of 
concordance, 
Wilcoxon Test 
probability
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Company's announcement of final results and 
direct contact with the company of greater 
relevance than annual reports. Annual reports 
and raw data were more Important than 
processed data from analysts.
Hossain and
Taylor
(1998b)
Information 
needs of major 
groups of 
corporate 
annual reports
300 users: stock 
exchange 
members, 
professional 
chartered 
accountants, bank 
loan officers, 
financial analysts, 
Pakistan, India, 
Bangladesh
Member’s 
Directory of the 
list of stock  
exchange, 
Directory of 
Members of 
Institute of 
Chartered 
Accountants, 
Investment 
Corporation, 
Address Book of 
companies
Questionnaire (98  
items), mean 
values, Kruskal- 
Wallis, Mann- 
Whitney test
Corporate annual report was perceived to be the 
most im portant source of information. Balance 
sheet was the most im portant part of the annual 
report in the th ree countries. High degree of 
consensus among respondents in the three 
countries.
Hodge
(2003)
Investors' 
Perceptions of 
earnings 
quality, auditor 
independence 
and usefulness 
of audited 
financial 
information
414 US Individual 
investors
Membership base 
of a regional 
chapter of NAIC.
Questionnaire, 
paired-samples t- 
test
(199Qand2000), 
chi-squared test, 
Pearson correlation mmwmmmmmmmmrmm
Investors positively and significantly relied on 
financial reports for Investing purposes and 
therefore had lower assessments of earnings 
quality.
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Al-Razeen 
and Karbhari 
(2004a)
Users'
perceptions of 
importance of 
corporate 
sources of 
information
303 Saudi users:
Individual
investors,
institutional
investors,
creditors,
government
officials, financial
analysts
Questionnaire, 
descriptive 
statistics, Kruskal- 
Wallis H test, 
Mann-Whitney U, 
Kendall’s 
coefficient of 
concordance, W
Annual report was ranked first followed by 
interim  reports and direct information from 
company. Friend's advice and m arket rum ours 
perceived to be of less importance. Institutional 
investors and creditors dem onstrated highest 
agreem ent and individual investors 
dem onstrated the lowest level of agreem ent
Al-Razeen 
and Karbhari 
(2004b)
Importance 
and use of 
corporate 
information
303 Saudi users:
Individual
investors,
institutional
investors,
creditors,
government
officials, financial
analysts
Questionnaire, 
descriptive 
statistics, Kruskal- 
Wallis H test, 
Mann-Whitney U, 
Kendall’s 
coefficient of 
concordance, W
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Income statement was the most important 
section followed by balance sheet while notes to 
financial statements and director’s report were 
least important Individual Investors agreed least 
with each others' views of the importance of 
reports’ sections,
Hodge and 
Pronk (2005)
Impact of 
Expertise and 
Investment 
Familiarity on 
Investors’ Use 
of Online 
Financial 
Report 
Information
US Professional 
investors and 
non-professional 
investors
W ebsite of Royal 
Philips
Electronics N.V. 
2003
Online survey, 
examination of 
online annual 
report, Frequency 
distribution, chi- 
square test
Professional investors paid more attention to 
income statem ent and statem ent of cash flows 
than non-professional investors who paid 
attention to management discussion and analysis 
report. Investors' expertise influenced the use of 
financial reports and type of information 
investors’ focus on within quarterly reports.
Al-Razeen 
and Karbhari 
(2007)
Importance, 
use, and 
technicality of 
Saudi annual 
reports
Individual
investors,
institutional
investors,
creditors,
government
officials, financial
analysts
Questionnaire 
(303), Cronbach's 
alpha, Kendal's 
coefficient of 
concordance W, 
Kruskal-Wallis H, 
Mann-Whitney U. If®
Balance sheet and income statement were the 
most important sections of annual report to most 
of the Saudi users. Individual investors indicated 
that the language of most of the sections of the 
annual reports is fairly complicated.
4.2.2 Survey Studies on the Importance of a List of Disclosure Items
Several empirical studies have investigated the importance of a list of disclosure items to user 
groups using the questionnaire approach. The studies vary in the num ber of information 
items included in the list which w ere selected based on the interests of user groups. In some 
studies, a single user group was asked to rate the importance of selected items in making 
decisions (Ho and Wong, 2003). Other studies asked multiple user groups to rank the 
importance of the disclosure items in annual reports for making their decisions (Beattie and 
Pratt, 2002). Table 4.2 summarises prior research examining the importance of a list of 
disclosure items.
In the U.S., Benjamin and Stanga (1977) investigated the disclosure needs of 600 bank loan 
officers and 600 financial analysts. A questionnaire was sent to them including 79 items of 
disclosure asking them  to judge the importance of each item on five-point scale. The null 
hypothesis was rejected for 51 items out of the 79. They reported that the financial analysts 
rely less on forecasted information than the bank loan officers. However, both groups agreed 
upon the importance of the breakdown of sales, comparative financial statements, dividend 
policy, and separate disclosure of expense items.
Similarly, Firth (1978) examined the importance of disclosures in corporate annual reports 
and the differences in views among the surveyed groups in the U.K. He sent 750 
questionnaires to financial directors, auditors, financial analysts and loan officers. The 
respondents were asked to rate 75 disclosure items on a five-point scale. Firth (1978) found 
that historical accounting information was perceived very im portant compared to future 
forecasts which received m oderate im portant responses. This contradicts the findings of 
Chenhall and Juchau (1977). The author found that there was a similarity in views between 
finance directors and auditors. Also, the study reported that financial analysts and bank loan 
officers had similar views in their importance ratings. Firth (1978) suggested that the high 
degree of consensus in the U.K. indicates that the issuance of only one annual report would 
satisfy the need of the various users of accounts. However, he did not consider the perception 
of individual investors.
However, most of the studies lack the comparison of the perceptions of both report users and 
accounting principle regulators. Wallace (1988) has considered this in his study conducted in 
Nigeria. He m easured the intranational and international consensus on the importance of 102 
disclosed items in Nigerian annual reports. 1200 questionnaires were mailed to chartered 
accountants, investors, senior servants, managers, financial analysts, professional users, and
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board members of the IASC. Only 39.2% responded to Wallace [1988] questionnaires. The 
respondents were asked to rank the disclosed items on a five-point scale. Wallace [1988] 
found that there is a high degree of consensus between Civil Servants and financial analysts 
[98%], managers and investors [96%], other professionals and investors [96%], and financial 
analysts and managers [93%]. The weak consensus was reported between the accountants 
and other users' group. The accountant user-group least preferred 53 out of 102 items when 
compared to other user-groups (Wallace, 1988]. Interestingly, the study revealed that only 
the government user-group perceived that developing countries is in a need for set of items 
different than those found in developed countries. Wallace [1988] concluded tha t the Nigerian 
report users' perceives the importance of disclosure in a different way than the Board 
members of IASC and the users in developed countries.
In the U.K., Beattie and Pratt [2002] tested the usefulness of 130 disclosure items. A 
questionnaire was sent to 1,645 professional and non-professional users and 33% were 
received back. Respondents were asked to rate the usefulness of these items for making 
investment decision on a five-point scale. The highly rated categories w ere financial, 
background, strategy and objective, and managem ent analysis and discussion. On the other 
hand, Risks and opportunities w ere poorly rated by user groups (Beattie and Pratt, 2002]. The 
study concluded that finance directors placed higher value on cost and revenue data, industry 
structure, m anagem ent plans, and forecasts of non-financial key performance indicators 
compared to investors who placed higher value on financial return data, human capital, risk of 
loss, identity of major shareholders, and director's compensation. Also, Beattie and Pratt 
[2002] reported that audit partners find managem ent discussion and analysis very helpful in 
the comparison with the private investors.
Studies conducted in developed and developing countries have brought about similar and 
different findings (see table 4.2]. First, agreem ent was reported between managers and 
analysts regarding the importance of the list of disclosure items. Second, the statem ent of cash 
flows was more highly rated by respondents than balance sheet and profit and loss account. 
Third, in developed countries, future data was more highly rated than in developing countries. 
Fourth, studies showed that users' perceptions had changed over time and it was therefore 
difficult to make direct comparisons between developed and developing countries. For 
example, disclosure policies were highly rated by some respondents and moderately rated by 
others in developed countries and of both high and m oderate importance to respondents in 
developing countries.
T a b l e  4.2:  Em pirica l  S tud ies  o f  Users'  P er c ep t io n s  o f  the Im p o r ta n c e  o f  a List  o f  Disc lo sure  I tems.
Chandra
(1974)
Consensus between 
users and preparers 
of accounting 
information
318 US certified 
public accountants, 
180 chartered 
financial analysts
Alphabetic List of 
Members of the 
American Institute of 
CPAs, Directory of 
Members of the 
Institute of CFAs
Questionnaire 
(58 items), pair­
wise comparison 
of means, t-test
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Accountants did not value 
information for equity Investment 
decisions in the same way as 
financial analysts. Accountants had 
equivalent value preferences in their 
dual roles as preparers and users of
Benjamin and
Stanga
(1977)
Differences in 
Disclosure Needs of 
Major Users of 
Financial Statements
208 US Commercial 
bank loan officers 
and 207 financial 
analysts
Dun and Bradstreet’s 
Million Dollar 
Directory,
membership directory 
of Institute of 
Chartered Financial 
Analysts.
Questionnaire 
(79 items), Chi- 
square, mean 
scores, standard 
deviation.
Financial analysts relied less on 
forecasted information than loan 
officers.
Chenhall and
Juchau
(1977)
Investor
informational needs
476 Australian 
investors
2 Investor interest 
groups involved in 
trading activity
Questionnaire 
(37 items), mean 
values, standard 
deviation, 
coefficients of 
variation, chi- 
square
Future data were the most important 
item followed by contemporary and 
historical data. Financial statements 
were the most important source of 
information followed by 
stockbrokers' advice.
Firth (1978) Importance of 
Disclosure of 
Individual Items in 
Corporate Annual 
Reports
302 UK financial 
directors, auditors, 
financial analysts 
and loan officers
Times 1000 
1977-1978 
London: Times Books 
(1977)
Questionnaire 
(75 items), mean 
scores, t 
statistics
Historical accounting information 
was more im portant than future 
forecasts. Consensus was found in 
the views of finance directors and 
auditors, and in the views of analysts 
and loan officers.
Adelberg
(1979)
Disclosures Contained 
in Financial Reports: 
means of
communicating or 
manipulation?
1.536 certified 
public accountants,
1.536 chartered 
financial analysts 
16 US
corporations
1974-1975
American Institute of 
Certified Public 
Accountants, 
membership directory 
of the Financial 
Analysts Federation, 
American Institute of 
Certified Public 
Accountants' NAARS 
system
Cloze Readability 
test, one-tailed t* 
test, Pearson 
Product-Moment 
correlation 
coefficient
Cloze readability 
procedure scores
Dollar change in earnings 
per share
Standard format footnotes and 
management analysis of operations 
were difficult to understand. In 
contrast, auditor's report and non­
standardised footnotes were easy to 
read and understand. 
Understandability of auditor's report 
and non-standard format footnotes 
influenced the performance of 
earnings per share.
Wallace Intranational and 470 Nigerian users: Register of members Questionnaire Respondents highly rated auditor's
(1988) international Chartered of ICAN, registers of (102 items), report, statem ent of cash flows,
consensus on the accountants, active clients of frequency disclosure policies, and am ount of
importance of investors, stockholders, list of distribution, revenues and fixed assets. Date of
disclosure items in shareholders, senior em ployees mean score, incorporation, information on
Nigerian financial senior civil working in all Mann-Whitney employee morale, and 10-year
reports servants, ministries, Nigerian test of comparative income statem ent and
managers, financial Institute of significance, balance sheet w ere considered of low
analysts, Management, stock- Kruskal-Wallis importance. High degree of
professionals, and broking firms, consensus between the sampled user
25 board members registers of groups, except between accountants.
of the IASC professional bodies Nigerian users' perceived 
importance of items differed from 
that of IASC board members.
Ibrahim and User-groups' 311 users: Register of members Questionnaire Amount of revenue, fixed assets,
Kim (1994) consensus on Accountants, of Egyptian (42 financial statement of cash flows, management
financial disclosure managers, financial Association of items), Mann- policies, and auditor's report were
preferences analysts, Certified Auditors and Whitney test, highly rated by respondents. Income
shareholders Accountants, list of 
shareholdings, 
Egyptian National 
Institute of 
Management, 
stockbroking firms 
and insurance 
companies
Kruskal-Wallis
mwrnmsmm
tax payments, accumulated 
depreciation, and personnel 
development expenditure were 
considered to be of low importance. 
Moderate levels of consensus 
between accountants and managers 
and analysts.
Beattie and Voluntary Annual 159 UK Expert Members of UKSIP, UK Questionnaire Highly rated  items were financial
Pratt (2002) Report Disclosures: users, 235 private Society of Investment (130 items), data, background data and
What Users Want shareholders, 83 Professionals, leading analysis of m anagement discussion and analysis.
finance directors, firms, corporate interview (22) Risk and opportunities data were
61 audit partners lending banks, UK 
Shareholders' 
Association, ProShare, 
Top 20 UK audit firms
data, mean,
standard
deviation,
correlation,
concentration
ratio, pairwise
group
comparison,
Pearson
correlation
coefficient
poorly rated. Finance directors used 
forecasts, cost and revenue data, and 
industry data more than individual 
investors who placed high value on 
financial re turn  data, risk loss and 
major shareholders.
65
Study (by 
d a te  o rd e r )
Event Sam ple size Sam ple so u rce  M ethodology 
an d  ap p lied  
te s ts
Ho and Wong 
(2003)
Preparers' 
perceptions of 
corporate reporting 
and voluntary 
disclosures
98 Finance 
directors in Hong 
Kong
Hong Stock Exchange Questionnaire 
(35 items), mean 
values, Chi- 
square analysis, 
frequency 
distribution
D ep en d en t In d e p e n d e n t v a riab le  Sum m ary  o f s tu d y  re su lts
v a riab le
Perceived Firm size, industry
importance of
report users,
disclosure policies,
internal
participants,
influence of
external bodies,
current financial
reporting,
Finance directors perceived 
institutional investors to be the most 
im portant report users followed by 
creditors and analysts. Government 
and customers w ere the least report 
users. No association was found 
between firm size o r industry and 
any perception m easures of financial 
reporting.
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4.3 Empirical Studies on the Importance of the Management Discussion and Analysis 
Report
Recently, studies have empirically investigated the importance of the contents of the 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A} report, and their association with a company's 
characteristics (Cole and Jones, 2004}. Table 4.3 summarises several MD&A report studies. 
Studies conducted in developing countries have focused on the im portance of MD&A as part of 
their investigation of the importance of annual reports' sections.
Many studies focused on the readership and usefulness of m anagem ent discussion and 
analysis (MD&A} section of the annual report. It was reported tha t the annual report was read 
by 42% of U.S. investors and 34% of them only found it somewhat useful for their investment 
decisions (Epstein and Pava, 1993; Anderson and Epstein, 1996}. Recently, researchers 
investigated the quality of MD&A disclosure and how it is related to some of the firm's 
characteristics.
One of the empirical studies to examine the usefulness of MD&A as a prediction tool was that 
one conducted by Pava and Epstein (1993}. They tested w hether the data in m anagement 
discussion and analysis sections (MD&A} of 25 U.S. companies provided useful clues to a 
company's future performance. They hypothesised that positive forecasts should have 
resulted in improved performance in the following year and negative forecasts should have 
resulted the opposite. The MD&A was divided into back-ward looking and forward-looking 
information. A list of 104 economic events that might affect each selected company was 
prepared by Pava and Epstein (1993}. Overall, the study reported that m ost of the selected 
companies did a good job disclosing historical data. However, only 40% of the 104 items were 
correctly projected in the MD&A sections of the annual reports. The projected positive 
economic events were more than twice the negative ones. Also, the MD&A correctly projected 
company-specific events (49%} compared to industry-specific (25%} and economic-specific 
events (13%}. Pava and Epstein (1993} argued that managers might not report projected bad 
news because they are sensitive to the potential legal liability of their forecast and to a loss of 
business flexibility if they articulate future plans in writing.
Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1999} investigated the usefulness of Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MD&A} in the annual reports of 55 Toronto Stock Exchange firms. They 
developed an MD&A scoring sheet and asked the Toronto Society of Financial Analysts to 
score each of the MD&A components based on their relative importance. A total of 416 survey 
questionnaires w ere sent to sell-side analysts and 91 annual reports were searched for
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forward-looking information. Clarkson, Kao and Richardson (1999) found that 68 out of 91 
firms had significant forward looking disclosures about fiscal year 1993 that had not 
previously disclosed in the press. In addition, the respondents believed that MD&A provides 
new information not available from outside sources, financial statem ents and footnotes. The 
authors m easured the quality of MD&A by relating it to a num ber of variables such as size, 
listing status, expected firm performance and CEO turnover. They reported that the MD&A 
disclosure quality positively associated with firm performance, financing activity, size, press 
releases at the 10% level and negatively related to occurrence of major events at the 5% level.
4.4 Empirical Studies on Corporate Governance Disclosures
Blair (1995, p.3) defined corporate governance as a "whole set o f legal, culture, and 
institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded corporations can do, who 
controls them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks and returns from  the activities 
they undertake are allocated".
Tricker (1984) identified four sources of corporate power: ownership, corporate directors, 
managerial and institutional shareholders. According to Kothari (2000), the quality of 
financial disclosure is influenced by the quality of accounting standards and other 
institutional factors. Institutional factors tha t affect the demand and supply of financial 
information are: the nature of corporate governance, the legal system, and the exercise and 
enforcement of laws governing investor protection and disclosure standards (Kothari, 2000, 
p.90). Implementing more corporate governance mechanisms strengthens internal 
monitoring and raises the corporate disclosure level (Lakhal, 2005).
Corporate governance is one of the main issues that have been investigated in the financial 
reporting area. A num ber of studies have investigated the importance of a corporate 
governance structure and its relation to the quality of annual reports. Table 4.4 presents some 
of these corporate governance studies.
Disclosure of corporate governance is required in some countries while it is voluntary in 
others. Some studies investigated the compliance of listed companies with the code. For 
example, Werder, Talaulicar and Kolat (2005) examined the overall compliance of 408 listed 
German companies with the German corporate governance code and how the extent of the 
code compliance associated with the company's size. The study revealed that 4.9% of the 
sampled companies complied with all recommendations. However, the authors expect that 52 
companies will comply will all the recommendations in the future. In addition, Werder,
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Talaulicar and Kolat (2005) found that the acceptance for the code increases with the size of 
the companies. In contrast, smaller companies believed that the code is a good instrum ent for 
communicating their corporate governance. Finally, Werder, Talaulicar and Kolat (2005) 
argued that the code norms do not contain clear-cut verbalised guidelines which can be 
complied with by a simple "yes" or "no" (p. 185, par. 7).
Some studies investigated the users' perception about the impact of corporate governance on 
certain voluntary disclosure. For instance, in the U.K., Solomon, Solomon, Norton, and Joseph 
(2000) investigated the users' perceptions regarding the risk disclosure and w hether their 
opinions were influenced by their views towards corporate governance. They sent 
questionnaires to 552 institutional investors. Solomon, Solomon, Norton, and Joseph, (2000) 
reported a num ber of findings. First, almost a third of the sampled group agreed that 
increased risk disclosure would help them in making portfolio investm ent decisions. Second, 
the respondents' attitudes towards risk disclosure were influenced by their perception of 
corporate governance on a m oderate level. Thirdly, pension and insurance fund companies 
specifically, seemed to agree with the view that corporate governance process should aim to 
encourage best reporting practice. Fourth, institutional investors believed that the general 
statem ent of business risk disclosed in annual reports is inadequate. Finally, Solomon, 
Solomon, Norton, and Joseph (2000) concluded that the current voluntary disclosures' 
framework should be maintained.
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Table 4.3: Empirical Studies of  the Usefulness and Extent of  the Management Discussion and Analysis  Report.
Study (by E vent Sam ple size Sam ple so u rce  M ethodology D ep en d en t In d e p e n d e n t v a riab le  Sum m ary  of s tu d y  re su lts
d a te  o rd e r )  an d  ap p lied  v a riab le
te s ts
Hooks and 
Moon (1993)
MD&A compliance 30 listed US 
companies, annual 
reports for years 
1988,1989,1990
Standard and Poor's 
Stock Reports Index
Disclosure 
classification 
scheme (60 
MD&A items), 
disclosure 
frequency, 
McNemar test
Effectiveness of classification scheme 
in analysing MD&A Items. 
Frequencies of MD&A disclosure 
increased after the  Issuance of FRR 
36.
Pava and
Epstein
(1993)
How Good is MD&A as 
an Investment Tool?
25 US companies Moody's Handbook of 
Common Stocks
Correlation MD&As' items (104  
items): historical; 
forward-looking; 
industry-and- 
economy specific
Company’s actual 
performance in the year 
following MD&A 
statement disclosure
Projected positive events were more 
than twice negative ones. Managers 
were more successful in predicting 
company-specific events than future 
events.
Bryan (1997) Incremental 
information content 
of required 
disclosures contained 
in Management 
Discussion and 
Analysis
250 management 
discussion and 
analysis sections in 
annual reports of 
US companies 
1990
CRSP database, 
Securities Act Release 
No. 6231
OLS regression 
analysis
MD&A information 
content
Future (short-term) 
performance measures 
and investment decisions
Sampled reports had more 
unfavourable than favourable 
disclosure for revenue changes and 
cost changes. Sales volume and future 
liquidity position w ere positively 
associated with one-period ahead 
changes in sales. Revenue changes 
and sales forecast revision positively 
impact on future liquidity and sales
Barron and 
Kile (1999)
MD&A quality as 
measured by SEC and 
analysts' earnings 
forecasts
284 US project 
firms
Institutional Brokers 
Estimate System, SEC, 
DCF branch offices
Scoring sheets,
regression
analysis,
descriptive
statistics,
Pearson
pairwise
correlation
Dispersion and 
error in analysts’ 
forecasts
MD&A score, surprise, St. 
Dev. ROE, total assets, 
market value of equity, no. 
of analysts, no. of press 
releases, no. of firm cites, 
% of new forecasts.
MD&A negatively correlated with 
individual forecast e rro r and 
dispersion. High quality MD&A 
results in a more level informational 
playing field for analysts.
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Study (by Event
date order)
Sam ple size  Sam ple so u rce  M ethodology
an d  ap p lied  
te s ts
Clarkson, Kao Usefulness of 55 public Canadian Toronto Stock Regression
and management firms Exchange analysis
Richardson discussion and 1991*1992
(1999) analysis.
Cole and Usefulness of MD&A 160 in-store-retail EDGAR or Lexis-Nexis Regression
Jones (2004) disclosures in Retail business analysis,
Industry descriptive
statistics,
Pearson
correlations
D ep en d en t In d e p e n d e n t v a riab le  S um m ary  o f s tu d y  re su lts
v a riab le
MD&A disclosure 
quality score
Future changes in 
revenues, changes 
in income, 
contemporaneous 
stock returns
Firm performance, 
financing activity, CEO, 
listing status, firm size, 
major event, analyst 
following, product market 
considerations, 
information asymmetry, 
other disclosure channel
MD&A disclosure was positively 
related with firm performance, 
financing activity, equity offering, and 
firm size and negatively with 
occurrence of m ajor events.
MD&A disclosures: Store 
sales growth, changes in 
sales growth, store 
openings, closings, capital 
expenditures, planned 
capital expenditures
Change in store sales growth and 
stores openings positively affects 
future changes in revenues. MD&A 
disclosures were associated with 
changes in future earnings and 
contemporaneous stock returns.
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Table 4.4: Empirical  Studies of  Corporate Governance and Disclosure.
Sam ple so u rce M ethodology 
an d  ap p lied  
te s ts
D ep en d en t
v a riab le
In d e p e n d e n t v a riab le Sum m ary  o f s tu d y  re su lts
Demsetz and 
Lehn(1985)
Causes and 
consequences of 
ownership structure
511 large U.S. 
firms
406 manufacturing 
and mining firms 
(subsample)
Corporate Data 
Exchange (CDE) Stock 
Ownership Directory: 
Energy (1980), 
Banking and Finance
(1980), Fortune 500
(1981)
OLS regression
analysis,
descriptive
statistics,
t-statistics,
frequency
% of shares owned
by top5and top20
shareholders,
Herfindahl index of
ownership
concentration: all
investors, family
and individual
investors,
institutional
investors
Model 1: Firm size, 
instability of firm's 
environment, instability in 
accounting profit rates, 
systematic regulation 
Model 2: accounting profit 
rate, firm size, ratios to 
sales of capital 
expenditures, advertising, 
R&D
Regulatory climate index
Profit instability and regulatory 
climate w ere positively related  to 
ownership concentration. Ownership 
concentration was higher in small 
size firms. Regulated firms had less 
concentration of ownership. Media 
firms had greater ownership 
concentration because of greater 
family and individual holdings.
Forker Corporate 182 UK listed firms Times 1000 Pearson Share option Proportion of options held Administrative costs of disclosure,
(1 9 9 2 ) governance and 1987-1988 DataStream correlation disclosure by directors, size, proportion of options held by
disclosure quality London Business Multivariate Unweighted proportion of non­ directors and dominated firms
School Risk probit model executive directors, audit negatively impact on quality of
Assessm ent Service committee, existence of 
dominant personality, 
interest of directors in 
equity of firm, big auditing 
firm, interest in 
withholding information 
on options, potential gain 
from withholding 
information on options
disclosure. The higher the value of 
options held by directors, the lower 
the disclosure quality for large firms.
Mangel and Ownership structure, 100 US largest Fortune 100 list, Pearson CEO cash Size, performance, tenure, The longer the  tim e CEO in position,
Singh (1993) board relationships firms CD Disclosure correlation, OLS compensation board composition, file higher the CEO pay. Institutional
and CEO 1988 databases regression director compensation, ownership and percentage of shares
compensation analysis external ownership, 
institutional equity, 
director equity, CEO 
equity
held by directors negatively influence 
CEO pay. Size and performance were 
positively significant.
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Study (by
date order)
Event Sam ple size Sam ple so u rce  M ethodology 
an d  ap p lied  
te s ts
Agrawal and
Knoeber
(1 9 9 6 )
Firm performance 
and mechanisms to 
control agency 
problems
383 large US firms 
1987
Forbes magazine’s 
annual survey of top 
executive 
compensation, 
DISCLOSURE CD-ROM, 
Standard and Poor's 
Register of 
Corporations, 
Directors, and 
Executives, 
COMPUSTAT annual 
files
La Porta, 
Lopez-de- 
Silanes, and 
Shleifer 
(1 9 9 9 )
Corporate ownership 
around the world
540 large firms, 
151 medium firms, 
27 countries 
1995/1996/1997
WorldScope database, 
book, Lexis/Nexis, 
internet
OLS
regression, 
two-stage 
least squares 
procedure
Frequency,
t-tests, .
cross*
sectional
regression
analysis
D ep en d en t
v a riab le
In d e p e n d e n t v a riab le S um m ary  o f s tu d y  re su lts
7 Control
mechanisms:
Insider
shareholdings, 
outside 
blockholders 
shareholdings, 
institutional 
shareholdings, 
outsider 
membership on 
board, firm-specific 
human capital, use 
of debt, no. of firms 
acquired over 
preceding 7 years 
within industry, 
firm performance
Antidirector index 
Weighted 
Corruption index
Std. deviation of stock  
returns, firm size, 
regulation, tenure, 
presence of a founding 
CEO, no. of officers and 
directors, industry R&D to 
asset ratio, NYSE listing, 
avg. no. of institutional 
shareholders for firms in 
industry, diversification, 
age of CEO, no. of outside 
job opportunities, cash 
flow return, all 7 
mechanisms,
Active outside shareholders create 
pressure to rely on m arket to 
evaluate managers. Greater insider 
shareholdings, fewer outside 
directors, less corporate debt, and 
less active m arket for corporate 
control all lead to improved firm 
performance.
Widely held firms, 
ultimate owners (family, 
State, widely held 
financial institutions, 
widely held corporations, 
miscellaneous), voting 
rights S: 20%, voting rights 
a 10%, cross­
shareholdings, pyramid 
ownership structure, 
family-controlled firms, 
management, 
independent financials, 
associated financials, 
single controlling 
shareholder, common 
/civil law, strong banks, 
dividends, tax, GDP per 
capita
Dominant form of controlling 
ownership in the world is by families. 
Dispersion of ownership is associated 
with good shareholder protection. 
State control is common in poor 
protection countries. Families 
manage the firms they control and 
have control rights over firms 
through pyramids. Controlling 
shareholders are not monitored by 
other large shareholders. Countries 
with greater ownership 
concentration and poor investor 
protection rely more on debts rather 
than equity.
Quality of investor protection is a 
main determinant of the occurrence 
of widely held firms.
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Study (by Event Sample size Sample source Methodology Dependent Independent variable Summary of study results
date order) and applied variable
tests
Ang, Cole and 
Lin (2000)
Agency costs and 
ownership structure
1708 small US C- 
corporations, 1992
National Survey of 
Small Business 
Finances
t-statistics,
chi-square
statistic,
multiple
regression
Agency cost, 
expense ratio, 
asset-utilisation  
ratio
No. of banks used by the 
firm, length of firm’s 
longest banking 
relationship, debt-to-asset 
ratio, firm age, industry 
type, size, ownership  
structure
Firms tha t are managed by an 
outsider and have a high num ber of 
non-manager shareholders have high 
agency costs. Agency costs vary 
inversely with the manager's 
ownership share and high external 
monitoring by banks.
Jiang and 
Kim (2000)
Cross-corporate 
ownership, 
information 
asymmetry and 
usefulness of 
accounting 
performance 
measures
16,561 non- 
financial and non­
utility Japanese 
companies 
1976-1994
Pacific-Basin Capital 
Market Research 
Centre at University of 
Rhode Island
Descriptive 
statistics, 
Pearson pair­
wise correlation 
coefficients, 
regression 
analysis
Annual stock 
returns
Level of cross-corporate 
shareholdings, return on 
total assets, firm size
Positive association betw een current 
re turns and low cross-owned firms, 
High cross-owned firms influence 
future profitability. Current m arket 
re turns were iower for large 
companies.
Solomon, 
Solomon, 
Joseph and 
Norton 
(2000b)
Institutional 
investors' views on 
corporate governance 
reform
97 U.K.
institutional
investors
National Association of 
Pension Funds Year 
Book (NAPF, 1997), 
Investment Trusts and 
Closed End Funds 
Manual (1997), 
Association of British 
Insurers List (1997), 
Unit Trust Yearbook 
(1997)
Questionnaire,
descriptive
statistics,
Principal
Components
Varimax
Orthogonal
Rotation (factor
analysis),
Kruskal- Wallis
tests
Certain initiatives with corporate 
governance were more relevant to 
institutional investors than others. 
Recent reform considered to be 
improved over period and it should 
be kept in the voluntary framework. 
Institutional investors are 
homogeneous in their attitudes 
towards corporate governance.
Bujaki and 
McConomy 
(2002)
Factors influencing 
voluntary corporate 
governance 
disclosure
290 publicly 
traded Canadian 
firms
Toronto Stock 
Exchange 300 index 
(1997)
Regression
analysis,
descriptive
statistics
Annual reports 
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(25 items)
Firm's financial condition, 
leverage, issuing 
additional share capital, 
number of financial 
analysts following firm, 
size, unrelated directors, 
regulated industries, 
disclosure medium
Highly leveraged firms, larger firms 
and firms w ith majority of unrelated 
directors provide voluntary 
corporate governance disclosure. 
Firms with extensive corporate 
governance disclosures choose less 
expensive medium ra th e r than 
disclosing via annual re p o r t
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Study (by Event Sample size Sample source Methodology Dependent Independent variable Summary of study results
date order) and applied variable
tests
Solomon, 
Solomon and 
P a rk (2002)
Evolving Role of 
Institutional 
Investors in South 
Korean Corporate 
Governance
50 South Korean 
fund managers
Korea Fund Research 
Database
Questionnaire,
interviews,
descriptive
statistics
Only 23% of respondents had a 
w ritten corporate governance policy. 
Reduce company's overall risks is the 
most im portant motive of corporate 
governance.
Lakhal
(2005)
Voluntary Earnings 
Disclosures and 
Corporate 
Governance
207 non-financial 
French firms 
1998-2001
SBF 250's index Logit regression 
analysis, 
descriptive 
statistics
Voluntary earnings 
disclosure 
concentration index 
Unweighted
Concentrated capital, 
foreign institutional 
ownership, proportion of 
outside directors, board 
size, unitary leadership 
structure, executive stock 
option compensation, firm 
performance, size, 
leverage, multi quotation, 
US quotation, industry 
type
Firms w ith , large controlling 
shareholder, high ownership 
concentration and French investors 
provided less voluntary earnings 
disclosures, Size, US listing, m ulti­
quotations, hi-technology industry 
and foreign investm ent influence 
disclosure of earnings.
Werder, 
Talaulicar 
and Kolat 
(2005)
Compliance with the 
German Corporate 
Governance Code
408 compliance 
statements of 
German companies
Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange
Content analysis,
descriptive
statistics
Only 4.9% of sampled firms complied 
with corporate governance code. The 
acceptance of corporate governance 
code increases as the size of the firm 
increases.
Al-Busaidi
(2005)
Role of corporate 
governance in 
improving 
functioning of a 
company’s board
15 board of 
directors, 14 listed 
companies, Oman
MSM publications, 
MDSRC database
Questionnaire,
interviews,
frequency
Corporate governance in Oman fairly 
covers all key concepts. Large 
dom inant shareholders in m ost listed 
companies. A gap in implementation 
of corporate governance practices.
Sheridan, 
Jones and 
Marston 
(2006)
Corporate
governance codes and 
supply of corporate 
information
5244 news 
announcements, 
46 companies, 
1989-2002, U.K.
London Stock 
Exchange Regulatory 
News Service
Sequential
regression
analysis
Total number of 
announcements 
issued per quarter
5 corporate governance 
codes issued in 1990s
The flow of corporate news increased 
as a function of the publication of 
corporate governance codes.
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4.5 Literature Review on Disclosure Indices' Studies
Disclosure indices are used to make inferences about disclosure adequacy (Ball and Foster, 
1982, p.199). They have been used to study the association between the extent of disclosure 
and some of the characteristics of the company disclosing the information. The main 
drawback of this approach is that the construction of the disclosure index and the awarding 
scores are based on the researcher's subjective judgm ent (Marston and Shrives, 1991).
There are two scoring methods that have been used in prior accounting research: weighted 
and unweighted scoring methods. There is an ongoing debate in the accounting literature 
regarding selection of the scoring method. A num ber of studies have applied either the 
weighted method (Hooks et al., 2002) or the unweighted method (Ahmed, 1996). Other 
studies have applied both scoring m ethods and found no differences in their results (Chow 
and Wong-Boren, 1987).
Previous studies have employed a disclosure index that relates the extent of information 
disclosed in the company's financial reports to certain company characteristics (e.g. firm size). 
Ahmed and Courtis (1999, p.37) indicated that reasons for selecting certain firm 
characteristics are related to agency costs, proprietary costs, political costs, corporate 
governance and monitoring, signalling and information asymmetry, litigation costs, and 
capital needs. They investigated the underlying factors for variations in the results of 29 
disclosure studies employing meta-analysis techniques. They confirmed a correlation 
between disclosure level and size, leverage and listing status.
Empirical studies of the adequacy of disclosure in annual reports can be divided into three 
types based on selected items: (1) aggregate disclosure, (2) mandatory disclosure, and (3) 
voluntary disclosure. Aggregate disclosure studies have investigated the extent of both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure in a company's financial reports. Table 4.5 summarises 
prior studies investigating the extent of disclosure in corporate reports.
The earliest study to investigate the adequacy of corporate reporting was conducted by Cerf 
(1961). As part of a large study, he examined the extent of corporate disclosure and how it is 
associated to a selected company's characteristics for a sample of 258 companies listed in the 
New York Stock Exchange, 113 companies listed in other stock exchanges, and 156 unlisted 
companies. A disclosure index was constructed containing 31 items. The author selected 
assets' size, profitability, the num ber of stockholders and stock m arket listing as the 
independent variables. Using regression analysis, Cerf (1961) found a significant positive
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relationship between the level of disclosure and assets' size, profitability and number of 
stockholders. In addition, the study revealed that institutional investors considered direct 
contact with company's m anagement to be an im portant source of information and relied on 
the balance sheet and income statement. Cerf (1961) recommended that accountants and 
professional bodies can help in the development of a better reporting and that analysts should 
indicate w hat information is needed for investm ent decisions.
It follows therefore that m ost of the earlier studies investigated the extent of disclosure only 
in large companies. Therefore a gap existed in the earlier research regarding small size 
companies. Buzby (1974) filled that gap by testing the relative importance of 38 of financial 
and non-financial items in the annual reports of 88 U.S. small and medium size companies. A 
questionnaire was mailed to 500 financial analysts. 26.2% of the mailed questionnaires were 
completed and returned. Buzby (1974) found that segmented reporting of income and sales 
were highly ranked by the respondents. However, out of the 66 firms that represented 
segment information, 69.7% did not provide segmented sales information and 92.4% did not 
provide segmented income data. Buzby (1974) concluded that there is a small correlation 
between the relative importance of the items and the extent of their disclosures in the small 
companies' annual reports. However, other studies have proved that generalization cannot be 
obtained over similar cases. For example, small companies with new issues disclosed more 
information in order to raise funds in comparison to large companies (Firth, 1980).
In Spain, Wallace, Naser, and Mora (1994) investigated the association between the level of 16 
mandatory items and firm characteristics. Annual reports of 30 listed non-financial firms and 
20 unlisted non-financial firms w ere collected by the authors. The study reported indexes 
ranged from 29% to 80%. In this study, the extent of disclosure was measured using size 
(total assets), gearing ratio, Liquidity ratio, earnings return, profit margin, industry type, 
listing status, and auditor type (Wallace, Naser, and Mora, 1994). Using statistical techniques, 
the study reported a significant positive relation between index of comprehensive disclosure 
of mandatory items and firm size (p=.003). It was also reported that firms with higher 
liquidity ratios tend to provide less detailed information in their reports (p=.044) and that 
listed Spanish companies provided more detailed information in their reports compared to 
unlisted companies (p=.008). Wallace, Naser, and Mora (1994) suggested that firms with low 
liquidity ratio tend to view their results as bad news and therefore they are accountable to 
provide report's users with detailed information.
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Recently, Owusu-Ansah (2005] investigated a num ber of company-specific characteristics 
that influence the extent of m andatory disclosure practices in New Zealand over a three-year 
period. He examined the disclosure of 149 non-financial listed companies using relative index 
and unweighted scoring approaches. Owusu-Ansah (2005} found th a t company age is the 
most critical factor influencing the extent of m andatory disclosure (p<0.01]. Also, he reported 
that company's size, existence of audit committee, profitability, liquidity [p<0.05] and type of 
external auditor are explanatory factors at least in two of the three years (p<0.01). Finally, 
Owusu-Ansah (2005} concluded that, though not statistically significant, proportion of shares 
held by insiders negatively influence the compliance of companies with disclosure 
requirements.
Empirical studies varied in the num ber of variables used to determine the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports. For instance, Haniffa and Cooke (2002} examined the 
relationship betw een a num ber of corporate governance, cultural, and firm-specific 
characteristics and the extent of 65 voluntary items in the annual reports of 167 Malaysian 
corporations. The study reported that the level of voluntary disclosure negatively associated 
with the non-executive director as chairperson (p<01} and the num ber of family members on 
the board (p<.05}. Haniffa and Cooke (2002} argued that owners have access to internal 
information therefore they less demand published information. Another reported finding was 
that cultural variables were not significantly associated with the level of disclosure. Also, the 
level of voluntary disclosure was positively related to assets-in-place, proportion of shares 
held by top ten shareholders, and foreign ownership at the 5% level (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002}. In measuring the impact of the industry type, construction sector disclosed more 
voluntary information compared to companies in other sectors. Finally, Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002} reported that profitability was significant at the 1% level and that the size and 
diversification were significant at the 5% level.
Other studies have compared factors affecting disclosure level in a num ber of countries. For 
example, Archambault and Archambault (2003} investigated the influence of national culture, 
national political systems, national economic systems, corporate financial systems and 
operating systems on the level of 85 disclosure items in the annual reports of 761 leading 
industrial companies. Archambault and Archambault (2003} reported that all the cultural, 
economic and political variables are significant at 1% level. Similarly, they found that large 
size companies and companies with high foreign sales provide m ore disclosure than other 
(p<0.000}. However, debt ratio was not a significant determ inant of the level of disclosure 
(Archambault and Archambault, 2003}. Finally, Archambault and Archambault (2003} argued
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that the factors in each of the above systems influence the level of corporate disclosure 
through their actions and this explains the variation in disclosure levels across countries 
fp.192).
Previous studies have used disclosure indices to examine the correlation between corporate 
governance structure and the level of disclosure (Seamer, 2007). For example, Eng and Mak 
(2003) examined the impact of corporate governance on voluntary disclosure of 158 firms 
listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore. They expected a negative relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and managerial and blockholder ownership and a positive relation with 
government ownership and the proportion of outside directors. A disclosure score sheet was 
developed and control variables w ere used to examine the proposed relationship. Eng and 
Mak (2003) found that managerial ownership (p=-0.288), proportion of outside directors (p=- 
0.157) and leverage (p=-0.17) negatively related to the voluntary disclosure. The negative 
impact of leverage contradicts the findings of some of the previous studies (Hossain, Perera 
and Rahman, 1995; Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995). In contrast, government ownership 
(p=0.369) and firm's size (p=0.345) had a positive impact on the voluntary disclosure. Eng 
and Mak (2003) concluded that the results are different due to the different role played by the 
independent directors.
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Table 4.5: Empirical  Studies of  the Extent of  disclosure in Corporate Reports .
Study (by Event Sam ple size Sam ple so u rce  M ethodology  D ep en d en t In d e p e n d e n t v a riab le  Sum m ary  of s tu d y  re su lts
d a te  o rd e r )  an d  ap p lied  v a riab le
te s ts
Em pirical S tud ies o f E xten t o f A ggregate D isclosure in  C o rp o ra te  R eports
Cerf (1961) Corporate reporting 
and investment 
decisions in US
258 listed 
companies in New 
York Exchange, 
113 companies 
listed in other 
exchanges, 156 
unlisted 
companies
Report of the 
Corporate Information 
Committee, Report to 
the Membership for 
the year 1955-1956, 
National Federation of 
Financial Analysts 
Societies, Standard and 
Poor's Corporation, 
Index to Stock and 
Bond Reports (Nov, 
1956 ed.)
Least square
regression
analysis,
descriptive
statistics,
Disclosure 
weighted index (31 
items)
Assets' size, profitability, 
ownership distribution, 
method of trading. Stock 
Exchange
Level of disclosure was influenced by 
assets' size, profitability and num ber 
of stockholders. Institutional 
investors relied on balance sheet and 
Income statem ent and considered 
direct contact with company the main 
source of information.
Singhvi and 
Desai (1971)
Quality of corporate 
financial disclosure
100 US listed firms 
and 55 unlisted 
firms
1965-1966
Fortune’s directory of 
1965
Multivariate
analysis
Disclosure score 
weighted index (34  
items)
Asset size, number of 
shareholders, listing 
status, CPA firm, rate of 
return, earnings margin.
Level of disclosure increases as asset 
size, num ber of shareholders, CPA 
firm, rate of return  and earnings 
margin increases. Contents of listed 
companies' annual reports were 
better than those of unlisted 
companies.
Choi (1973) Financial disclosure 
and entry to 
European Capital 
Market'
18 matched pairs 
of Euro-bond 
participants and 
non-participants 
from 11 countries
White Weld and 
Company, Ltd,, White 
Weld Securities, U.S.A. 
(weekly), Strauss, 
Turnbull and Company, 
Foreign Bond List, 
London, European 
Quotation Service, Rate 
Sheets (weekly), 
Morgan Guaranty 
Trust, World Financial 
Markets (monthly)
Wilcoxon
matched-pairs
signed-ranks
test,
64 5-year period 
annual reports 
Disclosure 
weighted and un­
weighted index(36 
items)
Entry to European capital 
market
Positive relationship was found 
betw een level of disclosure and entry 
to  European Capital m ark e t
Buzby(1974) Disclosure of 
segmental
information in annual 
reports
88 medium and 
small US listed 
firms
1970-1971
Moody's OTC Industrial 
Manual (1971), Wall 
Street Journal (1972)
Spearman’s rank 
correlation
Disclosure 
weighted index (38 
items)
Firm size A small correlation between relative 
importance of items and extent of 
their disclosure in small firms' 
reports
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Study (by Event Sample size Sample source Methodology Dependent Independent variable Summary of study results
date order)  and applied variable
tests
Buzby(1975) Determinants of 
disclosure level
4 4 US listed
manufacturing
firms and 44
unlisted
manufacturing
firms
Moody's OTC Industrial 
Manual (1971), Wall 
Street Journal (1972)
Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs 
test, Kendall 
rank correlation
Disclosure 
weighted index (39 
Items)
Asset-size, listing status Level of disclosure affected only by 
firm's asset size.
Robbins and
Austin
(1986)
Disclosure quality in 
governmental 
financial reports
99 US municipal 
annual reports 
1981-1982
Directory: Municipal 
Officers in U.S. Cities 
1981
Pearson 
correlation, 2 
sample t-test, 
multiple 
regression
Disclosure simple 
and compound 
index (27 items)
City government form, 
long-term debt per capita, 
inter-government 
Revenue/total revenue, 
audit firm size, per capita 
income, population, own 
revenue per capita
Disclosure quality was positively and 
significantly affected by government 
form, long-term debt per capita and 
intergovernmental revenue/total 
revenue.
Hossain and
Taylor
(1988)
Extent of disclosure in 
annual reports in 
developing countries: 
a study of India, 
Pakistan and 
Bangladesh
78 Bangladeshi 
non-financial 
companies, 80 
Indian companies, 
103 Pakistani 
companies
Dhaka Stock Exchange, 
Bombay Stock 
Exchange, Karachi 
Stock Exchange
Questionnaire,
Pair-wise
comparison,
descriptive
statistics
Weighted and 
unweighted Index 
(94 items)
Significant differences in levels of 
disclosure were found between 
Bangladesh-Indla and Bangladesh* 
Pakistan based on unweighted index 
and between Bangladesh-PakJstan 
and Pakistan-Indla based on 
weighted index. Lowest levels of 
disclosure appeared in Bangladesh 
and highest levels of disclosure In 
Pakistan.
Cooke(1989) Disclosure by 
Swedish companies
33 listed Swedish 
listed firms, 19 
multiple listed 
firms, 38 unlisted 
1985
Financial Information 
from the 4,000 Largest 
Companies in Sweden 
(1984)
Chi square, 
Cramer's V, one 
way analysis of 
variance, t-test, 
step-wise 
multiple 
regression
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(224 items)
Quotation status, firm 
size, parent company 
relationship
Quotation status and firm size were 
significant in explaining disclosure 
level.
Gibbins,
Richardson
and
Waterhouse
(1990)
Management of 
financial disclosure
20 companies (20 
interviews)
Interview transcripts Structured 
analysis of 
interview data 
Correlation
Disclosure output 
Unweighted
Disclosure position, 
antecedents of disclosure 
position, specific 
disclosure issued by firm, 
external consultants and 
advisors, structure
Corporate disclosure strategy 
explained voluntary disclosure. 
Industry norms influence disclosure 
position and thus disclosure outputs. 
Strong correlation between capital 
market and opportunism.
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date order)  and applied variable
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Cooke(1992) Impact of firm 
characteristics on 
disclosure in Japanese 
annual reports
35 listed Japanese
companies
1988
Japan Company 
Handbook
Multiple linear
regression
model,
descriptive
statistics
Annual reports 
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(165 items)
Firm size, stock market 
listing, industry type
Size and listing status significantly 
affected level of disclosure. Multiple 
and domestic listed manufacturing 
companies disclose a voluntary 
information more than those 
companies in other sectors.
Cooke(1993) Disclosure in 
Japanese corporate 
annual reports
13 unlisted 
Japanese 
companies, 25 
listed in Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, 10 
multiple listed. 
1988
Japan Company 
Handbook
Cochrans C and 
Bartlett-Box F- 
tests, t-test, 
Mann-Whitney 
U, Wilcoxon 
rank sum W test
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(195 items)
Quotation status Disclosures in Securities and 
Exchange Law reports were greater 
than in Commercial Code reports. 
Multiple listed companies provided 
more voluntary disclosure in both 
reports. ..........  .......
Malone, Fries 
and Jones 
(1993)
Investigation of 
extent of corporate 
financial disclosure in 
oil and gas Industry
41 US listed firms, 
84 unlisted firms, 
oil and gas 
industry
New York Stock 
Exchange, American 
Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ
Step-wise
regression
analysis,
Pearson's
product-
moment
correlations
125 annual reports 
Disclosure 
unweighted and 
weighted index 
(129 items)
Listing status, total assets, 
audit firm size, debt to 
equity, rate of return on 
net worth, industry 
diversification, net income 
to net sales, proportion of 
outside directors, 
presence of foreign 
operations, #  of 
shareholders
No significant association between 
the level of disclosure and asset size 
and rate of return. Disclosures in oil 
and gas industry were affected by 
debt-to-equity ratio, listing status and 
num ber of shareholders.
Nicholls and
Ahmed
(1995)
Disclosure quality in 
corporate annual 
reports of non- 
financial companies
98 Bangladeshi 
practising 
accountants, 157 
non-practising 
accountants, 136 
bank loan officers, 
and 55 financial 
analysts
63 annual reports 
1987-1988,30 
companies' reports 
1983-1988
Members list of 
Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of 
Bangladesh, Institute 
of Cost and 
Management 
Accountants of 
Bangladesh, 7 
commercial banks, 
Investment 
Corporation of 
Bangladesh 
Listed manufacturing 
companies
Questionnaire, t- 
test, Friedman 
test, Kendall 
coefficient of 
concordance 
test, Spearman 
rank
correlations
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(87 items)
5-year period disclosure 
Rankings of disclosure 
: Items by respondents
Most important section was balance 
sheet followed by profit and loss 
statement A wide gap existed 
between users' needs and actual 
disclosure. Differences in disclosure 
over 5 year period were significant. A 
significant association was found 
between actual disclosure and 
rankings of practising and non- 
practising accountants. Low 
compliance with disclosure rules.
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Ahmed
(1996)
Disclosure policy and
corporate
characteristics
118 Bangladeshi 
non-financial listed 
firms
1987-1988 and 
1992-1993
Dhaka Stock Exchange Multiple
regression
analysis
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(150 items)
Size, total debt, 
relationship with parent 
companies, qualification 
of principal accounting 
officer, size of audit firm
Multinational companies and large 
audit firms influenced overall extent 
of disclosure. Size, qualifications of 
accounting officer and debt w ere not 
significant.
Buhr and
Freedman
(1996)
A comparison of 
mandatory and 
voluntary 
environmental 
disclosure
68 large publicly 
traded Canadian 
firms and 68 US 
firms 
1994
US firms and Canadian 
firms
Paired t-tests, 
content analysis, 
Kruskal-Wallis 
one-way ANOVA
Annual reports, 
securities exchange 
filing,
environmental
reports
US companies provided more 
m andatory disclosure and Canadian 
companies provided m ore voluntary 
disclosure.
Lang and
Lundholm
(1996)
Corporate disclosure 
policy and analyst 
behaviour
7S1 US listed firms Report of the Financial 
Analysts Federation 
(FAF) Corporate 
Information 
Committee 
1985-1989
Regression,
simple
correlation
No. of analysts, Std. 
deviation of 
forecasts, forecast 
accuracy, revision 
volatility
Firm size, Std. dev. of ROE, 
return-earnings 
correlation, annual report 
other publications, 
investor relations, FAF 
scores
Firms with more informative 
disclosure had greater analyst 
following, more accurate forecasts 
and less dispersion. Investors’ 
relations were a significant 
determ inant of analysts' behaviour.
Zarzeski
(1996)
Effects of culture and 
market forces on 
disclosure practices
256 annual 
reports, 7 
countries (US, UK, 
France, Germany, 
Hong Kong, Japan, 
Norway)
Compustat Global 
Vantage (1990), 
International Brokers' 
Estimate System 
(1986-1992)
Descriptive 
statistics, OLS 
regression, 
Wald test
Investor-oriented 
disclosure index 
(52 items) 
Weighted and 
unweighted scores 
International 
dependence model 
(local vs,
international firms)
Market forces: foreign 
sales; debt ratio; firm’s 
asset-size 
Cultural forces: 
uncertainty avoidance; 
individualism vs. 
collectivism; masculinity; 
power distance
Firms with high foreign sales;, assets, 
individualism and masculinity tended 
to disclose m ore information. 
Uncertainty avoidance and debt 
ratios negatively impacted on levels 
of disclosure, Firm size influenced 
disclosure levels in each country. In 
Norway, high leveraged firms tended 
to disclose more information in their 
annual reports. Firms operating in 
the international m arketplace were 
disclosing high levels of public 
information.
Bartlett and 
Jones(1997)
Changes in the level 
of disclosure over a 
20 year period
Annual report 
1970-1990
A UK listed company Case study, Page 
analysis
Frequency of 
mandatory and 
voluntary items
Number of pages related to 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
increased. Mandatory disclosure 
increased due to increase in 
disclosure requirem ents. Non- 
financial voluntary disclosure 
increased and financial voluntary 
disclosure decreased.
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Inchausti
(1997)
Influence of company 
characteristics and 
accounting regulation 
on information 
disclosed by Spanish 
Firms
138 non-financial 
Spanish companies 
1989-1991
Valencia Stock 
Exchange (1990)
Stepwise 
regression, 
panel data 
analysis.
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(50 items)
Size, multi stock listings, 
profitability, leverage, 
audit firm size, industry, 
dividend pay-out
Firm size, auditing firm and listing 
status explained the  variations in 
level of disclosure. Legislation 
influenced positively level of 
disclosure,
Hossain and
Taylor
(1998a)
Disclosure and firm 
characteristics: a 
comparative study of 
Bangladesh, India and 
Pakistan
78 non-financial 
Bangladeshi 
companies, 80 
Indian companies, 
103 Pakistani 
companies, 1992- 
1993
Address book of 
companies listed in 
Dhaka Stock Exchange, 
Bombay Stock 
Exchange, Karachi 
Stock Exchange
Questionnaire,
Pearson product
moment
correlation
coefficients,
multiple
regression
Weighted and 
unweighted 
aggregate 
disclosure indices 
(94 items)
Size, debt-equity ratio, 
profitability, 
internationality, audit 
firm, industry type, 
proportion of assets-in- 
place, presence of public 
debentures in companies’ 
debt
For Bangladesh, subsidiary of a 
multinational company was 
significant in determining disclosure 
levels. In India, assets, presence of 
debenture in company's debt, and 
return  on assets were significant 
explanatory factors of variation in 
disclosure levels. In Pakistan, assets, 
presence of debenture in company's 
debt and assets-in-place influenced 
disclosure levels.
Ahmed and Disclosure level in 29 disclosure Research published in Meta-analysis Disclosure index Firm size, listing status, Firm size, listing status and leverage
Courtis annual reports studies journals and (11 to 224 items) profitability, leverage, w ere significant explanatory factors
(1999) monographs audit firm size of variation in disclosure levels.
Profitability and audit firm size were 
not significant
Street and 
Bryant 
(2000 )
Disclosure level and 
compliance with IASs
82 annual reports, 
1998
ADR Investor, IASC’s 
(2000) Companies 
Referring To Their Use 
of IAS, SEC’s (2000) list 
of12g3-2b
Stepwise
regression, OLS
regression
analysis,
Duncan’s
Multiple Range
Test
Overall disclosure 
unweighted index 
(31 standards) 
Disclosure index for 
compliance (30 
standards)
Size, listing status, 
companies with U.S. 
listing, U.S. filings, without 
U.S. listings or filings, 
profitability, industry, 
audit opinion indicates 
company follows IAS, 
audit opinion indicates 
company's financial 
statements are prepared 
in accordance with IASs, 
accounting policy footnote 
indicates IASs are the 
basis for financial 
statements,
Overall level of disclosure was 
greater for companies with US 
listings. Greater disclosure was 
associated with an accounting 
policies footnote that states that the 
financial statem ents were prepared 
in accordance with IASs and an audit 
opinion tha t stated that ISAs were 
followed when conducting the au d it 
Extent of compliance with IASs was 
greater for companies with US listings 
or filings. Higher levels of compliance 
w ere associated with an audit opinion 
which stated that the financial 
statem ents were in accordance with 
IASs and that ISAs were followed 
when conducting the au d it
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Hooks, Coy 
and Davey 
(2002)
Information gap in 
annual reports
33 New Zealand 
annual reports 
Electricity industry 
1998-1999
New Zealand retail and 
distribution industry
Mean, frequency 
distribution
Electricity Annual 
Reports Index (67 
Items)
Weighted
Level of importance of 
disclosure items (67)
-............... ■;...........;..... ....... ;...;....;.......... .^.. ;-j..'
Companies complied with mandatory 
disclosure. Information gap existed in 
voluntary disclosure. Electricity retail 
firms disclosed limited amount of 
information.
Naser, Al- 
Khatib and 
Karbhari 
(2002)
Depth of corporate
information
disclosure
84 non-financial 
Jordanian annual 
reports 
1998-1999
1999 Shareholding 
Companies Guide
Multiple
regression
analysis,
descriptive
statistics,
frequency
distribution
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(104 items)
Size, audit firm size, 
industry type, 
performance, ownership  
dispersion, capital 
structure.
Disclosure levels were affected by 
firm size, audit size, capital structure 
and performance. Firms with high 
liquidity tended to disclose less 
information.
Archambault
and
Archambault
(2003)
Multinational test of 
determinants of 
corporate disclosure
761 leading 
industrial 
companies in 37 
countries 
1993 or 1992
International 
Accounting and 
Auditing Trends 
(CIFAR, 1995), First 
Search Worldscope, 
Excite Money and 
Investing Financial 
Statements, Hoovers 
Company Capsule 
Financials, annual 
reports, World 
Factbook Country 
Profiles (Lexis-Nexis)
Descriptive
statistics,
correlation
matrix,
regression
analysis
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(85 items)
National culture, national 
political systems, 
economic systems, 
ownership, exchange , 
listing, dividends, 
leverage, auditor, size, no. 
of industries, foreign sales
Cultural, economical and political 
factors affected disclosure level. Firm 
size and foreign sales were significant 
explanatoiy factors for disclosure 
levels. Debt ratio was not significant
Argiles and 
Slof (2003)
Use of financial 
information and firm 
performance
170 Catalan farms’ 
annual reports 
5 years period
Catalan office of 
European Farm 
Accountancy Data 
Network
Short
questionnaire,
descriptive
statistics, partial
correlations,
multiple
regression
analysis
Farm’s
performance
(output,
profitability,
efficiency)
Use of accounting reports, 
farm size, type of farm, 
farm location, farmer’s 
age and experience,
Use of financial reports for decision 
making was positively related with 
farm performance. Farm size was the 
most influential factor for output and 
profitability but not for efficiency. As 
the farm er gets older, the farm’s 
profitability declines. Farms 
producing livestock showed higher 
output and efficiency than field and 
perm anent crop farms.
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AI-Razeen 
and Karbhari 
(2004c)
Interaction between 
compulsory and 
voluntary disclosure
55 Saudi listed 
firms, 13 largest 
unlisted firms
- Pearson's
correlation
Disclosure 
weighted and 
unweighted index
Mandatory index, 
voluntary related to 
mandatory index, 
voluntary index
Positive association between 
mandatory and voluntary closely 
related to mandatory disclosure. No 
relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and mandatory disclosure,
Coy and 
Dixon (2004)
A parametric 
disclosure index for 
annual reports
Annual reports of 
8 New Zealand 
universities 
1985-2000
Committee of Vice 
Chancellors (1994), 
Ministry of Education 
(1991), NZSA (1993), 
Public Finance Act 
(1989), published 
research, Department 
of Employment, 
Education and Training 
(1994), Performance 
Indicators Task Force 
(1989)
Delphi exercise, 
Spearman’s rho, 
sensitivity 
analysis
Public
accountability 
index (PA1) (58 
items) 
Weighted, 
unweighted
Weighted and unweighted 
indices’ scores for years 
1996 and 2000
Disclosure in universities annual 
reports changed over sampled 
period. Study’s results indicated that 
for practical purposes the use of 
weightings in an index is 
unnecessary.
Khanna, 
Palepu and 
Srinivasan 
(2004)
Disclosure practices 
of foreign companies 
interacting with U.S. 
markets
794 firms from 24 
countries, Asia- 
Pacific and Europe 
2000 and 2001
Japan S&P/Topix 
index, S&P Asia-Pacific 
100 index, S&P IFC 
Emerging Asia index, 
Europe 350 index
Descriptive
statistics,
regression
analysis
Transparencyindex 
(98 items) 
Disclosure index 
(35 items) 
Unweighted
US listing, US equity 
investment, US foreign 
direct investment, US 
exports, Has US exports, 
US operations, Has US 
operations, US trade, 
business travel to US, size, 
analyst following, 
performance, leverage 
R&D, English legal origin, 
stock return comovement, 
industry
US listing by a company, foreign 
direct investment, equity. 
Investments, US exports or 
operations* extent of business, travel 
to US were all positively associated 
with a company's disclosure levels. 
Firm size, performance, analyst 
following, R&D intensity, leverage, 
and country legal origin were also 
associated tvitb disclosure,
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Hassan, 
Giorgioni and 
Romilly 
(2006)
Hossain and
Taylor
(2007a)
Extent of financial 
disclosure and its 
determinants in Egypt
63 non-financial 
listed companies, 
14 private sector 
companies, 
1995-2002
Capital Market 
Authority, Egypt
Questionnaire,
descriptive
statistics,
Spearman
correlation,
pooled-
generalised
least-squares
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(49 mandatory 
items and 26 
voluntary items)
Firm size, legal form, 
profitability, gearing, 
stock activity
Egyptian companies published 90% 
of mandatory list and 48% of 
voluntary list. Public companies 
disclosed less information than 
private companies. Large companies 
disclosed more voluntary disclosure, 
but they disclosed less mandatory 
disclosure. There was a positive 
association between profitability and 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures. 
Gearing ratio decreased the voluntary 
disclosure, with no impact upon 
mandatory disclosure. Stock activity 
enhanced compliance with 
mandatory disclosure, but negatively 
influenced the voluntary disclosure.
Extent of disclosure in 38 listed banking 2002-2003 Annual
annual reports of 
Indian Banking 
companies.
companies on 
Bombay Stock 
Exchange and 
National Stock 
Exchange (18 
public sector and 
20 private sector), 
India
reports
Ordinary least
square
regression,
descriptive
statistics
Disclosure un­
weighted index 
(101 mandatory 
Items and 83 
voluntary items)
Company's age, size, 
profitability, operating 
history, diversification of 
business, complexity of 
business, dividends, 
multiple listing, assets-in- 
place, audit firm, board 
composition, market 
discipline
On average, Indian banks published 
60% of total disclosure. Indian 
banking sector highly complied with 
mandatory disclosure and made some 
progress in voluntary disclosure. 
Asset-size, profitability,
diversification, complexity of 
business, multiple listing, and board 
composition positively correlated 
with level of disclosure. Assets-in- 
place and market discipline had a 
negative relationship with level of 
disclosure.
87
Adhikari and
Tondkar
(1992)
Environmental 
factors influencing 
accounting disclosure 
requirements
33 stock exchanges 
149 financial 
executives (41 
countries)
International Monetary 
Fund's International 
Financial Statistics 
(1990), United Nations’ 
National Account 
Statistics (1989), 
Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s 
National Accounts 
(1989), International 
Finance Corporation’s 
Emerging Stock 
Markets Fact book 
(1988 and 1989), 
International Financial 
Statistics (1990), 
Merrill Lynch 
Euromoney Directory 
(1989)
Questionnaire,
descriptive
statistics,
multiple
regression
Required disclosure 
index (44 items) 
Weighted and 
unweighted
Degree of economic 
development, type of 
economy, size of equity 
market, activity on equity 
market, dispersion of 
stock ownership
Size of equity m arket was found to be 
significant in explaining the variation 
in disclosure levels in different stock 
exchanges. The other environmental 
variables were not significant.
Wallace, 
Naser and 
Mora (1994)
Relationship between 
the
comprehensiveness 
of corporate annual 
reports and firm 
characteristics in 
Spain
30 non-financial 
Spanish listed 
firms, 20 unlisted 
firms
Madrid and Valencia 
Stock Exchanges, 
Register of Spanish 
firms
Ranked OLS 
regression, 
correlation 
coefficients
Disclosure 
weighted index (16- 
items)
Size, gearing ratio, 
earnings return, liquidity 
ratio, industry, listing 
status, auditor type, profit 
margin.
A significant positive association 
betw een level of mandatory 
disclosure and firm size. Listed 
companies provided m ore details in  
their reports than  unlisted. Firms 
with higher liquidity ra tio  tended to 
provide less information.
Ahmed and
Nicholls
(1994)
Impact of non- 
financial company 
characteristics on 
mandatory disclosure 
compliance
63 non-financial 
Bangladeshi firms 
listed in Dhaka 
Stock Exchange 
1987-1988
Annual Reports Correlation,
multiple
regression
Mandatory 
disclosure 
unweighted index
Size, total debt, 
multinational company 
influence, qualification of 
principal accounting 
officer, size of audits firms
Companies who were subsidiaries of 
multinational companies and audited 
by large audit firms had a significant 
impact on degree of compliance. 
Qualification of accounting officer 
negatively impacted on degree of 
compliance.
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Wallace and 
N aser(1995)
Firm-specific 
determinants of 
comprehensiveness 
of mandatory 
disclosure
80 non-financial 
firms listed in 
Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong 
1991
Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong (Phenix, 
1994)
OLS regression, 
descriptive 
statistics, 
student’s t  test
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(30 items)
Foreign registered office, 
profit margin, earnings 
return, liquidity ratios, 
debt-equity ratios, asset- 
size, sales, market 
capitalisation, proportion 
of shares held by 
outsiders, non­
conglomerates status, 
auditor size
Hong Kong firms which disclosed 
m ore comprehensive information in 
their annual reports tended to have 
high total assets and low profit 
margin. They also tended to  appoint 
local audit firms and w ere not 
conglomerates.
Shankaraiah
and
Dabbeeru
(2002)
Corporate governance 
and accounting 
standards
Top 10 asset-size 
Omani companies 
(6 private and 4 
public companies)
Annual reports 
2001-2002
Simple
percentage
method
Disclosure of accounting policies was 
followed by alm ost all sample 
companies. Public companies 
complied with twenty to twenty five 
accounting standards. Most sampled 
companies viewed accounting 
standards as more relevant for 
corporate governance.
AH, Ahmed 
and Henry 
(2004)
Disclosure 
compliance with 
National Accounting 
Standards
566 non-financial 
listed firms In 
Bangladesh, 
India, Pakistan
Websites of listed 
companies and stock 
exchange, Research 
Development 
Association in India, 
Paksearch in Pakistan
OLS regression,
descriptive
statistics
Annual reports 
(1998)
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(131 items)
Size, leverage, 
multinational company 
influence, audit firm size, 
return on total assets
Large firms and subsidiaries of 
multinational firms complied w ith 
m andatory disclosure. In Pakistan, 
profitable firms complied w ith 
accounting standards more than 
others.
Akhtaruddin
(2005)
Corporate mandatory 
disclosure practices 
in Bangladesh
94 non-financial 
manufacturing 
listed firms 
1999
Dhaka Stock Exchange OLS regression 
analysis, Chi- 
square, Lambda, 
contingency 
coefficient of 
correlation
Disclosure 
unweighted 
Index (160 items)
Size, age, listing status, 
industry type, profitability
Size and profitability were 
explanatory factors of disclosure 
levels.
Owusu-Ansah
(2005)
Factors influencing 
corporate compliance 
with financial 
reporting 
requirements
149 non-flnancial 
New Zealand listed 
companies 
1996-1998
New Zealand Exchange OLS regression
descriptive
statistics,
Pearson.
correlations
Mandatory 
disclosure 
unweighted index
Existence of audit 
committee, firm size, age, 
quick ratio, return on 
capital employed, % of 
shares held by insiders, 
audit size
Company age was the  most critical 
factor influencing compliance of 
companies with disclosure 
requirem ents, Firm size, profitability, 
liquidity and existence of audit 
committee w ere significant factors.
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Seamer
(2007)
Corporate governance 
and continuous 
disclosure obligations
60 Australian 
listed companies 
subject to 
continuous 
disclosure 
obligations (CDO), 
60 Non-CDO 
companies
Annual reports, July 
2000 to June 2003
Logistic
regression
analysis,
descriptive
statistics
Continuous 
disclosure 
obligations 
unweighted index
Independence ofboard, 
audit committees, 
CEO/Board chair duality, 
company performance, 
financial leverage, block 
holder equity ownership, 
executive director equity 
ownership, auditor quality
A company was less likely to fail its 
continuous disclosure obligations as 
its performance increased and the 
proportion of independent directors 
on the board increased. Segregating 
role of CEO and board chair 
decreased likelihood of a company 
failing its continuous disclosure 
obligations.
I Em pirical S tud ies o f th e  E xten t o f V o lun tary  D isclosure in  C orp o ra te  R ep o rts
Emmanuel 
and Gray 
(1977)
Segmental disclosures 
and segment 
identification 
problem
100 largest UK 
quoted industrial 
companies 
1975-1976
. The Times 1000 Frequency
distribution
Segmental or single 
class of business
Supplementary 
disclosures about 
company's organization, 
UK standard industrial 
classification,
80% of sampled firms provided hill 
analysis of their international 
operations. 52 companies provided 
segmental disclosure that is 
consistent with supplementary
Firth (1979) Extent of voluntary 
disclosure
100 UK listed 
manufacturing 
firms, 40 listed 
firms, 40 unlisted 
firms
Jordans Survey, Times 
1000 (1978)
T -test, 
wilcoxon 
matched-pairs 
signed-ranks 
test, Kendall’s 
rank correlation
Disclosure 
weighted index (48  
items)
Size, share listings, 
auditor type
A positive association between 
disclosure levels and firm size and 
share listing. Auditor type was not 
significant.
Firth (1980) Raising finance and 
corporate reporting 
policies
40 UK companies 
made new issue of 
shares, 40 did not 
make new issue, 
62 small size firms 
with new issues, 
62 did not make, 
37 large firms 
made issues, 37 
did not make 
Manufacturing 
sector 
1972-1973
Financial Times- 
Actuaries Share 
Indices, Moodies and 
Extel Company 
Statistical Services, 
Jordans’ Dataquest 
Service
T-test Disclosure 
weighted index (48 
items)
Issuing shares, firms size Smaller sized companies increased 
their voluntary disclosure when 
raising new stock market finance.
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McNally, Eng 
and
Hasseldine
(1982)
An analysis of user 
preferences, 
corporate 
characteristics and 
disclosure practices 
for discretionary 
information in New 
Zealand
Annual reports of 
New Zealand 
manufacturing 
listed firms 
1979
New Zealand Stock 
Exchange
Spearman’s rho, 
t-test, Kruskal- 
Wallis
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(41 items)
Firm size, rate of return, 
growth in level of 
disclosure, auditors, 
industry groups
Sampled users highly ranked 
statem ent of future dividends and 
profit forecast. Level of disclosure 
was only affected by firm size.
Firth (1984) Extent of voluntary 
disclosure and 
security risk 
measures
100 UK
manufacturing 
firms for year 
1977
The Times' 1000 
largest firms
Regression
analysis
Disclosure 
unweighted and 
weighted index (48 
items)
Leverage, earnings beta, 
size, dividend yield
Level of disclosure had no significant 
impact on unsystematic risk and 
variance of return.
Chow and
Wong-Boren
(1987)
Voluntary disclosure 
by Mexican 
corporations
52 listed 
manufacturing 
firms in Mexican 
Stock Exchange 
1982
Mexican federal 
government’s,
1982 official gazette
Pearson
correlation,
Spearman
correlation,
regression
analysis
Disclosure 
weighted and 
unweighted index 
(24 items)
Size, leverage, assets-in- 
place
Large firms disclosed more voluntary 
information than smaller firms. 
Leverage had no influence on level of 
voluntary disclosure.
Gray and
Roberts
(1989)
Voluntary 
information 
disclosure and British 
multinationals
212 UK firms UN
Disclosure items from 
proposals/guidelines 
- from UN, OECD, IASC
Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs 
signed-ranks 
tests, Mean, t 
test and chi- 
square, Mann- 
Whitney U test
Disclosure level (34 
items)
Size, profitability, capital 
structure, % of foreign 
turnover, index of 
geographical 
diversification, industry.
Market pressures dominate political 
pressures in encouraging voluntary 
disclosures, Positive relationship was 
found between disclosure and size, 
profitability, and industry.
Cooke(1991) An assessm ent of 
voluntary disclosure 
in the annual reports 
of Japanese 
corporations
25 Japanese listed 
firms, 13 unlisted, 
10 multiple listed
Japan Company 
Handbooks
One-way 
analysis of 
variance, 
correlations, 
step-wise linear 
regression
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(106 items)
Size, listing status, 
industry type
Size and listing status were significant 
explanatory factors of variations in 
disclosure levels. Manufacturing 
companies provided more voluntary 
disclosure than other industry 
sectors.
Diamond and
Verrecchia
(1991)
Association between 
disclosure, liquidity, 
and the cost of capital
Developed a 
single firm 
models
Liquidity model, 
price formation, 
effect of disclosure 
on traders’ welfare,
Large firms tended to lower their cost 
of capital by providing low-precision 
information only to institutional 
investors. The higher the disclosure 
level, the higher the competition with 
market makers and the higher the 
future security returns.
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Lang and
Lundholm
(1993)
Cross-Sectional 
determinants of 
analyst ratings of 
corporate disclosures
Evaluations of 751 
US firms
Reports of Financial 
Analysts Federation 
Corporate Information 
Committee (1985- 
1989)
OLS regression 
analysis, rank- 
order
correlations,
descriptive
statistics
Analysts' disclosure 
scores weighted
Firm size, market- 
adjusted annual returns, 
earnings/returns 
correlation, abnormal 
returns, unexpected 
earnings, issue securities
Higher disclosure scores were 
associated with large firms that 
performed well. There was a weak 
relationship between annual stock 
returns and earnings, and issue 
securities.
Hossain,Tan 
and Adams 
(1994)
Voluntary disclosure 
in an emerging capital 
market
67 non-financial 
firms listed in 
Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange
Annual reports Pearson's 
product- 
moment 
correlation, 
student t-test, 
Mann-Whitney 
U, OLS 
regression
Disclosure 
unwweighted index 
(78 items)
Firm size, ownership 
structure, leverage, 
assets-ln-place, audit firm 
size, foreign listing status
Large firms, firms with low 
concentration of ownership and 
Internationally listed firms disclosed 
voluntary information to reduce their 
agency costs.
Ng and Koh 
(1994)
An agency theory and 
probit analytical 
approach to voluntary 
disclosure compliance
106 annual reports 
of listed
Singaporean firms 
1986
Stock Exchange of 
Singapore
Probit
(regression)
analysis
Voluntary
accounting
pronouncements
Firm size, profitability, 
solvency ratio, number 
operational complexity, 
industry, auditing firms
Corporate turnover, profitability, 
solvency and auditor type were 
significant factors in predicting 
compliance with voluntary 
pronouncements. Finance firms and 
hotels provided less voluntary 
disclosure than other industries.
Scott (1994) Incentives and 
disincentives for 
financial disclosure
288 Canadian 
firms
1987/1988
The Report on 
Business Top 1000, 
Financial Post 
Corporate Data Base
Correlations, 
ordinal logistic 
regressions, 
asymptotic t- 
statistics, chi- 
square statistic
Pension cost; 
interest assumption 
Benefit pension 
plan details
Proprietary costs, 
information costs, 
information relevance, 
size, SEC listing
Firms tha t w ere large and listed in 
SEC tended to disclose pension costs 
and plans. Firms with a  high 
percentage of significant owners 
tended to disclose less information 
about pension costs.
Hossain, 
Perera and 
Rahman 
(1995)
Voluntary disclosure 
in New Zealand 
annual reports
15 multiple listed, 
40 domestic listed 
firms 
1991
New Zealand Stock 
Exchange
OLS regression Annual reports 
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(95 items)
Firm size, leverage, assets- 
in-place, type of auditor, 
foreign listing status
Voluntary disclosures were affected 
by firm size, leverage, and foreign 
listing status. Auditor type and assets- 
in-place w ere not significant.
Gray, Meek 
and Roberts 
(1995)
International capital 
market pressures and 
voluntary annual 
report disclosures
180 MNCs (116 US, 
64 UK)
The Business Week 
1000 (1990), FT UK 
Top 500 (1989)
Regression
analysis
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(128 items)
International listing, 
sector, domestic listing, 
size, country
Market pressures explained strategic 
information and country factor 
influenced non-financial disclosure.
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Meek,
Roberts and 
Gray (1995)
Voluntary disclosure 
and multinational 
companies
226 MNCs (116 US, 
64 UK, 46  
European)
The Business Week 
1000 (1990), FT UK 
Top 500 (1989), 
Financial Times 
European Top 500  
(1989)
Regression
analysis
Voluntary annual 
report disclosure 
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(85 items)
Firm size, country, 
industry, leverage, 
multinationality, 
profitability, international 
listing status
The disclosure of strategic and 
financial information reflected 
international listing status. Size, 
country, industry influenced 
voluntary disclosure.
Raffoumier
(1995)
Voluntary disclosure 
by Swiss listed firms
161 non-financial 
listed firms 
1991
Annual reports Regression
analysis
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(30 items)
Size* profitability, return 
on equity, ownership, 
leverage, percentage of 
fixed assets, and auditor's 
size, export-on-sales ratio,
Disclosure was found to be associated 
with firm size, profitability and 
auditor's size, Ownership and 
leverage were not significant
Botosan
(1997)
Voluntary disclosure 
and cost of equity
122 manufacturing
firms
1990
AIMR, Nelson’s 
Directory of 
Investment Research
t-test
Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum test 
Pearson 
correlation
Disclosure 
weighted index
Size, leverage, listing 
status, analyst following, 
cost of equity
Firms with high analyst following 
disclosed historical summary 
information. Firms with low analyst 
following disclosed forecast 
information and non-financial 
statistics which in turn reduced cost 
of equity.
Isa (1997) Voluntary disclosures 
in airlines' annual 
reports
4 airlines In 
Malaysia, 
Singapore, 
Australia, New 
Zealand
Annual reports 
1994*1995
i l l f l i M f ®
111111
B;: V Bii■ :'B ' /  J
Voluntary 
disclosure (10 
items)
Malaysia airlines and Singapore 
airlines provided more voluntary 
disclosure than Qantas and Air New 
Zealand. Company reporting in the 
Asia region developing quickly 
towards a useful and relevant 
package of information.
Patton and
Zelenka
(1997)
Determinants of the 
extent of disclosure in 
annual reports
50 Czech joint- 
stock companies
Prague Stock Exchange 
Index(1993)
Descriptive
statistics,
frequency
distribution,
multiple
regression
Narrow index, 
som ewhat broader 
index, broad index 
Weighted and 
unweighted scores
Asset-size, performance 
(ROE), % of intangible 
assets, debt ratio, listing 
status, external auditor, 
no. of employees, industry
Firms’ choice of external auditor and 
num ber of employees were related to 
the extent of disclosure in their 
annual reports. Listing status was 
marginally significant. More 
profitable firms disclosed more 
information than less profitable 
firms. Firms’ size, leverage and 
industry were not significant.
Study (by Event Sample size Sample source Methodology Dependent Independent variable Summary of study results
date order)  and applied variable
tests
Williams
(1999)
Voluntary 
environmental and 
social accounting 
disclosure practices 
in the Asia-Pacific 
region
356 firms 
7 countries 
Asia-Pacific region
Listed companies in a 
seven nations study 
(1994)
Content
analysis,
Multiple
regression
analysis,
descriptive
statistics
Voluntary 
environmental and 
social accounting 
disclosures level
Level of uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity, 
political and civil 
, repression, Roman* 
German^ legal system, 
economic development, 
size of equity market, 
turnover of equity market, 
firm size, performance, 
industry
Firms with high m arket capitalisation 
and In the  finance industry provided 
voluntary environmental and social 
disclosures. High level o f uncertainly 
avoidance and political and civil 
system negatively affected voluntary 
disclosure levels.
Naser and Al- 
Khatib 
(2000)
Extent of voluntary 
disclosure in board of 
directors’ statement
84 non-financial 
firms listed in 
Amman Stock 
Exchange 
1997
Amman Financial 
Market annual 
directory
Pearson's
correlation,
step-wise
regression
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(30 items)
Firm size, profitability, 
ownership structure, 
capital structure
Firms that were large, profitable and 
with high government ownership 
provided more voluntary disclosure. 
High individual ownership negatively 
influenced level of disclosure.
Botosan and 
Plumlee 
(2002)
A re-examination of 
disclosure level and 
expected cost of 
equity capital
3,618 firm-year 
observations
Annual Reviews of 
Corporate Reporting 
Practices dated 
1985/86-1995/96 
examined by 
Association of 
Investment 
Management and 
Research
sensitivity
analyses,
regression,
Spearman
correlation
coefficients,
Fama and
MacBeth t-
statistics
Expected cost of 
equity capital
Market beta, size, 
fractional disclosure rank
Managers of large firms and firms 
th a t provided greater disclosure in 
the annual rep o rt benefited in term s 
of lower costs of equity. G reater levels 
of m ore timely disclosure w ere 
associated with high cost of equity 
capital.
Haniffa and 
Cooke(2002)
Culture, corporate 
governance and 
disclosure in 
Malaysian 
corporations
167 Malaysian 
non-financial firms 
1995
Annual Companies 
Handbook (1995), 
annual reports, 
Registrar of 
Companies, New 
Malaysian Who’s Who, 
published articles
Multiple 
regression, 
correlation, F 
and t-tests, 
descriptive 
statistics
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(65 items)
Size, assets-in-place, 
industry type, listing age, 
complexity of business, 
level of diversification, 
multiple listing status, 
foreign activities, 
leverage, profitability, 
ownership, corporate 
governance variables, 
cultural variables
Voluntary disclosure negatively 
associated with non-executive 
director as chairperson and number 
of family members on board. Size, 
profitability, industry, foreign 
ownership, proportion of shares held 
by major shareholders influenced 
levels of voluntary disclosure.
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Chau and 
Cray (2002)
Ownership structure 
and corporate 
voluntary disclosure 
in Hong Kong and 
Singapore
60 listed industrial 
firms in Hong Kong 
62 listed firms in 
Singapore
Guide to the 
Companies of Hong 
Kong (1998), Excel, 
Guide to the 
Companies of 
Singapore and 
Malaysia (1998)
Multiple
regression, t-
statistics,
descriptive
statistics,
ranked
regression
Annual reports 
(1997)
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(118 items)
Size, leverage, ownership 
structure, audit firm size, 
profitability, 
multinationality
Firms w ith w ider ownership provided 
m ore voluntary disclosure. Level of 
voluntary disclosure w as negatively 
influenced by family-controlled firms.
Eng and Mak 
(2003)
Corporate governance 
and voluntary 
disclosure
158 Singaporean 
listed firms
Stock Exchange of 
Singapore
Pearson 
correlation 
OLS regression
Disclosure 
weighted index
Leverage, size, growth 
opportunities, industry, 
analysts following, auditor 
reputation, ROE, ROA, 
stock performance, 
ownership, board 
composition, P/E ratio, 
Market/BV of equity
Managerial ownership, proportion of 
outside directors and leverage 
negatively related to voluntary 
disclosure. Large firms and firms with 
high government ownership provided 
more voluntary disclosure.
Bhojraj, 
Blacconiere 
and D’Souza 
(2004)
Voluntary disclosure 
in a multi-audience 
setting
81 US investor- 
owned electric 
utilities' annual 
reports 
1996-1997
FERC Form X, Resource 
Data International
Descriptive
statistics,
Pearson
Product-
Moment
correlations,
regression
analysis
Aggregate 
voluntary 
disclosure index 
Disclosures 
pertaining to plans 
to build or maintain 
customer loyalty , 
index
Disclosures of new 
opportunities’ 
strategies index 
unweighted
Dispersion in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts/no. of 
institutional investors, % 
of institutional holdings in 
firm's equity, future 
market demand, 
production costs, 
industrial revenues, 
regulatory climate, 
leverage, firm size
Firms with high stranded costs 
provided less overall disclosure. 
Disclosures about plans to exploit 
new  opportunities w ere Influenced by 
regulatory incentives. Firms relying 
m ore heavily on debt m ade more 
disclosures overall. Large size firms 
provided m ore voluntary disclosure.
Makhija and
Patton
(2004)
Voluntary disclosure 
and ownership 
structure
43 non-financial 
Czech firms
Prague Stock Exchange 
50 index (1993), 
Privatizace Kuponova, 
annual reports
Regression
analysis,
descriptive
statistics,
pairwise
correlation
coefficients
3 Disclosure 
unweighted indexes 
(140 items)
Internal owners, external 
owners, government 
ownership, ownership 
concentration, firm size, 
profitability, intangible 
assets, debt, industry, 
issuance of equity, auditor 
size, exchange listing
Firms with high levels of external 
ownership preferred less voluntary 
disclosure. Audit firm size was 
significant in explaining levels of 
voluntary disclosure.
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Marston and 
Polei (2004)
Corporate reporting 
on the Internet by 
German companies
Top 25 and last 25 
DAX100 
companies' Web 
sites, 2000 
44 DAX 100 
companies'Web 
sites, 2003
Onvista Descriptive 
statistics, Mann- 
Whitney, 
regression 
analysis
Voluntary 
disclosure checklist 
(53 items in 2000 
and71 items in 
2003}
Total score, 
presentation, 
content scores
Firm size, profitability, 
ownership structure, 
systematic risk, foreign 
listing status
T here was an increase in overall 
disclosure level on corporate Web 
sites firom 55% in 2000 to 68% in 
2003. Financial statem ents w ere most 
disclosed items. Firm size was a 
significant variable over time. 
Foreign listing was only significant 
for the year 2003 and ownership 
structure only significant for the year 
2000.
Al-Saeed
(2005)
Voluntary disclosure 
in Saudi annual 
reports
40 non-financial 
Saudi listed firms 
2002-2003
Saudi Stock Exchange OLS regression, 
Mann-Whitney 
U, Pearson 
Correlation 
coefficients
Disclosure 
unweighted index 
(20 items)
Size, age, debt, profit 
margin, return on equity, 
liquidity, ownership  
dispersion, industry type, 
audit firm size
Large firms tended to disclose more 
voluntary information than smaller 
firms.
Collett and
Hrasky
(2005)
Voluntary disclosure 
of corporate 
governance practices
29 firms listed in 
Australian Stock 
Exchange 
1994
Connect 4 database Multinomial
regression
Corporate
governance
disclosure
Unweighted
Raise new share capital, 
raise new debt funds, 
ROA, size, industry type, 
multiple listing status
Disclosure was associated with 
subsequent increase in  issued capital 
but not issued d e b t Industry sector 
and multiple listings influenced 
disclosure level. Size was not a  
significant factor.
Francis, 
Khurana and 
Pereira 
(2005)
Disclosure incentives 
and effects on cost of 
capital around world
672 firms 
34 countries 
1980-1989
Centre for
International Financial 
Analysis and Research 
data base 
1993 ,1995  
Global Vantage and 
International Moody’s 
manuals
Regression
Analysis
Annual reports 
Disclosure 
weighted index (90 
items)
Cost of equity 
capital
Cost of debt capital
Firm size, external 
financing, leverage, 
foreign listing status, 
investor protection, 
financial structure, ROA, 
earnings variability, bank 
rate, future inflation
Firm’s need for external financing, 
assets and leverage were 
determ inants of cost of capital. Firms 
with high cost of equity capital 
provided less voluntary disclosure. 
Cost of debt was negatively 
influenced by assets, bank rate and 
leverage.
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Debreceny 
and Rahman 
(2005)
Continuous corporate 
disclosure
334 listed 
companies in 8 
stock exchanges in 
Europe and Asia 
15 months
Announcements on 
stock exchange 
websites, World 
Federation of 
Exchanges, Morgan 
Stanley Capital Index
Frequency
distribution,
descriptive
statistics,
negative
binomial
regression
analysis
Spearman
correlation
Frequency of online 
disclosures (12,673 
announcements)
Level of information 
asymmetry, assets-in- 
place, firm's market 
concentration, firm's 
product cycle, absolute 
value of return on equity, 
analyst following, 
direction of performance, 
ownership spread, growth 
prospect industry type, US 
listing, country
Information asymmetry, profit 
making and ownership spread 
positively affected voluntary 
disclosure levels. Firms with high 
assets-in-place and re tu rn  on equity 
provided less voluntary disclosure,
Hossain and
Taylor
(2007b)
Extent of voluntary 
disclosure in annual 
reports of banking 
companies
20 private banks, 
2000-2001, 
Bangladesh
Bangladesh Bank 
Annual Report-2001
Pearson
product-
moment
correlation,
regression
Unweighted 
disclosure index 
(45 items)
Size, return on assets, link 
of audit firm to an 
international audit firm
Size and audit firm link were 
significant determ inant of the 
disclosure levels of the banks.
E m pirical S tudies of th e  E xten t o f Specific V olun tary  D isclosure in  C orp o ra te  A nnual R eports
Leftwich, 
Watts and 
Zimmerman 
(1981)
Voluntary disclosure 
in corporate interim 
reports
82 US firms listed 
in American Stock 
Exchange, 83 firms 
listed in New York 
Stock Exchange 
1937-1948
Moody’s News Reports, 
Moody's Industrial 
Manual (1938 and 
1949), Poor’s Register 
of Directors and 
Executives (1948), 
Who's Who in Finance 
and Industry (vol. 6)
Descriptive
statistics, simple
correlations,
probit
probability
models
Cross-sectional and 
time series of 
interim reporting 
frequency
Firm size, assets-in-place, 
leverage ratio of debt, 
leverage ratio of preferred 
stock, outside directors, 
reporting frequency, 
exchange listing.
Firms listed in New York Stock 
Exchange reported  with higher 
frequency than those listed in 
American Stock Exchange.
Craswell and
Taylor
(1992)
Discretionary 
disclosure of reserves 
by oil and gas 
companies
86 Australian oil 
and gas companies 
1984
Sydney Stock 
Exchange, Who Audits 
Australia and New  
Zealand
Univariate
analysis,
Pairwise
correlation
coefficients,
multivariate
analysis
Industry-specific 
disclosure level 
unweighted
Firm size, cash flow risk, 
leverage, Separation of 
ownership and control, 
auditor identity, 
proprietary costs
Large companies tended to employ 
big auditors to signal high quality 
reporting policy. Cash flow risk 
negatively influenced level of 
estim ated reserve disclosure in 
annual reports.
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Mckinnon
and
Dalimunthe
(1993)
Voluntary disclosure
ofsegment
information
65 listed 
diversified 
Australian firms
Australian Stock 
Exchange’s Personal 
Investment Magazine 
(1985)
t-test, Mann- 
Whitney U, Chi- 
square, probit 
binary analysis, 
OLS regression, 
Pearson’s 
correlation
Voluntary segment 
disclosure level
Firm size, minority 
interest, industry 
membership, ownership, 
leverage, related and 
unrelated industries
Firm size, level of minority interest, 
industry mem bership and ownership 
were factors motivating disclosure of 
segment information.
Deegan and
Gordon
(1996)
Environmental
disclosure
197 Australian 
annual reports 
1991 
22 firms
Australian Graduate 
School of Management 
annual report file 
1991
Australian 
Conservation 
Foundation: Directory 
of Environmental 
Groups in Australia
Content 
analysis, paired 
samples t-test, 
Wilcoxon 
matched pairs 
signed ranks 
test, Pearson 
product- 
moment 
correlation 
coefficients, 
Spearman rank 
correlation 
coefficients
Positive
environmental
disclosures
Environmental sensitivity
indices
Firm size.
Firms disclosed positive news but 
suppressed negative news. Disclosure 
level was positively associated with 
environmental sensitivity. Highly 
sensitive large firms provided 
environmental disclosure.
Schadewitz, 
Kanto, Kahra 
and Blevins 
(1999)
Effects of various 
degrees of voluntary 
disclosure on share 
returns
256 Finnish firms 
1985-1993
Helsinki Stock 
Exchange
Conventional
earnings
response
coefficients,
random walk
based
regression
Cumulative 
abnormal share 
returns
Voluntary interim reports 
indices
Firm will experience an increase in 
cumulative abnorm al re tu rns when 
disclosure level is lower than 
expected. When disclosure level is as 
expected, the abnorm al returns 
rem ain the same.
9 8
Sam ple size Sam ple so u rce Methodology
and applied
tests
D ep en d en t
v a riab le
In d e p e n d e n t v a riab le Sum m ary  o f s tu d y  re su lts
Brennan
(2000 )
Forecast disclosure 
by UK bidding 
companies
701 takeover bids Acquisition Monthly, Frequency,
(477 agreed bids 
and 224 contested  
bids)
1988-1992
Extel Financial’s 
microfiche service, 
Crawford’s Directory of 
City Connections
descriptive 
statistics, Mann- 
Whitney U test, 
logistic 
regression 
analysis, 
Pearson chi- 
square test, 
Wald statistics 
tests
Voluntary forecast 
unweighted  
disclosure 
Forecasters vs. non­
forecasters
Type of bid, bid horizon, 
purchase consideration, 
management ownership, 
large block shareholdings, 
firm size, listing status, 
industry, nationality
Probability of forecast disclosure was 
greater the shorter the bid horizon 
and during contested bids. Disclosure 
in contested bids was influenced by 
considerations of direct and indirect 
effects of information in the forecast 
Bidders' disclosure decisions were 
associated with purchase 
considerations. There were 
significant differences between 
forecasters and non-forecasters in 
term s of size, substantial 
shareholdings, listing status and 
nationality. Forecast disclosure was 
more likely when there was good 
news to report. Large shareholders 
influenced disclosures for targets in 
contested bids.
Lang and 
Lundholm 
(2 0 0 0 )
Voluntary disclosure 
and equity issue
82 US firms (41  
offering firms, 41  
non-offering firms)
SEC filing system  
1992
Dow Jones, News 
Retrieval, IEXIS/NEXIS
Logistic
regression
analysis
Change in 
disclosure 
frequency 
distribution
Pre-offerings earnings, 
post-offerings earnings, 
size, industry
Companies increased disclosure 
activity prior to offering. Frequency 
of optimistic statements increased 
while frequency of pessimistic 
statements fell.
Solom on, 
Solom on, 
Norton and  
Joseph  
(2 0 0 0 a )
Voluntary disclosure 
of corporate risk 
disclosure
95 UK institutional 
investors
Pension funds, 
investment trusts, unit 
trusts, insurance 
companies
Questionnaire,
chi-square x2,
Wilcoxon
signed-rank Z
statistics,
frequency
distribution
Institutional
investors'
perceptions of
corporate
governance, risk
disclosure,
relationship
General sta tem en t o f b u sin ess risk  
d isc losed  in annual reports w as  
inadequate. Risk d isclosure  
in fluenced  p ortfo lio  in vestm en t  
d ecision s.
betw een risk 
disclosure and 
investment 
decisions
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VanStaden
(2001)
Publication of value 
added statement
201 trade unions 
employees 
South Africa
Official South African 
Trade Unions 
Directory, National 
Economic 
Development and 
Labour Council 
homepage, Andrew 
Levy and Associates 
(Pty) Ltd, COSATU 
unions, FEDUSA 
unions, NACTU unions
Analysis of 
interview data
Trade unions and organisations doing 
financial analysis used a whole range 
of financial information instead of 
value added statem ent,
Jung and 
Kwon (2002)
Ownership structure 
and earnings 
informativeness
2820 observations 
from Korean listed 
firms
Korea Stock Exchange 
(1993-1998), Korea 
Investors Service
Regression,
descriptive
statistics
Earnings’
informativeness
Largest shareholders, 
institutional 
investors/blockholders, 
firm size, risk leverage, 
growth ratio, persistence 
of earnings ratio
Earnings' informativeness improved 
by high growth rate, high largest 
shareholders holdings, institutional 
holdings and blockholders' holdings. 
Earnings disclosure was less in the 
case of large and risky firms.
Miller (2002) Earnings' 
performance and 
discretionary 
disclosure
80 small and 
medium US firms
Compustat (1996), 
Dow Jones News 
Retrieval Service, CIG 
database
Descriptive 
statistics, 
frequency 
distribution, test 
of mean change, 
F-test, Wilcoxon 
sign test, cross- 
sectional 
regression
Change in number 
of total information 
items (33 items) 
and disclosure 
bundles
Change in analyst 
following, change in 
earnings, equity issuance, 
acquisitions, buybacks, 
change in size
Increases in earnings performance 
precipitated substantial and 
pervasive increases in disclosures, : 
Once these earnings increases ceased, 
the magnitude of disclosure returned  
to a  level consistent with the fiat 
earnings period. Decline earnings' 
firms shifted disclosure from long­
term  forecasts to  short-term  forecasts 
th a t focused on the current strong 
earnings news, Equity issuance and 
change in size w ere significant 
determ inants of changes in 
disclosure.
Watson, 
Shrives and 
Marston 
(2002)
Voluntary disclosure 
of accounting ratios
313 large UK listed 
firms
1989-1993
Times UK’s Top 1000  
list
Step-wise
logistic
regression,
descriptive
statistics
Ratio disclosure Profitability, return on 
investment, gearing, 
liquidity, company 
efficiency, size, industry
Investment ratios w ere the most 
popular type of disclosure followed 
by gearing and profitability. Large 
companies disclosed ratios and utility 
and media companies provided less 
ratio disclosure.
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Rimmel Users' perception of
(2004) human resource
disclosures
18 financial List of analysts Annual reports
analysts covering 2 Swedish 1996-2000
insurance corporations Analysis of
interview data
D ep en d en t In d e p e n d e n t v a riab le  Sum m ary  of s tu d y  re su lts
v a riab le
Human resource disclosure was 
perceived to be beneficial. Human 
resource valuations were negatively 
affected by detailed human resource 
disclosures.
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4.6 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has summarised some of the studies that have empirically investigated the 
usefulness of annual reports in general and annual reports' sections in particular. Their 
findings indicate professional reports' users relied more on the balance sheet, profit and loss 
account than non-professional users, who relied on the financial press and chairman's report. 
In addition, professional users placed a high value on historical data and future data while 
individual investors placed a high value on future data. Findings varied from one country to 
another and among different respondents. Importantly, the outputs of one country or user 
group cannot be generalised to other countries or user groups in the same country because 
there were external factors unique to each study that influenced the selection of targeted 
groups and methods applied. Some of the findings in less developed economies w ere similar 
to those in developed economies while others differed since they were based on the 
subjective perceptions of different user groups. Accordingly, no theory can as yet be drawn 
from the perceptions of users of annual reports and their sections in developed and less 
developed economies since research findings have varied between and across countries.
Empirical studies conducted in developed and less developed economies to m easure the 
extent of m andatory and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of both listed and unlisted 
companies have also been summarised in this chapter. Most of the studies concluded in 
developed and developing economies have concluded that a num ber of factors determ ine the 
level of disclosure: firm size, profitability, listing status, ownership structure, auditor type, 
industry type and ratios. However, the impact of these factors has been shown to vary from 
one study to another depending on the selected variables, user groups and country.
In conclusion, the outputs of previous studies cannot be generalised to future research 
studies. Notwithstanding, the findings of previous studies have been used to develop the 
hypotheses for this study and will provide a base for explaining similarities or differences 
between those derived from it and prior research. Since this study is conducted in a new 
context, Oman, the researcher believes such comparison will help to determ ine the quality of 
Omani annual reports in comparison to that of o ther countries.
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C H A P T E R  5 : D E V E L O P M E N T  OF S T U D Y  Q U E S T I O N S  AND 
H Y P O T H E S E S
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter presents the rationale for the research questions and the development of 
hypotheses. The research questions and hypotheses were built on discussions presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4 relating to discussion theories, models, and prior studies. The following 
section focuses on the research questions and related hypotheses pertaining to the primary 
data collection stage, a questionnaire survey. Research questions and related hypotheses 
pertaining to the secondary data collection stage are reported in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 
summarises and concludes the chapter.
5.2 Research Questions Related to Primary Data Collection Stage (Questionnaire 
Survey)
The first stage of this research investigated the perceptions of annual reports' user groups of 
the quality of the reporting system in Oman. This section includes a summary of previous 
literature explaining financial disclosure objectives and companies' reporting practices 
addressed in this study. Hypotheses were based on prior literature findings. The purpose of 
developing hypotheses was to operationalise the given research objectives regarding reports' 
users' perceptions of financial reporting practices in Oman. The report user groups in this 
study are individual investors, institutional investors, governm ent representatives, financial 
analysts, accountants, auditors, and regulators. The following subsections present the 
research questions and hypotheses related to the questionnaire survey.
5.2.1 What are the Perceptions of Annual Reports’ User Groups of the Objectives of 
Financial Reporting in Oman? (RQ1)
Financial reporting practice is an im portant elem ent in determ ining how advanced is the 
capital market, which is influenced by the quality of annual reports. Anderson and Epstein 
(1995, p.25) state that the purpose of the annual report is "to make information available to 
the corporate shareholders (or potential shareholders)". Another study (Healy and Palepu, 
1993, p.2.) describes financial reporting as "a potentially useful mechanism fo r  mangers to 
communicate with outside investors
5.2.1.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding the 
Purpose of Financial Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reports? (HI)
Financial disclosure objectives have been investigated as part of previous studies that 
examined the readership of corporate reports (Lee and Tweedie, 1981). Users of corporate 
reports have different information preferences and processing capabilities because of 
differing decision-making styles (Thomas, 1991, p.44). Based on the fact that users of annual 
reports are heterogeneous (ICAS, 1999, p.23), it is expected, in this study that the opinions of 
Oman's user groups including: 1) individual investors, 2) institutional investors, 3) 
government representatives, 4) financial analysts, 5) accountants, 6) auditors, and 7) 
regulators, will differ from those of preparers of corporate reports regarding the purpose of 
Financial disclosure. Differences in the views of various users and preparers of corporate 
reports may be due to principal-agent problems.
In the accounting literature, it is argued that financial disclosure is a reliable source of 
information because of the existence of auditors to certify the reports presented by 
management (Foster, 1986, p.10). Gibbins e t a l (1990) pointed out that the presence of 
auditors influences the set of disclosure outputs. According to Healy and Palepu (1993, p.3), 
imperfection in the financial reporting system might be due to imperfect accounting rules and 
auditing. Therefore, investigating the perceptions of auditors and identifying differences in 
their perceptions are crucial to the evaluation of the quality of financial reporting in Oman. In 
this study, auditors were classified into three groups, namely, Big four, international affiliated 
and local auditors, to enable the researcher to find out how the local auditing firms differ from 
Big four and international affiliated audit firms and how local auditors perceive the current 
disclosure regulations. No prior study has investigated the perceptions of different auditor 
groups. Extant studies have only examined the effect of audit firm size on level of disclosure. 
The hypotheses to be tested are:
H]a: There are significant differences between the perceptions of corporate reports' user groups7 of the 
purpose of financial disclosure in Oman.
H]b: There are significant differences between the perceptions of auditor groups of the purpose of 
financial disclosure in Oman.
7 1) individual investors, 2) institutional investors, 3) government representatives, 4) financial analysts, 5) accountants,
6) auditors, 7) regulators
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5.2.2 What are the Perceptions of Annual Reports’ User Groups of the Importance of 
Different Sources of Corporate Information? (RQ2)
To make an investm ent decision, users of corporate reports need to collect information about 
a particular company and analyse it. According to ICAS (1999, p.23), “corporate 
communications o f a financial nature comprise publicly disclosed information, the annual report 
and accounts, interim reports and preliminary announcements, and privately disclosed 
information revealed in analysts' meetings and informal one-to-one meetings with analysts, 
shareholders or banks".
As mentioned above, there are sources of corporate information other than the annual and 
interim corporate reports, for example, analysts' reports. It has been argued that financial 
reports are a competing source of information to analysts' reports (Beaver, 1989). Another 
source of information is meeting with the company's management. Holland (1997) argued 
that management's aim is to cultivate the tru st and confidence of major investors and analysts 
in the company and its managerial team to improve the credibility of future corporate 
disclosure.
5.2.2.1 Is There Consensus among Annual Reports' User Groups and Auditor Groups 
Regarding the Importance of Different Sources of Corporate Information? (H2)
The importance of corporate information sources in making decisions has been previously 
investigated (Anderson, 1981; Barker, 1998). Some users rely on stockbrokers' advice 
(Anderson and Epstein, 1996) and others rely on corporate reports (Gniewosz, 1990). The 
accounting literature indicates that selection of information source changes over time and 
from one person to another and from one country to another (Epstein and Pava, 1993; 
Anderson and Epstein, 1995).
ICAS (1999, p.23) comments "Each user's decision-making process is unique, in terms o f their 
information search tactics, selection criteria, and analytical frameworks/models." Thus, in this 
study it is expected that different respondents including: 1) individual investors, 2) 
institutional investors, 3) governm ent representatives, 4) financial analysts, 5) accountants, 
6) auditors, and 7) regulators, will rely on different sources to make an investment decision. 
The hypotheses to be tested are:
H 2a: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f reports’ user groups of the 
importance of different sources of corporate information in making investment decisions.
Hlb: There are significant differences between the perceptions of auditor groups of the importance of 
different sources of corporate information in making investment decisions.
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5.2.3 What Are the Perceptions o f Annual Reports' User Groups of the Importance of 
the Various Annual Report Sections? (RQ3)
Annual reports of public listed companies include quantitative and qualitative information. 
Healy and Palepu (2001, p.406) stated that "firms provide disclosure through regulated 
financial reports, including the financial statements, footnotes, management discussion and 
analysis". People use and rely on annual reports for many reasons. According to Foster (1986, 
p.2), different parties demand financial statem ents' information to facilitate decision-making, 
to facilitate the monitoring of management, or to interpret contracts or agreements that 
include provisions based on such information.
5.2.3.1 Is There Consensus Among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding the  
Importance of Omani Annual Reports' Sections in Making Investm ent 
Decisions? (H3)
The importance of and reliance on different sections of annual reports in order to make 
decisions has been investigated in prior studies (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004; Nicholls and 
Ahmed, 1995). The accounting literature shows that the importance of various sections of 
annual reports differs from one user to another and from one country to another (Cerf, 1961; 
McNally et al., 1982). Based on the above, it is expected, in this study, that there will be 
differences in the perceptions of different respondents including: 1) individual investors, 2) 
institutional investors, 3) governm ent representatives, 4) financial analysts, 5) accountants, 
6) auditors, and 7) regulators, regarding the importance of reports ' sections in making 
investment decisions. The hypotheses to be tested are:
H3 : There are significant differences between the perceptions of reports' user groups of the importance 
of annual report sections in making investment decisions.
H3b: There are significant differences between the perceptions of auditor groups of the importance of 
annual report sections in making investment decisions.
5.2.4 What Are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of the Usefulness of 
the Management Discussion and Analysis Report Sections in Making Investment 
Decisions? (RQ4)
Bohrer (2004:19, par. 3 and 4) states: "The basic purpose ofMD&A is to provide the reader with 
information necessary to an understanding o f [a company's] financial condition, changes in 
financial condition and results o f operations". "Unlike other sections o f a disclosure document, an 
MD&A section is required to contain prospective information".
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Many studies have focused on the readership and usefulness of the management discussion 
and analysis (MD&A) report (Anderson and Epstein, 1996; Epstein and Pava, 1993). More 
recently, researchers have investigated the quality of MD&A disclosure (Cole and Jones, 
2004). It was considered necessary in this study to investigate the usefulness of MD&A 
reports' sections in making investm ent decisions since it provides information different to 
that provided in financial statements.
5.2.4.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding the 
Usefulness of the MD&A Report Sections? (H4)
Previous researchers have investigated the quality of the MD&A report and how it is related 
to a company's performance (Barron and Kile, 1999; Bryan, 1997). This study investigated the 
usefulness of items disclosed in the MD&A report in making investm ent decisions in Oman. It 
is expected that different users including: 1) individual investors, 2) institutional investors, 3) 
government representatives, 4) financial analysts, 5) accountants, 6) auditors, and 7) 
regulators, will have different perceptions of the usefulness of MD&A report's sections 
because the ability of report users to in terpret these sections varies. The hypotheses to be 
tested are:
H 4a : There are significant differences between the perceptions of reports' user groups of the usefulness 
of the sections of the MD&A report in making investment decisions.
H4b: There are significant differences between the perceptions of auditor groups of the usefulness o f the 
sections of the MD&A report in making investment decisions.
5.2.5 What Are the Perceptions o f Annual Reports' User Groups of the Nature of the
Information Included in the M anagement Discussion and Analysis Report? (RQ5)
The nature of information included in MD&A report has been investigated previously. 
Findings suggest managers do not always report information and they reveal, or withhold, 
both "good" and "bad" news (Feltham and Xie, 1992, p.47). Newman and Sansing (1993) 
indicated that the degree of informativeness of disclosure depends upon investors' interests 
and the degree of competitive in the industry.
5.2.5.1 Is There Consensus am ong User Groups and Auditors Groups Regarding the 
Nature of the Information included in the MD&A report? (H5)
In the accounting literature, it was reported that the MD&A report provides new information 
and focuses on good news rather than bad news (Clarkson, Kao and Richardson, 1999; Pava 
and Epstein, 1993). In this study, it is expected that discrepancies in the perceptions of user
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groups including: 1) individual investors, 2) institutional investors, 3] government 
representatives, 4) financial analysts, 5] accountants, 6) auditors, and 7) regulators, of the 
nature of the information included in MD&A report will occur because different users have 
different needs, for example, financial analysts will read the MD&A report to predict a 
company's future earnings while regulators will read it to check a company's compliance with 
disclosure requirements. The hypotheses to be tested are:
HSa: There are significant differences between the perceptions of reports' user groups of the nature of 
information disclosed in the MD&A report in Omani annual reports.
H5b: There are significant differences between the perceptions of auditor groups of the nature of 
information disclosed in the MD&A report in Omani annual reports.
5.2.6 What Are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of Achievem ent of the 
Code of Corporate Governance? (RQ6)
Financial disclosure and transparency are major parts of the corporate governance 
framework. In Oman, listed companies are required to follow the Code of Corporate 
Governance to ensure transparency in their reporting system.
5.2.6.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding 
Achievem ent of the Code of Corporate Governance? (H6)
Based on earlier literature, differences are expected in the perceptions of different 
respondents including: 1) individual investors, 2} institutional investors, 3) government 
representatives, 4) financial analysts, 5} accountants, 6) auditors, and 7) regulators, since "the 
code norms do not contain clear-cut verbalised guidelines which can be complied with by a 
simple "yes"or "no" [W erder, Talaulicar and Kolat, 2005, p. 185, par. 7). The hypotheses to be 
tested are:
H 6a: There are significant differences between the perceptions of reports' user groups of the 
achievement o f the Corporate Governance Code in Oman 
H6b: There are significant differences between the perceptions of auditor groups of the achievement of 
the Corporate Governance Code in Oman.
5.2.7 What Are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of the Importance of 
the Corporate Governance Report's Sections? (RQ7)
In recent years, researchers have investigated the usefulness of corporate governance 
frameworks in making investm ent decisions (Solomon etal., 2002). Others have investigated
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corporate reports' users' perceptions of the corporate governance framework's impact on 
voluntary disclosure (Solomon et al, 2000b].
5.2.7.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding the 
Importance of the Corporate Governance Report's Sections? (H7)
As the importance of corporate governance increases worldwide, the need to investigate its 
quality and importance also increases. Since the corporate governance report is addressed to 
a wider audience, there is a problem in satisfying its users' needs (Whittington, 1993, p.315]. 
Thus, in this study it is expected that user groups including: 1] individual investors, 2] 
institutional investors, 3] governm ent representatives, 4] financial analysts, 5] accountants, 
6] auditors, and 7] regulators, will have differing views of the corporate governance report 
due to their different informational needs. The hypotheses to be tested are:
Hla: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f reports' user groups of the
importance of corporate governance report's sections in making investment decisions.
Hlb: There are significant differences between the perceptions of auditor groups of the importance of 
corporate governance report's sections in making investment decisions.
5.2.8 What Are the Perceptions of Annual Reports' User Groups of the Importance of a 
List of Voluntary Items? (RQ8)
Voluntary information is information that is disclosed voluntarily in a company's report and 
no effective regulations enforce a company to disclose it (Al-Saeed, 2005, p.316]. Thus 
managers have discretion over this kind of information to be disclosed in corporate reports. 
According to Foster (1986, p.31], voluntary disclosures are more likely to be the result of 
market forces than regulatory-based forces. Managers of public listed companies have 
incentives to provide voluntary disclosures to reduce the information asymmetry problem 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001, p.420]. Other incentives are to seek foreign funds and to reduce legal 
actions against inadequate and untimely disclosures. On the other hand, managers might 
decide not to disclose voluntary information if it affects their competitive disadvantage. 
Disclosure of voluntary information is im portant because it enables various users of corporate 
reports such as investors, analysts, and creditors to better understand mandatory disclosures 
by explaining and interpreting these disclosures. In this study, it was im portant to investigate 
the importance of a list of voluntary items, selected from previous literature, to obtain a broad 
view of the needs of user groups in Oman: 1] individual investors, 2] institutional investors, 3] 
government representatives, 4] financial analysts, 5] accountants, 6] auditors, and 7] 
regulators, and thus compare it with the required disclosure.
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5.2.8.1 Is There Consensus among User Groups and Auditor Groups Regarding the 
Importance of a List of Voluntary Items? (H8)
Voluntary disclosures have been investigated in prior studies (Botosan, 1997; Cooke, 1991; 
Ho and Wong, 2003; Hossain etal., 1995}. The selection and importance of voluntary items 
have been shown to vary from one study to another, one respondent to another and one 
country to another (Firth, 1978}. The accounting literature reveals significant differences in 
the perceptions of different respondent groups regarding such items (Beattie and Pratt, 2002; 
Wallace, 1988}. Accordingly, it is expected in this study that different respondents including: 
1} individual investors, 2} institutional investors, 3} governm ent representatives, 4} financial 
analysts, 5} accountants, 6} auditors, and 7} regulators, will have differing views of the 
importance of different voluntary items. The hypotheses to be tested are:
H g^ : There are significant differences between the perceptions of reports' user groups of the importance 
of a list of voluntary items in making investment decisions in Oman.
H %b: There are significant differences between the perceptions of auditor groups of the importance of a 
list of voluntary items in making investment decisions in Oman.
5.2.9 What Are the Perceptions of Professional User Groups of the Importance of a List 
of Mandatory Disclosures? (RQ9)
Mandatory disclosure is prescribed information requirem ents contained in various forms of 
legislation (Choi, 1973, p.160}. Mandatory public disclosure varies from one country to 
another and, therefore, the accounting literature reports the testing of different num bers of 
mandatory items (Benjamin and Stanga, 1977; Firth, 1984}.
It is im portant to investigate the perceptions of annual reports' users in order to identify their 
informational needs so that regulators can m eet their needs and provide information that is 
useful and understandable to users of reports (Epstein and Pava, 1993}.
5.2.9.1 Is There Consensus among Professional User Groups Regarding the Importance 
of a List of Mandatory Items? (H9)
Based on previous studies (Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Akhtaruddin, 2005}, it is expected in 
this study that there will be significant differences in the views of surveyed groups: 1} 
financial analysts, 2} accountants, and 3} auditors, on the importance of a list of m andatory 
items in making an investm ent decision. The hypothesis to be tested is:
H9: There are significant differences in the perceptions of professional user groups of the importance of 
a list of mandatory items in making investment decisions in Oman.
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5.3 Research Questions Related to the Secondary Data Collection Stage
The secondary data collection stage was concerned with m easuring the extent of disclosure in 
Omani annual reports. Seven company characteristics identified from previous studies were 
used to develop hypotheses relating to the extent of disclosure.
The extent of disclosure in annual reports can be used as a surrogate of the quality of these 
financial reports. Ceteris paribus, the more the disclosure in annual reports, the higher the 
quality of such reports. The following subsections explain the research questions and related 
hypotheses pertaining to the m easurem ent of the extent of disclosure in Omani annual 
reports.
5.3.1 To What Extent Do Omani Listed Companies Comply with Mandatory Disclosure 
Requirements?(RQ10)
Previous accounting literature shows that the extent to which companies comply with 
regulations can be investigated by applying disclosure indices. For example, in Bangladesh, 
Nicholls and Ahmed (1995) investigated the quality of m andatory disclosure by constructing 
overall disclosure and statutory disclosure indices. Nicholls and Ahmed (1995, p.156) argued 
that "disaggregation was necessary to capture the relative intensity o f information disclosure". 
Nicholls and Ahmed (1995) found tha t overall disclosure quality was low. In this study, it is 
expected that Omani companies comply with disclosure requirem ents. The hypothesis to be 
tested is:
H]0: Omani listed companies comply with disclosure requirements set by the Capital Market Authority.
5.3.2 To What Extent Do Omani Listed Companies Disclose Voluntary Information in 
their Annual Reports? (RQ11)
Voluntary disclosure is an im portant aspect of financial reporting because it helps users of 
annual reports in making decisions about public companies. Botosan (1997, p.329) stated 
"although the annual report is only one means o f corporate reporting, it should serve as a good 
proxy fo r  the level o f voluntary disclosure provided by a firm  across all disclosure avenues". 
Voluntary disclosure has been tested in different cultures (Chau and Gray, 2002; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). In this study, it is expected that Omani listed companies provide high levels of 
voluntary disclosure. The hypothesis to be tested is:
H : Omani listed companies provide high levels of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports.
I l l
5.3.3 Do Current Levels of Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure in Omani Annual 
Reports Reflect the Informational Needs of Users? (RQ12)
According to Healy and Palepu (2001), information problems arise from information 
differences and conflicting incentives between entrepreneurs and savers (p.408). 
Akhtaruddin (2005, p.404) also pointed out that disclosure often does not serve the needs of 
users because managers are likely to consider their own interests when exercising managerial 
discretion, which enhances the disclosure gap (i.e. differences between expected and actual 
disclosures). Prior studies have investigated the informational needs of various users in 
countries such as New Zealand (McNally etal., 1982). In this study, it is expected that there 
will be an information gap between the demand and supply of corporate information.
H12 : Levels of mandatory disclosure in the current Omani annual reports do not reflect the 
informational needs of users.8
H l2b: Levels of voluntary disclosure in the current Omani annual reports do not reflect the informational 
needs of users.
5.3.4 Do Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosures in Omani Annual Reports Correlate 
Significantly with Each Other? (RQ13)
Wallace et al. (1994) contended that to m easure the comprehensiveness of m andatory 
disclosure is to measure indirectly voluntary disclosure (p.44). Al-Razeen and Karbhari 
(2004c) also maintained that the correlation between types of disclosure might suggest the 
level of coordination between the board of directors and m anagem ent in writing annual 
reports (p.358).
5.3.4.1 Do Mandatory Disclosures and Voluntary Disclosures Correlate Significantly 
with Each Other? (H13)
Only a few studies investigated the association between the levels of m andatory and 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports of public listed companies (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 
2004c). In order to investigate the quality of financial reports in Oman, it was im portant to 
study the association between mandatory and voluntary disclosure levels. It is expected in 
this study that m andatory disclosure level in Omani annual reports affects the voluntary 
disclosure level in such reports. The hypothesis to be tested is:
8 1) Individual investors, 2) institutional investors, 3) governm ent representatives, 4) financial analysts, 5] 
accountants, 6) auditors, and 7) regulators.
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H13; There is a significant positive association between the levels of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in Omani annual reports.
5.3.5 What Are the Effects of Company Attributes on Current Levels of Disclosure in 
Omani Annual Reports? (RQ14)
In order to assess the quality of Omani annual reports, two types of variables w ere used in the 
analysis: dependent and independent. Dependent variables w ere variables explained or 
predicted by independent variables. They w ere created through the development of 
disclosure indices for each company in the sample and were used later in the multivariate 
analysis. Independent variables w ere explanatory variables of variations in the level of 
disclosure in Omani annual reports.
In order to explain the variations in level of disclosure, previous accounting studies were 
reviewed to provide a set of variables to represen t company characteristics, such as size, 
profitability, performance, liquidity, auditor type and listing status. According to prior 
literature, there is no agreed theory on the num ber or selection of variables or items to be 
included in a disclosure index and there is no theoretically correct way of describing the 
association between extent of disclosure and a company's characteristics (Wallace et al., 
1994).
Firm specific characteristics have been empirically tested to determ ine their effect on levels of 
disclosure in annual reports. These characteristics were classified by Wallace et al. (1994) 
into three non-mutually exclusive categories: structure, performance, and market-related 
variables. Thomas (1991, p.50) reported that organisational attributes shown to be associated 
with particular reporting practices are organisational structure, size, gearing/leverage, and 
ownership-control status of firms. The following sub-sections discuss the variables used in 
this study drawn from prior literature.
5.3.5.1 Structure-Related Variables
5.3.5.1.1 Company Size (H14)
Company size has been empirically tested as a variable in many previous studies (Cooke, 
1989; Watson etal., 2002). The accounting literature suggests that the size of a company is 
the main explanatory variable of the variations in disclosure level (Gibbins etal., 1992a). The 
impact of organisation size on disclosure level is supported by agency theory. The larger the 
firm becomes the larger are the total agency costs because it is likely that monitoring function 
is inherently more difficult and expensive in a larger organisation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976,
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p.348).) Watts and Zimmerman (1986) also argued that larger firms are more politically 
sensitive and have relatively larger wealth transfers imposed on them than smaller firms 
(p.235).
Many reasons have been given for the positive relationship betw een the size of a company 
and the level of disclosure. First, a large corporation has the ability to drawn upon advanced 
internal data gathering and reporting systems (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). Second, large 
companies may have lower information production costs (Firth, 1979; Gray e t  a l, 1995). 
Third, large companies are complex and may suffer more additional political costs or public 
pressure than smaller companies (Cooke, 1989). Fourth, large companies are likely to realise 
possible benefits of better disclosure such as easier marketability of securities (Cerf, 1961). 
Finally, large companies do not fear competition (Naser and Al-Khatib, 2000).
Prior studies conducted in developing countries have reported a positive association between 
the size of a company and the level of disclosure (Ahmed, 1996; Hossain et al., 1995). 
However, some studies in less developed countries have found no relationship between the 
size of a company and level of disclosure (Ahmed and Nichollas, 1994), possibly because "size 
can be measured in a number o f different ways and there is no overriding theoretical reason to 
select one rather than another" (Cooke, 1991, p. 176). Table 5.1 summarises the different size 
measures used in some previous studies.
T a b l e  5 .1 : S u m m a r y  o f  a S a m p le  o f  P r e v i o u s  S t u d i e s  Using C o m p a n y  S ize  as  a M e a s u r e  o f  
E xte n t  o f  D isc losure .
Cerf (1961) Total assets Least square regression p<,05 (+)*
Number of stockholders p<.05 (+)
Singhvi and Desai (1971) Total assets Chi square p<.01 (+)
OLS regression not significant
Number of stockholders P<-01 M
not significant
Buzby (1975) Total assets Kendall rank correlation p<.001 (+)
Firth (1980) Market capitalization ttest pc.05 (+)
Chow and W ong-Boren Market value of equity plus book OLS regression p<oi M
(1987) value of debt
Cooke(1992) Total assets Step-wise regression p< 005 (+)
Current assets not significant
Fixed assets p<.005 (+)
Number of shareholders p<.005 (+)
Shareholders’ funds not significant
Bank borrowings not significant
Turnover not significant
Capital stock not significant
Gray, Meek and Roberts Sales turnover ANOVA P-01 (+)
(1995)
Naser and Al-Kahtib (2000) Total assets Step-wise regression P<-01 M
Number of employees P<-01 (+)
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) Total assets Multiple regression pc.05 (+)
Collet and Hrasky (2005) Market capitalisation Multi-nominal Not significant
regression
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In this study, two size measures w ere used: total assets and m arket capitalisation. Market 
capitalisation is the total num ber of a company's outstanding shares multiplied by the current 
price per share. Other m easures are not suitable for representing the size of a company, for 
instance, total sales and sales turnover are not suitable for determ ining the size of financial 
companies. Because of high governm ent ownership, large institutional investors, and large 
investors' ownership of Omani companies' shares and the concentration of ownership in 
Oman (Al-Busaidi, 2005], num ber of shareholders is not a suitable m easure of a company's 
size in Oman. Wallace and Naser (1995] argued that num ber of shareholders is not a suitable 
proxy for corporate size because a company may have more shareholders than another 
company which has a greater total asset base. Also, the num ber of employees does not 
represent the real size of a company because the high technology used in Omani companies 
and the availability of tem porary employment contracts decrease the num ber of staff which 
need to be hired in some companies. Based on the above discussion, a positive association is 
expected between the size measures and level of disclosure. Accordingly, the hypotheses to be 
tested are:
Hl4a : There is a positive association between the total assets of an Omani listed company and the
level o f mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
HUa : There is a positive association between the total assets of an Omani listed company and the
level o f voluntary disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
; There is a positive association between the market capitalisation of an Omani listed company
and the level o f mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
HXAb : There is a positive association between the market capitalisation of an Omani listed company
and the level o f voluntary disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
5.3.5.1.2 Company Gearing Level (H15)
Prior accounting literature empirically suggests a positive relationship betw een the gearing 
level of a company and the extent of disclosure in annual reports. Jensen and Meckling (1976] 
contended that the agency cost of debt will rise as the amount of outside financing increases, 
thus to reduce the cost managers have to disclose information. Additionally, it is maintained 
that managers are motivated to ensure that debt is capable of being 'rolled over' by receptive 
investors when due and therefore will disclose more information in order to decrease 
investors' uncertainties (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999, p.55]. Further, highly geared companies 
are subject to high monitoring costs and expected to disclose m ore information in their 
annual reports (Watson et. al., 2002]. However, Eng and Mak (2003] argued that an inverse
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relationship is expected between debt and disclosure because debt as a mechanism for 
controlling the free cash flow problem reduces the need for disclosure (p.328). Zarzeski 
(1996) indicated that high debt companies share more private information with creditors 
who therefore demand less published information. Also, in growing and profitable companies, 
debt has no effect on disclosure because these companies go to financial m arkets to obtain 
capital (Jensen, 1986).
A positive relationship between a company's leverage level and the extent of its disclosure has 
been reported in some prior studies (Firth, 1984; Hossain et al., 1994; Naser and Al-Khatib, 
2000). While some studies have reported that low geared companies disclose more 
information (Eng and Mak, 2003), others have found no such relationship (Chow and Wong- 
Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1992).
The effect of debt on the level of corporate disclosure in Omani annual reports was tested in 
this research. Gearing level was m easured by dividing total debt by total assets. This ratio 
informs how much a company relies on debt to finance its assets. Gearing ratio has been 
tested in previous studies (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Watson et. al., 2002). A positive relationship is expected between the gearing ratio and 
disclosure level in Omani annual reports. The hypotheses to be tested are:
H ]5a : There is a positive association between the debt ratio of an Omani listed company and the level
of mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
H]5b: There is a positive association between the debt ratio of an Omani listed company and the level of
voluntary disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
5.3.5.1.3 Company Liquidity position (H16)
The liquidity position of a company provides information about that company’s ability to meet 
its short-term  financial obligations. Some previous studies have hypothesised a positive 
relationship between liquidity ratios and level of disclosure on the basis that liquidity ratios 
are used in bankruptcy prediction, and regulators and investors are interested in a company's 
going concern status. Consequently, companies w ith a strong liquidity position tend to bring 
this fact to users of reports by disclosing more information (Owusu-Ansah, 2005). Another 
reason given in prior studies is that liquidity ratio is a good indicator of management 
performance and companies with high liquidity ratio thus tend to disclose more information 
in their reports (Naser etal., 2002). Other studies have hypothesised a negative association 
between company's liquidity position and disclosure (Ng and Koh, 1994) because a firm may
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need to provide more details to explain its weak performance Wallace etal. (1994). On the 
other hand, some have hypothesised no association between the extent of disclosure and 
liquidity ratios (Watson et al, 2002).
The empirical results presented in previous studies are mixed. While some have reported a 
positive relationship between liquidity ratios and disclosure (Owusu-Ansah, 2005), others 
have reported a negative association (Wallace et al., 1994), and some have found no 
association (Al-Saeed, 2005).
In this study, the current ratio was used as a proxy of a company's liquidity and was measured 
by dividing current assets by current liabilities since no single m easure can adequately reflect 
all aspects of liquidity (Al-Saeed, 2005). Current ratio has been used in previous studies 
(Wallace e ta l ,  1994; Watson e ta l ,  2002). In this study, a positive association is expected 
between a company's current ratio and the level of disclosure because the form er is a good 
indicator of management performance and thus attracts speculative investors in Oman and 
increases share price. The hypotheses to be tested are:
H ]6a: There is a positive association between the liquidity position of an Omani listed company and the 
level of mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
Hl6b: There is a positive association between the liquidity position of an Omani listed company and the 
level of voluntary disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
5.3.5.1.4 Company Ownership structure
Ownership structure determines the level of monitoring and thus the level of disclosure in 
reports (Eng and Mak, 2003). Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) indicated that 
expenditure on monitoring is an increasing function of the proportion of a firm's assets that is 
financed by outside capital, because the incidence of agency costs is higher for firms of the 
same size with a greater proportion of outside capital (p.57).
Previously, some prior studies have used num ber of shareholders as a surrogate of ownership 
diffusion (Malone etal., 1993). However, Raffournier (1995) argued that this variable 'is more 
a surrogate of size than a m easure of ownership diffusion (p.264)'. In this study, ownership 
structure is measured by the percentage of shares held by shareholders who own 10% or 
more of the company's shares, the percentage of shares held by minority shareholders, the 
percentage of government investment, the percentage of institutional investment, and the 
percentage of major foreign investment. The percentages of ownership in each listed company 
were collected from Annual Shareholders' Guide (MSM, 2005).
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5.3.5.1.4.1 Percentage of Shares Held by Shareholders Who Own 10% or More of the 
Company's Shares (H17)
In the accounting literature, previous studies have reported a negative relationship between 
the percentage of major shareholders and the level of disclosure because external owners 
with higher levels of ownership can be expected to ask for reduced disclosure in order to 
shield their direct consumption from scrutiny (Makhija and Patton, 2004]. Further, a firm's 
agency costs decrease as the ownership becomes more concentrated (Ang, Cole and Lin, 
2000]. While some previous studies have found a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and level of disclosure (Chau and Gray, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002], others 
have found no relationship between major shareholders and disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003].
In this study, the percentage of shares held by shareholders who owned 10% or more was 
used as a measure of diffusion in ownership. This variable would show the impact of major 
shareholders in Omani listed companies on the level of disclosure. The m easure of major 
shareholders was more suitable for the Omani environment than num ber of shareholders 
because of the high concentration of ownership of some companies' shares (MSM, 2005]. 
Based on agency theory, large investors might try  to benefit themselves at the expense of 
other investors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997]. Moreover, owners demand less published 
information because they have access to internal information (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002] and 
are involved in management (Wallace and Naser, 1995]. It is also contended in prior literature 
that demand and supply of disclosure will be high in corporations that are widely dispersed 
(Kothari, 2000]. Thus, a negative association is expected between major shareholders and 
level of disclosure. The hypotheses to be tested are:
Hlla: There is a negative association between the percentage of shares held by major shareholders and 
the level of mandatory disclosure.
H nb: There is a negative association between the percentage of shares held by major shareholders and 
the level o f voluntary disclosure.
5.3.5.1.4.2 Percentage of Shares Held by Minority Shareholders (H18)
It has been contended in previous studies that investors who do not actively participate in a 
firm's corporate governance rely on financial statem ents to value their claims because 
accounting data potentially reflect managers' proprietary business information (Healy and 
Palepu, 1993; Raffournier, 1995]. A positive relationship has also been hypothesised on the 
basis that external owners lacking sufficient power or influence because of low stock holdings 
will encourage disclosure of information (Makhija and Patton, 2004]. While a positive
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relationship has been found in previous studies between the percentage of shares held by 
minority shareholders and the level of disclosure (Mckinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993], other 
studies have found no significant relationship (Raffournier, 1995). In this study, the 
percentage of shares held by minority shareholders is used as a proxy of ownership diffusion 
and is expected to have a positive relationship with disclosure level. Findings will help to 
determine the effect of minority investors on the quality of financial reporting in Oman. The 
hypotheses to be tested are:
Hx%a: There is a positive association between the percentages of shares held by minority shareholders 
and the level of mandatory disclosure provided in Omani annual reports.
Hm : There is a positive association between the percentages of shares held by minority shareholders 
and the level of voluntary disclosure provided in Omani annual reports.
5.3.5.1.4.3 Percentage of Government Investm ent (H19)
Some accounting studies m easuring the association between governm ent ownership of a 
company's shares and level of disclosure have reported a positive relationship in less 
developed countries (Naser and Al-Khatib, 2000). Reasons for this are that companies 
disclose more information to mitigate higher agency costs and decrease the governance of 
these companies. Further, governm ent owned companies have easier access to different 
finance sources and face less discipline from the m arket for lack of corporate control (Eng and 
Mak, 2003, p.330].
Naser and Al-Khatib (2000] argued tha t in a developing country, governm ent participation in 
the ownership of a company's shares is viewed as a monitoring mechanism to improve the 
quality of information disclosure (p.105]. In Oman, the governm ent owns a substantial 
amount of shares of many companies and is viewed as a large long-term investor. This study 
expects the percentage of government ownership to be positively associated with mandatory 
disclosure and negatively with voluntary disclosure. Government owned companies w ant to 
set a good example through compliance with regulations. However, these companies might 
not disclose voluntarily because governm ent representatives have access to a company's 
private information at any time and thus have no need to disclose this in their reports. The 
hypotheses to be tested are:
Hl9a: There is a positive association between the percentage of government investment and level of 
mandatory disclosure in Omani annual reports.
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Hm : There is a negative association between the percentage of government investment and level of 
voluntary disclosure in Omani annual reports.
5.3.5.1.4.4 Percentage of Institutional Investm ent (H20)
The percentages of shares held by institutional investors have been used in previous studies 
to determine their influence on the level of disclosure. Some studies have expected the 
percentages of institutional investors to increase disclosure in order to reduce informational 
asymmetry (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002}, however, no significant relationship has been found 
between percentages of institutional investors and disclosure level (Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002}.
As in the case of government ownership, many Omani companies are substantially owned by 
institutional investors. These investors are either listed or unlisted companies. It is therefore 
expected in this study that the percentages of shares held by institutional investors will 
positively influence a company's compliance with disclosure requirem ents. In contrast, a 
negative relationship is expected between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure 
because institutional investors have access to a firm's information and use it to generate 
trading profits (Fama, 1970} and therefore will not encourage voluntary disclosure. Holland 
(1997, p.33} argued that the larger the institutional shareholder and the more proactive its 
portfolio policy, the more proactive the private disclosure. The hypotheses to be tested are:
H 20a ■ There is a positive association between the percentage of institutional investment and level of 
mandatory disclosure in Omani annual report 
H20b: There is a negative association between the percentage of institutional investment and level of 
voluntary disclosure in Omani annual report
5.3.5.1.4.5 Percentage of Shares Held by Major Foreign Investors (H21)
Previous studies have measured the impact of foreign investors on the level of disclosure and 
reported a positive relationship (Naser and Al-Khatib, 2000}. Two reasons given for this are, 
first, obtaining foreign funds means a greater need for disclosure to m onitor management 
actions (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p.339} and, second, foreign investors from countries with 
better governance and disclosure demand greater disclosure and better governance in those 
companies and countries in which they have invested (Khanna et al., 2004}. Further, Choi 
(1973} argued that foreign investors rely m ore heavily on information provided by a
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borrowing firm than domestic investors that have access to a variety of competing 
information sources about a particular company.
One of the main objectives of the capital market in Oman is to attract foreign investment. This 
has been achieved by issuing rules that makes it easy for foreign investors to own up to 100% 
of a company's shares. However, few companies in Oman are substantially owned by foreign 
investors. In this study, there is an expectation that the higher the foreign investment in a 
company, the higher the level of disclosure since foreign investors are better educated and 
have more experience with adequate reporting systems. The hypotheses to be tested are:
H 2la: There is a positive association between the percentage of foreign investment and the level of 
mandatory disclosure in an Omani annual report.
H2lb: There is a positive association between the percentage of foreign investment and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in an Omani annual report.
5.3.5.2 Performance-Related Variable (H22)
Many studies in the accounting literature report an association between the profitability of a 
company and the level of its disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003; McNally et. al., 1982}. Cerf (1961} 
argued that profitability is a measure of good management and managers tend to disclose 
more information to support continuance of their positions and compensations (p.21}. On the 
other hand, unprofitable companies may disclose more information in order to show reasons 
for lower profitability (p.21}. Additionally, Singhvi and Desai (1971} have argued that if a 
negative association is found between rate of return and level of disclosure, it means that the 
company relies on internal sources of financing and management may therefore tend to give 
less attention to the informational needs of users (p.134}.
The reasons cited for the association between profitability level and extent of disclosure apply 
to Oman. Management of a profitable Omani company have the opportunity to praise 
themselves and support the continuance of their position. Moreover, managers have to 
provide explanations for any misstated material information or loss, otherwise companies 
will be penalised by the regulators. In this study, performance of companies is measured by 
return on equity ratio, calculated by dividing net income by total of owners' equity. It is 
expected that the higher the return on equity ratio the higher the level of disclosure. The 
hypotheses to be tested are:
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H 22a: There is a positive association between a company's performance and the level of mandatory 
disclosure it provides in its annual report.
H 22h: There is a positive association between a company's performance and the level of voluntary 
disclosure it provides in its annual report.
5.3.5.3 Market-Related Variables:
5.3.5.3.1 Industry Sector (H23)
A market-related variable is the classification of the sector to which a company belongs. 
Wallace et al. (1994, p.47] stated that "every culture shapes corporate reporting behaviour, 
either through a common action (such as uniform accounting practices within an industry) or by 
continually offering certain practices which a firm  may conceivably want to emulate". Further, 
proprietor costs vary across industries and thus industry membership may exert an influence 
on level of disclosure (Gray e t  al., 1995, p. 559]. There are many reasons offered in the 
accounting literature for the association between the level of disclosure and the sector type to 
which a company belongs. First, companies in industries may wish to show that they are 
complying with industry best practices. Second, companies in highly regulated industries will 
be motivated to disclose information to try to reduce agency costs (Watson et. al., 2002, p. 
298]. However, McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982] have contended that differences in 
disclosure level may not result from differences in industry group but may be further 
confirmation of the impact of size on the level of disclosure (p.16].
A Comparison of previous studies' findings (Collett and Hrasky, 2005; Cooke, 1991] regarding 
the relationship between sector type and level of disclosure is difficult for two reasons. First, 
industry classifications and regulations differ from one country to another, and, second, not 
all sector types have been included in previous studies. Financial institutions have been 
excluded from most prior studies because these institutions are subject to additional 
regulations (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004c; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987].
There are five industry sectors in Oman: banking, investment, industrial, service, and 
insurance. The banking sector is excluded from the analysis in this study because it has to 
comply with additional regulations set by the Central Bank of Oman. Moreover, the 
relationship between industry sector and level of disclosure is likely to be unclear because 
firms from a particular sector may adopt disclosure practices additional to those required in 
all sectors and thus their levels of disclosure will differ from other firms (Wallace etal., 1994, 
p.47]. Accordingly, the hypotheses to be tested are:
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H 2 2a ■' There is an association between the type of sector to which an Omani listed company belongs and 
the level of mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual report 
H 23b '■ There is an association between the type of sector to which an Omani listed company belongs and 
the level of voluntary disclosure it provides in its annual report.
5.3 .5 .3 .2  A uditor Type (H 24)
Another market-related variable investigated in prior research is auditor type. In the 
accounting literature, audit firm size/type has been used as a measure to explain variations in 
disclosure level. It has been argued that financial statements are the product of a bargaining 
process between management and auditors (Antle, 1982) and the contents of corporate 
reports are not only audited but also influenced by auditors (Wallace etal., 1994). It has been 
hypothesised in the accounting literature that there is a positive association between big audit 
firms and level of disclosure (Hossain and Taylor, 2007b; Owusu-Ansah, 2005). This is 
because such audit firms have greater expertise and experience (Wallace etal., 1994), and use 
the information disclosed by their clients as a means of signalling their own quality and 
reputation (Inchausti, 1997). Based on agency theory, companies also try to reduce agency 
costs by contracting with audit firms (Antle, 1982,1984; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
While a number of previous studies have reported a positive relationship between auditor 
type and level of disclosure (Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Craswell and Taylor, 1992; 
Hossain and Taylor, 2007b; Inchausti, 1997; Naser et al, 2002), others have found no 
association between auditor type and level of disclosure (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Al-Saeed, 
2005; Chau and Gray, 2002; Firth, 1979; Eng and Mak, 2003; Hossain and Taylor, 1998).
Omani listed companies are required to be audited by audit firms registered by the Capital 
Market Authority.9 Auditors in Oman can be classified into three groups: Big four (KPMG, 
Ernst and Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte and Touche), international affiliated firms 
(firms with international links), and local audit firms. The majority of Omani listed companies 
(66%) are audited by Big four and the rest (34%) are audited by international affiliated audit 
firms. It is therefore expected that, in Oman, listed companies audited by Big four audit firms 
will tend to disclose more information than companies audited by non-Big four audit firms. 
This is because Big four audit firms enjoy a reputation (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995) and have 
greater expertise and experience in auditing large quoted companies (Lennox, 1999). 
Accordingly, the hypotheses to be tested are:
9 There are 14 audit firms registered in the CMA: the Big-4, nine International affiliated, and one Local (in year 
2004 It did not audit any listed company (MSM, 2005).
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H 2 4 a • The mandatory disclosure compliance level of a company audited by a Big-four audit firm is 
greater than that of a company audited by a non-Big-four audit firm.
H 2 4 b ■' Omani Listed companies audited by a Big-four audit firm tend to disclose more information than 
companies audited by a non-Big-four audit firm.
5.3 .6  A M odel for D isclosu re E valuation
In light of the above discussion, this study explores a model for disclosure evaluation in Omani 
listed companies. The model identifies the impact of a company's characteristics on the 
disclosure levels in its annual reports. Prior empirical studies and disclosure models suggest a 
company's attributes will influence disclosure extent in Omani corporate reports. The 
investigated model is therefore im portant because it will help annual reports’ users and 
regulators to better understand the motives of management for current disclosure, especially 
disclosure of good versus bad news. Figure 5.1 shows the conceptual structure of the model. 
The effect of a company's characteristics on disclosure level are measured using weighted and 
unweighted scoring methods which are discussed in Chapter 6.
F i g u r e  5 .1 :  A  M o d e l  f o r  D i s c l o s u r e  E v a l u a t i o n .
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5.4 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has explained the development of this study's research questions and 
hypotheses. The two main research stages in this study are: (1] investigating the perceptions 
of corporate reports' users of the importance of the reporting system in Oman, and (2) 
measuring the extent of disclosures in Omani annual reports and the association between 
these disclosures and a company's characteristics. Company characteristics m easured in this 
study are size, profitability, liquidity, gearing level, ownership structure, auditor type and 
industry. Research questions and hypotheses have been developed based on disclosure 
theories and prior empirical studies.
Disclosure theories and prior literature point to an information gap in corporate reports 
between the demand and supply of information. This is because there is a conflict of interests 
between managers and stakeholders. Differences are therefore expected in the perceptions of 
reports' user groups of the quality of the financial reporting system. Prior empirical studies 
and disclosure models suggest a company's attributes will influence the extent of disclosure in 
Omani corporate reports. The following chapter explains the research methods. Chapters 7, 8, 
and 9 present and discuss the study findings pertaining to the aforementioned research 
questions and hypotheses.
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C H A P T E R  6 : R E S E A R C H  M E T H O D O L O G Y
6.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the methodology for this research, including the research design, data 
collection methods, and sample selection. The research will be undertaken in three stages. 
Stage I involves primary data collection through a questionnaire survey; stage II consists of 
secondary data collected from Muscat Securities Market's (MSM) database; and stage III elicits 
data through an interview survey. The following section focuses on the questionnaire survey, 
its design and constituent parts. Section 6.3 describes the prim ary data collection method, 
while Section 6.4 explains questionnaire reliability and generalisability tests. Section 6.5 
presents the mandatory disclosure list. The secondary data collection method is discussed in 
Section 6.6 while Section 6.7 describes the application of statistical tests. Section 6.8 details 
the third stage of data collection. Interview analysis is explained in Section 6.9 and Section 
6.10 summarises and concludes the chapter.
6.2 Stage I: Questionnaire Survey
The quality of financial reporting is examined by determining the informational needs of 
corporate reports' users, for which a questionnaire survey can be used as a data collection 
method. Questionnaires are one of the m ost widely used techniques to collect data. 
Oppenheim (1966) stated that “a questionnaire is not ju st a list o f questions or a form  to be 
filled. It is essentially a measurement tool, an instrument fo r  the collection o f particular kinds o f 
data" (p.2). Questionnaires provide an efficient way of collecting responses because each 
respondent is asked to respond to the same set of questions (Saunders etal., 1997, p.244). 
One advantage of a questionnaire survey is that it increases the comparability of responses 
since respondents answer the same questions which facilitate the analysis of collected data. 
Another is that it reduces the researcher's effects and bias. However, interpretation of 
collected data might be affected if the researcher and respondents do not share the same 
meaning system (Bryman, 2001).
In order to test the perceptions of user groups in Oman, a questionnaire was considered the 
most applicable methodology. Baker and Haslem (1973, p.65) have pointed out that 
‘determining the user market and its needs fo r  financial information is complex because users 
are a heterogeneous group with often widely divergent interests'.
6.2.1 Questionnaire Design
A delivery and collection questionnaire was used in this study instead of a postal 
questionnaire to ensure a high response rate, minimise researcher bias, and facilitate the 
checking of incomplete questionnaires. Ball and Foster (1982, p.186) have argued that 
"increasing the number o f observations is one means o f increasing the power o f a statistical test." 
Before designing the questionnaire the relevant literature was reviewed to identify research 
areas and ensure the designed questionnaire covered all areas of interest and its contents 
were consistent with the research objectives.
In deciding the sequence of questions in the questionnaire, the funnel approach was applied. 
The funnel approach starts off with a very broad question and then progressively narrows 
down the scope of questions until it comes to very specific points (Oppenheim, 1966, p.39). 
Scale questions and an open-ended question were used. The form er were used because they 
require less time and no writing which makes them  easy to answer and increase the response 
rate. The open-ended question was used to encourage respondents to freely write down their 
thoughts about the reporting system in Oman.
It took four months to design and draft the questionnaire based on previous literature and 
what was considered applicable to the Omani business environment. Each draft of the 
questionnaire was given to the researcher's supervisors to comment on it. Drafts were revised 
until the final draft was approved by her supervisors. The construction and validation of the 
final draft of the questionnaire were tested. There are two types of validity: (1) face validity, 
which assures that individual items in the questionnaire m easure the concept that it is 
supposed to measure, and (2) content validity, which assures that questionnaire items are 
well-balanced in content and cover the areas the researcher intends to measure (Oppenheim, 
1966). To ensure the validity of questions, the researcher extensively reviewed prior 
literature and adapted some of the questions used in previous studies. The final draft of the 
questionnaire was also reviewed by the researcher's supervisors, several PhD students in the 
accounting departm ent at Cardiff Business School, and a num ber of Omani expatriates living 
in the UK. They were asked to comment on the questionnaire's content, wording, and 
information flow.
The final questionnaire was then translated into Arabic since this is the dominant language in 
Oman. English and Arabic copies of the questionnaire were pilot tested in Oman by 
distributing them to 14 individuals to ensure respondents would not experience difficulties in 
answering the questionnaire and to obtain an assessm ent of questions' validity (Saunders et
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al., 1997). Participants in the pilot study were members of board of directors, academics who 
were also shareholders, institutional investors, government representatives, auditors, 
accountants, and regulators. They were asked to comment on the simplicity and wording of 
the questionnaire, the accuracy of translation, and to suggest additional information that 
should be included in the questionnaire. Respondents suggested excluding the list of 
mandatory items from the questionnaire because of the accounting terminologies included in 
the list. They argued that it would be difficult for unprofessional users to understand all of the 
listed accounting terminologies and thus rate them in an efficient manner. Participants 
suggested a few additional items to the questionnaire. Based on the participants' suggestions, 
the author added the following items to the first part of the questionnaire (use of annual 
reports): (1) to assess a company's cash flow and (2) to fulfill statutory and legal 
requirements. She also added company's quarterly reports, annual general meeting, and 
sector information as sources of corporate information (see part 1 of questionnaire, question 
2). In part five of the questionnaire, the current study researcher added the following to the 
list of voluntary disclosures: 1) trend analysis on a company's profitability, 2) company's 
insurance coverage, 3) company's technological developments, and 4) company's competitive 
pressures. Both Arabic and English copies of the questionnaire are provided in Appendix A.
6.2.2 Parts of the Questionnaire
The questionnaire started with a covering letter that stated the purpose of the research and 
assured respondents of the confidentiality of their responses. It was also accompanied by a 
letter from the researcher's sponsor, Sultan Qaboos University, confirming that the researcher 
was a PhD student and that the research was part of her PhD programme (see Appendix A). 
Guidelines were given to respondents at the beginning of each question. Simple language was 
used in written questions.
The questionnaire consisted of six main parts. Part 1 focused on the purpose of financial 
disclosure and various sources of corporate information while part 2 contained items relating 
to annual report sections. Part 3 addressed the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) 
report and the nature of the information included in the MD&A report. Part 4 focused on two 
aspects: (1) the code of corporate governance, and (2) corporate governance report. This part 
was constructed based on Lee and Tweedie's (1975, p.3) argum ent that "....the utility and 
relevance to the user o f reported accounting information lies not simply in how well it describes 
the economic activity o f the enterprise but also in how clearly it presents its economic message 
to the user.” Part 5 sought respondents' perceptions of the importance of a list of 36 voluntary
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items and any additional items that should be added to the annual report. The list was 
constructed in two stages. The first stage was an extensive review of prior literature while the 
second stage was a review of CMA disclosure requirem ents and recommendations. The 
statistical analysis of this question would be used in calculating voluntary disclosure indices.
Finally, Part 6 sought respondents' background information. This part was placed at the end 
of the questionnaire because respondents consider such information to be highly sensitive 
aspect and they expect some interesting questions dealing with the research topic at the 
beginning of the questionnaire (Oppenheim, 1966, p.37). Respondents were asked to classify 
themselves in one of seven categories in order to determ ine similarities or differences in the 
perceptions of targeted groups and avoid the duplication of roles.
There were two reasons for the inclusion of six parts in the questionnaire: (1) to discover 
main features of the financial reporting system in Oman, and (2} to measure statistically the 
similarities or differences in the perceptions of different user groups. Respondents were 
required to give their views on the im portance and usefulness of various aspects of the 
financial reporting system in Oman using a five-point Likert scale. This scale was adopted in 
Part 1 through to Part 5 of the questionnaire.
6.3 Primary Data Collection Method
Questionnaires were distributed to 500 respondents, 287 were returned, but only 285 were 
usable. The distribution and collection of questionnaires were made in person in order to 
increase the response rate. The overall response rate was 57%, higher than the response rate 
(48%) of similar studies conducted in Saudi Arabia (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004a and 
2007) and other developed countries (Anderson and Epstein, 1996). The researcher always 
carried a good quantity of English and Arabic copies of the questionnaire on her person. 
Because people are not accustomed to the idea of research, the researcher assured 
respondents of the confidentiality of their identity and responses, and explained the purpose 
of the research to encourage participants to cooperate fully.
Crucial stages in any research process are determining whom to approach and w hether they 
are representative of the whole population or not. Based on the reviewed literature and 
taking into account the Omani environment, seven groups were selected as samples: 
individual investors, institutional investors, government representatives, accountants, 
financial analysts, auditors, and regulators. All sampled groups have a significant role in
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shaping the Omani capital m arket and thus influence the information published. The following 
subsections describe sampled groups.
6.3.1 Individual Investors
Personal contact with individual investors was the only way to m eet them since it was 
difficult to gain access to their addresses. The only places to meet them were the trading hall 
in MSM and trading rooms in brokerage companies during trading hours, which were two 
hours. Operating officers of trading rooms introduced the researcher to investors and helped 
in distributing and collecting questionnaires. The officers were contacted later to collect 
completed questionnaires. Around 30 investors were also approached through other 
investors. Overall, the researcher was able to distribute 93 questionnaires and received back 
66 .
6.3.2 Institutional Investors
Institutional investors were identified from the Annual Shareholders Guide [MSM, 2005}. 
They were contacted to set appointments to distribute questionnaires. The researcher visited 
institutional investors and met the investment manager in each organization. Overall, 49 
questionnaires, mostly in English, were distributed, and respondents given a week within 
which to complete them. Twenty-six were returned.
6.3.3 Government Representatives
Government representatives are employees who are responsible for investing funds on behalf 
of the government. The researcher set appointments with investm ent departm ent managers 
and met them before or after trading hours. These managers helped the researcher to 
distribute 30 questionnaires to other employees in their departments. Not all governmental 
bodies welcomed the researcher's visit. Governmental bodies visited were: the Diwan Royal 
Court Pension Fund, Royal Police Pension Fund, State General Fund Reserve, Public Authority 
of Social Insurance, Defence Pension Fund, Internal Security Service, and Ministry of the 
National Economy. The researcher was able to collect 19 completed questionnaires.
6.3.4 Regulators
The researcher contacted the director of issue and disclosure, the director of licensed 
companies, and the director of supervision companies and funds in the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA). They were cooperative and distributed 23 questionnaires to their 
employees, 15 questionnaires were received back.
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6.3.5 Financial Analysts
Financial analysts in banks' trading units, brokerage companies and investment companies 
were contacted by the researcher. The brokerage companies were listed in the Annual 
Shareholders' Guide (MSM, 2005) as licensed brokers. Appointments were set with them and 
70 questionnaires were distributed and a week later 57 questionnaires were collected.
6.3.6 Auditors
In Oman, most listed companies are audited by Big four and international affiliated audit 
firms. Local audit firms do not audit listed companies because they are not registered in MSM. 
The researcher contacted auditors working in the Big four, international affiliated and local 
audit firms and distributed 95 copies. 30 questionnaires were received back from local 
auditors, 12 from international audit firms, and 15 from Big four audit firms.
6.3.7 Accountants
Most listed companies were contacted by the researcher who asked to m eet the heads of 
accounting departments. Appointments were set with them in order to distribute the 
questionnaire to them and their employees. A week was given to them to complete 140 
questionnaires and follow-up rem inders were sent by the researcher. 45 questionnaires were 
returned back.
6.3.8 Summary of the Distribution and Collection of the Questionnaire
T a b l e  6.1: D i s t r i b u t io n  a n d  Col lec t ion  o f  the  Q u es t ion n a ire s .
Individual investors 93 66 71%
Institutional m h h e h m b h ih h h h 53%
investors
Government 30 ..19............ ....... 63%
representatives
Regulators 23 15 65%
Financial analysts 70 57 81%
Auditors 95 57 60%
Accountants 140 45 32%
Total 500 285 57%
6.4 Questionnaire Reliability and Generalisability tests
Reliability of a measure refers to its consistency (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). Instruments 
with multiple item scales should be assessed for internal consistency. In other words, each 
scale measures a single idea and items that make up the scale should be internally consistent 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2005). Cronbach's alpha is the most widely used reliability test. It
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calculates the average of all possible split-half reliability coefficients (Bryman and Cramer, 
2005, p.77). A correlation coefficient is generated, which varies between 0 and 1, and the 
nearer the result is to 1, and preferably at or above 0.8, the more internally reliable is the 
scale. Table 6.2 reports the alpha value for each user group as well as for the sample as a 
whole. It shows a high internal consistency of responses for each user group as well as the 
whole sample. The high alpha scores also indicated that the proportion of total variance was 
not due to error or fault in the wording of questions (Oppenheim, 1966, p.71). Similar 
coefficients have been reported in previous studies conducted in the Gulf region (Al-Razeen 
and Karbhari, 2007).
T a b l e  6.2:  Cronbach's Alpha  v a l u e s  for  the  Q u es t io n n a ir e .
Individual
investors
Financial Auditors 
Analysts
Accountants Institutional 
Investors
Government
Representatives
Regulators Whole
Sample
0.9707 0 .9587  0.9800 0 .9389  0 .9658 0 .9744 0.9696 0.9679
Another test was used to m easure w hether the conclusions drawn from questionnaire 
responses could be generalised to the population or not. The generalisability test is called the 
non-response bias test. Oppenheim (1966, p.34) argued that late respondents represent non­
respondents. The researcher compared late responses with early responses using the Mann- 
Whitney U test. It is a non-parametric test used to test w hether two independent groups have 
been drawn from the sample population and tha t the sample is a good representative of the 
population (Siegel and Castellan, 1988).
The researcher concluded that the research findings could be generalized to the population, 
since out of 98 questionnaire items, late respondents from the individual investors group 
differed significantly from other respondents in the same group on only 3 items; late 
respondents from auditors group differed significantly from other auditors on 4 items; late 
accountants differed from other accountants on only 1 item; late institutional investors 
significantly differed from other institutional investors on 1 item; and late government 
representatives differed from other governm ent representatives on 3 items.
6.5 List o f M andatory Item s
A list of mandatory items was adopted from CMA disclosure requirem ents in this study. In the 
pilot study, Omani regulators, auditors, academics, members of board directors, and financial 
analysts were asked about their opinions regarding the questionnaire and the list of 
mandatory items. The list consisted of 30 items required by the International Accounting 
Standards Board and CMA to be disclosed in the balance sheet, the profit and loss account, and
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notes to the financial statements. A copy of the list of m andatory items is provided in 
Appendix B. The statistical results pertaining to this list will be used later to calculate the 
mandatory disclosure indices. The following table summarises the distribution and collection 
of the mandatory list of items.
T a b l e  6 . 3  - .D ist r ibu t ion  a n d  Col lec t ion  o f  the  M a n d a t o r y  I t e m s  List.
Financial analysts 70 40 57%
Accountants 140 44 31.4%
Auditors 70 31 44.29
Total 280 115 41.07%
6.6 Stage II: Secondary Data Collection Method
Jonas and Blanchet (2000, p.354] suggest that the "quality o f financial reporting depends on 
the quality o f each part o f the fmancial-reporting process". They contended that there are two 
approaches for assessing the quality of financial reporting: user needs and
shareholder/investor protection. The user needs approach is concerned with providing users 
with relevant information useful in making decisions whereas shareholder/investor 
protection is concerned with ensuring that users receive full and fair disclosure (p.357]. In 
order to apply the above approaches, the quality of corporate annual reports m ust be proxied 
by something measurable. This subject is discussed in the following sub-sections.
6.6.1 Extent of Disclosure in Corporate Annual Reports
Based on prior studies, the extent of disclosure in annual reports was used as a surrogate for 
the quality of such reports. Botosan (1997, p.324) stated that "researchers tend to assume 
quantity and quality positively related. This assumption is justified on the basis o f  the 
importance o f managers' reporting reputations and the constraints placed on managers by legal 
liability". Therefore, ceteris paribus, it was assumed, in this study, that the quantity of 
disclosure in Omani annual reports was a good proxy of the quality of corporate reports.
6.6.2 Construction of Disclosure Indices
The quality of disclosure can be assessed based on two criteria: the company's compliance 
with mandatory disclosure and the depth of voluntary disclosure in annual reports. The 
accounting literature indicates that the practical research tool for measuring the quality of 
reports is the disclosure index. "The Disclosure index is a score sheet containing specific items 
that are possible to report in an accounting report" (Schadewitz et. al., 1999, p.2). Marston and 
Shrives (1991, p. 195] stated that the disclosure index "can be used to show compliance with 
regulations i f  the items in index are so chosen or to show level o f voluntary disclosure". However,
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they pointed out that the construction of the disclosure index and awarding scores to 
companies involves subjective judgm ent (p.207). Patton and Zelenka (1997) also argued that 
disclosure indices should be viewed as a noisy measure of the extent of disclosure. To reduce 
subjectivity, the researcher should select items that relate to the nature and purpose of user 
groups (Buzby, 1974, p. 424) and review relevant literature and the regulations of the country 
concerned (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, p.535).
In this study, the researcher reviewed the literature, considered the CMA regulations, and 
consulted a num ber of professional users, such as auditors and financial analysts, during the 
pilot study. Two scoring sheets w ere constructed to measure the depth of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure in each report of the sampled Omani listed companies. Since there is no 
agreed theory on the num ber or the selection of items to be included in the disclosure index, 
this study m easured the depth of 30 m andatory items and 36 voluntary items in Omani 
annual reports. The following sections present the construction of both the mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure index and items included in the scoring sheets for each.
6.6.2.1 Index of Mandatory Disclosure
An index of mandatory disclosure was adopted from CMA disclosure requirem ents to 
measure the depth of m andatory disclosure and companies' compliance with some of the 
listed requirements. Mandatory items w ere selected from the CMA pro-forma10. The selected 
items are applicable to all companies almost all of the time. The researcher included all those 
items required to be disclosed in the balance sheet, the profit and loss account, and notes to 
financial statem ents by CMA. Other items disclosed in other sections, such as management 
discussion and analysis, were excluded because they are of a narrative nature and additional 
documents have to be provided in order to confirm the information stated therein. Statements 
of cash flows and changes in stockholders' equity were also not included because they only 
explain some of the figures appearing in the balance sheet such as cash. Measuring the 
disclosure of individual items would reveal the compliance and depth of disclosing such items 
and would provide a base for comparing a company's disclosure with users' selection of 
important mandatory items to make their decisions. The depth of the explanatory notes was 
also assessed in order to m easure the compliance and depth of multi-element items.
A list of 30 m andatory disclosures was adopted in order to determ ine the importance of 
mandatory items to users of corporate reports. Items used to calculate the index of mandatory 
disclosure for each Omani company are to be found in Appendix C, Table 1.
10 Pro-forma is a set of minimum disclosure requirem ents directed for each sector.
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In some previous studies users have been asked to rate the importance of a whole set of 
financial statem ents or the breakdown or classification of certain items in these statements 
(Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004b; McNally e ta l,  1982). In this study, Omani companies were 
assessed for the disclosure of individual items, such as cash and non-current assets, instead of 
assessed on the classification or arrangem ents of assets.
6.6.2.2 Index of Voluntary Disclosure
An index of voluntary disclosure was constructed to measure the depth of voluntary 
information in Omani annual reports. Botosan (1997) contends that annual reports serve as a 
good proxy for the level of voluntary disclosure provided by a firm (p. 329). Items used to 
calculate the index of voluntary disclosure are presented in Appendix C, Table 2. The selection 
of these items was based on four criteria:
1. Items recommended by previous studies to be included in annual reports, such as a 
summary analysis of cash flows by segment.
2. Items recommended by the Capital Market Authority, such as gross profit margin.
3. Items recommended by professional users in Oman, such as trend analysis on 
profitability.
4. Items related to m andatory narrative disclosure, such as a graph illustrating a company's 
market price in comparison to the broad based index of Muscat Security Market.
6.6.3 Scoring M ethods an d  C alcu lation  o f  D isc lo su re  Index
Two scoring sheets were prepared to m easure the extent of disclosure of 30 m andatory items 
and 36 voluntary items. Buzby (1974) divided the items into three groups: self-contained, 
items with varying degrees of specificness, and items with sub-elements. He gave companies 
that disclosed self-contained items full credit and zero if they did not disclose them. In the 
case of items with varying specificness and sub-elements, he gave companies full credit for full 
disclosure and partial credit for partial disclosure (p.429). The partial credit was calculated by 
distributing the maximum score among the sub-elements (Buzby, 1974, p.430). This 
calculation method reduces the subjectivity of scoring methods (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
This approach was applied recently by Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004c).
In this research, the researcher aw arded a single elem ent item, such as net assets per share, a 
full point if disclosed and zero otherwise. In the case of items with sub-elements, the full point 
was distributed among the sub-elements. For example, if a company disclosed an am ount of 
taxes but did not disclose tax rate, it was aw arded half (0.50) of the point. This measure is
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more reliable than awarding zero for partial disclosure, since it presents the actual disclosure 
of items in Omani annual reports and avoids confusion between the score of zero for non­
disclosure and the score of zero for partial disclosure.
After assigning the scores, the index of disclosure was calculated by dividing the actual total 
points that each company received by the maximum points it would have received by 
reporting all eligible disclosure items. The maximum points varied from one company to 
another because not all the items w ere applicable to all companies in that particular year. An 
item was coded as not applicable only after investigating the entire report and ensuring that 
no similar information appeared in any other parts of the report. Companies were not 
therefore penalised for non-disclosure of a non-applicable item. For example, a company that 
had paid its long-term debt in a current year would not report long-term debt in its balance 
sheet and therefore would not be penalised for not disclosing the am ount of debt, interest 
rate, source of debt, and the m aturity value. The scoring sheets for each disclosure item are 
provided in Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix C. This approach has been used in prior studies (Chau 
and Gray, 2002; Cooke, 1989].
6.6.3.1 Weighted and Unweighted Scoring Methods
There are two types of scoring methods suggested in prior accounting literature: unweighted 
and weighted scoring methods. The unweighted method is a dichotomous approach where a 
company is awarded one if it disclosed an item and zero otherwise. The weighted method 
assigns scores to items based on their relative importance to specific groups of annual report 
users. In this study, the weighted score was obtained by asking annual reports' users to rate 
the importance of selected m andatory and voluntary items in making investm ent decisions on 
a five-point scale, where responses extended from 1 'no im portance' to 5 'very high 
importance'. Then, the average of the scores given by respondents to an item was used as a 
weighted score and awarded to a company if it disclosed an item and zero otherwise.
In the accounting literature, there is an ongoing debate between those researchers who 
favour the unweighted method and those who favour the weighted method. Chow and Wong- 
Boren (1987] argued that unweighted scores are used to compensate for two potential 
limitations of weighted scores: (1] the ratings are obtained through a survey and are without 
real economic consequences, and (2] they might not fully reflect actual use of items by 
respondents. Moreover, unweighted scores perm it an analysis independent of a particular 
user group's perceptions (p. 536]. However, Coy and Dixon (2004] have contended that the 
unweighted scoring method suffers from several problems. First, it treats all items equally
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although there are differences in their content and importance (p.83), and, second, all items 
are accorded equal importance regardless of w hether their absence or presence is 
fundamental to the overall quality of a report (p.84).
Those who support the weighted method maintain that it allows greater recognition of items 
that are inherently extensive (e.g. balance sheet) than items tha t are inherently limited in 
extent (e.g. statem ent of movement in equity) (Coy and Dixon, 2004, p.84). Wallace (1994) 
also argued that the weighted scoring method seeks to rew ard the depth of information 
provided in annual reports to give credit to the fullness of information in each item (p.43).
Previous studies have argued that if there are a large number of items in the index, then one 
can expect weighted and unweighted scores to give the same results (Marston and Shrives, 
1991, p.203). This has been proved in the studies of Firth (1980), Robbins and Austin (1986), 
and Chow and Wong-Boren (1987).
Marston and Shrives (1991) have suggested that if a weighted index is constructed then it is 
advisable to calculate the unweighted scores as well as in order to discern the effect of 
weighting on the ranking of companies (p.203). This advice was followed in this study to show 
the effect of weighting scores on statistical analysis. Unweighted and weighted methods were 
applied to each scoring sheet for each Omani listed company in the sample. Previous studies 
have employed only one user group (Hooks, Coy and Davey, 2002), this study employed most 
annual report user groups in order to produce a well balanced weighted index of disclosure.
6.6.4 Secondary Data Sample
This study selected a secondary data sample of 111 annual reports of Omani listed companies 
for the year 2004. The annual reports sample was selected based on the availability of annual 
reports for the year 2004, since some of the companies had been listed for less than a year. In 
addition, year 2004 was selected because it was the first year in which companies were 
required to provide soft copies of their annual reports to MSM in order to upload them on its 
website.11 Thus MSM database contained the annual reports of all listed companies in the year 
2004. Annual reports of banks w ere excluded from this study because the banking sector is 
regulated by many regulatory bodies. The annual reports sample was derived from MSM's 
Website www.msm.gov.om. Few companies in Oman have websites; therefore the researcher
11 As stated by the information centre in MSM: MSM information centre was established in June 2003. It was 
responsible for uploading hard copies of reports submitted by companies in 2003 and previous years. However, not all 
companies provided their reports.
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used the above source to gain access to whole documents of annual reports. Companies whose 
annual reports were examined for the year 2004 are listed in Table 5 in Appendix C.
6.7 Statistical Tests' Application
This section discusses the different statistical tests applied to analyse the questionnaire and 
secondary data collected in this research. There are four main considerations in selecting 
appropriate statistical tests [Bryman and Cramer, 2005, p. 142; Siegel and Castellan, 1988, 
p.33):
1. Type of data measurement, i.e. categorical or ordinal,
2. Number of independent groups involved in the research,
3. Number of cases in each group, and
4. Whether the groups are independent or related.
Based on the above considerations, there are two types of statistical tests: (1) parametric, and 
(2) non-parametric. A param eter as defined by Bryman and Cramer (2005, p.144) is "a 
measure which describes the distribution o f the population such as the mean or variance". 
Parametric tests are based on three assumptions: (1} level or scale of m easurem ent is of equal 
interval or ratio scaling, [2] the distribution of the population scores is normal, and (3) the 
variances of both variables are equal or homogeneous (Bryman and Cramer, 2005, p.144). 
Parametric tests are more powerful than non-param etric tests (Bowerman and O'Connell, 
2007). These tests are systemised and different tests are variations on a central theme (Siegel 
and Castellan, 1988).
A nonparametric or distribution free test, as defined by Siegel and Castellan (1988, p.34), “is 
based on a model that specifies only very general conditions and none regarding the specific 
form o f the distribution from which the sample was drawn". Bowerman and O'Connell (2007) 
state that the advantage of nonparam etric tests is that they can be used w ithout the 
assumption that the sampled populations have any particular probability distributions. In this 
study, statistical tests were selected based on the above considerations and assumptions.
6.7.1 Statistical Tools Used in Stage I of the Research
Oppenheim (1966) indicated that a typical survey will usually have to go through several 
predictable stages: univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis (p.254). Such statistical 
tools were applied in this study to analyse questionnaire data. Statistical analyses results are
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reported in Chapter 7. Major statistical tools used in the first stage of this research were as 
follows:
1. Univariate test represents the total sample distribution of one variable at a time. 
Descriptive statistics are univariate tests which are divided into statistics that measure 
central tendency (e.g. mean and median) and statistics that m easure dispersion (e.g. 
standard deviation). Central tendency measures are concerned with locating where 
values in a distribution tend to concentrate. The dispersion m easure is concerned with 
how wide a distribution is (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). Frequency distribution is used 
to ascertain how many cases in each category and the percentage of cases within each 
frequency [relative frequency). In this research, the aforementioned statistical tests were 
applied to questionnaire data. The relative frequency was calculated for each question to 
detect the percentage of respondents who had similar ratings. To determ ine various 
respondent groups' perceptions of different items listed in the questionnaire, the mean 
and median were calculated for each respondent group's ratings. The standard deviation 
was also calculated to detect the degree of dispersion in responses within each 
respondent group of the im portance of various items.
2. Bivariate analysis is concerned w ith the association between two variables. In this study, 
bivariate analysis was used to test w hether there were significant differences among 
pairs of user groups regarding their perceptions of the financial reporting system in 
Oman. There were seven respondent groups with a different num ber of cases in each 
group and respondents' perceptions w ere measured on an ordinal scale. Based on the 
above-mentioned conditions, the m ost appropriate statistical tests were non-parametric 
tests. In order to determ ine which pair or pairs of groups' responses significantly 
differed, the Mann-Whitney U or the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was applied. This test 
was used to compare the num ber of times a score from one of the samples was ranked 
higher than a score from the other samples (Bryman and Cramer, 2005, p.167). The 
alternative hypothesis would be accepted if there were significant differences in the 
perceptions of each pair of user groups considered in the test. There are, however, 
limitations in the non-param etric tests used to analyse data. Non-parametric tests are 
less sensitive than param etric tests. Further, non-parametric tests are not systematic 
whereas param etrical tests are systemised and provide more statistical analysis.
3. Multivariate analysis deals with more than two variables. In order to test w hether there 
were significant differences between various user groups regarding their perceptions of 
financial disclosure, the nonparam etric Kruskal-Wallis H test was used. This test is
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designed to test w hether different independent samples come from different 
populations (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p.206), and it can be used to compare scores in 
more than two groups (Bryman and Cramer, 2005, p. 169). The Kruskal-Wallis H test 
reported any significant differences within the whole sample but w ithout specifying 
which pair or pairs of groups had significant differences. The alternative hypothesis was 
accepted if there were significant differences in the perceptions of the whole sample.
6.7.2 Statistical Tools Used in Stage II
Three types of statistical test w ere used in analysing disclosure indices and their association 
with disclosure explanatory factors: univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analysis. The 
results of these tests are reported in Chapters 8 and 9. The major statistical tools used in the 
second stage of this research were as follows:
1. Univariate analysis. In order to test the level of disclosure in Omani corporate annual 
reports, two univariate tests were considered. These tests were descriptive and normality 
tests. Descriptive tests, such as mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard 
deviation, were applied in this study to obtain a general idea about the collected data. The 
normality test (diagnostic) was used to ensure that the distribution of the sample data 
corresponded to a normal distribution (Hair et al, 1998). Data collected from Omani 
corporate reports were tested for normality by applying skewness, kurtosis, histograms, 
stem and leaf plots, box plots, the Kolmogorv-Smirnov test, scatter plots and normal 
probability plots. The skewness reveals the symmetry of distribution whereas the kurtosis 
indicates the peakedness or flatness of the distribution compared to the normal 
distribution. A histogram was used to visually compare the data to that of a normal 
distribution. A stem and leaf diagram is similar to the histogram but it provides an 
enumeration of the actual data values (Hair et al., 1998). It was used to determ ine the 
shape of the data distribution, degree of dispersion, and outliers. Box plots were applied to 
determine the skewness of the data, and the direction of the skewness. Finally, the 
Kolmogorv-Smirnov test which is a specific normality statistical test available in SPSS was 
applied. The aforementioned normality tests w ere applied in order to determ ine w hether 
dependent and independent variables w ere normally distributed or not, and w hether 
there was a linear relationship between m andatory and voluntary disclosure indices and 
independent variables, namely, company size, performance, liquidity, gearing level, 
ownership structure, and sector.
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2. Bivariate analysis. The nonparam etric Wilcoxon matched-pairs-signed-ranks test was used 
to find the size of differences betw een the related weighted (mean and median) and 
unweighted disclosure indices of related scores by ranking and then summing those with 
the same sign (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). The second bivariate test applied in this study 
was correlation. Correlation is a test that indicates both the strength and direction of 
relationships between a pair of variables (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). This test was used 
to test the hypothesis that there is an association between the level of mandatory 
disclosure and the level of voluntary disclosure in Omani corporate annual reports. The 
result of this test would indicate w hether companies that were complying with disclosure 
requirements were also disclosing additional information in their reports. Since the level 
of disclosure was m easured on a ratio scale, then the most appropriate correlation test 
was the Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient The Pearson's r  varies between - 
1 and +1, where 1 indicates a perfect relationship between variables. The closer r is  to 0, 
the weaker the relationship (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). Bryman and Cramer (2005) 
pointed out that it is im portant to investigate scatter diagrams before computing the 
Pearson's coefficient to examine the linear relationship between data and w hether it is 
normally distributed. If the data distribution deviates from normality and if there is a non­
linear relationship then Spearman's rho coefficient will be applied instead of Pearson's r. 
To determine the impact of non-param etric tests on the study's results, the Pearson 
correlations, was employed as a check for hypotheses. The same results were obtained 
when Pearson correlations were performed.
3. Multivariate analysis. This study's objective is to statistically measure the association 
between disclosure and corporate characteristics: total assets, m arket capitalisation, debt 
ratio, current ratio, ownership structure, return  on equity, auditor type and sector type. 
The test most appropriate to m easure the impact of corporate characteristics on level of 
disclosure is multiple regression analysis because the relationship between disclosure level 
and corporate characteristics is a dependence relationship and disclosure scores are 
m easured on a metric scale. Multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique that is 
used to analyse the relationship between one dependent variable (disclosure level) and 
several independent variables (corporate characteristics). There are four assumptions in 
multiple regression analysis (Hair et al., 1998, p. 172): linearity of the phenomenon 
measure, constant variance of the error term s (homoscedasticity), independence of the 
error terms, and normality of the error term  distribution. Each assumption should be 
tested before running final versions of the regression models. Outliers and influential 
observations are causes of abnorm ality in any regression model. There are many ways to
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detect them, such as calculating studentised residuals, Cook's Distance (Dz), and using box 
plots. Studentised residuals are the m ost common residuals used to detect outliers and 
correspond to a t  value of = ± 1.96 (Hair etal., 1998, p.226). Cook's Distance is the most 
representative measure of influence on overall fit because it captures the impact of size of 
changes in predicted values when a case is omitted and an observation's distance from 
other observations. Cook's D threshold used in this study to identify influential 
observations was 0.04 (4 / (n-k-1)) (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998, p.225).
4. In the statistics literature, it has been suggested that transforming either the dependent 
variable or independent variable or both is a rem edy to achieve linearity, normality, and 
homoscedasticity. Silver (1997, p. 124) indicated that if the relationship is not linear, we 
still can use linear regression if we are able to transform  the non-linear data to linear 
form. Hair et al. (1998, p. 76) also stated that "data transformations provide a means o f 
modifying variables fo r  one o f  two reasons: (1) to correct violations o f the statistical 
assumptions underlying the multivariate techniques, or (2) to improve the relationship 
between variables". Hair etal. (1998, p.77) also suggested that the researcher should apply 
all possible transform ations and then select the m ost appropriate transform ed variable in 
order to achieve normality and linearity. According to Miles and Shevlin (2001), if the 
skewness statistic is less than 1.0, there should be little problem, however, if it is greater 
than 1.0 but less than 2, although it will have an effect on tests, this will probably be all 
right (p.74). In this study, 6 regression models, one for each disclosure index (i.e. 
mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure and overall disclosure), were run in order to 
determine the impact of independent variables on disclosure levels.
6.8 Stage III: Qualitative Data Collection Method
Qualitative research is a research strategy tha t tends to be concerned with words rather than 
numbers in the collection and analysis of data. One of the main qualitative methods is the 
interview. The interview is defined by Robson (1993, p.228) as a "conversation with a 
purpose". He also pointed to reasons for using interviews (p.228):
"Interviews carried out for research or enquiry purposes are a very commonly used approach, possibly 
in part because the interview appears to be a quite straightforward and non-problematic way of 
finding things out. A situation where one person talks and another listens: what could be easier? We do 
it all the time."
Mason (2002, p.63) has listed some of the reasons for using interviews. First, the ontological 
position suggests that people's knowledge, views, understanding of the quality of Omani
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annual reports are meaningful properties of social reality which research questions are 
designed to explore. Second, the epistemological position allows the researcher to talk 
interactively with people, to ask them  about financial reporting in Oman, and to listen to them. 
Some prior studies have applied interviews to investigate reporting practices (Barker, 1998; 
Holland, 1997; Rimmel, 2004). According to Robson (1993, p.404), the triangulation 
technique, the use of different methods to collect data, enhances credibility.
The face-to-face sem i-structured interview was employed in this study. It is a narrative 
approach where the interview is designed to have a flexible structure to enable the researcher 
to cover a number of topics, themes or issues (Mason, 2002, p.62). This type of interview was 
chosen because it permits the researcher to gain in-depth knowledge about the topic by 
allowing interviewees to answ er questions on their own terms. Interviews were conducted to 
follow up interesting questionnaire survey responses and to investigate underlying motives 
for the levels of disclosure in Omani annual reports (Robson, 1993, p.229). An interview 
consists of three interacting variables: the respondent, the interviewer, and the interview 
guide.12 To achieve the research objectives, an interview schedule was developed in English 
and Arabic and was used with all interviewees (see Appendix E). The questions in the 
schedule and their sequence were prepared based on the survey findings and secondary data 
analysis. Thus, themes used in preparing the interview schedule were: (a) purpose of financial 
disclosure, (b) importance of corporate information sources, (c) importance of management 
discussion and analysis disclosure and its nature, (d) corporate governance in Oman, (e) 
issues relating to financial statem ents' items, (f) classification of audit firm and quality of 
reports, (g) issues relating to voluntary disclosure, and (h) the Omani accounting profession.
A pilot test was undertaken with a regulator, an analyst, a finance manager, and an auditor 
from a Big four audit firm. The purpose of piloting the interview was to make adjustments and 
alterations to the interview’s contents (Gillham, 2000, p. 53). The researcher received 
feedback and comments regarding the wording and comprehensiveness of interview 
questions. Additional questions w ere added under the selected them es as a result of piloting 
the interview.
Questions primarily employed in the interview approach were open-ended. This type of 
question provided the researcher with the opportunity to discuss current financial reporting 
practices, factors affecting these practices, and issues relating to the corporate governance 
framework. Gillham (2000, p.45) points out that the researcher can control interviewee
12 An interview guide is a brief list o f m em ory prom pts o f areas to be covered (Bryman, 2001, p. 317].
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responses by steering the direction of thought and ensuring that key points are covered. This 
involves the use of probes which is simply bouncing back something the interviewee has said 
to get him or her to focus and expand on that elem ent (Gillham, 2000, p.47, May, 2001, p.123). 
Probes were applied in this research whenever necessary by asking interviewees to justify or 
clarify their comments or give an example depending on w hat had been said.
One of the main problems of the interview approach is that the researcher may experience 
difficulties achieving depth because interviewees are garrulous in ways which are not 
relevant to the discussed topic (Mason, 2002, p.73). In some cases, it was not possible to 
complete the questions within the agreed timeframe, thus, permission was obtained from the 
interviewee to prolong the session. Another major problem with this approach is interviewer 
bias. To avoid the response bias problem, the interviewer should ask interviewees clearly 
phrased questions in a neutral tone of voice and should project a neutral response to 
interviewees' answers (Saunders et al, 1997). This was applied in this study. Berg (2001, 
p.79) also pointed out that the sequence of questions may significantly affect the results, thus 
the interview should begin with mild, non-threatening questions and end with complex and 
sensitive ones. This technique was adopted in the current study in that interviewees' 
perceptions of corporate governance practice and quality of disclosures were elicited at the 
end of interviews. To build up tru st it was necessary to very quickly establish a relationship 
that encouraged respondents to participate fully in the interview process and answer freely. 
This has been defined by Bryman (2001, p. 114) as rapport
6.8.1 The Selected Interviewees
The interviewees were identified from those who voluntarily indicated in the questionnaire 
that they are willing to be contacted and interviewed at a further stage. Kvale (1996, p.102) 
pointed out that in the interview studies, num ber of interviews tend to be around 15±10. In 
the current study, the total num ber of interviews was 27.
The selected interviewees represented various professional users of corporate reports: 
finance managers, auditors, analysts, regulators, and government representatives. A request 
for an interview was made by telephone because it was more difficult for respondents to 
refuse it when speaking to the researcher over the phone (Healey and Rawlinson, 1994). The 
current study researcher sent a copy of the interview questions to the interviewees in 
advance in order to prom ote credibility, reliability, and validity of the collected data 
(Saunders e ta l  1997, p.220). This enabled participants to prepare for the interview questions 
and assemble any supporting documents. In addition, the researcher looked at companies'
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reports, financial data, and information related to the interviewees' posts. This enhanced the 
credibility of the researcher and encouraged the interviewees to provide more details on 
discussed topics. In some instances, planned interviews were postponed to other dates and 
times due to interviewees' urgent meetings in a company or personal reasons.
During the interviews all the interviewees w ere briefed on the research objectives and how 
their responses would enrich the current research. Also, they w ere assured that that their 
personal and company's information would not be identified in the current research report. 
Additionally, respondents were asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix E). Giving the 
respondents assurance of anonymity is crucial in obtaining frank and revealing responses 
(Oppenheim, 1966, p.37). Permission from interviewees was sought to tape record their 
answers and a full record of the interviews was created by tape recording m ost of the 
interviews in order to reduce bias and produce reliable data (Saunders et al, 1997). Tape 
recording allowed the current study researcher to focus on questioning, to re-listen to the 
interview and to use direct quotes. This was a more convenient way of recording responses 
for interviewees who had tight schedules. At the end of each interview, interviewees were 
thanked for their time and valuable answers. 20 interviews were tape recorded and 7 were 
not because the interviewees refused to record their answers. In such cases, the researcher 
made notes during the interviews. Besides, the researcher made notes even when using a tape 
recorder. Five interviews were conducted in Arabic and thus they w ere translated during the 
interviews' transcribing stage.
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 summarise interviews conducted. Discussions on conducted interviews are 
arranged accordingly starting with finance managers of the Omani listed companies followed 
by other respondents groups.
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T able 6.4: In terv iew  - Managers  o f  Public Listed  Companies.
M l 1 H ead of O perations C hartered
A ccountant
Service 6.5
M2a 2 Vice P re s id en t Finance and  
A dm inistra tion
C hartered
A ccountant
Investm en t 18
M2b Vice P res id en t R esearch M asters in 
M athem atics and 
Finance
16
M3 1 Financial C ontroller C hartered
A ccountant
Service 19
M4 1 Finance and  A dm inistra tion  
M anager
Bachelor Investm en t 15
M5 1 Financial C ontroller C hartered
A ccountant
Banking 14
M6 1 Finance M anager C hartered
A ccountant
Service 15
M7 1 Finance M anager C hartered
A ccountant
Industry 16
M8 1 Vice P re s id en t Finance and  
A dm inistration
C hartered
A ccountant
Insurance 20
M9 1 Finance M anager C hartered
A ccountant
Industry 19
M10 1 Finance and  A dm inistra tion  
M anager
C hartered
A ccountant
Industry 22
M il 1 Finance an d  A ccounting 
M anager
Diploma in Cost 
A ccounting
Service 30
M12 1 A ssistan t G eneral M anager 
Inves tm en t Banking
C hartered  
A ccountant and 
C hartered  
Finance A nalyst
Banking 10
M13 1 Financial C ontroller MBA and 
C hartered  of 
In stitu te  of 
M anagem ent 
A ccounting
Industry 31
Average of Years of Experience  '   17.96
In the current study, 14 managers of Omani listed companies in different sectors were 
selected to be interviewed in the current study, as can be seen from Table 6.4. Eight out of the 
fourteen allowed the researcher to tape record the interview in order to keep a full record of 
it. The rest of the managers [43%) did not consent to the use of a tape recorder in the 
interviews, thus notes were taken throughout the interviews.
The opinions received from the interviewed managers were reliable opinions because of their 
experience in the business world w hether in Oman or abroad. The length of experience held 
by the interviewees enabled them to evaluate the current disclosure system in Oman on 
international basis rather than on local basis. In the current study, 93% of managers 
interviewed had more than 7 years experience, and on average, managers had 18 years of 
experience.
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T able 6.5: In terv iew  - Other R espon den t  Groups.
Auditors
A l 1 A uditing M anager C hartered  A ccountant 8
A2 1 A udit Superv iso r B achelor 9
A3 1 A udit Superv isor C hartered  A ccountant 4
A4 1 E ngagem ent Senior A udito r B achelor 7
Financial Analysts
FA1 1 Head of B usiness D evelopm ent MBA and C hartered 6
A ccountant
FA2 1 H ead o f R esearch an d  Senior MBA 12
In v estm en t A nalyst
Government Representatives
G1 1 Financial C ontroller C hartered  A ccountant 27
G2 1 H ead o f  Inves tm en t D ep artm en t B achelor 14
G3 1 Inves tm en t A dvisor M asters in A ccounting 15
and Finance
G4 1 Senior R esearch A nalyst MBA 5.5
Regulators
R1 1 Econom ic R esearcher and Bachelor 6
M em ber of D isclosure
D evelopm ent W orking Group
R2 1 Financial A nalyst in D irec to ra te  of C hartered  A ccountant 16
M arket O perations
R3 1 Acting D irector of D ep artm en t of Bachelor 3
Licensed Com panies
Average o f Years o f Experience 10.19
Table 6.5 shows that one of the auditors being interviewed represented an international 
affiliated audit firm and the other three represented the Big four audit firms. Local auditors 
were not interested in participating in the interview  stage. A possible reason might be that 
because they are not involved in the audit of public listed companies. Additionally, 
international affiliated auditing firms are just a local branch with a brand name, thus people 
do not see any differences between them and local firms.
One of the government representatives (25%] did not consent to the use of a tape recorder 
and he pointed out that this was his organization's policy. Combining financial analyst group 
with government analysts, all of the interviewees had more than 5 years of experience. Out of 
the 3 regulators interviewed, one had less than 5 years experience, and on average, they had 8 
years of experience. Overall, it is interesting to note that 85% of the interviewees had more 
than 5 years experience. Interviewing different people enabled the researcher to answer the 
research questions and fully understand the whole picture of financial reporting system in 
Oman from different perspectives. A detailed analysis of period of experience of participants 
in the interview stage is provided in table 6.6.
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T a b l e  6 . 6 :  A n a ly s i s  P r e s e n t i n g  th e  P e r io d  o f  E xper ien ce  o f  P a r t i c i p a n t s  in I n t e r v i e w  
Survey .
Number | % | Number | % n^irnberl%^H
Under 5 
years 0 0 1 25 0 0 0 0 1 33.333
6-10 years 2 14.3 3 75 1 50 1 25 1 33.333
11-15 years 3 21.4 0 0 1 50 2 50 0 0
16-25 years 7 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 33.333
More than 
2 5 years 2 14.3 0 0 0 0 1 25 0 0
Total 14 100 4 100 2 100 4 100 3 100
Table 6.6 presents the period of experience of participants and percentage of them who 
belong to that experience period. The majority of the interviewees had more than 5 years 
experience. Only 25% and 33.33% of the auditors and regulators respectively had less than 5 
years experience. The lowest period of experience is 3 years which is the period of 
employment of one of the regulators. Although he had 3 years of experience but he had been 
appointed by the Capital Market Authority as the acting directors of one of the licensed 
companies departments. Overall, the opinions provided by the interviewees are trustw orthy 
and can be generalized to the whole population because of the long period of experience.
For each interview there is a separate interview guide with the name of interviewee and 
organization on it. Due to the time constraints of interviewees it was not possible to ask them 
to read through the actual interview transcripts. However, after each question the researcher 
summarized responses to interviewees to allow them to evaluate adequacy of interpretation 
and correct it where necessary (Saunders et al. 1997, p.224].
There are main indications of the success of interviews undertaken in Oman. Firstly, most of 
the interviewees expressed their willingness to be contacted again via telephone or email for 
further enquires. Secondly, most of the interviews lasted more than one hour although the 
permission from interviewees was sought at the beginning of the interview for an hour. The 
order of the questions changed in some of the interviews based on the flow of conversation. 
Thirdly, the majority of respondents seemed to be interested in the topic and hoped that the 
regulators would consider the current research findings before setting certain rules. Finally, 
some interviewees pointed out that there is a need for more researches in Oman to improve 
the quality of financial reporting system.
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6.9 Interview Analysis
In the current study, the researcher compared the findings of interviews with the findings of 
the questionnaire survey, secondary data and previous studies. Coding is the starting point for 
qualitative data analysis. Bryman (2001, p. 398] explained the steps taken in the coding 
process. Firstly, the interview er read through initial set of transcripts and notes. Secondly, he 
or she should read it again and make marginal notes. Thirdly, the researcher starts to 
generate theoretical idea about the data. The results of the interview  analysis are reported in 
Chapter 10.
6.10 Summary and Conclusion
In summary, this study has applied both prim ary and secondary data collection methods. Also, 
it has used qualitative approach as a confirmatory approach. This strategy allowed the 
researcher to collect enough data to enable the conclusions to be drawn from the current 
study about the quality of financial reporting system in Oman. The questionnaire survey was 
carried out in order to discover the perception of users of corporate report regarding the 
quality of disclosure in Omani annual reports and the nature of items disclosed in these 
reports. Data from 285 questionnaires was used in this study which presents a response rate 
of 57%. After reaching conclusions from the prim ary data, secondary data was carried out in 
order to determine the level of supplying information in Oman based on the m andatory and 
voluntary disclosure indices. Data was collected from 2004 annual reports of 111 listed 
companies which accounts for 88% of the population. The interview survey was carried out in 
order to confirm and understand the findings of the prim ary and secondary data. 27 
interviews were conducted in this study. Using different research methodologies allowed the 
researcher to understand the current reporting practice in Oman. Moreover, these 
methodologies enhanced the credibility of the current study. The next chapters, Chapter 7, 8, 
9 and 10 will discuss on the analysis and findings of the different methodologies. Chapter 7 
will discuss the questionnaire findings w hereas Chapter 8 and 9 will discuss on the analysis of 
secondary data. Chapter 10 presents the findings from the interview analysis.
149
C H A P T E R  7 : US E R S '  P E R C E P T I O N S  OF T H E  I M P O R T A N C E  OF
F I N A N C I A L  D I S C L O S U R E  IN MAKI NG I N V E S T M E N T  
D E C I S I O N S
7.1 Introduction
In order to explore users' perceptions of the usefulness of Omani listed companies' annual 
reports in making investment decisions, a questionnaire survey was distributed to corporate 
reports' users. This chapter reports the findings of the analysis of the various parts of the 
distributed questionnaire and the importance of a list of m andatory items. The following 
section describes the demographic profile of the respondents. Section 7.3 focuses on the use 
of annual reports in Oman. Perceptions of users of the importance of annual reports' sections 
are discussed in Section 7.4. Sections 7.5 and 7.6 present users' perceptions of disclosure in 
the management discussion and analysis report and its nature, respectively. Section 7.7 
highlights users' perceptions of corporate governance report while Sections 7.8 and 7.9 
discuss the importance of voluntary disclosure and suggested voluntary items, respectively. 
Sections 7.10 through to 7.17 analyse differences among and between auditor groups 
regarding the above questionnaire topics. Section 7.18 presents users' perceptions of 
mandatory items and Section 7.19 concludes the chapter.
7.2 Demographic Profile of the Respondents
Table 7.1 presents the demographic profile of respondents. Overall, most respondents were 
male (85.6%). Respondents w ere well educated: 37.5% of participants were chartered 
accountants, 31.9% had a bachelor degree, and 21% a m aster degree. More than a third 
(37.9%) had less than 5 years' experience in the investment field, 31.6% had 5 to 10 years' 
experience, and 18.9% had 11 to 15 years' experience. The majority (84%) of their 
respondents held a bachelor degree and 70% had more than six years' working experience.
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Table 7.1: Demographic Profile of the Respondents.
G E N D E R
Fem ale
41.00_
(14.4%)
Male
244.00
(85.6%)
E D U C A T IO N Diploma 15.00 
(5.3%)
Batchelor Degree 
91.00 
(31.9%)
Other
107.00
.(37.5%)
High School 
10.00 
(3.5%)
Master Degree 
60.00 
(21 .1%)
O C C U P A T IO N
Financial Analysts. 
57.00 
(20%)
Regulators
15.00
(5.3%)
Individual Investors 
66.00 
(23%)
Gov. Representatives 
19.00 
(6.7%)
Institutional Inverstors 
26.00 
(9.1%)
Auditors
57.00
(20%)
Accountants 
45.00 
(15.8%)
E X P E R IE N C E  (Y E A R S )
16-20
7.3 The Use of Annual Reports in Oman
One of the main objectives of this research is to find out the extent to which different groups 
use annual reports. In order to achieve this, respondents were asked two questions. The first
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question was concerned with the objectives of financial accounting and the second one 
addressed various information sources about the company.
7.3.1 Objectives of Financial Reporting in Oman
The first question asked respondents to rate their level of agreem ent with eight possible 
purposes of disclosing information in the annual report.13 Respondents were asked to rate the 
first question using a five-point Likert-type scale, where responses extended from 1 “strongly 
disagree" to 5 "strongly agree".
7.3.1.1 Analysis of Users' Ratings of Different Disclosure Objectives
Table 7.2 reports the percentage of responses for each of the financial disclosure purposes. It 
shows that 64.2% of respondents strongly agreed that the main purpose of financial 
disclosure is to assess a company's financial position, 46% strongly agreed that the purpose is 
to evaluate a company's performance, while 28.4% were neutral regarding the purpose of 
raising capital.
T a b l e  7 . 2:  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  t h e  S e t  o f  P u r p o s e s  o f  F i n a n c i a l  
D i s c l o s u r e .
■ •• ' ' :  ' :r “ ■' J Stronglydisagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Agree
A ssess financial position 0.7 1.1 2.1 31.9 64.2
Evaluate com pany's perform ance 1.1 3.5 6.0 43.5 46.0
Assess company's cash flow 1.1 3.5 12.6 44.2 38.6
Enhance company's value 4.2 13.0 27.0 30.5 25.3
Fulfil statutory and legal requirem ents 1.8 8.4 23.5 42.5 23.9
Assess company's com pliance w ith  
Regulations
1.8 8.8 21.8 44.6 23.2
Predict company's future outcom es 3.9 16.5 26.7 34.0 18.9
Raise capital 10.5 21.4 28.4 28.1 11.6
Table 7.3 shows the median, mean, standard deviation, and num ber of respondents with 
respect to user groups' ratings of the different disclosure purposes.
Assessing the company's financial position is rated num ber one by all the groups in Table 7.3. 
The mean value assigned by all groups is above the fourth point of rating, which corresponds 
to "agree". Respondents in different user groups were more consistent in their agreement 
with assessing financial position than they were with other purposes. This is evidenced by the 
lower standard deviation shown by the groups and the whole sample.
13 The full set of questions is d iscussed in chapter 6 and appendix A.
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Table 7.3 further reveals that participants also perceived assessing a company's cash flow and 
evaluating a company's performance as main financial disclosure purposes. Surprisingly, all 
the groups and the whole sample rated predicting a company's future outcomes above the 
midpoint of rating which corresponds to "neutral". This suggests Omani users believed annual 
reports provide information that is useful to assess current conditions of a company more 
than predict its future outcomes. Respondents were also neutral regarding raising capital as a 
purpose of financial disclosure. This might be because raising capital is not a frequent event 
for an existing company. It is more related to newly established companies.
T a b l e  7. 3:  U s e r s '  R a t i n g s  o f  F i n a n c i a l  D i s c l o s u r e  P u r p o s e s .
Ind ividual Median* 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
In vestors Mean* 4.55 3.76 4.11 3.61 4.29 3.55 3.8 2.94
K T _  ££ StD. .661 1.024 .879 1.122 .873 1.084 .964 1.175
Financial Median* 5 4 4 3 5  4 4  3
A n alysts Mean* 4.6 3.7 4.04 3.53 4.3 3 .46 3.77 2.98
.. StD. .623 .906 .925 1.151 .925 1.001 .824 1.261
A u d itors Median* 5 4 4 4 4  4 4  3
Mean* 4.56 3.95 4.25 3.58 4 .18 3.58 3.86 3.28
StD. .627 .971 .763 1.068 .710 1.194 1.187 1.176
A ccountants Median* 5 4 4 4 4  3 4  3
Mean* 4.69 3.73 4.24 3.58 4.31 3.24 3.67 3.11
St.D. .468 .863 .679 1.118 .733 1.090 .826 1.027
In stitu tion al Median* 5 4 4 4 5  3 4  3
In vestors Mean* 4.52 3.96 4.19 3 .96 4.52 3.41 3.74 3.3
„  St.D. .893 .808 .962 1.055 .753 .888 .859 1.103N= 2 6
G overnm ent Median* 5 4 4 4 4  3 4  4
R ep resen ta tiv  Mean* 4.63 3.74 4.26 3.42 4.42 3.26 3.79 3
St.D. .496 1.098 .733 1.261 .607 1.195 1.134 1.414es
N= 19
R egu lators Median* 5 4 4 4 5  4 4  3
Mean* 4.4 3.6 4.07 3.6 4 .27 3.87 3.87 3.2
St.D. 1 .056 1.183 1.163 1.298 1.1 .915 .915 1.146
W hole Sam ple Median* 5 4 4 4 4  4 4  3
Mean* 4.58 3.79 4.16 3.6 4.3 3.78 3.78 3.09
St.D. .659 .957 .851 1.124 .817 .961 .961 1.173
^Median and Mean: 5=strongly agree; l= strong ly  disagree
In conclusion, the various users of annual reports were more concerned with the financial 
position of the company. This is understandable since the stock m arket is based on the trading
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of shares which, in turn, is affected by a company's financial position and performance. In a 
developing capital market, such as Oman, most investors are m ore concerned with short-run 
returns and are affected by a company's announcem ents regarding its financial condition.
7.3.1.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups 
Regarding Purposes of Financial Disclosure
This section examines w hether the different user groups were significantly homogenous or 
heterogeneous in their ratings of the various financial disclosure purposes in Oman. The first 
hypothesis tested is as follows:
Hla: There are significant differences between the perceptions of reports' user groups of the purpose of 
financial disclosure in Oman.
Since participants in the survey w ere not homogenous and they rated the set of various 
purposes of financial disclosure on an ordinal scale, the Kruskal-Wallis H test was used to test 
differences among user groups. The Mann-Whitney U test was also used to test differences 
between each possible pair of user groups.
The first hypothesis is rejected for the whole set of financial disclosure purposes. There are 
only statistically significant differences in the views of auditors and institutional investors 
regarding the purpose of disclosure is to evaluate a company's performance (p<.025). This 
supports earlier results w here institutional investors more highly rated evaluating a 
company's performance than auditors and other user groups (see Table 7.3). A possible 
explanation is that institutional investors rely on reports to evaluate a company's 
performance in order to confirm and judge the promises the company's management has 
made during private meetings w ith these investors and thus make investment decisions. This 
supports agency theory that owners m onitor managers through corporate reports. On the 
other hand, auditors believed that corporate reports are used to assess a company's financial 
position and cash flows rather than evaluate its performance, since a company's financial 
condition affects its ability to remain a going concern (see Table 7.3). Results are reported in 
Appendix D, Table 1, since the majority of results w ere not significant.14
14 Tables of significant differences betw een  user groups regarding the various annual report aspects presented in the questionnaire are 
reported in Appendix D. Only significant differences are reported in this chapter.
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7.3.2 Importance of Corporate Information Sources in Oman
The second question in the survey asked participants to rate the importance of twelve 
possible sources of corporate information. Respondents rated their importance using a five- 
point Likert-type scale, where the responses extended from 1 "no importance" to 5 "very high 
importance".
7.3.2.1 Analysis of Users' Ratings of the Importance of Different Corporate Information 
Sources
Table 7.4 shows the response percentages of the importance of different information sources, 
where the highest response was assigned to the financial analysis of a company's annual 
report (89.8%) followed by a company's annual report (83.8%), a company's quarterly 
reports (74.4%), and sector information (60.7%).
The median, mean, standard deviation and num ber of respondents with respect to the user 
groups' rating of the importance of different information sources are reported in Table 7.5. It 
shows that the highly im portant information sources used by m ost of the user groups are the 
financial analysis of a company's annual report, annual report, quarterly reports, sector 
information, and meeting with company's management. This supports signalling theory that 
managers in corporate reports signal new information, such as off-balance sheet 
arrangements, to owners, creditors and potential investors.
Institutional investors rated m eeting with a company's management as the most im portant 
source followed by the financial analysis of a company's annual report, and a company's 
annual report. This might be because this source is the only feasible means to obtain inside 
information about a company and ask well researched questions (Holland, 1998).
Moderate importance was given to a company's annual general meeting, Muscat Securities 
Market (MSM) issues, and stockbrokers' advice (mean >3.2). Other investors, trading units in 
commercial banks, and a company's website were least im portant sources of information 
when making investment decisions in Oman. The low importance of a company's website 
might be because not all listed companies have websites and companies' websites are not 
always updated. The availability of corporate information in Oman through companies, 
brokers, and MSM, makes banks' trading units one of the lowest sources of information. Other 
investors were considered to be of low importance because of their lower reliability than 
other sources.
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T a b l e  7 A: R e s p o n s e  Scale  P e r c e n t a g e s  (% )  o f  th e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  D i f f e r e n t  I n f o rm a t io n  
Sources .
No
im portance
Little
im portance
Moderate
im portance
High
im portance
Very high 
Importance
Financial Analysis o f  Company's 
Annual Reports 0.4 2.5 7.4 32.6 57.2
Company’s Annual Report 0.7 2.1 13.3 32.6 51.2
Company's Quarterly Reports 0.0 4.6 21.1 41.8 32.6
Meeting with Company's 
Management 8.1 11.9 19.6 32.3 28.1
Sector Information 1.8 8.1 29.5 44.9 15.8
MSM issues 3.2 14.7 37.9 30.2 14.0
MSM link on Internet 5.3 15.4 33.7 32.3 13.3
Annual General M eeting 4.6 21.4 33.7 28.1 12.3
Stockbrokers' Advice 6.7 15.1 35.8 30.5 11.9
Company’s W ebsite 12.6 24.6 34.4 19.6 8.8
Other Investors 9.1 23.2 39.6 20.7 7.4
Trading Units in Commercial 
Banks 8.8 23.5 40.0 21.8 6.0
Table 7.5: Users’ Ratings of  the Importance of  Different Sources of  Information When Making Inves tment Decisions.
Individual 
Investors 
N= 66
Median*
Mean*
StD.
4
4.11
.994
4
4.03
.911
3
3.05
1.073
3
2.53
1.084
4
4.29
.799
4
3.35
1.353
3
3.02
1.030
3
3.26
.933
3
2.77
.941
3
3.05
1.059
4
3.58
.895
3
3.12
.985
Financial 
Analysts 
N= 57
Median*
Mean*
StD.
4
4.35
.668
4
4.05
.766
3
3.25
1.023
3
2.91
1.154
5
4.51
.759
4
3.72
1.098
3
3.30
1.133
3
3.16
1.146
3
2.86
.990
3
2.88
.965
4
3.74
.768
3
3.33
1.006
Auditors 
N= 57
Median*
Mean*
StD.
5
4.35
.790
4
3.84
.882
3
3.30
1.117
3
3.18
1.227
5
4.40
.776
4
3.42
1.224
3
3.46
1.070
4
3.54
1.196
3
3.30
1.085
3
3.18
1.037
4
3.67
.951
4
3.70
1.017
Accountants
N=45
Median*
Mean*
StD.
5
4.49
.843
4
4.09
.874
3
3.22
.927
3
2.93
1.053
5
4.58
.723
4
3.44
1.216
4
3.42
.892
3
3.09
.949
3
2.93
1.095
3
2.96
.999
4
3.44
.867
3
3.44
.943
Institutional 
Investors 
N= 26
Median*
Mean*
StD.
4
4.26
.764
4
4.19
.834
3
3.19
1.178
3
3.04
1.344
5
4.37
.792
5
4.41
.971
3
3.44
1.155
3
2.78
1.050
3
2.67
.832
2
2.3
1.068
4
3.56
1.050
3
3.19
.962
Government 
Representatives 
N- 19
Median*
Mean*
StD
5
4.63
.684
4
4.05
.780
4
3.42
1.170
3
2.74
.872
5
4.63
.496
5
4.16
1.119
4
3.74
1.098
3
3.21
.976
3
3
1.054
3
3.21
.976
4
4.05
.780
4
3.63
1.065
Regulators
N=15
Median*
Mean*
StD.
5
4.2
.941
4
4.13
.834
3
3.47
.99
3
2.93
.884
5
4.47
.915
4
3.4
1.242
3
3.47
.915
4
4
.655
3
2.93
1.163
3
2.73
1.280
4
3.80
1.082
3
3.2
.862
Whole
Sample
N=285
Median*
Mean*
StD.
5
4.32
.834
4
4.02
.849
3
3.22
1.060
3
2.87
1.134
5
4.44
.765
4
3.6
1.236
3
3.33
1.056
3
3.26
1.066
3
2.93
1.020
3
2.94
1.048
4
3.65
.902
3
3.37
1.001
* Median and Mean: 5=vt;ry high importance; l= iio importanc
~ '  r . . . f . V <. : 4 - & -
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In summary, the annual reports of listed companies in Oman and the financial analysis of 
these reports were perceived to be the m ost im portant sources of information. However, 
institutional investors perceived meetings with companies' m anagem ent to be the most 
important information source. A possible explanation is that through such meetings, 
institutional investors are able to evaluate companies' management. Also, new information 
might be presented to them before it is disclosed to other user groups which might affect their 
decisions. Institutional investors also rated quarterly reports more highly than other groups. 
Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004a) offer an explanation for this finding, arguing that investors 
use interim reports to predict annual dividends.
7.3.2.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups 
Regarding the Importance o f Different Corporate Information Sources
This section reports w hether the different user groups statistically had different views about 
the importance of the different sources of information using Kruskal-Wallis H and Mann- 
Whitney U tests. The following is the second hypothesis:
H la '■ There are significant differences between the perceptions o f reports' user groups of the 
importance of different corporate information sources in making investment decisions.
Table 7.6 presents the significance results for the user groups as well as the whole sample. 
The whole sample is statistically different in the ratings of the importance of three 
information sources: meeting with a company's management, stockbrokers' advice, and other 
investors. The differences in the ratings of the rest of the sources are not significant among all 
groups, which indicate the high degree of consensus among the groups in considering such 
sources in making investment decisions. This is consistent with Mirshekary and Saudagaran's 
(2005) reported findings.
From Table 7.6, the second hypothesis cannot be rejected for m ost of the information sources 
when comparing pairs of user groups. The im portance of a company's annual report was 
rated differently by individual investors compared to accountants and government 
representatives. This might be because individual investors are not able to fully understand 
the annual report because of the use of unfamiliar terminologies in some parts. Individual 
investors also differed from institutional investors and government representatives in their 
ratings of meeting with a company's m anagem ent as a source of information. This proves the 
findings reported in Table 7.5 which indicated that the individual investors group had a lower 
mean value for meeting with a company's m anagem ent compared to institutional investors 
and government representatives since they do not have access to a company's management.
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Institutional investors differed from financial analysts, auditors, accountants, and regulators 
in their views of the importance of meeting with a company's management. This was expected 
since institutional investors had rated meeting with a company's management as the most 
important source of information (see Table 7.6). Moreover, this source of information was 
more highly rated by governm ent representatives than accountants and auditors (p<0.025), 
possibly because government representatives obtain additional information from these 
meetings while accountants, who prepare corporate reports, already have such information. 
Further, since auditors believed that corporate reports present all the information required 
and there is no inside flow of private information during these meetings, they therefore less 
highly rated them than governm ent representatives. In these meetings, according to agency 
and signalling theory, managers try  to reduce information asymm etry by signalling new 
information to major shareholders and thus reduce major shareholders' monitoring activities. 
In Oman, financial analysts might have less access to all private information compared to 
institutional and large investors because they represent and invest on behalf of many 
minority investors.
Table 7.6 shows significant differences between individual investors and auditors, 
accountants, and government representatives in their views of the MSM link on the Internet. 
Individual investors more highly rated  the MSM link on the Internet than auditors because 
they use it to obtain latest news about a company, such as share m arket value and any 
penalties imposed on any of the listed companies. Auditors might not use this link since they 
do not make investment decisions. The ratings assigned by accountants and government 
representatives to the MSM link on the Internet were higher than individual investors' ratings. 
A possible explanation is that accountants and government representatives are more able to 
understand and use the announcem ents and m arket regulations stated on the link in order to 
make short and long-term decisions than individual investors who are more concerned with 
the market value of a company's share and short-term  investment returns.
Similarly, stockbrokers' advice was rated differently by institutional investors compared to 
auditors and individual investors. Institutional investors rated stockbrokers' advice higher 
than individual investors because they believe that stockbrokers have the skills necessary to 
evaluate a company's status and predict its future and thus their advice is a reliable source for 
unskilled individual investors. However, not all individual investors pay to obtain 
stockbrokers' advice because of their short-term  interest in a company. Auditors more highly 
rated this source of information than institutional investors because they believe that this is a 
reliable source that is available both to capital m arket participants and to unskilled individual
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investors. Additionally, regulators m ore highly rated stockbrokers' advice than individual 
investors, institutional investors, accountants, financial analysts, and government 
representatives. This confirms the findings in Table 7.5 where regulators' mean value for 
stockbrokers' advice is 4.0 compared to 3.0 for the whole sample. This source of information 
was highly rated by regulators and auditors since it is a reliable source because brokers have 
skills to analyse corporate reports and are registered in the MSM.
Regarding the importance of trading units in banks, there w ere significant differences 
between auditors and individual investors, institutional investors, and financial analysts. 
Individual investors and financial analysts assigned ratings to trading units lower than 
auditors because of the availability of other trading places, such as brokerage companies. On 
the other hand, institutional investors rated this source higher than auditors because they use 
this source to invest in certain companies. Auditors rated the importance of trading units in 
banks as a source of information based on its reliability as a source.
Other investors as a source of information was more highly rated  by individual investors, 
financial analysts, auditors, accountants, and governm ent representatives than institutional 
investors (see Tables 7.5 and 7.6), possibly because this source might sometimes provide 
them with private information obtained from companies' management. In Oman, institutional 
investors have more short-term  and long-term investments compared to government 
representatives who are more concerned with long-term investm ents and institutional 
investors therefore, obtain information from different sources that will serve both their short­
term and long-term interests.
In summary, the different user groups relied more on the information they obtained from 
listed companies in Oman via formal and informal channels. Informal channels, such as 
meeting with company's management, are not available to all investors in the Omani stock 
market.
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Table 7.6: Level of  Significance fo r  Differences among User Groups and be tween Each Pair of  User Groups Regarding their  Ratings
of the Importance of  Different Sources of  Information when Making Inves tment  Decision.
la■ ■ ■ M ■
Company's .13 .32 .21 .021* .82 .022* .77 .74 .12 .54 .069 .72 .24 .43 .13 .64 .083 .51 .26 .054 .97 .16
Annual _ . . . _ _ + + _ + . + + + _ +
Report
Company’s .72 .87 .19 .76 .64 .897 .78 .22 .63 .57 .96 .72 .13 .15 .42 .28 .84 .71 .95 .65 .93 .75
Quarterly + + . + + _ _ + . _ _ _ _ . + + + .
Reports
Company's .72 .40 .23 .31 .71 .14 .21 .72 .85 .799 .37 .45 .77 .61 .58 .66 .74 .36 .57 .38 .43 .84
Annual . _ . . . + . _ + + _ . + _ _ _ +
General
Meeting
Company's .11 .062 .003** .052 .16 .39 .14 .25 .96 .96 .53 1.000 .28 .43 .14 .40 .97 .48 .99 .61 .92 .499
Website - - - - - - - - - + = + + + + + + + + - -
Financial .25 .072 .39 .029 .73 .11 .26 .32 .58 .28 .81 .92 .14 .76 .31 .49 .14 .85 .79 .26 .42 .93
Analysis of . . . _ . . . + . . . + . . + + + _ . .
Company's
Annual
Reports
Meeting .001* .18 .88 .85 .000* .016* .995 .23 .33 .006* .092 .44 .92 .000** .015* .97 .000** .019* .92 .43 .004** .048
With _ . . . + + + . . + . . + . + + + +
Company’s
Management
Muscat .066 .11 .015* .019* .15 .005* .12 .49 .62 .81 .11 .71 .86 .75 .22 .91 .86 .12 .99 .24 .86 .26
Securities . + . . _ . . . . . + + . + + + . . +
Market link
On Internet
Stockbrokers’ .002* .62 .11 .27 .024* .92 .004* .074 .67 .12 .74 .007* 026 .005** .26 .21 .17 .38 .001** .077 .000** .014*
Advice + - + - - - - + + - - + + + - + - - - -
Trading units .045 .75 .006* .32 .26 .33 .55 .024* .56 .21 .497 .73 .13 .002** .32 .29 .091 .87 .98 .093 .23 .87
In _ . . + . . - . + - - + + + + + + . . +
commercial
Banks
Other .005* .27 .60 .62 .001* .60 .28 .107 .62 .006* .17 .61 .33 .000** .86 .17 .003** .37 .45 .002** .19 .19
Investors + - + + - + - - + - + + + - + + + - - +
Sector .24 .37 .53 .44 .98 .027 .42 .85 .11 .54 .094 .72 .19 .67 .098 .65 .61 .008* .23 .12 .52 .53
Information - - + + - - + + + - - + + - - - - - - +
Muscat .031 .21 .002*” .079 .99 .077 .83 .058 .64 .33 .33 .53 .16 .017* .76 .063 .14 .55 .297 .14 .85 .23
Securities . _ _ _ _ _ . . + . + + + + + + + . . +
Market issues
1 All groupss Asymp.sig. Levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H test of all groups: (*) as.05; (**) ocS.Ol.
The other columns are the Asymp.sig. levels of Mann-Whitney U test of pairs of user groups: (*): a£.025; (**) aS.005 (one-tailed test) '
1 + , -  or = signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e, + sign means larger mean)
*A= Individual Investors vs. Analysts ■ E= Individual Investors vs. Government 1= Financial Analysts vs. Institutional Investors M= Auditors vs. Institutional investors Q- Accountants vs. Government
B= Individual Investors vs. Auditors F= Individual Investors vs. Regulators 1= Financial Analysts vs. Government N= Auditors vs. Government R= Accountants vs. Regulators
Cs Individual Investors vs. Accountants G=Financial Analysts vs. Auditors K= Financial Analysts vs. Regulators 0= Auditors vs. Regulators SPiilSI S- Institutional Investors vs. Government I
D= Individual vs. Institutional Investors H= Financial Analysts vs. Accountants L= Auditors vs. Accountants P= Accountants vs. Institutional Investors T= Institutional Investors vs. Regulators
1 0= Government vs. Regulators I
161
7.3.3 Comparison of this Study's Results w ith Previous Studies' Regarding the Use of 
Annual Reports
As mentioned in section 7.3.1.1, 66.4% of respondents in this study believed that the main 
purpose of financial disclosure is to fulfil statutory and legal requirem ents as compared to 
11% of respondents in Lee and Tweedie's (1981] study conducted in the UK. A possible 
explanation is that in Oman, as a developing country, the num ber of companies providing 
minimum disclosure in their reports is higher than in developed countries, such as the UK, 
and therefore the percentage of respondents in this study who agreed with the above 
mentioned purpose was higher than that reported in the aforementioned study conducted in a 
developed countries.
Main sources of information used by Omani user groups were the financial analysis of a 
company's annual report, a company's annual report, a company's quarterly report, and 
meeting with a company's management. These findings are consistent with the findings of 
most previous studies undertaken in developing and developed countries (Abu-Nassar and 
Rutherford, 1996; Barker, 1998). It also provides support for the agency and signalling theory 
that managers signal information to uninformed parties to reduce information asymmetry.
In this research, the advice of stockbrokers was considered to be of m oderate importance. 
This is consistent with Mirshekary and Saudagaran's (2005) findings. A possible explanation 
is that, in the Omani and Iranian capital markets, the majority of investors in both markets 
might decide to make their own investm ent decisions because they are more concerned with 
short-term profits and therefore rely less on stockbrokers' advice.
Omani institutional investors considered meeting with a company's m anagem ent the most 
important source of information. This is consistent with the findings of Barker's (1998) study 
in the UK suggesting that Omani institutional investors rely on the same source as 
institutional investors in developed countries. However, the aforementioned finding 
contradicts the findings of a study conducted in Saudi Arabia (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004a) 
where institutional investors assigned a lower ranking to this source than other sampled 
groups, suggesting Omani institutional investors can more easily access information from 
companies than Saudi investors. Also, although both countries have many similarities in 
culture, religion and language, the way in which their stock businesses is run is based on 
different regulations and business environment.
Omani individual investors assigned a lower ranking to meeting with company's management. 
This is consistent with findings of Al-Razeen and Karbhari's (2004a) study. Based on
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stakeholder theory, most of the individual investors in Oman and Saudi Arabia have no 
marketplace power, and thus managers do not give them access to their private information.
7.4 Users' Perceptions of the Importance of Annual Reports' Sections
This section focuses on the importance of annual reports' sections from the viewpoint of 
different user groups. There are twelve sections in the annual reports of Omani listed 
companies. Survey participants w ere asked to rate the importance of annual reports' sections 
on a five-point Likert-type scale, w here responses extended from 1 "no importance" to 5 "very 
high importance".
7.4.1 Analysis of Users' Ratings of the Importance of Annual Reports' Sections
This section reveals the response percentages, median, mean, standard deviation and number 
of respondents in respect of user groups' rating of the im portance of the various sections of 
the annual reports in Oman. Table 7.7 shows the response percentages regarding the 
importance of the various annual report sections in making investm ent decisions. Over two- 
thirds (69.1%) of respondents perceived the profit and loss account as of very high 
importance, 64.9% viewed the balance sheet as of very high importance, 55.4% attached very 
high importance to the statem ent of cash flows, and 47.7% attached high im portance to the 
auditor's report. This provides support for Ball and Foster (1982) argum ent that financial 
statements are one of the ways that shareholders can monitor managers.
T a b l e  7 .7:  R e s p o n s e  Scale  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  the  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s '  
Sect ions .
No
im portance
Little
im portance
Moderate
im portance
High
im portance
Very high 
Im portance
Profit and Loss account 0.0 0.4 5.3 25.3 69.1
Balance Sheet 0.0 0.7 5.6 28.8 64.9
Statement o f Cash flows 0.0 1.8 10.9 31.9 55.4
Auditor Report 1.8 3.9 13.3 33.3 47.7
Notes to Financial Statem ents 0.4 2.5 17.5 33.3 46.3
Statem ent o f Changes in 
Shareholders' Equity 1.1 4.9 20 40.4 33.7
Summary of Performance 0.0 2.8 20.4 43.2 33.7
Management Discussion and 
Analysis
0.7 5.6 21.8 41.1 30.9
Auditor Report on Corporate 
Governance 2.5 8.1 23.5 35.1 30.9
Statement o f Principal Accounting 
Policies 1.4 4.9 28.4 36.1 29.1
Corporate Governance Report 1.1 10.9 30.9 34.7 22.5
Chairman's Report 2.1 12.6 30.9 34 20.4
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Table 7.8 shows descriptive statistics pertaining to users' perceptions of the importance of 
annual reports' sections. Highly ranked sections by mean value of the whole sample were:
• Profit and loss account (1st]
• Balance sheet (2nd)
• Statement of cash flows (3rd]
• Notes to the financial statem ents (4th)
• Auditor's report (5th)
Corporate governance report and the chairman's report are the lowest rated sections (11th 
and 12th respectively). The different user groups perceived the corporate governance report 
to be of moderate importance, although corporate governance is viewed as an essential issue 
by the Omani m arket authority and worldwide. This perception might be because it is a newly 
required report and people are not aware of its im portance in making investment decisions. 
Also, chairman's report was perceived to be of m oderate im portance because it does not 
provide new information.
Based on table 7.8, the MD&A report was highly rated by institutional investors, possibly 
because this section provides information not presented in other sections, which provides 
support for signalling theory. Auditor's report was highly rated by accountants, probably 
because it provides assurance of the credibility and reliability of financial statem ents 
prepared by accountants.
A point worth mentioning is that the notes to financial statem ents are more highly rated by 
individual investors (4.14) than institutional investors (4.04) and government 
representatives (4.11), findings inconsistent with those presented in a study conducted in 
Saudi Arabia (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004b) w here individual investors assigned a lower 
ranking to this section than other sampled groups. A possible explanation is that Omani 
individual investors are able to use the notes to financial statem ents to understand financial 
figures disclosed in the financial statem ents compared to Saudi individual investors who 
being unable to understand them are unlikely to use them in their decisions.
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Table 7.8: Users' Ratings of  the Importance of  Annual Reports'  Sections.
Individual Median* 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4
Investors Mean* 3.33 3.56 3.68 3.83 3.92 3.61 4.53 4.64 4.30 3.95 3.64 4.14
N=66 St.D. .982 .947 .931 .756 1.086 1.108 .749 .671 .859 1.029 .955 .910
Financial Median* 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4
Analysts Mean* 3.75 3.79 4.11 4.25 4.28 3.95 4.72 4.77 4.56 4.02 4 4.3
N=57 St.D. 1.074 1.048 .859 .739 .881 .990 .453 .423 .756 .876 .845 .755
Auditors Median* 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4
N=57 Mean* 3.58 3.63 3.84
4 4.40 4.02 4.46 4.46 4.37 4.16 4.07 4.26
StD. 1.068 .957 .960 .845 .704 .935 .709 .657 .698 .862 .884 .835
Accountants Median* 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4
N=45 Mean* 3.60 3.73 3.93 4.20
4.47 3.96 4.58 4.73 4.53 3.96 3.91 4.33
StD 1.074 .986 .780 .786 .757 .903 .583 .495 .548 .903 .874 .826
Institutional Median* 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4
Investors Mean* 3.63 3.67 4.30 4 4 3.67 4.48 4.48 4.22 3.63 3.63 4.04
N=26 St.D. .839 .877 .823 .920 1.109 1.177 .643 .700 .801 .839 .967 .980
Government Median* 4 3 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4
Representatives Mean* 3.68 3.47 4.21 4.21 4.26 3.58 4.79 4.74 4.47 4.16 3.84 4.11
N= 19 StD. .885 .964 .918 .855 1.046 1.170 .419 .452 .697 .765 1.259 .809
Regulators Median- 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 5
N= IS Mean* 3.80 3.87 4.27 4.33 4.13 4.13 4.67 4.60 4.40 4.27 4 4.40StD. 1.014 1.125 .884 .724 .990 .990 .617 .737 .910 .884 1.000 .828
Whole Sample Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4
N= 285 Mean* 3.58 3.67 3.96 4.08 4.21 3.84 4.58 4.63 4.41 4.01 3.87 4.23StD. 1.017 .977 .903 .806 .938 1.032 .632 .600 .753 .912 .940 .848
♦Median and Mean: 5=very high importance, l= n o  im portance, .. ‘ . ' * V  :
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7.4.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups in 
Oman Regarding the Importance of Annual Reports' Sections
This section investigates the level of consensus between each pair of user groups and the 
sample as a whole statistically, using the Kruskal-Wallis H and Mann-Whitney U test. The 
following is the third hypothesis:
H3a: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f reports' user groups o f the importance 
of annual reports' sections in making investment decisions.
Table 7.9 presents significance differences in user groups' perceptions of the importance of 
annual reports' sections. Based on table 7.9, the third hypothesis is rejected for the whole 
sample, except for the managem ent discussion and analysis report. When comparing the 
perceptions of reports' user groups, the hypothesis cannot be rejected for m ost reports' 
sections. The exceptions are the balance sheet, corporate governance report, the auditor's 
report on corporate governance, and notes to the financial statem ents. The absence of 
significant differences between user groups regarding the importance of the aforementioned 
four sections suggests a high degree of consensus among user groups as to the importance of 
such sections in making investment decisions. Agreement on the importance of the balance 
sheet and notes to the financial statem ents in this study is consistent with the findings of Al- 
Razeen and Karbhari [2007).
There was a significant difference in the views of the whole sample regarding the importance 
of the MD&A report (p<0.025), possibly because different user groups differed in their views 
of its importance because of the credibility issues related to this section since it is not audited. 
Also, the nature of the information disclosed in the MD&A report differs from that in other 
report sections and thus some user groups use it more in their analyses and differ in their 
skills to analyse it.
Table 7.9 shows a num ber of significant differences between pairs of user groups regarding 
the importance of some annual reports' sections. First, the individual investors' group 
significantly differed from analysts, institutional investors, government representatives, and 
regulators in their views of the MD&A report. This supports the findings in Table 7.8 where 
the MD&A mean value of individual investors is the lowest among other user groups. A 
possible explanation is that it might be difficult for individual investors to analyse the 
information disclosed in this report. Also, m ost individual investors are short-term  investors 
and thus are more concerned with short-term  profits than a company's future plans and risks.
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Second, individual investors rated the summary of performance section lower than analysts, 
accountants, and regulators (see Tables 7.8 and 7.9], possibly because the summary of 
performance section highlights the im portant ratios of a company and individual investors 
might not be able to interpret these ratios and use them.
Third, individual investors rated auditor's report lower than auditors and accountants. A 
possible explanation might be tha t it is difficult for individual investors to understand the 
contents of the auditor's report compared to auditors and accountants. Fourth, analysts and 
accountants more highly rated the profit and loss account than auditors, possibly because 
accountants and analysts use this financial statem ent to make internal and external decisions 
that affect a company whereas auditors use it only to report their opinion.
Fifth, analysts were more concerned with the statem ent of cash flows than institutional 
investors since they make investm ent decisions on behalf of their clients who have different 
investments interests. Table 7.9 also shows that auditors m ore highly considered the 
statement of changes in equity than institutional investors since they have to audit it. Sixth, 
regulators more highly rated this statem ent than institutional investors because they have to 
check a company's compliance with regulations. On the other hand, institutional investors 
moderately (see Table 7.9) relied on it because the statem ent only explains the shareholders' 
equity figure presented in the balance sheet.
In summary, the main significant differences reported in Table 7.9 w ere between the 
individual investors group and the other user groups. There are two possible reasons for this 
finding: (1) the short-term  interest of individual investors, and (2) relative ability to analyse 
the annual reports' sections.
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T a b l e  7 . 9 :  Level  o f  Signi f icance for ,  and  Direct ion of, Differences among User Groups and  b e tw e en  each p a i r  o f  User Groups  
r e g a rd in g  the ir  R at ings  o f  the Im por tance  o f  Annual  Repor t s '  Sections.
D■1 ■ ■ II m ■ ■
Chairman's .26 .019* .12 .10 .21 .13 .092 .38 .49 .33 .68 .93 .87 .82 .78 .48 .68 .895 .56 .61 .37 .66
Report - - - - - - + + + + - - + - - + - - - - -
Corporate .67 .15 .53 .28 .58 .75 .28 .35 .71 .47 .199 .78 .61 .97 .46 .40 .70 .29 .64 .48 .46 .27
Governance - - - - + - + + + + - - - + - + + - + - -
Report
Management .018* .012* .30 .17 .007* .025* .019* .15 .25 .42 .57 .45 .76 .060 .12 .096 .085 .15 .103 .89 .97 .88
Discussion and - - - - - - + + - - - - - - - + - - + - +
Analysis
Summary of .042 .002** .18 .012* .34 .074 .023* .11 .79 .33 .95 .696 .23 .897 .36 .18 .47 .92 .598 .54 .33 .74
Performance - - - - - - + + + + - - - - - + - - - - -
Auditor .063 .062 .013* .005** .83 .15 .51 .61 .28 .23 .81 .62 .49 .098 .99 .40 .044 .64 .24 .28 .67 .595
Report - - - - - - - - + - + - + + + + + + - - +
Auditor .19 .095 .043 .12 .96 .89 .063 .75 .93 .22 .22 .45 .68 .14 .15 .58 .24 .24 .39 .94 .16 .14
Report on - - - + + - - + + + - + + + - + + - + - -
Corporate
Governance
Balance .29 .27 .42 .92 .41 .20 .54 .055 .25 .074 .55 .97 .48 .89 072 .28 .46 CO .500 .070 .26 .64
Sheet - + + + - - + + + - + - + - - + - - - - +
Profit and .074 .44 .053 .63 .18 .80 .95 .006* .80 .042 .76 .58 .022* .89 .11 .30 .088 .91 .71 .199 .42 .81
Loss account - + - + - + + + + + + - - - - + + + - - +
Statement of .26 .063 .94 .31 .44 .53 .61 .055 .33 .022* .45 .51 .297 .36 .54 .59 .084 .92 .96 .23 .31 1.000
Cashflows - - - + - - + + + + + - + - - + + + - - =
Statement of .17 .95 34 .795 .065 .60 .27 .37 .73 .044 .62 .25 .25 .009* .87 .61 .12 .47 .20 .042 .016* .55
Changes in - - + + - - - + + - - + + + - + - - - - -
Shareholders’
Equity
Statement of .096 .043 .013* .13 .71 .23 .14 .60 .68 .059 .97 .81 36 .027 699 .91 .12 .79 .57 .22 .14 .83
Principal - - - + - - - + + + - + + + + + - - - - -
Accounting
Principles
Notes to .71 .42 .47 .26 .72 .76 .29 .94 .69 .33 .35 .54 .67 .37 .41 .55 .23 22 .71 .96 .26 .22
The financial - - - + + - + - + + - - + + - + + - - - -
statem ents
1 All groups= Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H te s t of all groups: (*) as.05; (**) as.01.
The other columns are Asymp.sig. levels of the Mann-Whitney U te s t of pairs of user groups: (*): aS.025; (**) as.D05(one-talled test)
| +, -  or = signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + sign means larger mean)
*A- Individual Investors vs. Analysts E= Individual Investors vs. Government 1= Financial Analysts vs. Institutional Investors M= Auditors vs. Institutional investors Q= Accountants vs. Government
B= Individual Investors vs. Auditors F= Individual Investors vs. Regulators J= Financial Analysts vs. Government N= Auditors vs. Government R= Accountants vs. Regulators
C- individual Investors vs. Accountants G= Financial Analysts vs. Auditors K= Financial Analysts vs, Regulators 0= Auditors vs. Regulators S= Institutional Investors vs. Government
D= Individual vs. Institutional Investors H= Financial Analysts vs. Accountants L= Auditors vs. Accountants P= Accountants vs. Institutional Investors T= Institutional Investors vs. Regulators
U= Government vs. Regulators
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7.4.3 Comparison of this Study's Results w ith Previous Studies' Results Regarding the 
Importance of Annual Reports' Sections
There were some differences in the num ber of annual reports' sections tested in this study 
compared to prior studies because of changes in disclosure regulations over time. The most 
important sections in Omani annual reports as perceived by the various user groups were: 
profit and loss account, balance sheet, statem ent of cash flows, notes to financial statements, 
and auditor's reports, consistent with the findings of most previous studies conducted in 
developed and developing economies (Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1996; Epstein and Pava, 
1993; Hodge and Pronk, 2005}. In Saudi Arabia, users ranked the balance sheet first followed 
by the income statem ent (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2007}. The differences in rankings of the 
balance sheet and income statem ent betw een Saudi and Omani users might be due to the level 
of usage of these statem ents in making decisions. However, in Beattie and Pratt's (2002} study 
in the UK, expert users ranked the statem ent of cash flows first followed by the notes to 
financial statements, the profit and loss account, and the balance sheet. Similarly, the 
statement of cash flows was highly rated by users in Ibrahim and Kim's (1994} study. In 
addition, Saudi users (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004b} highly ranked the auditor's report 
similar to Omani users, which emphasises the importance of such report in making 
investment decisions.
The disclosure of accounting policies was considered to be of m oderate to high importance by 
the different Omani user groups, consistent with the findings of Wallace (1988} and Ibrahim 
and Kim (1994}. This points to some similarities in the views of Omani user groups and other 
user groups in developing countries.
Interestingly, the chairman's report ranking has declined over time. It was highly ranked in 
earlier studies conducted in developed countries (Anderson, 1981; Bartlett and Chandler, 
1997} in comparison to this study's results. Al-Razeen and Karbhari's (2007} study reported a 
similar finding to that in this study. However, their individual investors' sample more highly 
rated this report than Omani individual investors. The low im portance assigned to the 
chairman's report by Omani and Saudi users might be because this report is just an 
introductory report and does not explain or provide new information compared to other 
reports, such as the MD&A.
Omani user groups viewed the corporate governance report as of moderate to high 
importance in making investm ent decisions, possibly due to the fact that the corporate 
governance report is a newly required report and not all users are familiar with it and know
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how to analyse this report in order to evaluate a company. Some users might also feel that 
such a report is not relevant to them. A similar explanation was offered by Bartlett and 
Chandler's (1997) study conducted in the UK to explain the low readership of the corporate 
governance section. Both sets of findings suggest that corporate report users in developed 
and developing countries need some time to understand the importance of the corporate 
governance report in making decisions.
The present study found significant differences between individual investors and the rest of 
the user groups' views on the MD&A report, summ ary of performance, and auditor's report. 
This might be because of the passive nature of many individual investors and their short-term  
interests. Also, institutional investors significantly differed from auditors and regulators in 
their views on the statem ent of changes in shareholders' equity since they view this statem ent 
as an explanatory statement.
Also, in this research there w ere significant differences between financial analysts and 
auditors and between auditors and accountants regarding the im portance of the profit and 
loss account and between analysts and institutional investors regarding the importance of the 
statement of cash flows. This is inconsistent with Hodge and Pronk's (2005) study which 
reported agreement among professional users. A possible explanation is tha t in Oman, 
professional users have different views because of their exposure to different capital markets 
since many of them are expatriates and the length of their experience.
7.5 The Usefulness of Sections of the M anagement Discussion and Analysis Report
Survey respondents were asked to rate the usefulness of the sections of the MD&A report in 
the investment decision-making process on a five-point Likert-type scale, w here responses 
extended from 1 “not useful at all" to 5 “very useful''. The following sub-sections provide 
descriptive and univariate analyses of the different Omani user groups' ratings of the 
usefulness of MD&A items.
7.5.1 Analysis of Users' Ratings o f the Usefulness of the MD&A Report Sections
Table 7.10 reports the response percentage for each of the MD&A sections. The majority 
(87.4%) of respondents viewed risks and concerns as useful, 85.9% regarded analysis of 
segment and product performance as useful, and 83.9% believed the discussion on financial 
performance to be useful in making investm ent decisions. The only MD&A section considered 
to be of moderate use was Omanisation training, by 39.7%.
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Table 7.11 shows the median, mean, standard deviation and num ber of respondents in 
respect of user groups' ratings of the usefulness of MD&A items in making investment 
decisions. The most im portant MD&A sections arranged by mean value were:
•  Risks and concerns (1st)
•  Discussion on financial position (2nd)
• Opportunities and threats [3rd)
•  Discussion on operational performance (4th]
•  Analysis of segment and product performance (5th]
The ratings of some user groups regarding the usefulness of some MD&A sections are worth 
mentioning. Government representatives more highly rated investm ent portfolio and outlook 
than the rest of the groups. A possible explanation is that governm ent representatives are 
long-term investors and are concerned with the future of companies because this affects their 
future returns. Also, they might use the outlook section to check and confirm the information 
they have obtained from meetings with company management. Regulators had the highest 
mean value regarding usefulness of the adequacy of internal control systems, possibly 
because regulators in Oman always emphasise on the issues of corporate governance and the 
internal control system in order to ensure transparency and good corporate governance 
practice.
In summary, most MD&A sections had a mean value above the fourth point, which 
corresponded to “useful", supporting the analysis in the previous section, w here the 
importance ratings for the MD&A report ranged from the third point corresponding to 
"moderate importance" to the fourth point corresponding to "high importance" [see Table 
7.8).
T a b l e  7 . 1 0 :  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  U s e f u l n e s s  o f  M D & A  R e p o r t  S e c t i o n s .
Not Useful 
At All
Of Little 
Use
Of M oderate 
Use
Useful Very
Useful
Risks and concerns 0.0 2.5 10.2 37.9 49.5
Discussion on financial perform ance 0.4 1.4 14.4 37.9 46.0
Opportunities and threats 0.0 2.8 11.6 44.2 41.4
Adequacy o f internal control system s 0.7 4.2 19.6 36.1 39.3
Discussion on operational perform ance 0.4 2.5 12.6 45.6 38.9
Analysis o f segm ent and product 0.0 3.2 10.9 50.5 35.4
performance
Outlook 0.7 4.9 18.9 42.5 33.0
Investm ent portfolio 0.7 3.2 21.1 42.5 32.6
Industry structure and developm ent 0.4 5.3 23.2 43.5 27.7
Omanisation training 9.5 17.2 33.7 26.0 13.7
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Table 7.11: Users' Ratings of  Usefulness of  MD&A Report's  Sections.
■
Individual Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
Investors Mean* 3.70 3.91 4.05 4.14 3.98 4.18 3.82 4.05 4.05 2.91
N= 66 StD. .944 .988 .793 .762 .936 .840 1.094 .935 .919 1.034
Financial Median* 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 3
Analysts Mean* 4.21 3.98 4.47 4.35 4.30 4.47 4.11 4.32 4.28 3.19
N- 57 St.D. .674 .813 .630 .641 .680 .658 .772 .783 .726 1.043
Auditors Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4
N= 57 Mean* 3.91 4.14 4.12 4 3.81 4.26 4.25 4.42 4.28 3.42
StD. .950 .789 .803 .824 .953 .813 .830 .680 .726 1.209
Accountants Median* 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4
N= 45 Mean* 3.80 3.91 4.22 4.09 3.62 4.40 4.20 4.40 4.11 3.27
StD. .786 .900 .850 .701 .912 .688 .842 .751 .832 1.250
Institutional Median* : 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 3
Investors Mean* 4.07 4.11 4.37 4.41 4.30 4.59 4 4.07 4.26 3.19
N= 26 StD. .917 .698 .742 .636 .775 .636 .832 .675 .594 1.001
Government Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Representatives Mean* 3.95 4.32 4.26 4.26 4.37 4.16 4.16 4.37 4.21 3.21
N= 19 StD. .780 .582 .653 .806 .684 .898 .958 .684 .631 1.512
Regulators Median* 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 3
N= 15 Mean* 4.13 4.13 4.40 4.20 4.27 4.53 4.47 4.53 4.47 3.07
StD. .834 .990 .737 .862 .799 .640 .743 .640 .743 1.335
Whole Sample Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
N= 285 Mean* 3.93 4.03 4.24 4.18 4.02 4.34 4.09 4.28 4.20 3.17
StD. .865 .853 .765 .747 .884 .761 .903 .785 .779 1.155
♦Media and Mean: 5=very usefiil; l= n ot useful at all ■ ;r V/* ^  .'I ■ •
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7.5.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups 
Regarding the Usefulness of MD&A Sections
This subsection reports differences among the user groups and betw een each pair of Omani 
user groups regarding the usefulness of MD&A items in the investm ent decision making 
process. The fourth hypothesis is as follows:
H 4a : There are significant differences between the perceptions o f reports' user groups o f the usefulness 
of the sections o f the MD&A report in making investment decisions.
The Kruskal-Wallis H test and Mann-Whitney U test were used to test differences among all 
groups and between each possible pair of user groups. The results, summ arised in Table 7.12, 
show that the fourth hypothesis is rejected for the whole sample's ratings of the MD&A 
sections, except for the ratings of outlook (p<0.005). Regarding differences in MD&A ratings 
between pairs of user groups, financial analysts differed in their ratings of industry structure 
and development from individual investors and accountants, because they have to prepare 
analysis reports for different companies in different sectors in order to advise investors about 
their investment decisions, whereas accountants and individual investors are already familiar 
with the sector in which they are involved.
Similarly, financial analysts significantly differed in their views of the usefulness of a 
company's opportunities and threats compared to individual investors and auditors. 
Opportunities and threats information is used by analysts to evaluate a company and predict 
its future and thus make a decision about that company. On the other hand, individual 
investors are more concerned with short-term  returns and might not be able to interpret 
opportunities and threats information and therefore assigned it a lower rating than analysts 
(see Table 7.11). Also, auditors might not attach high importance to this information because 
of the credibility issue since it is not audited and mostly discusses the future.
Further, this study found auditors' ratings w ere lower than the ratings assigned by analysts 
and institutional investors to the analysis of segment and product performance (see Tables 
7.11 and 7.12). This might be because auditors do not use such information in conducting 
audits whereas institutional investors and analysts use this information to make a decision.
The MD&A section with the m ost significant differences was outlook. First, there were 
significant differences between the views of analysts and auditors and between analysts and 
accountants regarding the im portance of a company's outlook, likely due to the nature of the 
analyst's job which requires the analysis of quantitative and qualitative information disclosed
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in annual reports in order to make decisions, whereas accountants and auditors deal with the 
preparation and auditing of annual reports. Second, auditors' rating of a company's outlook 
was lower than that assigned by governm ent representatives (see Table 7.11). Government 
representatives consider a company's outlook in order to make decisions. Third, there were 
significant differences between accountants' and institutional investors' ratings, between 
accountants' and government representatives' ratings, and betw een accountants' and 
regulators' ratings of a company's outlook. A possible explanation is that accountants are 
concerned with the preparation of reports whereas institutional investors and government 
representatives are concerned with a company’s present and future. Regulators are also 
concerned with companies' disclosure in order to ensure transparency and good disclosure 
practice.
In addition, auditors differed from individual and institutional investors in their views of the 
usefulness of the discussion on financial performance, because auditors audit the financial 
information disclosed in the annual report. Moreover, institutional investors significantly 
differed from accountants, auditors and regulators regarding the usefulness of the discussion 
on financial performance, possibly because institutional investors might already have 
obtained all the information and its explanations through the meeting with a company's 
management compared to other user groups.
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T a b l e  7 .1 2:  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r ,  a n d  D i r e c t i o n  o f ,  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  U s e r  G r o u p s  a n d  b e t w e e n  E a c h  P a i r  o f  U s e r  G r o u p s  
R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  U s e f u l n e s s  o f  M a n a g e m e n t  D i s c u s s i o n  a n d  A n a l y s i s  R e p o r t  S e c t i o n s .
B H 1 la B
■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Industry .054 .002** .21 .74 .13 .30 083 .12 .007* .50 .21 .896 .38 .61 .99 .42 .23 .397 .11 .68 .75 .41
Structure and - - - - - + + + + + + - - - - - + - -
Development
Investment .54 .86 .24 .88 .37 .13 389 299 .75 .41 .13 .43 .22 .94 .48 .84 .31 .10 .36 .44 .79 .81
Portfolio - + - - - - + - - - + + - - - - - - +
Opportunities .043 .002** .52 .18 .033 .33 .10 .015* .17 .83 .19 .797 .44 .100 .62 .22 .37 .91 .52 .36 .94 48
and Threats - - - - - + + + + + - - - - - + + + •
Analysis of .13 .12 .36 .59 .098 .499 .74 .018* .047 .61 .79 .62 .72 .024* .23 .41 .047 .34 .56 .57 .47 .85
Segment and - + + - - - + + - + + - - - - - - + + +
Product
Performance
Outlook .001** .085 .31 .39 .22 .13 .29 .005** .000** .97 .69 .97 .23 .040 .021* .066 004** 002** .010* .73 .98 .77
- + + - - - + + + - - + - - - - - - - +
Risks and .19 .048 .595 .20 .027 .95 .13 .19 .59 .43 .17 .75 .48 .094 .68 .27 .26 .35 .52 .092 .77 .22
Concerns - - - + - + + ■ + - - - + - - + + + -
Adequacy of .15 .25 .034 .090 .75 .22 .030 .27 .497 .59 .56 .098 .78 .13 .82 .36 .25 .98 .29 .29 .043 .33
Internal - - - - - - - + - - + + + - + + - - -
Control
System
Discussion on .054 .12 .025* .040 .65 .21 .057 .56 .595 079 .92 .37 .99 .015* .73 .58 .021* .74 .597 .100 .022 .46
Financial - - + - - - - + - - - + + - + + - - -
Performance
Discussion on .55 .21 .19 .83 .43 .69 .084 .98 .35 796 .60 .33 .33 .76 .57 .32 .57 .82 .13 .76 .25 .20
Operational - - - - - - + + + - + + + - - - + - -
Performance
Omanisation .25 .16 011* .057 .397 .26 .60 .21 .44 .79 .69 .81 .59 .19 .71 .33 .35 .93 .48 .56 .97 .62
Training - - - - - - - + - + + + + + + + - + +
1 All groups= Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H test of all groups: (*) as.05; (**) aS.Ol.
The other columns are Asymp.sig. levels of the Mann-Whitney U test of pairs of user groups: (*): a£.025; (**) aS.005(one-tailed test)
+, -  or = signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + sign means larger mean)
*A- Individual Investors vs. Analysts E= Individual Investors vs. Government Ip Financial Analysts v s . Institutional Investors Ms Auditors vs. Institutional investors Q= Accountants vs. Government
B= Individual Investors vs. Auditors F= Individual Investors vs. Regulators J- Financial Analysts vs. Government l#ll N= Auditors vs. Government R= Accountants vs. Regulators
C= Individual Investors vs. Accountants G= Financial Analysts vs Auditors K= Financial Analysts vs. Regulators p,2| 0= Auditors vs. Regulators S= Institutional Investors vs. Governmed
D= Individual vs. Institutional Investors H-Financial Analysts vs. Accountants L= Auditors vs. Accountants K'S'i P= Accountants vs. Institutional Investors T = Institutional Investors vs. Regulators
L IMS! U= Government vs. Regulators _____ |
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7.5.3 Comparison of this Study's Results w ith Previous Studies' Results Regarding the 
Usefulness of the MD&A Report Sections
The usefulness of risks and concerns to Omani user groups was consistent with the findings of 
Beattie and Pratt's (2002) study in the UK, suggesting that such disclosure is im portant for 
users in developing and developed countries to make investm ent decisions. However, Omani 
users viewed industry structure and developm ent information as of m oderate use to useful 
compared to users in Beattie and Pratt's (2002) study, who regarded it as useful. This is 
because in Oman there are fewer industries than in developed countries and therefore Omani 
user groups are familiar with the existing industries and their structure.
Outlook information was also considered to be useful to Omani user groups, consistent with 
earlier studies conducted in the US (Baker and Haslem, 1973), and Australia (Chenhall and 
Juchau, 1977). Other MD&A content considered useful by Omani user groups was adequacy of 
the internal control systems. Institutional investors in South Korea also regarded internal 
control mechanisms as im portant (Solomon et. aL, 2002). Such findings indicate the 
importance of having adequate internal control systems on user groups' decisions.
7.6 Nature of MD&A Information and the Code o f Corporate Governance
This section investigates users' perceptions regarding the nature of the information disclosed 
in the MD&A report and the extent to which Omani listed companies achieved the purpose of 
the Code of Corporate Governance.
7.6.1 Nature of MD&A Information in Omani Annual Reports
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent of their agreem ent with five given statem ents 
regarding the information disclosed in the MD&A section on a five-point scale, where 
responses extended from 1 "strongly disagree" to 5 "strongly agree". The following 
subsections present the descriptive and univariate analyses of users' perceptions and the 
level of consensus among all the groups and betw een each pair of user groups.
7.6.1.1 Analysis of Users' Perceptions of the Nature of MD&A Information
The frequency distribution of users' responses regarding the nature of MD&A information is 
presented in Table 7.13. It shows tha t 65.2% of respondents believed the MD&A report to be 
useful for evaluating managerial performance. Further, 57.2% of participants viewed the 
MD&A report as useful for predicting a company's future earnings. More than 50% of 
respondents believed the MD&A rep o rt focused m ore on good than bad news.
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Table 7.13: Response Scale P e r c e n ta g e s  (%) o f  Nature  of  MD&A Information.
Strongly
D isagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Agree
Is useful to predict future earnings 1.8 11.2 29.8 42.5 14.7
Is useful to evaluate managerial perform ance 1.8 8.8 24.2 51.9 13.3
Focuses on good new s m ore than bad new s 3.2 17.2 28.1 39.3 12.3
Is not available from outside sources 1.8 17.5 32.6 36.5 11.6
Is not available from financial statem ents and  
footnotes
2.8 14.4 38.6 38.9 5.3
Table 7.14 presents the descriptive statistics pertaining to Omani user groups' perceptions of 
the nature of the information disclosed in the MD&A report. It shows that most users agreed 
with the statements pertaining to the nature of MD&A disclosure. The mean values of the 
whole sample were above the mid-point of the rating in the questionnaire, which 
corresponded to “neutral" and below the fourth point of the rating which corresponded to 
"agree”.
To test the above results statistically, a single sample t te s t  with a confidence interval of 95% 
was used. The t test revealed the following:
a) The whole sample's agreem ent that the MD&A report provides information that focuses 
on good more than bad news was statistically significant at the 5% level (confidence 
interval 3.29-3.52).
b) The whole sample's agreem ent that the MD&A report provides information that is not 
available from outside sources was statistically significant at the 5% level (confidence 
interval 3.29-3.51).
c) The whole sample's agreem ent that the MD&A report provides information that is not 
available from financial statem ents and footnotes was significant at the 5% level 
(confidence interval 3.20-3.41).
d) The whole sample's agreem ent that the MD&A report provides information that is useful 
to evaluate managerial performance was significant at the 5% level (confidence interval 
3.56-3.77).
e) The whole sample's agreem ent that the MD&A report provides information that is useful 
to predict a company's future earnings was significant at the 5% level only at the lower 
bound of the confidence interval 3.46 to 3.70.
In summary, different user groups in Omani viewed the MD&A report as providing 
incremental information not available from outside sources, financial statem ents and 
footnotes. Also, they regarded this information as useful for evaluating managerial 
performance and predicting future earnings. This study's findings provide the reasons for
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requiring listed companies to disclose the MD&A report. However, the MD&A report focuses 
on good more than bad news.
Interestingly, while the regulators' group viewed the MD&A report as useful for evaluating 
managerial performance, they believed the information provided did not tell the true picture 
by focusing more on good than bad news. Further investigation is needed in this area.
T a b l e  7 . 1 4 :  U s e r s '  R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  N a t u r e  o f  M D & A  I n f o r m a t i o n .
Individual Median* 3 3 3 4 4
Investors Mean* 3.36 3.29 3.27 3.71 3.70
N= 66 StD. .905 .890 .851 .837 .841
Financial Median* 4 4 3 4 4
Analysts Mean* 3.49 3.44 3.39 3.72 3.56
N= 57 StD. .909 .945 .901 .921 .926
Auditors Median* 4 4 3 4 4
N= 57 Mean* 3.53 3.51 3.26 3.75 3.56
StD. 1.054 1.120 .897 .892 .982
Accountants Median* 3 3 3 4 3
N= 45 Mean* 3.07 3.18 3 3.51 3.31
StD. 1.095 .912 .853 .968 1.104
Institutional Median* 4 4 4 4 4
Investors Mean* 3.41 3.56 3.63 3.56 3.70
N= 26 StD. 1.010 .801 .688 .801 .724
Government Median* 3 3 4 4 4
Representatives Mean* 3.26 3.26 3.42 3.42 3.63
N= 19 StD. 1.240 1.098 .838 .838 .955
Regulators Median* 4 3 3 4 4
N= 15 Mean* 3.87 3.60 3.27 3.87 3.67
StD. .990 .910 1.100 .743 .976
Whole Sample Median* 4 3 3 4 4
N= 285 Mean* 3.40 3.39 3.29 3.66 3.57
StD. 1.012 .963 .879 .879 .934
I ^Median and Mean: 5=strongly  agree, l= stron g iy  d isagree
7.6.1.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups 
Regarding the Nature of MD&A Information
This subsection reports the level of significance for difference among user groups and 
between each pair of user groups regarding their perceptions of the nature of MD&A 
disclosure. The following is the fifth hypothesis:
H 5a: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f reports' user groups o f the nature o f  
information disclosed in the MD&A report in Omani annual reports.
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The Kruskal-Wallis Test indicated that the fifth hypothesis for the whole sample should be 
rejected. This meant user groups held similar views regarding the nature of MD&A disclosure. 
15 Further, the Mann-Whitney U test revealed no significant differences between pairs of user 
groups, except in two cases. First, there w ere significant differences between accountants' and 
regulators' views regarding the statem ent that the MD&A report focuses on good more than 
bad news. Accountants were neutral about the statement, possibly because they are reluctant 
to admit they focus more on good news, because regulators might require an audit of the 
MD&A report. On the other hand, regulators check the degree of a company's transparency 
and based on their experience might feel companies are sometimes hiding bad news.
Second, there were significant differences between accountants' and institutional investors' 
views regarding the statem ent that the MD&A report provides increm ental information not 
available from financial statem ents and footnotes. Accountants did not highly rate this 
statement probably because they viewed the MD&A report as just an explanatory report of 
the financial statements. In contrast, institutional investors read the MD&A report to obtain 
additional information and confirm the information gathered through meetings with company 
management.
7.6.1.3 Comparison of this Study's Results w ith Previous Studies' Results Regarding 
the Nature of MD&A Information
Omani user groups were neutral about the statem ents that the MD&A report provides 
information that is not available from financial statem ents and footnotes. This contradicts the 
findings of Clarkson e ta l 's  (1999) study conducted in Canada w here analysts believed the 
MD&A report provides incremental information. The aforementioned findings suggest that in 
Oman the level of disclosure in the MD&A report is not adequate and thus does not provide 
incremental information as is the case in Canada and other developed countries, where 
analysts read this report to obtain additional information about a company.
One of the interesting findings in this study is tha t regulators believed that the MD&A report 
focuses more on good news than bad news. This supports signalling theory that managers 
signal good news to raise a company's share price (Ross, 1979).
7.6.2 Users' Perceptions of A chievem ent of the Code of Corporate Governance in Oman
The purpose of the code is to prom ote a culture of compliance, transparency, and 
accountability. Survey respondents w ere given the purpose of the code and were asked to
15 The results are reported in Appendix D in Table 2
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state their views about achievement of the code on a five-point scale that extended from 1, 
"strongly disagree" to 5, "strongly agree".
Table 7.15 shows 57.9% of the respondents agreed that listed companies in Oman disclose 
sufficient information. Interestingly, 30.2% were neutral about the aforementioned matter. A 
possible explanation is that reports ' users are not appreciating the corporate governance 
requirements (Al-Busaidi, 2005].
T a b l e  7 .1 5 : R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  A c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t e  
G o v e r n a n c e  C o d e .
S tro n g ly
D isag ree
D isa g re e  N e u tra l  A g ree  S tro n g ly
A gree
A ch iev em en t o f  c o rp o r a te  g o v e rn a n c e  c o d e 1.8 10.2 30.2 48.4  9.5
1.6 .2.1 Analysis of Users' Perceptions o f Achievem ent o f the Code of Corporate 
Governance in Oman
Table 7.16 presents descriptive statistics pertaining to users' perceptions of achievement of 
the code of corporate governance. It shows that the different user groups viewed Omani listed 
companies as disclosing sufficient information in the corporate governance report and 
thereby achieving the code of corporate governance. The mean value for all groups was below 
the fourth point of rating which corresponded to agree. Using a t test with a confidence 
interval of 95%, the whole sample's perception of achievement of the code was significantly 
below the fourth point (p<0.05, 2-tail test, with a confidence interval 3.44 to 3.64].
In descriptive terms, accountants assigned this item the highest rating, w hereas the 
regulators' group assigned it the lowest. This is understandable since accountants are the 
ones responsible for preparing annual reports and regulators audit companies' compliance 
with regulations. Findings suggested the regulators' group was less satisfied with the extent of 
disclosed information than the other groups.
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T able 7.16: Users' Percep t ions  o f  A ch ievem ent  o f  the Corporate  Governance Code.
A ch iev em en t o f  th e  C o rp o ra te  G o v ern an ce  Code
Individual Investors Median* 4
N= 66 Mean* 3.41
StD. 0.841
Financial Analysts Median* 4
N= 57 Mean* 3.68
StD . 0.711
Auditors Median* 4
z ii in Mean* 3.58
St.D. 0.778
Accountants Median* 4
N= 45 Mean* 3.69
StD . 0.874
Institutional Investors Median* 3
N= 26 Mean* 3.30
StD . 0.912
Government Representatives 4
N= 19 Mean* 3.63
StD . 0.955
Regulators Median* 4
N= 15 Mean* 3.27
StD . 1.387
Whole Sample Median* 4
N= 285 Mean* 3.54
StD . 0.866
♦Median and Mean: 5=strongly agree, 1=strongly disagree
7.6.2.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups in 
Oman Regarding Achievem ent of the Code of Corporate Governance
The Kruskal-Wallis H test and Mann-Whitney U test were used to test the sixth hypothesis:
H6a: There are significant differences between the perceptions of reports' user groups of achievement
of the corporate governance code.
Study findings indicated that the sixth hypothesis should be rejected since no significant 
differences were found among user groups, and between user groups and the whole sample.16 
Overall, findings indicated that all user groups held similar perceptions of the extent of 
information disclosed by Omani listed companies in the annual report and their level of 
compliance with the code of corporate governance. This is because in Oman there is no 
disclosure benchmark against which user groups can compare the current disclosure level.
7.7 Users' Ratings of the Importance of the Corporate Governance Report's Sections in 
making investm ent decisions in Oman
Respondent were asked to rate the importance of corporate governance sections on a five- 
point scale, where responses extended from 1 "no importance" to 5 "very high importance".
16 Results are reported in Table 3 in Appendix D.
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The following sections present the descriptive statistics of users' ratings and the level of 
consensus among the groups and between each possible pair of user groups.
7.7.1 Analysis of Users' Perceptions of the Importance of Corporate Governance 
Report's Sections
Table 7.17 shows the frequency distribution of responses regarding the importance of the 
corporate governance report sections. Percentages assigned to sections were as follows:
• Disclosure policies (79.7%)
• Details of a company's management (72.7%)
• Distribution of shareholdings (70.9%)
• Details of non-compliance by company (70.5%)
T a b l e  7 . 1 7 :  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  S e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  
C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  R e p o r t .
H o
Im p o r ta n c e
L ittle
Im p o r ta n c e
M o d e ra te
Im p o r ta n c e
H igh
Im p o r ta n c e
V e iy h ig h
Im p o r ta n c e
D isc lo su re  p o lic ie s 2.1 4.9 13.3 45.3 34.4
D eta ils  o f  n o n -c o m p lia n c e  
b y  a  co m p an y
2.5 7.0 20.0 38.2 32.3
M ark e t p r ic e  d a ta 2.5 5.6 22.8 38.2 30.9
D eta ils  o f  a  co m p a n y ’s  
M an ag em en t
2.1 3.2 22.1 45.3 27.4
D eta ils  o f  a u d it  c o m m itte e 3.2 9.8 26.3 34.0 26.7
D is tr ib u tio n  o f  
sh a re h o ld in g s
1.4 6.3 21.4 44.9 26.0
P ro file  o f  e x te rn a l a u d i to r 4.2 9.1 23.5 37.5 25.6
C om position  a n d  
q u a lifica tio n s  o f  B o a rd  o f  
D irec to rs
3.2 5.3 21.4 47.4 22.8
M eetings o f  b o a rd  o f 
D irec to rs
6.0 11.6 35.4 30.5 16.5
P ro cess  o f n o m in a tin g  
d ire c to r s
6.3 17.5 33.0 27.0 16.1
M eans o f co m m u n ic a tio n  
w ith  sh a re h o ld e rs
4.2 10.9 30.9 38.6 15.4
C om pany 's p h ilo so p h y 4.9 12.6 37.5 31.9 13.0
R e m u n e ra tio n  m a t te r s 5.3 19.6 38.9 27.0 9.1
Table 7.18 shows the descriptive statistics of users' ratings of the importance of corporate 
governance report sections. It shows that the highest mean value (4.05) was assigned by all 
user groups to disclosure policies, which corresponded to a “high importance'' rating, because 
it is the section that describes disclosure policy followed by a company to prepare its reports. 
On the other hand, rem uneration m atters were assigned the lowest mean value (3.15) since 
these do not affect the investment decisions of user groups.
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Interestingly, most of the thirteen sections disclosed in the corporate governance report were 
highly rated by regulators and accountants, indicating that report preparers and regulators 
believed it im portant for a company to disclose its corporate governance practices to 
interested parties. The accountants group highly rated the above sections because of 
regulators' emphasis on the importance and influence of these sections on investors' 
decisions.
One result worth mentioning is that individual investors highly rated the importance of the 
details of non-compliance by a company, probably because this kind of information ensures 
that listed companies are complying with regulations and regulators are happy with them. 
Also, non-compliance data reassures small shareholders about the going concern of a 
company, since they do not have access to companies' management unlike major 
shareholders.
Another result worth mentioning is that details of a company's m anagement were highly 
rated by institutional investors. This confirms previous results (see Tables 7.5 and 7.8] where 
the institutional investors' group perceived meeting with a company's management and the 
management discussion and analysis report to be of high importance. They significantly 
differed from other groups in their views because they evaluate details of a company's 
management before meeting with them to decide which strategy to use with them to gain 
access to private company information and then relate the details to the company's overall 
performance.
Table 7 .18: U sers' Ratings of  the Importance of Corporate Governance Reports  Sections.1
Individual Median* 3 4 3 3.50 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4
Investors Mean* 3.23 3.53 3.21 3.39 3.05 2.82 3.68 3.97 3.38 3.82 3.88 3.77 3.55
N - 66 StD. 1.064 1.153 1.144 1.122 1.129 .991 .897 .976 .973 .910 .985 .989 1.070
Financial Median- 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Analysts 
N= 57
Mean* 3.26 3.68 3.28 3.65 3.19 3.11 3.95 3.68 3.54 4.04 4.18 3.96 3.63
St.D. .936 .985 1.098 1.026 .990 .838 .854 1.088 .908 .823 .869 1.017 .993
Auditors Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Ns 57 Mean* 3.58 4 3.60 3.91 3.63 3.49 4 3.96 3.79 3.89 4.09 4.09 3.93
St.D. 1.034 .945 .997 .950 1.112 1.136 1.000 1.117 1.081 .817 .931 .808 1.033
Accountants Median* 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4
N=45 Mean* 3.31 4.11 3.58 4.09 3.27 3.11 4.02 3.91 3.29 3.78 4.29 4.20 3.89
StD. 1.184 .682 .965 .848 1.053 .982 .866 .925 1.079 .997 .695 .786 1.071
Institutional Median* : 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 4
Investors Mean* 3.59 3.78 3.48 3.59 3.22 3.33 4.07 3.89 3.52 3.89 4.07 3.41 3.44
N= 26 St.D, .844 .641 1.221 1.248 1.368 1.000 .829 .847 .849 .934 .781 1.309 1.086
Government Median* 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Representative Mean* 3.21 3.84 3.26 3.53 3.37 3.05 3.89 3.89 3.32 3.63 3.42 3.53 3.63
N= 19 StD. .787 .898 1.046 1.124 1.300 1.026 .937 1.100 1.157 1.065 1.305 1.020 1.342
Regulators Median* 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4
N= 15 Mean* 3.40 4 3.53 4 3.67 3.53 4.13 4.27 3.67 4.13 4.27 3.93 4
StD. 1.121 .756 1.125 1.134 .976 .990 .743 .799 1.113 1.187 .884 .961 1.069
Whole Sample Median* 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
N= 285 Mean* 3.35 3.81 3.40 3.71 3.29 3.15 3.93 3.91 3.50 3.88 4.05 3.89 3.71
StD. 1.020 .952 1.079 1.062 1.124 1.011 .899 1.010 1.016 .917 .929 .987 1.075
^ R ^ i a j t i  an d  m ean : 1 "no  im p o rtan ce" , 5 "very  h igh im p o rtan ce"
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7.7.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups 
Regarding the Importance of Corporate Governance Report Sections
This section investigates the level of consensus between each pair of Omani user groups and 
the sample as a whole statistically by applying Kruskal-Wallis H and Mann-Whitney U tests. 
The results are reported in Table 7.19. The following is the seventh hypothesis:
Hla: There are significant differences between the perceptions of reports' user groups of the
importance of the corporate governance report sections in making investment decisions in Oman.
From Table 7.19, the above hypothesis cannot be rejected for the whole sample regarding the 
importance of three corporate governance items: (1) details of the audit committee, (2) 
remuneration matters, and (3) m arket price data. When comparing pairs of user groups, 
individual investors significantly differed from auditors in five corporate governance sections: 
the composition and qualifications of the board of directors, details of the audit committee, 
the process of nominating directors, rem uneration matters, and means of communication 
with shareholders. Auditors had a more positive view of the five corporate governance 
sections than the individual investors' group, possibly because individual investors are more 
concerned with the financial position of companies than details of its board of directors since 
the latter does not directly affect the investm ent return. On the other hand, auditors are more 
concerned with small details that might affect the credibility of the information disclosed, 
since they have to audit it. Accountants are more concerned with the composition and 
qualifications of the board of directors, details of the audit committee, and m arket price data 
than individual investors because these sections reflect internal compliance with regulations 
and also the external status of a company's shares.
Another finding was that financial analysts and accountants both had more positive views of 
the importance of disclosure policies than governm ent representatives, possibly because both 
groups are concerned with the accounting methods used to prepare the financial statem ents 
and how they affect the bottom line figures, such as net income. Additionally, financial 
analysts from brokerage companies deal with different clients who have different investment 
objectives, whereas government representatives invest on behalf of their employers in 
organisations with whom they have had long-term contact and dealings they are likely to 
know a lot about.
Further, auditors and accountants more highly rated market price data than institutional 
investors. Also, accountants assigned higher ratings to market price data than government 
representatives. Institutional investors and government representatives might not highly
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consider market price data disclosed in annual reports because it is historical data. 
Accountants and auditors are m ore concerned about m arket price data because they have to 
disclose it in the corporate governance report and audit i t
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T a b l e  7 . 1 9 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  U s e r  G r o u p s  a n d  B e t w e e n  E a c h  P a i r  o f  U s e r  G r o u p s  R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  
R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  D i f f e r e n t  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  R e p o r t  S e c t i o n s  i n  M a k i n g  I n v e s t m e n t  D e c i s i o n .
1 ■ ■ ■■ 1■ ■ ■Company's Philosophy .495 .87 .076 .59 .23 .81 .66 .093 .64 .26 .64 .75 .31 .74 .11 .52 .57 .49 .93 .18 .66 .64
- - - - + - - - - + - + + + + - + . + + .
Composition and 
Qualifications 
Ofboard of 
directors
.059 .61 .017* .010* .65 .34 .20 .054 .030 .97 .54 .32 .88 .083
+
.41
+
.73
+
.043
+
.32
+
.61
+
.54 .33 .72
Meetings of Board of 
Directors
.29 .84 .039 .069 .34 .86 .40 .070 .104 .42 .97 .49 .81
+
.57
+
.18
+
.74
+
.69
+
.24
+
.78
+
.53
+
.93 .55
Details of the Audit 
Committee
.017* .25 .007* .001** .61 .66 .061 .13 .027 .74
+
.74
+
.23 .37 .19
+
.16
+
.61 .071
+
.054
+
1.000 .97
+
.25 .21
Process of Nominating 
Directors
.074 .50 .004** .27 .65 .26 .054 .016* .53 .96 .43 .092 .087
+
.13
+
.49
+
.99 .79
+
.63 .21 .59 .25 .58
Remuneration .012* .13 .001** .13 .060 .24 .006* .038 .85 .42 .82 .041 .077
+
.36
+
.17
+
.83 .52 .89 .062 .60
+
.299 .13
Details of a  Company's 
Management
.25 .073 .032 .042 .083 .25 .080 .54 .67 .62 .91
+
.52 .88
+
.93
+
.57
+
.84 .89 .68
+
.75 .64
+
.86
+
.53
Details of Non- 
Compliance 
by a company
.49 .12
+
.74 .58
+
.56
+
.85
+
.320 .11 .33 .47 .395 .064 .45
+
.49
+
.698
+
.46 .87
+
.83 .199 .77 .21 .36
Means of
Communication with 
Shareholders
.17 .39 .014* .82
+
.68 .99 .324 .089 .33
+
.78
+
.60
+
.62 .016*
+
.11
+
.11
+
.66
+
.58 .86 .27 .79
+
.54 .41
Distribution of 
Shareholdings
.52 .20 .62 .94
+
.91 .61
+
.13 .39
+
.23
+
.39
+
.17
+
.38 .62
+
.79
+
.397
+
.14 .88 .67
+
.14 .61
+
.22 .11
Disclosure Policies .057 .074 .19 .035 .58 .22 .14 .66 .69 .31 .014* .64 .41 .53 .029 .45 .19 .008* .85 .12 .26 .033
- - - - + - + - + + - - + + - + + - + - -
Market price Data .019* .22 .082 .024* .16 .34 .60 .70 .32 .033 .076 .80 .48 .011* .026 .59 .005** .010* .35 .69 .17 .26
- - - + + - - - + + + - + + + + + + - - -
Profile of the External 
Auditor
.16 .74 .046 .079 .67
+
.51 .12 .098 .14 .52
+
.58 .17 .899
+
.052
+
.52
+
.78 .073
+
.600
+
.700 .25 .089 .43
All groups^ Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H test of all groups: (*) as.05; (**) as.Ol.
The other columns are Asymp,sig. levels of the Mann-Whitney U test of pairs of user groups: (*): as.025; (**) a£.005(one-tailed test) 
The + or - signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (I.e. + sign means larger mean)
*A= Individual Investors vs. Analysts 
B - Individual investors vs. Auditors 
O  Individual Investors vs. Accountants 
D= Individual vs. Institutional Investors
E= Individual Investors vs. Government 
F= Individual Investors vs. Regulators 
G= Financial Analysts vs. Auditors 
H= Financial Analysts vs. Accountants
1= Financial Analysts vs. Institutional Investors 
)= Financial Analysts vs. Government 
K= Financial Analysts vs. Regulators 
L- Auditors vs. Accountants
M= Auditors vs. Institutional investors 
N= Auditors vs. Government ] 
0= Auditors vs. Regulators 
P= Accountants vs. Institutional Investors
Q= Accountants vs. Government 
R= Accountants vs. Regulators 
S= Institutional Investors vs. Government 
T= Institutional Investors vs. Regulators 
U= Government vs. Regulators
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7.7.3 Comparison of this Study's Results w ith Previous Studies’ Results Regarding the 
Importance of Corporate Governance Report Sections
Private shareholders in Bartlett and Chandler's (1997) study regarded board m atters as of 
moderate importance, consistent with the results of this research. A similar finding was 
reported in Firth's (1978), Wallace's (1988), Ibrahim and Kim's (1994) and Beattie and Pratt's 
(2002) studies. This might be because disclosure of board m atters does not directly affect the 
investment decision process. Financial analysts in a study conducted in the USA (Cerf, 1961) 
viewed a list of the names of directors as useful. Also, analysts in Benjamin and Stanga (1977) 
ranked the names of a company's directors higher than the am ount of compensation, 
consistent with Omani analysts ranking of the names of a company's directors. This is because 
disclosure of the names of a company's directors indirectly affects user groups' decisions to 
invest in that particular company because of the reputation and experience of those directors.
Financial analysts in Oman believed that details of a company's m anagem ent was of moderate 
importance, while the same group in Firth's (1978) study believed it was important. This is 
because in Oman financial analysts already know about a company's management through 
their meetings with them. Details of a company's management w ere also viewed as of 
moderate importance to different user groups in a study conducted in Nigeria (Wallace, 
1988). However, Omani user groups highly rated details of a company's management with no 
significant differences between groups compared to significant differences between Nigerian 
user groups at the 1% level. Similar findings that management details are of moderate 
importance were reported in Ibrahim and Kim's (1994) and Cerfs (1961) studies. The 
aforementioned findings suggest that details of a company's managem ent are not highly 
important when making investm ent decisions, especially in developing markets, because in 
such markets there are personal networks betw een companies' m anagem ent and major 
reports' user groups, such as financial analysts and large shareholders. Additionally, the 
number of listed companies in developing m arkets is less than in developed markets and thus 
it is easier for reports' user groups to get to know about companies' management than in 
developed markets.
7.8 Users' Ratings of the Importance of a List o f Voluntary Disclosure Items
Participants were asked to rate the importance of 36 voluntary items on a five-point scale, 
where responses extended from 1 "no im portance” to 5 "very high importance". The following 
sub-sections present the descriptive statistics and level of consensus analysis pertaining to 
users' perceptions of the im portance of the provided voluntary disclosure items.
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7.8.1 Analysis of Users' Ratings o f th e Im portance o f a List o f V oluntary D isclosure  
Items
Table 7.20 shows the response scale percentages for the importance of a set of voluntary 
disclosures while Table 7.21 reports the median, mean, standard deviation, and number of 
respondents in respect of user groups' ratings of the importance of voluntary disclosures. 
Table 7.22 illustrates the ranking order of the mean values of each user group, and the sample 
as a whole, for the importance of voluntary disclosure items in Oman.
T a b le  7 .2 0 :  R e s p o n s e  S c a l e  P e r c e n t a g e s  ( % )  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  a  S e t  o f  V o l u n t a r y  
D i s c l o s u r e  I t e m s .
No Little M oderate High Very High
Im portance Im portance Im portance Im portance Im portance
Profit forecast 0.7 3.9 18.6 35.4 41.4
Comparison of actual perform ance with 0.0 2.5 16.8 39.6 41.1
competitors
Price earnings ratio 0.4 3.2 12.3 43.5 40.7
Future cash flows 0.7 4.2 16.8 39.6 38.6
Gross profit margin 0.4 2.8 14.7 45.3 36.8
Trend analysis on profitability 0.0 1.8 18.2 43.5 36.5
Graphs of Company's Income 0.7 3.2 17.9 42.8 35.4
Financial Inform ation for m ore than  2 0.7 4.9 15.4 44.2 34.7
years
Comparison of actual perform ance with 0.4 4.6 14.7 46.3 34.0
plans
Analysis of a company's investm ent 0.4 3.5 19.3 44.2 32.6
portfolio
Company's competitive pressures 0.7 4.2 17.2 46.0 31.9
Company's forward-looking Statem ent 0.4 7.0 21.1 40.0 31.6
Comparison of actual perform ance 0.0 3.9 22.1 42.5 31.6
with sector’s indicators
Summary analysis of cash flows by 1.1 5.6 24.9 36.8 31.6
segment
Graphs of company’s m arket price in 0.7 4.9 24.2 40.4 29.8
comparison to MSM Broad Index
Forecasted m arket share 0.7 5.6 24.6 39.3 29.8
Current ratio 0.0 6.0 20.0 45.6 28.4
Effect of in terest ra te  on fu ture results 1.1 7.4 20.0 43.2 28.4
Uncertainties that are  reasonably 1.4 7.7 24.6 38.6 27.7
expected to affect financial condition
Graphs of im pact of price changes on 2.1 3.2 27.4 39.6 27.7
earnings per share over several years
Statement of retained earnings 1.1 6.3 23.5 42.8 26.3
Impact of existing regulations on 1.1 5.3 21.8 46.7 25.3
business operations
Off-balance sheet arrangem ents 2.5 7.4 27 38.6 24.6
Stock statistics of company's share 1.4 6.7 27.4 41.4 23.2
Company’s technological developm ents 1.4 5.6 22.5 48.1 22.5
Effect of in terest ra te  on cu rren t resu lts 1.8 7.0 20.4 48.8 22.1
Company’s insurance coverage 1.4 9.5 34.0 35.1 20.0
Report on ethical conduct of a 4.6 14.7 29.1 31.9 19.6
company’s
Officers
Sources of financing arranged bu t not 1.4 7.4 30.2 42.1 18.9
yet used
Company's health, safety, and securities 3.5 19,6 31.6 31.6 13.7
% of Omani employees in different 12.6 23.2 36.1 16.8 11.2
levels of a company
Company’s environm ental perform ance 5.6 17.9 33.7 31.9 10.9
Human resource training expenditure 8.1 19.3 44.2 17.9 10.5
Cost of safety m easures 3.2 13.7 39.6 33.0 10.5
Average wages of employees 8.4 22.5 39.6 21.8 7.7
Corporate policy on employee train ing 5.6 17.9 44.6 26.0 6.0
Table 7.22 shows that the most im portant voluntary disclosures to the whole sample and user 
groups were: profit forecast (1st), comparison of company's actual performance with
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competitors (2nd], price earnings ratio (3rd), trend  analysis on profitability (3rd), future cash 
flows (4th), and gross profit margin (5th). This indicates that in Oman, user groups are more 
concerned with financial information relating to the present and future status of a company. 
This also supports earlier findings w here a company's financial statem ents were perceived to 
be of very high importance compared to other annual reports' sections (see Table 7.7).
Least important voluntary disclosures to the whole sample and user groups were: cost of 
safety measures, a company's health, safety, and securities, and a company's environmental 
performance, suggesting that Omani user groups w ere not that interested in the social and 
environmental activities of companies. A possible reason is that these user groups are not 
aware of the effect of social and environmental issues on the future of a company since they 
are not familiar with these environmental issues because they are aware that the government 
is responsible for such issues.
Further, the percentage of Omani employees in different levels of a company was ranked 36th 
by the whole sample and user groups. This information might be im portant to governmental 
bodies and not user groups possibly because, in Oman, companies are required by law to 
recruit a certain percentage of Omanis and therefore this item was of little importance to 
users. Moreover, corporate policy on employee training was ranked 30th by user groups 
possibly because corporate report users are m ore concerned with a company's profits and 
returns than its training policy.
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Table 7.21: Users' Ratings of the Importance of Set of Voluntary Disclosure Items.
Statem ent o f Current Price Gross Financial Corporate Average % of Omani Human Graph Graph
Retained ratio Earnings Profit Inform ation Policy on w ages Em ployees Resource Illustrating Illustrating
earnings Ratio m argin for Em ployee Of Ind ifferent Training Impact of Incom e of a
More than training em p loyees Levels of a Expenditure price com pany
2 years com pany Changes 011
Earnings 
per share  
Over 
several 
years
Individual 
Investors 
N= 66
Median*
Mean*
St.D.
4
3.58
1.024
4
3.89
.862
4
4.21
.775
4
4.11
.862
4
3.91
.924
3
2.88
1.000
3
2.77
1.049
3
2.62
1.064
3
2.70
1.081
4
3.97
.911
4
4.21
.713
Financial Median* 4 4 5 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4
Analysts Mean* 3.96 4.04 4.42 4.25 4.32 3.09 2.89 2.95 3.09 3.91 4.21
N= 57 St.D. .886 .731 .706 .689 .783 .950 .939 1.141 .987 .950 .861
Auditors Median* 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4
N= 57 Mean* 3.96 4.14 4.11 4.19 4.19 3.26 3.21 3.21 3.26 3.96 3.88
St.D. .865 .718 .748 .667 .789 .897 1.048 1.250 .992 .778 .758
Accountants Median* 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4
N= 45 < Mean* 4.09 4.13 4.24 4.11 4 3.24 3.11 3.07 3.18 3.82 4.29
St.D. .763 .815 .773 .910 .826 .908 1.049 1.195 .984 .834 .695
Institutional Median* 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4
Investors Mean* 3.81 3.78 4.07 4.19 4.15 3 2.96 2.85 2.85 3.52 3.74
N= 26 St.D. .786 1.121 1.035 .962 .907 .961 1.091 .907 1.099 1.014 1.023
Government Median* 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4
Representatives Mean* 3.68 3.58 3.84 3.84 3.63 3.21 3.11 3.11 3.32 3.79 4.05
N= 19 St.D. 1.003 .902 1.015 .688 .955 1.134 1.243 1.370 1.250 1.228 1.311
Regulators Median* 4 4 5 5 4 3 3 2 3 4 4
N= 15 Mean* 4.13 3.73 4.47 4.40 4 3 2.93 2.40 3.13 4 4.07
St.D. .915 1.033 .640 .828 1.000 .756 1.100 1.183 1.187 1.069 .799
Whole Sample Median* 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4
N= 285 Mean* 3.87 3.96 4.21 4.15 4.07 3.09 2.98 2.91 3.04 3.88 4.09
St.D. .912 .851 .804 .799 .871 .947 1.045 1.162 1.058 .924 .847
*Mcdian and mean: 1 "no importance", 5 "very high importance" K ---MB
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Table 7.21 (Continued): Users' Ratings of the Importance of Set of Voluntary Disclosure Items.
1
Individual Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Investors Mean* 4 4.09 3.56 3.77 3.95 3.98 3.77 4.08 4.18 4.05 3.56 3.73
z if ©> m St.D. .841 .696 .897 .819 .849 .794 .941 .847 .84 .849 .994 1.031
Financial Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4
Analysts Mean* 3.88 4.25 3.63 3.91 4.02 3.98 3.72 4.12 4.33 4.05 3.74 3.82
N*57 St.D. .983 .830 1.011 .851 .916 .935 .996 .927 .764 .811 .813 1.020
Auditors Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
N= 57 Mean* 3.91 4.14 3.68 3.88 3.89 4.02 3.93 4.05 4.09 3.88 3.77 3.77
St.D. .739 .789 .869 .825 .958 .834 .842 .833 .786 .867 .846 .926
Accountants Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
N=45 Mean* 4.16 4.31 3.69 3.78 3.71 4.07 3.91 4.16 4.22 3.93 3.80 3.71
St.D. .852 .733 .996 .876 .968 .837 .874 .767 .795 .889 .919 1.058
Institutional Median* 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4
Investors Mean* 3.56 4.04 3.52 3.81 4 4.19 3.56 4.07 4.15 4.15 3.89 3.85
N= 26 St.D. 1.050 .759 .935 .879 .784 .786 .847 .781 .770 .718 .751 .718
Government Median* 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Representatives Mean* 3.79 3.89 3.79 3.89 4.26 4.11 3.63 4.11 4.11 4.21 3.58 3.63
N= 19 St.D. 1.084 .875 1.273 1.286 .991 1.049 1.065 .875 .937 .855 .961 1.065
Regulators Median* 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
IM=15 Mean* 4.27 4.13 3.60 4 4.20 4.20 3.80 4.07 4.27 4.13 3.47 3.67
St.D. .704 .834 .910 1.000 .941 .775 1.014 .799 .799 .743 1.246 1.113
Whole Sample Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
N= 285 Mean* 3.94 4.15 3.63 3.85 3.95 4.04 3.78 4.09 4.19 4.02 3.70 3.75
St.D. .894 .773 .954 .883 .916 .851 .924 .834
.................... *
.801 .833
.............. . ' ' p
.908 .987
i, l=no importance Sip
192
Table 7.21 (Continued): Users' Ratings of the Importance of Set of Voluntary Disclosure Items.
Individual Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4
Investors Mean* 3.98 3.88 3.8 3.86 4.03 3.98 4.20 3.21 3.21 3 3.35 3.80 3.88
N= 66 St.D. .936 .953 .948 .975 .911 .903 .789 .969 1.060 1.109 1.116 .980 1.015
Financial Median* 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 4
Analysts Mean* 4.16 3.95 3.91 3.93 4.42 4.09 4.40 3.42 3.40 3.30 3.42 3.88 3.86
N* 57 St.D. .797 .789 .739 .776 .680 .851 .842 .963 1.033 1.017 .925 .965 .743
Auditors Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4
N» 57 Mean* 4.02 3.89 3.74 3.82 4.04 3.82 3.82 3.35 3.32 3.25 3.53 3.74 3.96
St.D. .813 .859 .955 .947 .823 .826 .848 .935 1.055 1.040 1.182 .992 .944
Accountants Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
N=45 Mean* 4.09 3.78 3.76 3.82 3.93 3.73 4 3.49 3.49 3.51 3.33 3.76 3.84
St.D. .821 .902 1.090 1.093 1.031 1.053 1.022 1.014 1.058 1.058 1.168 1.069 1.043
Institutional Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4
Investors Mean* 3.96 4.04 4.04 4.19 4.22 4.07 4.22 3.30 3.22 3.30 3.78 4.11 4.07
N= 26 St.D. .706 .759 .706 .736 .801 .781 .892 .724 .934 .823 .974 .698 .829
Government Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4
Representatives Mean* 4.11 3.74 3.84 4 4.11 3.79 4.21 3.37 3.37 3.26 3.58 3.84 3.95
N= 19 St.D. .875 1.098 1.015 1.000 .875 .976 .855 1.257 1.383 1.384 1.346 1.068 1.177
Regulators Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 3 3 3 4 4 4
Ns 15 Mean* 4.07 4.13 3.80 4 4 3.87 4.13 3.27 3.27 3.33 3.80 4 4.20
St.D. .799 .743 .941 1.000 1.134 1.125 1.125 .704 .884 .976 1.014 .845 .862
Whole Sample Median* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4
Ne 285 Mean* 4.05 3.90 3.82 3.91 4.11 3.92 4.13 3.34 3.32 3.25 3.47 3.84 3.92
StD. .831 .876 .914 .932 .881 .910 .896 .949 1.049 1.049 1.102 .966 .939
Table 7.22: Ranking by Mean Values of Users' Ratings of the Importance of a Set of Voluntary Disclosure Items.
Price earnings ratio 1 1 3 3 5 8 1 i
Comparison of actual company's performance with competitors 3 3 4 4 3 l l l l l l S I l l l l l I l lllBillBBlg 2
Trend analysis on profitability 5 6 2 1 6 7 5 3
Gross profit margin 4 i i i s i i i i i 1 7 2 8 2 3
Profit forecast 2 2 13 1 0 1 2 5 4
Future cash flows 8 1 6 1 1 llilllilllilllllliil:m m m m m SlillllllB llliS 5 .
Comparison of actual performance with plans 6 9 5 5 5 3 6 6
Graph illustrating income of a company 1 7 1 2 2 14 IM S 111M 11M 1 6 , 6  ,
Financial information for more than 2 years 16 4 1 1 0 3 12 7 7
Analysis of company's investment portfolio 1 1 8 7 8 8 ■ l i l l l i l l i i i l l ■ ■ « ■ ■ ■ 8
Company's competitive pressures 1 0 15 7 9 2 3 4 9
Comparison of company's performance with sector’s indicators 7 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 S I l i l l S B i l l l i 5 1 0
Current ratio 17 1 2 2 6 13 13 1 0 1 1
Company's forward-looking statement 13 14 1 1 19 IlllllSSIIIIISSSillllSllBSIllliiillSllllllS 4 1 2
Statement of retained earnings 25 16 8 8 1 2 i i 5 13
Graph of a company's market price in comparison to MSM's 
index
9 2 0 1 0 5 15 l l l l i l l l g l i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 13
Forecasted market share 15 1 0 13 18 5 9 8 14
Summary analysis of cash flows by segment 18 2 1 8 13 5 6 4 14
Effect of interest rate on future results 19 18 13 14 2 5 7 15
Impact of existing regulations on business operations 18 17 1 1 16 6 1 0 5 16
Graphs of impact of price changes on earnings per share over 
several years
1 2 19 8 14 16 9 7 17
Company’s technological developments 2 2 19 1 2 16 1 2 glllBlllllllllllllllllllilllll 18
Uncertainties that are reasonably expected to affect financial 
condition
2 1 2 0 15 17 4 8 7 19
Effect of interest rate on current results 2 0 19 15 17 I H i H I Sllllllllllilllllilll 2 0
Stock statistics of a company's share 23 2 A 9 12 15 1 2 9 2 1
Off-balance sheet arrangements 24 2 2 14 19 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2
Sources of financing arranged but not yet used 27 23 14 15 1 0 13 13 23
Company's insurance coverage 26 25 16 2 0 16 1111 lillllilillillllli 1 2 24
A report on the ethical conduct of a company’s officers 28 26 17 23 13 13 9 25
Cost of safety measures 29 26 18 2 2 17 14 15 26
Company's health, safety and securities 29 27 19 2 2 18 14 15 27
Company's environmental performance 30 28 2 1 2 1 17 16 14 28
Corporate policy on employee training 31 29 2 0 24 19 17 17 29
Human resource training expenditure. 33 30 2 0 25 2 1 15 16 30
Average wages of employees. 32 32 2 2 26 2 0 18 18 31
% of Omani employees in different levels of a company 34 31 2 2 27 2 1 18 19 32
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7.8.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Different User Groups
Regarding the Importance of a List of Voluntary Disclosure Items
This section investigates the level of consensus between each pair of user groups and the 
sample as a whole statistically using Kruskal-Wallis H and Mann-Whitney U tests. The 
following is the eighth tested hypothesis:
HSa: There are significant differences between the perceptions of reports' user groups of the importance 
of a list of voluntary items in making investment decisions in Oman.
Table 7.23 presents actual levels of differences in mean ratings among the whole sample and 
between pairs of user groups. Table 7.23 indicates the eighth hypothesis should be rejected 
for 34 of 36 voluntary items for the whole sample. There were significant differences among 
user groups' views of the importance of graphs of a company's income and profit forecast.
When comparing pairs of user groups, government representatives assigned lower ratings to 
current ratio and financial information for more than 2 years than auditors. The availability of 
financial information to calculate current ratio and a company's previous reports might 
explain the view of government representatives. Also, governm ent representatives assigned 
lower ratings to current ratio and higher ratings to a company's forward looking statem ent 
than accountants (see Table 7.21}. A company's forward looking statem ent are im portant for 
government representatives as an input to their investment decision process while 
accountants already have this information.
Regarding the individual investors' group, they assigned lower ratings to financial 
information for more than 2 years and future cash flows than financial analysts, possibly 
because it is difficult for individual investors to interpret and use these items to make 
investment decisions. Also, individual investors had lower mean values for the percentage of 
Omani employees in different levels of a company and human resource training expenditure 
than auditors because these items do not directly affect a company's profitability. On the other 
hand, individual investors more highly rated graph illustrating income of a company and 
profit forecast than auditors. These items are more related to investment returns and thus 
individual investors consider them. Individual investors differed from accountants in their 
views of three items: the statem ent of retained earnings, human resource training 
expenditure, and company's environmental performance. Individual investors assigned lower 
ratings to the statem ent of retained earnings because they are short-term investors and are 
more concerned with dividends rather than the portion of net income retained by a company 
and not paid out as dividends. Also, for them the human resource training expenditure and
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company's environmental performance do not directly affect their investment returns. Finally, 
individual investors assigned lower ratings to graphs of impact of price changes on earnings 
per share over several years and graph illustrating income of a company than institutional 
investors, possibly because individual investors might not be able to in terpret these graphs 
and use them to predict in a similar way as institutional investors.
Institutional investors also differed in their opinions from regulators and accountants 
regarding the importance of the graph of a company's market price in comparison to MSM's 
broad-based index. They assigned low ratings to such a graph because it does not present new 
information, whereas regulators and accountants might find this graph helpful for reports' 
users, especially, individual investors, to help them visualise changes in share price. There 
were also significant differences between institutional investors and accountants regarding 
graphs illustrating the income of a company, and between institutional investors and auditors 
regarding stock statistics of a company's share. A possible explanation might be that, although 
these graphs are useful, they present historical data in the view of institutional investors 
compared to accountants who regard these items as im portant to visualise changes in a 
company's financial condition. Similarly, institutional investors assigned lower ratings to 
stock statistics of a company's share than auditors because of the availability of such 
information on the MSM link on the Internet. On the other hand, auditors positively viewed 
these statistics because they show the changes in a company's shares and they might help, 
especially individual investors, in making investm ent decisions.
Financial analysts differed significantly from auditors regarding the importance of four items: 
[1] price earnings ratio, (2) graphs of a company's income, (3) future cash flows, and (4) 
profit forecast. This may have been because although these items for analysts are very helpful 
when analysing different investm ent opportunities, auditors view price earnings ratio and 
graph of a company's income as historical data. In addition, they perceive future cash flows 
and profit forecast as not entirely reliable information for investm ent decision making 
because of its predictive nature. Additionally, analysts differed from government 
representatives in their views of the importance of price earnings ratio and financial 
information for more than 2 years, possibly because analysts view different investment 
portfolios in the course of dealing with different clients whereas government representatives 
invest on behalf of their respective organisations. There were also significant differences 
between analysts and institutional investors regarding the importance of graphs of a 
company's income, again possibly due to the nature of analysts' jobs. Finally, analysts more
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highly rated future cash flows than accountants because they use such data to predict a 
company's future.
In summary, the different user groups in Oman relied most on information of a financial 
nature voluntarily disclosed in annual reports when making investm ent decisions, probably 
because such information helps them to evaluate a company's performance and investment 
returns and predict its future.
Table 7.23: Level of Significance for  Difference among User Groups and between Each Pair of User Groups Regarding their Ratings
of the Importance of a Set of Voluntary Disclosure Items in Making Investm ent Decisions in Oman.
A ll
Groups A* B C D E F G H I J  K L M N O P Q R S T U
Statement of
Retained
Earnings
.12 .044 .050 .012* .37 .65 .048 .96
+
.57 .43
+
.33
+
.46 .52 .47
+
.36
+
.44 .198
+
.16
+
.695 .78
+
.18 .16
Current ratio .11 .45 .15 .11 .56
+
.15
+
.59
+
.47 .34 .27
+
.041
+
.31
+
.799 .13
+
.015*
+
.17
+
.14
+
.014*
+
.16
+
.62
+
.99
+
.61
Price earnings 
Ratio
.104 .095 .31
+
.78 .67
+
.13
+
.23 .017*
+
.22
+
.14
+
.020*
+
.91 .26 .90 .37
+
.094 .57
+
.13
+
.35 .47
+
.24 .065
Gross profit .36 .51 .83 .89 .59 .10
+
.19 .65
+
.66
+
.95 .032
+
.34 .95
+
.68 .055
+
.22 .74 .14
+
.26 .086
+
.40 .035
Financial 
Information 
For more than
.034 .010* .089 .73 .17 .24
+
.71 .33
+
.035
+
.62
+
.003**
+
.26
+
.20
+
.86 .017*
+
.53
+
.29 .16
+
.91 .048
+
.55
+
.28
Corporate 
Policy on 
Employee 
Training
.28 .22 .035 .070 .95 .18 .698 .37 .51 .35
+
.55 .65
+
.86
+
.11
+
1.000 .29
+
.15
+
.90 .36
+
.26 .75 .42
+
Average wages 
Of employees
.35 .49 .026 .14 .82 .25 .66 .100 .38 .72
+
.42 .98 .56
+
.15
+
.77
+
.36
+
.34
+
.89 .59
+
.40 .85 .61
+
% of Omani 
Employees in 
Different 
Levels of 
Company
.062 .097 .011* .047 .46 .091 .43
+
.29 .64 .47
+
.50 .094
+
.60
+
.13
+
.84
+
.032
+
.28
+
.76 .062
+
.24 .21
+
.104
+
Human
Resource
Training
Expenditure
.027 .037 .002** .011* .68 .033 .12 .29 .53 .24
+
.35 .71 .71
+
.051
+
.76 .79
+
.11
+
.59 .97
+
.12 .28 .66
+
All groups^ Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H te s t of all groups: (* 
The other columns are Asymp.sig. levels of the Mann-Whitney U test of pa 
The + or -  signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group me
afi.05; (**) 05.01.
rs of user groups: {*); 05.025; (**) aS.005(one-tailed test) 
fin compared to second group fi.e. + sign means larger mean)
*A- Individual Investors vs. Financial Analysts
B- Individual Investors vs. Auditors
C= Individual Investors vs. Accountants
D= Individual vs. Institutional Investors
E= Individual Investors vs. Government representatives
F— Individual Investors vs. Regulators
G= Financial Analysts vs. Auditors
H= Financial Analysts vs. Accountants 
1= Financial Analysts vs. Institutional Investors 
1= Financial Analysts vs. Government Representatives 
K— Financial Analysts vs. Regulators 
L= Auditors vs. Accountants
Auditors vs. Institutional Investors 
N = Auditors vs. Government Representatives
0= Auditors vs. Regulators 
P« Accountants vs. Institutional Investors 
Q= Accountants vs. Government Representatives 
Rs Accountants vs. Regulators
S= Institutional Investors vs. Government Representatives 
T= Institutional Investors vs. Regulators 
Us Government Representatives vs. Regulators
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Table 7.23 (continue): Level of Significance for Differences among User Groups and between Each Pair of User Groups Regarding their Ratings of the
Importance of a Set of Voluntary Disclosure Items in Making Investment Decisions in Oman.■ ■■ ■■ ■ u ■Graphs of 
Impact of 
Price changes 
On earnings 
Per share over 
Several years -'■
.30 ■74
+
.74
+
.298 .0 2 1 *
+
.76
+
.74 .96 .54
+
.049
+
.95
+
.58 .49
+
.029
+
.95
+
.54 . 1 0 2
+
.67 .27 .16 .052 .63
Graphs of a 
Company's 
Income
.024* .75
‘
.017*
+
.58 .024*
+
.6 8 .52
+
.017*
+
.85 .025*
+
.94 .45
+
.007
*
.499
+
.070 .43 .013*
+
.95 .34
+
.1 1 .28 .48
+
Graphs of a 
Company's 
M arket price 
in comparison 
To MSM's 
Broad-based 
. index'- v
.12 .58
+
.42
+
.32 .036
+
.56
+
.28 .897
+
.17 .13
+
.84
+
.196 .096 .1 1
+
.95
+
.09
9
.0 1 0 *
+
.23
+
.76 .31 . 0 2 0
*
.2 0
Trend analysis 
on profitability
.31 .1 2 .59 .094 .59
+
.41
+
.79 .37
+
.82 .1 1
+
.093
+
.56
+
.28 .39
+
.28
+
.97
+
.088
+
.073
+
.47
+
.75
+
.58 .45
Company’s
Insurance
Coverage
.84 .72 .6 6 .39 .47
+
.28 .93
+
.91 .69 .39
+
.47 .81
+
.70 .29
+
.51 .72
+
.2 2
+
.57 .57
+
.24 .65 .49
+
Company's
Technological
Developments
.800 .35
-
.65 .97
+
.92 .25 .17 .70
+
.42
+
.59
+
.597 .52 . 6 6
+
.798
+
.48 .36 .91 .34 .24 .45 .34 .97
+
Company’s
Forward-
Looking
Statements
.24 .61 .77
+
.16
+
.99 .078 .24 .49
+
.1 0
+
.76
+
.2 1 .44 .34
+
.77 . 1 0 2 .24 .27 .023* .07
5
.18 .36 .75
+
Company's
Competitive
Pressures
.898 .82
■
.796 .56 .28 .34 .37 .97 .74 .41 .49 .49 .75 .41 .47 .49 .58 .61 .64 .99
+
1 .0 0
0
1 .0
0 0
All groups^ Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H test of all groups: (*) aS.05; (**) aS.Ol.
The other columns are Asymp.sig. levels of the Mann-Whitney U tcs to i pairs of user groups: (*): a£.025; (**) ct£,005(one-tailed 
The + or -  signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + sign means largei
test)
mean)
' . / e , Vj.// ''/‘S 'Sy/
W S m m — Hi
*A= Individual Investors vs. Financial Analysts
B= Individual Investors vs. Auditors
C= Individual Investors vs. Accountants
D= Individual vs. Institutional Investors
Es Individual Investors vs. Government Representatives
F= Individual Investors vs. Regulators
G= Financial Analysts vs. Auditors
H= Financial Analysts vs. Accountants 
1= Financial Analysts vs. Institutional Investors 
J= Financial Analysts vs. Government Representatives 
K= Financial Analysts vs. Regulators 
L= Auditors vs. Accountants 
1 Me Auditors vs. Institutional Investors 
I N= Auditors vs. Government Representatives
I......................................................  '' ■ ..............< ' : V '  ■>
Os Auditors vs. Regulators 
P= Accountants vs. Institutional Investors
Accountants vs. Government Representatives 
R= Accountants vs. Regulators
S= institutional investors vs. Government Representatives - 
T= Institutional Investors vs. Regulators 
U« Government Representatives vs. Regulators
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Table 7.23 (continue): Level of Significance for Differences among User Groups and between each pair of User Groups Regarding their Ratings of the
Importance of a Set of Voluntary Disclosure Items in Making Investment Decisions in Oman.■■ ■■ ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■Stock
Statistics of a
Company's
Share
.47 .85
+
.396 .53 .12
+
.73
+
.99
+
.32 .43 .17
+
.84
+
.92 .89
+
.025*
+
.36
+
.61
+
.052
+
.44
+
.69
+
.36 .36 .799
Comparison 
Of actual 
Performance 
With plans
.98 .598 .77
+
.71 .64
+
.89 .82
+
.46
+
.89
+
.42
+
.84
+
.61
+
.52 .84
+
.76 .98
+
.44
+
.898
+
.63
+
.67 .91 .796
+
Comparison 
Of actual 
Performance 
With
competitors
.71 .33 .37
+
.88 .55
+
.82
+
.77 .087
+
.47
+
.20
+
.38
+
.76
+
.35 .89 .71 .43 .51
+
.75
+
.86 .81 .52 .68
Comparison 
Of actual 
Performance 
With sector's 
Indicators
.696 .91
+
.23
+
.46
+
.89 .41 .83 .299
+
.53
+
.81 .39 .77 .75 .27 .12 .33 .44 .22 .48 .52 .93 .64
+
Sources of 
Financing 
Arranged but 
Not yet used
.86 .42 .31 .24 .27 .86 .94
+
.83 .63 .63 .71
+
.61
+
.79 .77 .61
+
.52
+
.98 .47
+
.44
+
.49
+
.46
+
.93
+
Off-balance
Sheet
Arrangements
.996 .68 .968 .93
+
.90 .68
+
.84
+
.72
+
.65
+
.89
+
.52
+
.63
+
.899
+
.896 .66
+
.799
+
.83 .75
+
.88 .61 .72
+
.93
Analysis of a 
Company's 
Investment 
Portfolio
.93 .41 .95
+
.66 .61
+
.65 .84 .39
+
.74
+
.26
+
.898
+
.74
+
.61 .65
+
.62 .78
+
.38 .89 .92
+
.42 .51 .84
+
All groups>Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H test of ail groups: (*} <*£.05; (**) aS.Ol.
The other columns are Asymp,sig. levels of the Mann-Whitney U test of pairs of user groups: (*): <*£.025; (**) as.005(one-l 
The + or -  signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + sign means
ailed test) 
larger mean)
*A= Individual Investors vs. Financial Analysts
B= individual Investors vs. Auditors
C= Individual Investors vs. Accountants
D= Individual vs. Institutional Investors
E- Individual Investors vs. Government Representatives
F= Individual Investors vs. Regulators
G= Financial Analysts vs. Auditors
H= Financial Analysts vs. Accountants
1= Financial Analysts vs. Institutional Investors
1- Financial Analysts vs. Government Representatives
K= Financial Analysts vs. Regulators
I -  Auditors vs. Accountants
Ms Auditors vs. institutional Investors
N= Auditors vs. Government Representatives
0= Auditors vs. Regulators
Accountants vs. Institutional Investors 
Qs Accountants vs. Government Representatives 
R= Accountants vs. Regulators
S= Institutional Investors vs. Government Representatives 
T= Institutional Investors vs. Regulators 
U= Government Representatives vs. Regulators
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Table 7.23 (continue): Level of Significance for Differences among User Groups and between Each Pair of User Groups Regarding their Ratings of the
Importance of a Set of Voluntary Disclosure Items in Making Investment Decisions in Oman.■ ■■ ■■ ■ ■ ■
Impact of 
Existing 
Regulations on 
Business 
Operations
.88 .92 .92
+
.45
+
.64 .698
+
.42 .83
+
.39
+
.69 .62
+
.45 .52
+
.57 .73
+
.38 .29 .94 .197 .47
+
.71 .36
Effect of 
Interest rate 
On current 
Results
.97 .76 .58
+
.96 .54 .92 .98
+
.37
+
.81
+
.695 .89
+
.82
+
.69 .29 .67 .78 .598 .88 .97
+
.695
+
.63
+
.898
+
Effect of 
Interest rate 
On future
.87 .99 .72
+
.99
+
.26 .54 .64 .66
+
.95
+
.24 .55 .67 .81 .17 .43 .52 .32 .58 .64 .77
+
.73
+
.99
+
Future 
Cash flows
.16 .015* .92
+
.76
+
.51 .77 .89 .009*
+
.015*
+
.23
+
.16
+
.25
+
.84
+
.45 .698 .82 .39 .62 .73 .796
+
.75
+
.96
+
Forecasted 
Market share
.53 .56 .21
+
.23
+
.96 .42
+
.88
+
.081
+
.10
+
.69
+
.24
+
.62
+
.86
+
.29 .98
+
.61 .30 .92 .599 .44
+
.85
+
.70
Profit forecast .014* .080 .014*
+
.45
+
.89 .86 .82 .000**
+
.029
+
.26
+
.29
+
.49
+
.19 .062 .069 .15 .48 .50 .52 .99 .93 .896
Cost of safety 
Measures
.62 .25 .62 .11 .86
+
.36 .86 .55
+
.62 .26
+
.86 .53
+
.29 .64
+
.56 .91
+
.105
+
.87
+
.30
+
.24 .70 .47
+
Company's 
Health, safety, 
and securities
.66 .36 .71 .14
+
.72
+
.51 .99 .57
+
.48 .28
+
.89 .54
+
.24 .65
+
.66 .92
+
.056
+
.81
+
.195
+
.37 .84 .57
+
All groups= Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H test of all groups: (*) a£.05; (**) a£.01.
The other columns are Asymp.sig. levels of the Mann-Whitney U test of pairs of user groups: (*): aS.025; (**) a<;.005(one-tailed test) 
The + or -  signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + sign means larger mean)
*A= Individual Investors vs. Financial Analysts
B* Individual Investors vs. Auditors
C= Individual Investors vs. Accountants
D= Individual vs. Institutional Investors
E= Individual Investors vs. Government Representatives
F- Individual Investors vs. Regulators
G= Financial Analysts vs. Auditors
H= Financial Analysts vs. Accountants 
1= Financial Analysts vs. Institutional Investors 
J- Financial Analysts vs. Government Representatives 
K= Financial Analysts vs. Regulators 
L= Auditors vs. Accountants
M= Auditors vs. Institutional Investors 1 
N= Auditors vs. Government Representatives
0= Auditors vs. Regulators 
P= Accountants vs. Institutional Investors 
Q= Accountants vs. Government Representatives 
R= Accountants vs. Regulators
S= Institutional Investors vs. Government Representatives 
T= Institutional Investors vs. Regulators 
Us Government Representatives vs. Regulators
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Table 7.23 (continue): L evel o f  S ign ifican ce  f o r  D ifferen ces a m o n g  U ser G roups a n d  b e tw e e n  Each P a ir  o f  U ser G roups R eg a rd in g  th e ir  R a tin g s  o f  th e  Im p o rta n ce  o f  a  S e t o f  
Voluntary Disclosure Item s in Making Investm ent Decisions in Oman.
All
Groups* A* B C D E F G H  I J K L M N O P  Q R S T  U
Company's
Environmental
Performance
.32 .18 .398 .016* .48 .36 .38 .51
+
.197 .62
+
.900 .96
+
.088 .79 .65 .68 .094
+
.48
+
.37
+
.62 .79 .91
+
Report on 
Ethical 
Conduct of a 
Company's 
Officers
.56 .74 .44 .87 .11 .36 .16 .69 .94 .14 .38 .16 .54
+
.39 .75 .43 .17 .38 .19 .80
+
.899 .76
Uncertainties
That are
Reasonably
Expected to
Affect
Financial
Condition
.89 .73 .68
+
.92
+
.29 .84 .59 .48
+
.67
+
.47 .99
+
.74 .800 .16 .63 .42 .32 .79 .56 .54
+
.77
+
.78
Summary 
Analysis of 
Cash Flows 
by Segment
.82 .57
+
.74 .88
+
.65 .64 .27 .43 .73 .36 .38 .084 .66
+
.82 .82
...
.37 .58 .59 .25 .93 .46 .65
All groups* Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H test of all groups: (*) a£.05; (**) aS.01.
The other columns are Asymp.sig. levels of the Mann-Whitney U test of pairs of user groups: {*): aS.025; (**) a£.005(one»tailed test) 
The + or ** signs under p* values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + sign means larger mean)
*A= Individual Investors vs. Financial Analysts 
B= Individual Investors vs. Auditors 
C» Individual Investors vs. Accountants 
D— Individual vs. Institutional Investors 
E* Individual Investors vs. Government Representatives 
F= Individual Investors vs. Regulators 
G- Financial Analysts vs. Auditors 
...................  1
H- Financial Analysts vs. Accountants
Is Financial Analysts vs. Institutional investors
}- Financial Analysts vs. Government Representatives
K» Financial Analysts vs. Regulators
L= Auditors vs. Accountants
Ms Auditors vs. Institutional Investors
N= Auditors vs. Government Representatives
0= Auditors vs. Regulators 
P= Accountants vs. Institutional Investors 
Q= Accountants vs. Government Representatives 
R= Accountants vs. Regulators
S= Institutional Investors vs. Government Representatives 
T= Institutional Investors vs. Regulators 
U- Government Representatives vs. Regulators
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7.8.3 Comparison of this Study's Results w ith Previous Studies' Results Regarding the 
Importance of a List of Voluntary Items
Price earnings ratio was ranked first among other items by Omani user groups and was 
considered to be of high importance. This is inconsistent with findings reported in the studies 
of Barker and Haslem (1973) and Chenhall and Juchau (1977) in which individual investors 
regarded the price earnings ratio as of m oderate importance. A possible explanation is that, in 
Oman, individual investors are concerned with short-term returns, whereas individual 
investors in developed countries might have longer term  investment interest.
Gross profit margin was highly rated by the different user groups in Oman and in a study 
conducted in the UK (Beattie and Pratt, 2002). This suggests tha t user groups in developed 
and developing countries are concerned with a company's profitability when making 
investment decisions since it reflects that company's performance. The average wages of 
employees was of little to moderate importance to Omani user groups. This conflicts with 
Beattie and Pratt's (2002) study where expert users regarded average compensation of 
employees to be useful. This is because in GCC countries, such as Oman, there are no powerful 
labour unions and such information is thus of little importance to user groups since it does 
not affect a company's profitability. In developed countries, such as the UK, it is im portant to 
obtain such information when making decisions about a company.
User groups in Oman viewed human resource training expenditure as of moderate 
importance in making investment decisions. This is consistent with results reported in a 
number of studies (McNally et al., 1982; Wallace, 1988) because it does not directly impact on 
investment decisions. A company's technological developments w ere considered useful by 
user groups in Beattie and Pratt's (2002) study, while they were of moderate to high 
importance to Omani user groups, possibly because in Oman not many reports' user groups 
are able to predict the impact of a company's technological developments on its long-term 
performance.
Analysts in Clarkson etal.’s (1999) study believed that the forward-looking statem ent was of 
moderate importance compared to analysts in Oman who regarded the aforementioned 
statement as of high importance, possibly because Oman's capital market is a young market 
and analysts use the forward-looking statem ent to learn more about a company's future. The 
present research found comparisons of actual performance with plans and that of competitors 
were of high importance to different user groups, similar to a study conducted in the UK 
(Beattie and Pratt, 2002) since such comparisons reflect a company's market status and share.
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Future cash flows have been viewed as of moderate importance by respondents in a number 
of studies (Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005). For Omani user groups they were of high 
importance, because in Oman the m arket is still developing and reports' users are concerned 
with companies' profitability and liquidity issues. Profit forecast was also highly rated by 
respondents in this research, consistent with findings reported in the studies of Firth (1978) 
and McNally e ta l  (1982) since it impacts on the investment decisions of reports' users.
A company's health, safety and securities information was of m oderate importance in the 
investment making decision process in Oman compared to fairly useful in the decision process 
in the UK (Beattie and Pratt, 2002), possibly because, in Oman, people are not aware of the 
impact of such information on a company's performance and already have the idea that it is 
the government's responsibility to check these issues.
In conclusion, Omani user groups differed from user groups in other countries in respect of 
certain issues, possibly due to differences in regulations, capital m arket authorities, 
informational needs, and the quality of disclosures between countries. Notwithstanding, this 
research revealed that Omani user groups held similar views as those in developed markets.
7.9 Suggested Voluntary Items
Respondents were asked if there was any additional information they would like to see in 
Omani annual reports to make decisions. A num ber of items were suggested for inclusion in 
annual reports, indicating that the level of disclosure in current reports is inadequate. Main 
items suggested by respondents were: forecasted financial statem ents for the next 5 years, 
competition analysis, foreign fund flow, foreign stock listing, top 5 managers' salaries, 
government support and spending on infrastructure, stock ageing analysis, investment in 
research and development activities, capital commitments, cost and pricing policies, and 
employees' turnover.
7.10 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Auditor Groups Regarding 
the Purposes of Financial Disclosure
This section examines w hether the different auditor groups were significantly homogenous or 
heterogeneous in their ratings of the various financial disclosure purposes in Oman. Auditor 
groups were divided into local, international and Big four auditing firms. The tested 
hypothesis is as follows:
H lb: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f auditor groups o f the purposes o f  
financial disclosure in Oman.
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To test the above hypothesis, Kruskal-Wallis H and Mann-Whitney U tests were used. Table 
7.24 presents actual levels of significance for differences in mean ratings between pairs of 
user groups. This table shows that the above hypothesis cannot be rejected for 6 out of 8 
purposes. Comparing responses between the three auditor groups, local auditors significantly 
differed from auditors in international firms in their perceptions of the purpose of assessing 
the financial position (p<0.025). International affiliated audit firms had a positive view of the 
above mentioned purpose because they deal more with large and listed companies that 
require large funds from banks and financial institutions than local auditors who deal with 
small unlisted companies.
Interestingly, there were significant differences between local auditors and auditors in Big 
four auditing firms regarding all the financial disclosure purposes, except for evaluating a 
company's performance, possibly because in Oman, most listed companies are audited by Big 
four audit firms and therefore these firms have more knowledge about the information needs 
of reports' users and the usage of corporate reports in making investm ent decisions than local 
auditors who audit unlisted companies.
The present research reported significant differences between auditors from international 
and Big four audit firms in their perceptions of two disclosure purposes: assessing a 
company's compliance with regulations and raising capital. Such differences might be due to 
the higher level of involvement in and experience of auditors of Big four firms in auditing 
listed companies than auditors of international affiliated audit firms (MSM, 2005).
T a b l e  7 .2 4 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  
R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  P u r p o s e s  o f  F i n a n c i a l  D i s c l o s u r e .
A ssess financial Position 0.011* 0.019* 0.019* 0.83
Assess Company's Compliance with Regulations 0.000** 0.57 0.000** 0.003**
A ssess Company's Cash Flow 0.052 0.58 0.017* 0.12
Enhance company's Value 0.003** 0.63 0.000** 0.073
Evaluate company's Perform ance 0.158 0.095 0.149 0.703
Predict company's Future Outcomes 0.024* 0.65 0.008* 0.046
Fulfil Statutory and Legal requirem ents 0.011* 0.300 0.002** 0.22
Raise Capital 0.004** 0.21 0.006* 0.004**
All groups= Asyrap.sig. levels of the Kruskal-W allis H te s t of all groups: (*} asO.OS; (**) aSO.Ol.
The o ther columns a re  Asymp.sig. levels of th e  Mann-Whitney U te s t o f pairs of u ser groups: (*): aS0.025; (**) a£0.005 (one­
tailed test). The + o r -  signs under p-values indicate th e  location of the  first group m ean com pared to  the second one (i.e. + 
s i g n m e a n s l t a i g e i j n e a n ) ^ ^ _ —— _ _ ——— *
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7.11 Analysis of Level Consensus Among and Between Auditor Groups Regarding the
Importance of Different Sources of Information
Table 7.25 shows the level of significance for differences among and between auditor groups 
regarding the importance of corporate information sources. The following is the tested 
hypothesis:
Hlb: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f auditor groups o f the importance o f  
different information sources in making investm ent decisions.
Table 7.25 indicates that the above hypothesis cannot be rejected for all corporate 
information sources, with the exception of the financial analysis of a company's annual report. 
Auditors of Big four audit firms significantly differed from auditors from local and 
international affiliated audit firms in their views of the importance of sources of corporate 
information probably because they have more international experience and thus are more 
aware of the importance and effect of each information source than auditors from local and 
international affiliated audit firms who might have limited experience in global markets.
Local auditors significantly differed from auditors of international auditing firms in their 
perceptions of the importance of trading units in commercial banks in making investment 
decisions, possibly because small companies in Oman invest small funds through these 
trading units while international affiliated audit firms deal with large and listed companies 
that invest large amounts of money directly in other listed companies.
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T a b l e  7 .2 5 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  
R e g a r d i n g  T h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  D i f f e r e n t  I n f o r m a t i o n  
S o u r c e s  in  O m a n .
Company's Annual Report 002** .64 .000** .004**
Company's Quarterly Reports .009* .37 .016* .003**
Company's Annual General M eeting .000** .84 .000** .000**
Company's W ebsite .000** .38 .000** .003**
Financial Analysis o f a  Company's Annual R eports .744 .73 .44 .78
Meeting With a Company's Management .001** .66 .000** 013*
Muscat Securities Market link On the Internet .001** .79 .000** .003**
Stockbrokers' Advice .000** .51 .000** .002**
Trading Units In com m ercial Banks .000**
+
.021* .000** .000**
Other Investors .000** .053 .001** .000**
Sector Information .000**
+
72 .000** .001**
Muscat Securities Market Issues .002** 76 .000** .016*
+ - -
All groups= Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H te s t of all groups: (*} a£0.05; (**) aSO.Ol.
The o ther columns a re  Asympjsig. levels o f th e  Mann-Whitney U te s t of pa irs  o f u ser groups: (*): a s 0.025; (**) as0 .005  (one- 
tailed test)._______________________________________________________________________________________________________
7.12 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Auditor Groups Regarding 
the Importance of Annual Reports' Sections
The tested hypothesis is as follows:
H3b: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f various auditors o f the importance o f  
annual reports' sections in making investment decisions.
Table 7.26 indicates that the hypothesis cannot be rejected for four sections of annual reports: 
[1] chairman's report, (2} corporate governance report, (3) statem ent of accounting 
principles, and (4) notes to the financial statements. Auditors from Big four audit firms more 
highly rated five annual reports' sections than auditors from local audit firms: chairman's 
report, corporate governance report, MD&A, statem ent of changes in shareholders' equity, 
and notes to the financial statements, possibly because local auditors are not involved in 
auditing listed companies' annual reports and thus not so aware of their contents and 
importance in making investm ent decisions as auditors from Big four audit firms. Similarly, 
there were significant differences between Big four and international affiliated audit firms' 
perceptions of the chairman's report, statem ent of changes in shareholders' equity, and 
statement of principal accounting policies. Due to their global experience, auditors from Big
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four audit firms knew that the aforementioned reports serve the informational needs of 
various corporate reports' users and therefore more highly rated them than other auditors. 
Because international affiliated audit firms are local firms with international links their staff 
have limited experience in global markets. Thus, auditors from such firms might have 
perceived these statements as simply explanatory statements and not im portant for investors' 
decision-making, especially minority investors. Also, Big four audit firms have more 
knowledge of the Omani capital m arket and users' needs because of the research they conduct 
compared to international affiliated firms.
T a b l e  7 .2 6 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  
R e g a r d i n g  T h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ’ 
S e c t i o n s .
Chairman’s Report .000** .93 .000** .000**
Corporate Governance Report .018* .59 .006* .046
Management D iscussion and 
Analysis
.032 .54 .006* .18
Summary of Performance .053 .79
+
.030 .035
Auditor Report .377 .15 .68 .41
+
Auditor Report on Corporate Governance .222 .86
+
.080 .26
Balance Sheet .33 .16 .42 .48
+
Profit and Loss account .32 .14 .64 .32
+
Statement o f Cash flows .66
+
.093 .100
Statement of Changes in Shareholders' Equity .027 .70
+
.013* .023*
Statement o f Principal Accounting Policies .006* .087
+
.039 .002**
Notes to The financial Statem ents .012* .69
+
.003** .026
All groups= Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H  test of all groups: (*) a<;.05; (**) aS.Ol.
The other columns are Asymp.sig. levels of the M a n n - W h i tn e y  t/test of pairs of user groups: (*): a£.025; (**) aS.005 (one­
tailed test). The + or -  signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + 
sign means larger mean)
7.13 The Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Auditor Groups
Regarding the Usefulness of the MD&A Sections in Making Investment Decisions 
in Oman
This section tests the following hypothesis:
H 4b: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f auditor groups o f the usefulness of 
sections o f the MD&A report in making investm ent decisions.
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Table 7.27 indicates that the above hypothesis cannot be rejected for four of the MD&A items 
among auditor groups: industry structure and development, investment portfolio, outlook, 
and Omanisation training.
Comparing auditor groups, there were no significant differences between local auditors and 
auditors of international affiliated auditing firms. On the other hand, Big four audit firms rated 
more highly six MD&A sections than local audit firms, possibly because they are more 
involved with auditing listed companies than local audit firms. Interestingly, Big four differed 
from international affiliated audit firms in their views of two MD&A sections: outlook and 
Omanisation training. Auditors from international affiliated audit firms might have viewed 
outlook information as not that im portant because it becomes historical data at the time 
corporate reports are published and main investors are already aware of such information 
from their personal networks. Auditors from such firms might have regarded Omanisation 
training as not that im portant because in their view it is disclosed simply to comply with 
disclosure requirements and does not affect investment decisions. On the other hand, because 
of their international exposure to global markets, auditors from Big four audit firms knew that 
each detail in corporate reports is im portant in making investment decisions, especially for 
minority investors.
T a b l e  7 .2 7 ;  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  
R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  U s e f u l n e s s  o f  M D&A  S e c t i o n s .^ I B
Industry Structure and D evelopm ent .006* .24 .001** .14
Investment Portfolio .003** .13 .001** .071
Opportunities and Threats .034 .22 .012* .23
Analysis of Segm ent and Product Performance .050 .095 .026 .89
Outlook 014* .67 .008* .010*
Risks and concerns .14 .14 .093 .955
Adequacy of Internal Control Systems .35 .28 
. 4.
.66 .14
Discussion on Financial Performance .197 .35 .082 .56
Discussion on Operational Performance .048 .66 .018* .071
Omanisation Training .000** .19
+
.000** .000**
All groups= Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H  test of all groups: (*) cc£.05; (**) a£.01.
The other columns are Asymp.sig. levels of the M a n n - W h i tn e y  U  test of pairs of user groups: (*): as.025; (**) aS.005 (one­
tailed test). The + or -  signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + 
sign means larger mean)
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7.14 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Auditor Groups Regarding
the Nature of the Information Included in MD&A Report
This section tests the following hypothesis:
Hsb: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f auditor groups o f the nature o f  
information disclosed in the MD&A report in Omani annual reports.
Table 7.28 shows that the above hypothesis cannot be rejected for all of the five given 
statements, except for the statem ent that the MD&A report provides information that is not 
available from financial statements and footnotes. This points to general agreement among 
auditors that the MD&A report provides information that is not available from financial 
statements and footnotes, possibly because this is the main purpose of providing the MD&A 
report.
Big four audit firms differed from other audit firms in their ratings of the following statements 
that the MD&A report provides information that is: not available from outside sources, useful 
to evaluate managerial performance, and useful to predict a company's future earnings. This 
might be because of the differences in levels of disclosure in the MD&A report between listed 
and unlisted companies and thus differences in the way it is used. Another possible reason is 
that the MD&A report in corporate reports audited by international affiliated audit firms 
might provide only minimum information compared to that audited by Big four auditors. The 
latter group of auditors might encourage their clients to disclose more information to enhance 
their own reputation (Inchausti, 1997). Auditors from international affiliated audit firms 
might therefore have viewed the MD&A report as less useful for predicting a company's future 
and evaluating managerial performance due to it not providing incremental information.
Local audit firms more highly rated useful to evaluate managerial performance than 
international audit firms, possibly because the MD&A report explains management objectives 
and achievements, especially in small companies. Additionally, local auditors assigned a lower 
rating to the statem ent that the MD&A report focuses more on good than bad news than Big 
four audit firms. A possible explanation for this finding is that local auditors are not registered 
in the MSM and thus might be unable to judge whether the MD&A report of listed companies 
focuses on good news or not.
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Table 7.28: Level of Significance fo r  D ifferences among and betw een  A uditor  Groups
R egarding th e ir  P ercep tions  o f  the N ature o f  MD&A Inform ation.
All Local vs. Local vs. International vs.
Groups International Big four Big four Auditors
Auditors Auditors
Focuses on Good new s More than Bad news .006* .45 .001** .06
Is not available From outside Sources .001** .82
_i_
.000** .006*
Is not available From financial Statem ents and .23
T
.43 .104 .35
Footnotes + + +
Is useful to Evaluate Managerial Performance .000** .011*
_L
.002** .000**
Is useful to Predict Future Earnings .000**
T
.67 .000** .001**
+ - -
All groups= Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H te s t of all groups: (*) os.05; (**) as.01 .
The o ther colum ns a re  Asymp.sig. levels of the  Mann-Whitney U te s t of pa irs  o f user groups: (*): ccS.025; (**} a£.O05 (one­
tailed test). The + o r  -  signs under p-values indicate the  location of th e  first group m ean com pared to second group (i.e. +
7.15 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Auditor Groups Regarding 
Companies' Achievement of the Corporate Governance Code in Oman
This section tests similarities or differences in the opinions of auditor groups of achievement 
of the Code of Corporate Governance. The following is the tested hypothesis:
H6b: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f auditor groups o f achievement o f the 
code o f corporate governance.
Table 7.29 shows significant differences among auditor groups. Big four audit firms 
significantly differed from other audit firms in their views of the achievement of the code of 
corporate governance probably because they are more involved in auditing the corporate 
governance practices of listed companies in Oman. Also, Big four auditors have more 
knowledge of the purpose and importance of the code because of their international 
experience in global markets.
Table 7 .2 9 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  g r o u p s  
R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n  o f  C o m p a n i e s '  A c h i e v e m e n t  o f  t h e  C o r p o r a t e  
G o v e r n a n c e  C o d e  in  O m a n .
Corporate governance Code 0.008* 0.62 0.007* 0.003**
All groups= Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H te s t of all groups: (*) aS.05; (**) aS.Ol.
The other columns are  Asymp.sig. levels of the Mann-Whitney U te s t of pa irs of user groups: (*): as,025; (**) a£.005 (one-tailed 
test). The + or -  signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group m ean com pared to  second group (i.e. + sign m eans 
Jargermean)
7,16 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between Auditor Groups Regarding
the Importance of Corporate Governance Report Sections
This section reports differences among and between auditor groups. The investigated 
hypothesis is:
Hlb: There are significant differences between the perceptions o f auditor groups o f the o f corporate 
governance report sections in making investment decisions in Oman.
Table 7.30 shows that the hypothesis cannot be rejected for 11 of 13 items. Further, Big four 
audit firms' ratings of most items significantly differed from those of local and international 
affiliated audit firms due to their high involvement in auditing listed companies and their 
recognition of the importance of the corporate governance report in making investment 
decisions. Because corporate governance is still a new concept in many developing markets, 
this might have affected the perceptions of auditors from international affiliated audit firms.
Table  7 . 3 0 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  
R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  C o r p o r a t e  G o v e r n a n c e  
R e p o r t  S e c t i o n s .
Company's Philosophy .003** .93
+
.002** .006*
Composition and Qualifications Of Board o f  
Directors
.014* .23
+
.036 .003**
Meetings of Board of Directors .005** .46
+
.004** .005**
Details o f Audit Committee .003** .012*
+
.101 .001**
Process of Nominating Directors .000** .083
+
.001** .000**
f Remuneration Matters .001** .69 .000** .005**
Details of a Company’s Management .015* .704 .004** .051
Details of Non-Compliance by a company .089 .69
+
.062 .036
Means of Communication With Shareholders .000** .15
+
.000** .000**
Distribution Of Shareholdings .010* .74
+
.010* .004**
Disclosure Policies .012* .054
+
.092 .005**
Market price Data .084 .93 .033 .097
Profile o f the External Auditor .000** .049
+
.001** .000**
All groups= Asymp.sig. levels of the Kruskal-Wallis H te s t of all groups: (*} ccS.05; (**) as.01 .
The other columns a re  Asymp.sig. levels of th e  Mann-Whitney U te s t of pairs of u ser groups: (*}: a<.025; (**} aS.005 (one­
tailed test}. The + o r -  signs under p-values indicate the  location of the first group mean com pared to second group (i.e. + 
sign means larger mean}
7.17 Analysis of Level of consensus Among and Between Auditor Groups Regarding
the Importance of a List of Voluntary Items
This section investigates the following hypothesis:
HSb: There are significant differences between the perceptions of auditor groups of the importance of a 
list of voluntary items in making investment decisions.
Table 7.31 shows that the hypothesis cannot be rejected for 23 of 36 items. The selected 
voluntary items were more highly rated by Big four audit firms than other audit firms, 
possibly because Big four audit firms know that the annual reports of listed companies serve 
the informational needs of various reports' users and thus are aware of the importance of 
such voluntary disclosure items in making investment decisions, while local auditor groups 
deal with companies that are not concerned with voluntary disclosure since they do not have 
to publish their reports to the public. Because of Big four audit firms' ongoing involvement in 
different global markets and their participation in the forming of accounting regulations, they 
are more aware of the importance of the disclosure of a wide range of voluntary items in 
making investment decisions because of continuous changes in business environments, 
technology, and users' informational needs.
In summary, there were similarities in the views of local and international affiliated auditors 
but differences between their views and those of auditors from Big four audit firms regarding 
the quality of annual reports in Oman. This was probably because, in Oman, Big four audit 
firms deal more with listed companies and have to ensure their compliance with disclosure 
and capital market regulations, while local and international affiliated audit firms are more 
involved with unlisted companies that are not required to publish their reports and thus their 
reports' users differ from those of listed companies. Also, the international experience of Big 
four audit firms and their standards make them more knowledgeable and aware of the impact 
of disclosure on decisions. Moreover, corporate reports are one means of signalling the 
quality of the audit services provided by Big four audit firms.
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T a b l e  7 .3 1 :  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  D i f f e r e n c e s  a m o n g  a n d  b e t w e e n  A u d i t o r  G r o u p s  
R e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  P e r c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  a L i s t  o f  V o l u n t a r y  
I t e m s .
Statement of Retained Earnings .010* .86
+
.005** .013*
Current ratio .001** .012* .000** .50
Price earnings Ratio .013* .064 .005** .94
Gross profit Margin .021* .11 .008* .44
Financial Inform ation For m ore than  2 years .106 .76
+
.057 .072
Corporate Policy on Employee Training .001** .042
+
.005** .001**
Average Wages Of Employees .001** .15 .002** .001**
% of Omani Employees in Different Levels of Company .000** .63
+
.000** .000**
Human Resource Training Expenditure .000** .26
+
.000** .000**
Graphs of Impact of Price changes on earnings Per share .130 .36 .19 .035
over Several years + - -
Graphs o f a Company's Income .061 .15
+
.15 .025*
Graphs of Company's M arket price in comparison to MSM’s .031 .65 .025* .015*
Broad-based index + - -
Trend analysis on Profitability .031 .77 .012* .041
Company's Insurance Coverage .070 .67
+
.054 .029
Company's Technological Developments .066 .49
+
.11 .007*
Company’s Forward-Looking Statements .004** .072
+
.072 .000**
Company’s Competitive Pressure .042 .60
+
.058 .003**
Stock Statistics of a Company's Share .003** .42 .001** .010*
Comparison of Actual Performance w ith Plan .009* .52 
+ ■
.007* .007*
Comparison of Actual Performance with Competitors .087 .51 .028 .196
Comparison of Actual Perform ance w ith Sector's Indicators .12 .22 .052 .61
Sources of Financing Arranged but Not yet used .003** .62
+
.003** .001**
Off-balance Sheet Arrangem ents .11 .55 .046 .15
Analysis of Company's Investm ent Portfolio .014* .699 .009* .008*
Impact of Existing Regulations on Business O perations .002** .93 .002** .002**
Effect of In terest Rate on Current Results .005** .44
+
.005** .003**
Effect of In terest Rate on Future Results .005** .29
+
.007* .003*
Future Cash Flows .190 .36
+
.24 .065
Forecasted M arket Share .006* 1.000 .003** .009*
Profit Forecast .007* .48
+
.004** .009*
Cost of Safety M easures .000** .38 .000** .001**
Company's Health, Safety, and Securities .000** .42 .000** .000*
Company's Environmental Performance .000* .499
+
.000** .001**
Report on Ethical Conduct of Company's Officers .001* .43
+
.001** .002'*
Uncertainties tha t are  Reasonably Expected to  affect 
Financial Condition
.064 .27 .025* ,255
Summary Analysis of Cash Flows by Segment .002** .36
+
.003** .001**
All groups^ Asymp.sig. levels of th e  Kruskal-Wallis H te s t of all groups: (*} a:£.05; (**) aS.01.
The o ther columns a re  Asymp-sig, levels of ih& Mann-Whitney U te st o f pairs of u ser groups: {*): aS.025; (**) a£.005 (one­
tailed test). T he + o r - s ig n s  under p-values indicate the locationof th e  find; group m ean com pared to  second group (i.e. + 
sign m eans larger m ean)
7.18 Professional Users' Perceptions of the Importance of a List of Mandatory 
Disclosure in Making Investment Decisions in Oman
This section discusses the analysis of the views of professional users regarding the 
importance of 30 mandatory items in making investment decisions. Professional users were 
asked to rate the importance of these items in making investment decisions on a five-point 
scale, where responses extended from 1 'no importance' to 5 'very high importance'.
7.18.1 Analysis of Users’ Ratings of the Importance of Mandatory Items
Table 7.32 shows the percentage of responses for each of the mandatory items. It reveals that 
highly rated items were: earnings per share (71.3%), net profit or loss (67.8%), and profit 
from operations (64.3%). Also, 47.8% of respondents viewed long-term liabilities as of very 
high importance, the highest among the other balance sheet items, since they affect the 
current and future liquidity of a company.
Table 7.33 presents descriptive statistics, namely, mean, median and standard deviation of 
users' ratings of the importance of 30 mandatory items. Earnings per share, net profit or loss, 
and amount of revenues were very highly rated by the whole sample as well as user groups. 
The three lowest ranked mandatory items were the calculation of taxes, number of 
employees, and the percentage of Omanisation, possibly because they do not directly impact 
on investment decisions.
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Table 7.32: R esponse Scale P ercen tages  (% ) o f  the Im portance o f  a List o f  M andatory
Items.
llarnings per share 0.0 0.9 laiiM iisi'ft 22.6 71.3 s^t
Net profit/loss 0.0 0.9 6.1 25.2 67.8 2nd
•jftiplitfironi operations 0.0 0.0 10.4 25.2 64.3
Amount of revenues 0.0 0.0 5.2 32.2 62.6 4 th
Retailed earnings 0.0 0.9 12.2 33.9 53.0 5 th
Profit after tax 0 .0 0.9 10.4 35.7 53.0 6 th
Profit/loss before incom e tax 
and minority interest
0 .0 0,9 14.8 35.7 48.7 7 th
Long term liabilities 0 .0 0.9 7.8 43.5 47.8 8 th
Share capital 0 . 0 3.5 SMI®®!!®: 33.9 47.0 9 th
Net assets per share 0 .0 0 .0 13.9 40.0 46.1 1 0  th
Current liabilities 0 .0 0 .0 13.9 41,7 44.3 1 1 th
Description of nature and effect 0.9 4.3 13.0 37.4 44.3 1 2 th
of any change in accounting
Current assets 0 .0 0 . 0 15.7 41.7 42.6 13*
Details o f bank loans and 
overdrafts
0 .0 1.7 13.9 43.5 40.9 14th
Details o f  related parties and 
holders o f 10% o f  company's 
share®
0.9 3.5 18.3 40.0 37.4 15*
Cash 0.9 6 .1 27.8 29.6 35.7 16*
Dividend policy 0 . 0 4.3 18.3 42.6 34.8 17*
Details of any pending litigation 17 5.2 19.1 39.1 34.8 18*
Nonrcurrent assets 0.9 0.9 20.9 43.5 33.9 19*
Administration and general 
expenses
0 .0 6 .1 2 0 .0 40.0 33.9 2 0 *
Details o f contingent liabilities 1.7 6 .1 17.4 41.7 33.0 2 1 *
Depreciation and am ortization  
expenses
1.7 4.3 27.0 34.8 32.2 2 2 nd
Listofmajor shareholders 0.9 5.2 25.2 36.5 32.2 23rd
Investments in quoted securities 0.9 0.9 20.9 46.1 31.3 24*
Income tax 0 .0 8.7 23.5 41.7 26.1 25*
Segmental information 0.9 7.0 21.7 51.3 19.1 26*
Disclosure o f contractual 
obligations
2 .6 6 .1 25.2 47.0 19.1 27*
Disclosure Contractual 
Obligations
7.8 9.6 33.0 33.9 15.7 28*
Calculation o f taxation 8.7 19.1 35.7 25 2 11.3 29*
Number of em ployees 
Percentage o f Omanisation
8.7 2 2 .6 33.9 23.5 11.3 30*
‘Ranking o f item s is  based on ‘very high importance' responses.
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Table 7.33: D e s c r i p t i v e  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  U s e r s '  R a t i n g s  o f  t h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  a  L i s t  o f  M a n d a t o r y  I t e m s .1
Financial Mean 3.90 4.13 3.93 4.22 4.43 4.38 4.25 4.33 4.63 4.10 3.98 4.60 4.47
analysts Median 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.50 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
N = 40 StD. .900 .723 .694 .733 .636 .667 .776 .764 .540 .709 .862 .632 .679
Rank* 23rd 13th 22nd 11th 7th 8th 10th gth 3rd 15th 20 th 4th 5th
Auditors Mean 3.77 4.26 4.03 4.29 4.29 4.19 4.03 4.23 4.58 3.94 3.74 4.45 4.10
N= 31 Median 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00
; StD .920 .682 .983 .693 .693 .749 1.048 .805 .672 .964 .965 .723 .870
1 Rank* 24th 8th 15th 6th 7th 11th 16th 10th 1st igth 25th 2nd 13th
Accountants - ; Mean 4.07 4.41 4.27 4.39 4.41 4.36 4.39 4.57 4.52 4.00 3.98 4.55 4.34
N=44 Median 4.00 5.00 4.00 4.50 4.50 4.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00
StD 1.09 .726 .758 .689 .693 .718 .722 .625 .590 .988 1.045 .697 .713
Rank* igth 6th 14th gth 7th nth 10 th 3rd 5* 23rd 24th 4th 12 th
Whole i  Mean 3.93 4.27 4.09 4.30 4.38 4.32 4.24 4.39 4.57 4.02 3.91 4.54 4.32
sample Median 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.00
N=115 j  St.D. .980 .717 .812 .703 .670 .708 .844 .734 .593 .888 .960 .679 .756
Rank* 23rd 11th 16th 10th 7th 8th 12th 6th 3rd igth 24th t^h gth
Table 7.33 (continued): D escriptive s ta tis tic s  o f  Users' R atings o f  the  Im portance  o f  a L ist o f  M andatory Item s.
Financial Mean 3.70 4.47 4.80 4.75 4.13 4.20 4.03 4.00 3.85 4.08 3.83 3.95
analysts Median 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
as 11 0 St.D. .966 .751 .405 .588 .883 .687 .832 .751 .864 .859 .781 .932
Rank* 26th 6th 1st 2 nd 14th l 2th 17th 19th 24* 16* 25* 21st
Auditors Mean 3.81 4.32 4.35 4.42 4.26 4.16 4.03 3.90 3.87 4.10 3.55 3.87
N= 31 Median 4.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
St.D .980 .748 .798 .762 .893 .820 1.048 .978 1.088 .908 .995 1.147
Rank* 23rd 5th 2j.th 3rd gth 12* 17th 20th 21st 14* 27* 22nd
Accountants Mean 4.02 4.41 4.59 4.70 4.23 4.32 4.20 4.23 4.07 4.07 3.98 4.09
N=44- ' Median 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
St.D .792 .658 .658 .509 .912 .771 .795 .677 .873 .789 .792 .830
Rank* 22nd 8th 2nd 1st 15 th 13th 17th 16* 20* 21st 25* 18*
Whole Mean 3.85 4.41 4.60 4.64 4.20 4.23 4.10 4.06 3.94 4.08 3.81 3.98
sample Median 4.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
N=115 StD .910 .712 .646 .624 .890 .753 .878 .798 .930 .839 .857 .955
Rank* 25th 5th 2nd 1st 14th 13th 15* 18* 22nd 17* 26* 21st
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Table 7.33 (continued): Descriptive statistics of Users' Ratings of the Importance of a List of Mandatory
Items.
H I
Financial Mean 3.20 3.00 3.03 3.68 4.03
analysts M edian 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00
N = 40 St.D. 1.203 .987 1.074 .797 .862
Rank* 28 th 30 th 29 th 27 th 18*
; Auditors Mean 3.45 3.13 3.06 3.74 4.00
N= 31 M edian 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00
St.D 1.121 1.204 1.237 1.032 1.183
Rank* 28 th 29th 30* 26* 18*
Accountants Mean 3.55 3.20 3.09 3.80 3.98
N=44 M edian 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00
St.D .999 1.173 1.117 .978 .876
Rank* 28 th 29* 30th 27 th 26*
Whole Mean 3.40 3.11 3.06 3.74 4.00
sample M edian 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00
N=115 St.D 1.107 1.114 1.126 .928 .955
Rank* 28 th 29* 30* 27* 20 th
7.18.2 Analysis of Level of Consensus Among and Between User Groups Regarding the 
Importance of a List of Mandatory Items
This section indicates whether the three professional groups were significantly homogenous 
or heterogeneous in their ratings of the importance of a list of mandatory items. The tested 
hypothesis is as follows:
H9: There are significant differences in the perceptions of professional user groups o f the importance of 
a list o f m andatory items in making investment decisions in Oman.
This study revealed that the above hypothesis should be rejected, except for the rating of the 
net profit or loss importance level for the sample as a whole (p<0.05).17
Net profit or loss was more highly rated by analysts than auditors, possibly because analysts 
have to make investment decisions on behalf of different clients and thus they rely on this 
item. On the other hand, auditors only view this item to check whether it is consistent with the 
internal documents of a company or not. Overall, professional users were in agreement about 
the importance of mandatory disclosure because it fairly presents a company's performance 
and financial condition.
7.18.3 Comparison of this Study's Results with Previous Studies' Results
This study's findings are consistent with prior studies' findings (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; 
Hooks eta l, 2002). This is expected because mandatory disclosure requirements are mainly 
set by international and local accounting bodies in developed markets and applied by
17 The results are reported in Table 4 in Appendix D.
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developing markets that do not have their own accounting profession such as Oman. Some 
previous studies have asked respondents to rate the importance of the breakdown of current 
assets and not the current assets themselves (Wallace, 1988) whereas this study measured 
the importance of individual mandatory items, such as cash.
7.19 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the results of the primary data collection method. Different users 
had different views regarding the financial reporting system in Oman. The most im portant 
finding is that the various users of the Omani reporting system relied on companies' annual 
reports to obtain financial information in order to make decisions. Corporate stakeholders 
used annual reports to assess a company's financial position and evaluate its performance. 
Also, institutional investors relied on their meetings with company's management to make 
decisions. The most important annual report sections as perceived by corporate stakeholders 
were the balance sheet, profit and loss account, and auditor's report. The corporate 
governance report and chairman's report were considered to be of low importance when 
making investment decisions.
This study indicates that the most important sections of the management discussion and 
analysis report were risks and discussion on financial position. Questionnaire respondents 
viewed the management discussion and analysis report as useful to evaluate a company's 
management and predict future earnings. They also believed that managers focus more on 
good news than bad news in the MD&A report. Regarding the corporate governance report, 
the most im portant sections were disclosure policies and details of a company's management.
The research findings suggest that corporate stakeholders perceived a number of voluntary 
items presented to them in the questionnaire as highly important, namely, price earnings 
ratio, profit forecast, gross profit margin, and trend analysis on company's profitability.
An interesting finding is that Big four audit firms' views of the current reporting system 
differed from those of international affiliated and local audit firms because they are more 
involved in auditing listed companies and have more experience in international markets, 
while local auditor groups are involved with unlisted companies and international affiliated 
audit firms who are local audit firms with limited international experience and thus have 
different views of published annual reports. This contributes to the existing literature by 
showing how the reputation and international exposure affects different auditor groups'
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perceptions of the various aspects of corporate annual reports rather than measuring the 
impact of audit firm size/type on disclosure level.
This study identified differences among non-professional and professional users of corporate 
reports. Users of corporate reports also demanded an additional number of disclosures which 
reflected an information gap in the current reporting system. Respondents totally agreed on 
the importance of mandatory items, whereas a number of significant differences among users 
were reported regarding the importance of voluntary items. A possible explanation is that the 
importance of voluntary disclosure depends on three aspects: (1] nature of the user's job, (2] 
nature of the sector to which a company belongs, (3) and the level of demand for the item.
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C H A P T E R  8 : T H E  E X T E N T  OF A G GR E GA T E DI S CL OS URE  IN O M AN I  
A NN U A L  R E P O R T S
8.1 Introduction
This research measured the level of disclosure in 111 Omani annual reports. This chapter 
presents an analysis of the disclosure indices prepared for both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Omani listed companies. Weighted and unweighted scores 
were assigned to mandatory and voluntary indices.18
The following section discusses the extent of mandatory disclosure in Omani annual reports. 
Section 8.3 focuses on the measurement of voluntary disclosure in Oman while section 8.4 
presents the overall disclosure of Omani listed companies. Section 8.5 explains the association 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure in Omani annual reports, and section 8.6 
provides a summary of the main findings presented in this chapter.
8.2 Measuring the Extent of Mandatory Disclosure in Omani Annual Reports
One hundred and eleven annual reports were assessed in this study to determine the extent of 
items disclosed in these reports by Omani listed companies. Companies were divided into 
three sectors: industrial (N=49), service (N=39), and financial (N=23).
8.2.1 Degree of Compliance with Disclosure Requirements
This section measures listed companies' compliance with 30 mandatory items. The total 
disclosure index of a company was calculated based on the scores of the items that were 
applicable to that company (applicable data set). This study also calculated the index based on 
the total score of the sampled 30 items (total items data set). Analysis of the disclosure index 
using the applicable data set is presented in this chapter and Chapter 9. This scoring approach 
conveys the level of the total disclosure and the disclosure of individual items in Oman.19
8.2.1.1 Overall Corporate Compliance with Mandatory Disclosure
Table 8.1 presents descriptive statistics pertaining to the mandatory index of Omani listed 
companies as a whole and as individual sectors. The tested hypothesis is:
H ]0: Omani listed companies comply with disclosure requirements set by the Capital Market Authority.
18 The scoring sheets for mandatory and voluntary indices are to be found in Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix C.
19 The descriptive analysis and results o f tests o f the total items data set are provided in Appendix G in Table 1.
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Table 8.1: Descrip t ion of  Overall Index of  Mandatory  Items Disclosed in Omani Reports .
Industrial (N=49) Mean 0.926 0.935 0.936
Median 0.929 0.938 0.939
Std. D. 0.055 0.049 0.047
Minimum 0.778 0.803 0.811
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000
Service (N=39) Mean 0.937 0.945 0.946
Median 0.958 0.962 0.963
Std. D. 0.061 0.058 0.056
Minimum 0.640 0.661 0.670
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000
Financial (N=23) Mean 0.934 0.944 0.946
Median 0.931 0.946 0.948
Std. D. 0.049 0.045 0.043
Minimum 0.760 0.786 0.796
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000
Whole sam ple Mean 0.932 0.940 0.942
(N“ l l l ) Median 0.929 0.940 0.941
Std. D. 0.056 0.051 0.050
Minimum 0.640 0.661 0.670
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000
As seen in Table 8.1, there are three sets of mandatory indices: unweighted, weighted by 
mean, and weighted by median. Table 8.1 shows that the mean scores of both weighted (0.94) 
and unweighted (0.93) indices are high, with low standard deviations. This indicates that the 
Omani listed companies were strictly complying with the disclosure requirements, probably 
because of close monitoring by regulators. Therefore, H l0 hypothesis cannot be rejected.
However, the unweighted mandatory disclosure index values were slightly lower than the 
mean and median weighted values. The slight differences were due to highly rated items by 
different users (minimum of 3.06 out of 5) and the high compliance with requirements. 
Companies in the industrial, service, and financial sectors were similar in their degree of 
compliance with disclosure regulations. Notwithstanding, Omani service companies were 
complying more with regulations (mean=0.94) than financial and industrial companies 
(mean=0.93), possibly because service companies are more highly held by government and 
institutional investors than other sectors and want to set a good example to other companies 
by following regulations.
The unweighted mandatory index ranged from 0.64 to 1, with a mean of 0.93. This study's 
index range was lower than Cooke's (1992) index range (0.88-1) and higher than Ahmed and 
Nicholls' (1994) and Naser's et a l’s (2002), (0.60-0.80) and (34-85%), respectively.
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Additionally, in this study, the weighted mandatory index ranged from 94% to 100%, which 
was higher than the weighted index range of 29% to 80% reported by Wallace et al. (1994).
In order to measure the differences in scores between the unweighted and weighted methods, 
the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test was applied.20 Table 8.2 reports the level of 
significance of differences between applied mandatory indices.21
T a b l e  8.2:  L e v e l  o f  S i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  D i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  U n w e i g h t e d  a n d  W e i g h t e d  
M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e  I n d i c e s ’ S c o r e s .
Industrial 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
Service 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
Financial 0.000** 0.000** 0.002**
Whole sample 0.000**
+
0.000**
+
0.000**
+
• Actual significance levels (*:a£0.025; **:a£0.005 2-tailed test)
• The +,- and = signs indicate the location of value of first nam ed index compared to second one (i.e. + sign indicates the first 
named index has a higher value than the second one)
Table 8.2 shows there were significant differences between the weighted and unweighted 
scores of the mandatory index in all sectors, as well as the whole sample, because the 
weighted scores were higher than the unweighted scores (see Table 8.1). This suggests Omani 
listed companies were complying with the regulations and providing items highly perceived 
as important by users.
To conclude, Omani listed companies were strictly complying with disclosure requirements, a 
finding consistent with that reported in Shankaraiah and Dabbeeru (2002) study conducted in 
Oman.
8.2.1.2 The Disclosure of Mandatory Items in Omani Annual Reports
Table 8.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the disclosure of individual unweighted 
mandatory items. In this table, most of the items have a mean value of 1. Minimum and 
maximum values vary from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates no disclosure and 1 indicates full 
disclosure.
20 Wilcoxon matched pairs signed test is similar to the sign t-test. This test has been discussed in Chapter 6 .
21 The Wilcoxon test of the total item s data set show ed similar results.
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Table 8.3: Descr ip t ive  S ta t i s t i cs  o f  the Index Value fo r  Each o f  the Mandatory Disclosure
Item.
Cash 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Current assets 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Non-current assets 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Current liabilities 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 - 111 100
Long-term liabilities 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 105 100
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.095 0.00 1.00 111 100
Amount of revenues 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Administration and general 
expenses
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Depreciation and am ortisation  
expenses
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Profit from operations 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Profit/loss before incom e tax and 
minority interest
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Profit after tax 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Net profit/loss 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Details o f related parties and  
holders o f 10% o f  a company’s share
1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
110
100
Disclosure of contractual obligations 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 16 100
Details o f any pending litigation LOO 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 29 100
Retained earnings 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Investments in quoted securities 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 60 100
Earnings per share 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.00 1.00 111 99.1
Description o f nature and effect o f  
any change in accounting policies
0.99 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.00 1.00
111
99.1
Details of contingent liabilities 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.12 0.00 1.00 73 98.6
List o f major shareholders 0 9 8 1.00 1.00 013 0.00 1.00 l :!;:l l l “ ’ 98.2
Details of bank loans and overdrafts 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 102 96.1
Income tax 0 96 1.00 100 0.21 0.00 1.00 92 95.7
Calculation of taxation 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 92 93.5
Number o f em ployees 0,85 1.00 100 0.37 0.00 1.00 111 84.7
Segmental information 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 96 81.2
Net assets per share 0 78 1.00 1.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 111 78.4
Dividend policy 0.57 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 111 56.8
% of Omanisation 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 LOO 111 34.2
a. Minimum = 0 if company did not disclose the item.
b. Maximum = 1 if company fully disclosed the item.
c. N = num ber of companies to which the item  was applicable and disclosed the item.
d. % of N = % of companies to which the item  tha t was applicable and disclosed the item.
The percentage of Omani companies disclosing each item varied depending on the 
applicability of that item to them. For example, companies that did not have long-term 
liabilities were not penalised for it. Table 8.4 shows the percentage of Omani companies in 
different sectors that were disclosing individual mandatory items in their annual reports.
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 indicate that Omani companies were disclosing a high percentage of the 
required items in their annual reports. Earnings per share were disclosed by 100% of 
companies in the industrial and financial sectors compared to (97.4%) of companies in the 
service sector. These findings show that almost all Omani companies surveyed disclosed this 
item, since it is important to different users in making investment decisions.
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Although the ratio of net assets per share was highly rated by Omani users, 15 industrial 
companies (30.6%) did not disclose it. Similarly, 7.7% of service companies and 26.1% of 
financial companies did not disclose it. A possible explanation is the availability of different 
ratios on MSM website and the MSM monthly issues and thus no necessity to disclose it in 
corporate reports.
Tables 8.3 and 8.4 also show that the disclosure percentage of Omanisation is low compared 
to other items, especially in the financial sector. There are three possible reasons: (1) it is 
perceived to be of low importance (30th), (2) the availability of such information in the 
Shareholders' Annual Guide and on the MSM website and (3) it does not affect a company's 
returns and profitability.
Based on the above findings, the current annual reports of Omani listed companies do not 
reflect all the needed and required items and thus the following hypothesis cannot be 
rejected:
H]2a: Levels o f mandatory disclosure in current Omani annual reports do not reflect the 
informational needs o f users.
Comparing the results of this study with those reported in previous studies conducted in 
other countries, i.e. New Zealand and the UK, 67% and 15.6% of companies disclosed 
segmental information in the studies of Emmanuel and Gray (1977) and Hooks, Coy and 
Davey (2002), respectively, compared with 81.2% of Omani companies. Moreover, 75.5% of 
Omani manufacturing companies disclosed segmental information compared with 44% of 
manufacturing companies in Mexico (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987). Hooks, Coy and Davey 
(2002) reported that 82% of New Zealand companies disclosed related party transactions and 
that applied accounting methods were well reported. In contrast, almost all Omani companies 
surveyed disclosed related party transactions and 99.1% disclosed the applied accounting 
methods. These comparisons would suggest that companies' compliance with a number of 
mandatory disclosure requirements improved over time and that in developing countries, 
such as Oman, there is an effective enforcement of the law since companies disclose most of 
the required disclosure items.
Disclosure practices in Oman changed between 2002 and 2004. Shankaraiah and Dabbeeru 
(2002) reported that not one of their sampled Omani companies disclosed net profit or loss, 
changes in accounting policies, and bank details. In contrast, the study found 100% of 
sampled companies disclosing the amount of net profit, 99% reporting changes in accounting
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policies, and 96% reporting bank details. Shankaraiah and Dabbeeru (2002) also found that 
only 30% of their sampled companies (N=10) reported related party transactions compared 
to almost all the sampled companies in this study.
In conclusion, Omani listed companies were complying with the disclosure requirements by 
disclosing the highly rated items in their annual reports. However, some listed companies in 
Oman w ere not disclosing some ratios that were highly weighted by different users. Further, 
mandatory disclosure in Oman had improved from 2002 to 2004.
T a b l e  8 .4 :  D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e  i n  D i f f e r e n t  
C o m p a n i e s '  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s .
S e c t o r O m a n i  L i s t e d
\ ~ Mean Na % of Nb 1
Cash 3.93 49 100
Current assets 4.27 49 100
Non-current assets 4.09 49 100
Current liabilities 4.30 49 100
Long-term liabilities 4.38 49 100
Share capital 4.24 49 100
Retained earnings 4.39 49 100
Disclosure o f contractual obligations 3.74 3 100
Amount o f  revenues 4.57 49 100
Administration and general expenses 4.02 49 100
Depreciation and am ortisation expenses 3.91 49 100
Profit from operations 4.54 49 100
Net p rofit/loss 4.60 49 100
Details o f related parties and holders o f 10% of a company's share 4.10 48 100
Details o f contingent liabilities 3.98 34 100
Profit/loss before income tax and m inority interest 4.32 49 100
Profit after tax 4.41 49 100
Investm ents in quoted securities 4.06 24 100
Details o f  any pending litigation 4.00 11 100
Earnings p er share 4.64 49 100
Description o f nature and effect o f any change in accounting policies 4.20 49 100
List o f m ajor shareholders 3.86 49 98.0
Details o f bank loans and overdrafts 4.03 47 95.7
Income tax 3.65 38 94.7
Calculation o f taxation 2.96 38 89.5
Number o f  em ployees 2.54 49 81.6
Segmental information 2.84 45 75.5
Net assets p er share 2.997 49 69.4
Dividend policy 2.25 49 55.1
Percentage o f  Omanisation 1.31 49 42.9
a. N= number of companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item
b. % of N = % of companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item
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Table 8.4 (continued): Description of Mandatory Disclosure in Different Sector Omani Listed Companies'
Annual Reports.
Mean % of Nb
Cash 3.93 39 100
Current assets 4.27 39 100
Non-current assets 4.09 39 100
Current liabilities 4.30 39 100
Long-term liabilities 4.38 36 100
Share capital 4.24 39 100
Retained earnings 4.39 39 100
Amount of revenues 4.57 39 100
Administration and general expenses 4.02 39 100
Depreciation and am ortisation expenses 3.91 39 100
Profit from operations 4.54 39 100
Profit/loss before incom e tax and m inority interest 4.32 39 100
Profit after tax 4.41 39 100
Net profit/loss 4.60 39 100
Details of related parties and holders of 10% of a company's share 4.10 39 100
Investments in quoted securities 4.06 15 100
Details of contingent liabilities 3.98 21 100
Disclosure o f contractual obligations 3.74 12 100
Details of any pending litigation 4.00 9 100
Earnings per share 4.52 39 97.4
Description of nature and effect o f any change in accounting policies 4.09 39 97.4
List of major shareholders 3.84 39 97.4
Income tax 3.74 34 97.1
Calculation of taxation 3.30 34 97.1
Details of bank loans and overdrafts 3.995 36 94.4
Number of em ployees 2.87 39 92.3
Net assets per share 3.99 39 92.3
Segmental information 3.13 28 82.1
Dividend policy 1.99 39 48.7
Percentage o f Omanisation 1.02 39 33.3
a. N= number of companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item
b. % of N = % of companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item
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Table 8.4 (continued): Description of Mandatory Disclosure in Different Sector Omani Listed Companies'
Annual Reports.
. Mean Na % of Nb 1
Cash 3.93 23 100
Current assets 4.27 23 100
Non-current assets 4.09 23 100
Current liabilities 4.30 23 100
Long-term liabilities 4.38 20 100
Share capital 4.24 23 100
Amount o f revenues 4.57 23 100
Administration and general expenses 4.02 23 100
Depreciation and am ortisation expenses 3.91 23 100
Profit from operations 4.54 23 100
Profit/loss before incom e tax and m inority interest 4.32 23 100
Profit after tax 4.41 23 100
Net profit/loss 4.60 23 100
Description of nature and effect o f any change in accounting policies 4.20 23 100
Details o f related parties and holders o f 10% of a company's share 4.10 23 100
Investments in quoted securities 4.06 21 100
List o f major shareholders 3.94 23 100
Details of bank loans and overdrafts 4.23 19 100
Details o f contingent liabilities 3.98 18 100
Disclosure of contractual obligation 3.74 1 100
Details of any pending litigation 4.00 9 100
Retained earnings 4.39 23 100
Earnings per share 4.64 23 100
Income tax 3.66 20 95.0
Calculation of taxation 3.23 20 95.0
Segmental information 3.31 23 87.5
Number of em ployees 2.43 23 78.3
Net assets per share 3.19 23 73.9
Dividend policy 3.02 23 73.9
Percentage o f Omanisation 0.53 23 17.4
a. N= number of companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item
b. % ofN = % of companies to which the item was applicableand disclosed the item .
8.3 Measuring the Extent of Voluntary Disclosure in Omani Annual Reports
In this section, the researcher presents the examination of the extent of disclosure of 36 
voluntary items in the annual reports of 111 Omani listed companies for the year 2004. 
Voluntary items were assigned weighted and unweighted scores. The following sub-sections 
answer the research question regarding the extent to which Omani listed companies were 
disclosing additional information in their annual reports using the applicable data set.
8.3.1 Overall Voluntary Disclosure in Omani Annual Reports
Table 8.5 presents descriptive statistics pertaining to the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
Omani annual reports. The tested hypothesis is:
H  ^; Omani listed companies provide high levels o f voluntary disclosure in their annual reports.
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Table 8.5 shows that the level of voluntary disclosure was low (mean value=0.23} with the 
highest scores in the industrial sector and the lowest scores in the service sector. Therefore,
H is rejected. Industrial companies were providing more voluntary disclosure for two
possible reasons. First, some industrial companies have a unique nature of business 22 niche 
in Oman and the Middle East and thus provide additional information in order to present the 
uniqueness and consequences of their business, especially in the case of net loss. Second, 
these companies seek internal and external funds because of the nature of their business and 
thus are required to provide more details about their activities. In this study, industrial 
companies had a higher debt ratio (mean= 0.74} than service and financial sectors (mean=
0.55 and 0.45, respectively}. This supports the above explanations. On the other hand, 
industrial listed companies complied less with disclosure regulations than service companies 
(see Table 8.1}.
Financial companies disclosed more voluntary information in their reports than service 
companies (see table 8.5}, possibly due to the nature of the financial sector, in which 
companies are involved in wide investment portfolios, and have a wide range of interest rates 
and liquidity risks. There is a possible reason for the low voluntary disclosure of service 
companies. These companies are substantially owned by government and institutional 
investors compared to the other sectors, accordingly, managers might feel that it is not 
necessary to provide high levels of additional information since governmental and 
institutional investors have access to private information.
Overall, mandatory indices' values were higher in comparison to voluntary indices' values 
because Omani listed companies are required to follow the disclosure standards, otherwise 
they will be penalised by the CMA. A possible reason for overall low voluntary disclosures is 
that financial reporting in Oman is developing since the introduction of the Code of Corporate 
Governance in 2002. Further, there is still no public pressure on companies to provide 
voluntary disclosure. Moreover, in Oman, people use personal networks to obtain 
information, especially if they are major investors. Finally, listed companies do not provide 
voluntary disclosure because of competitors, especially unlisted competitors.
In comparison with previous studies, the unweighted voluntary index of 21.96% was higher 
than Mexican companies' mean of 7.86% (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987} and Japanese 
companies' mean of 16.6% (Cooke, 1991} but lower than Malaysian companies' mean of
22 For example, producing mushroom products.
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31.3% (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002]. The unweighted voluntary scores of Omani companies 
ranged from 3.1% to 50%. The maximum 50% score by Omani companies was higher than the 
17% reported by Chow and Wong-Boren (1987] and 37% by Cooke (1991].
The mean-weighted voluntary index of 22.5% for Omani companies was higher than the mean 
of 18% reported by Hossain etal. (1995]. However, the maximum score assigned to Omani 
companies of 51.6% was lower than the maximum score of 79.37% in Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1987] and the 55% reported in Hossain et al. (1995].
T a b l e  8.5:  D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  O v e r a l l  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  in  O m a n i  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s .
Sector Descriptive Statistics Index o f unweighted 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Scores
Index of mean- 
weighted Voluntary 
Disclosure Scores
Index o f median- 
w eighted Voluntary 
Disclosure Scores
Industrial Mean 0.224 0.231 0.232
N = 4 9 Median 0.235 0.239 0.239
Std. D. 0.081 0.082 0.081
Minimum 0.059 0.060 0.062
Maximum 0.485 0.480 0.480
Service Mean 0.213 0.217 0.217
N = 39 Median 0.235 0.246 0.241
Std. D. 0.087 0.087 0.086
Minimum 0.031 0.032 0.033
Maximum 0.353 0.364 0.357
Financial Mean 0.221 0.227 0.228
N = 23 Median 0.212 0.227 0.224
Std. D. 0.111 0.113 0.114
Minimum 0.067 0.071 0.071
Maximum 0.500 0.516 0.519
W hole sam ple Mean 0.220 0.225 0.226
N = 111 Median 0.235 0.239 0.240
Std. D. 0.089 0.090 0.090
Minimum 0.031 0.032 0.033
Maximum 0.500 0.516 0.519
Table 8.6 reports the degree of significance for differences in scores' rankings between the 
weighted and weighted values of the index of voluntary disclosures. It shows there were 
significant differences between the weighted and unweighted scores (p<.005] of the index of 
voluntary disclosures of the whole sample. The main reason for differences between weighted 
and unweighted scores is that users assigned relatively high weights to most of the voluntary 
items, which resulted in higher weighted values assigned to these items than unweighted 
scores.23
23 The Wilcoxon test of the total items data set showed similar results.
230
Table 8.6: Level of  Significance Between Unweighted and Weighted Voluntary
Disclosure Indices' Scores Using Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test.
■
Industrial 0.000**
+
0.000**
+
0.093
+
Service 0.000**
+
0.002**
+
0.640
+
Financial 0.000**
+
0.000**
+
0.130
+
Whole sample 0.000**
+
0.000**
+
0.043
+
• The scores are actual significance levels {*:a£.025; **:a£.005 2-tailed test)
• The +,- and = signs indicates the location of value of the first named index compared to the second (i.e. +• sign 
indicates that the first named index has a higher value than the second)
8.3.1.1 Omani Corporate Disclosure of Voluntary Items
Table 8.7 shows descriptive statistics pertaining to the disclosure of voluntary items in Omani 
annual reports. Mean values of the voluntary items are low compared to the mean values of 
mandatory items. They vary from one item to another.
Overall, the disclosure of voluntary items was low, although annual reports' users were 
seeking additional information to be disclosed. Table 8.7 indicates that only a few companies 
were disclosing those items perceived to be very important by users (see Chapter 7, Section 
7.8.1], with the exception of the disclosure of trend analysis on profitability. More than three- 
quarters (78%) of Omani listed companies were disclosing trend analysis on profitability in 
their annual reports. This points to an information gap in Omani annual reports between the 
informational needs of users and companies' disclosure.
Table 8.7: Descript ive Stat is t ics  of Index Value for  Each Voluntary Disclosure Item.
Off-balance sheet arrangements 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 20 100
Sources of financing arranged but not yet used 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 3 100
Statement of retained earnings 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 111 99.1
Analysis of company's investment portfolio 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 61 96.7
Trend analysis on profitability 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 111 78.4
Uncertainties that are reasonably expected to affect financial condition 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 111 73.0
Company’s competitive pressures 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 111 62.2
Company's technological developments 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 111 42.3
Corporate policy on employee training 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 111 40.5
Impact of existing regulations on business operations 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 111 36.0
Comparison of a company's performance with sector's indicators 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 111 33.3
Comparison of actual performance with plans 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 111 28.8
Effect of interest rate on current results 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 110 20.0
Effect of interest rate on future results 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 109 18.3
Graph illustrating a company's m arket price in comparison to the broad 
based index of Muscat Securities Market
0.18 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 106 17.9
Comparison of actual company’s performance with competitors 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 111 14.4
Company's health, safety and security 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 111 12.6
Financial information for more than 2 years 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 1.00 108 13.0
Gross profit margin 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 111 11.7
Company’s environmental performance 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 111 10.8
Human resource training expenditure. 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 111 9.9
Company's forward-looking statem ent 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 111 7.20
Stock statistics of a company's share 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 111 5.40
Cost of safety m easures 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 111 4.50
Graph illustrating income of a company 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 111 4.50
Company’s insurance coverage 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 111 4.50
Profit forecast 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 111 4.50
Current ratio 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00 111 3.60
Future cash flows 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 111 2.70
Summary analysis of cash flows by segment 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 96 2.10
Price earnings ratio 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 107 1.90
% of Omani employees in different levels of a company 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 111 0.90
Average wages of employees. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 111 0.00
Forecasted m arket share 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 111 0.00
A report on ethical conduct of a company's officers. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 111 0.00
Graph illustrating impact of a company's price changes on earnings per 
share overall several years
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 110 0.00
a. Minimum = 0 if company didn’t  disclose the item.
b. Maximum = 1 if company fully disclosed the item.
c. N = num ber of companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item.
d. % of N = % of companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item.
232
8.3.1.2 Disclosure of Voluntary Items in Omani Sectors
Table 8.8 reports the percentage of Omani companies in each sector that disclosed some of 
the voluntary items. It shows that the most reported voluntary item by all three sectors was 
the statement of retained earnings since it explains the changes in a company's retained 
earnings. All Omani industrial and service companies disclosed the statement of retained 
earnings compared to 96% of financial companies. Other items reported by all companies in 
the three sectors were: trend analysis on profitability, uncertainties that are reasonably 
expected to affect a company's financial condition, and competitive pressure. Trend analysis 
on profitability was more highly disclosed by financial companies (91.3%) than companies in 
the industrial and service sectors (83.7% and 64%, respectively). A possible reason is that 
financial companies had a higher return on equity ratios (mean=0.18) than industrial 
(mean=0.02) and service companies (mean=0.17), therefore, wanted to highlight their good 
performance by presenting the trend analysis on their profitability. More than 70% of 
industrial companies disclosed the uncertainties reasonably expected to affect their financial 
condition and competitive pressure, while 74% and 64% of service companies, respectively, 
and more than 60% of financial companies disclosed these items. There are two possible 
reasons for the disclosure of these items. The first is that a company's uncertainties justify the 
current and future results based on any uncertainties or competition. The second is that 
companies have to compete with listed and unlisted competitors and external competitors 
and disclosing a company's competitive pressure thus explains the disclosure or the non­
disclosure of items such as segmental information.
A point worth mentioning is that only a few Omani industrial companies disclosed items 
related to their health, security, and safety policies (6%). Further, only 12% of industrial 
companies disclosed their environmental performance. A possible explanation is that in 
Oman, people are not aware of environmental issues and thus there is no public pressure on 
companies to disclose these issues. Moreover, people in Oman are aware that there are 
governmental bodies established to deal with these issues, therefore, there is no necessity to 
demand and disclose these issues. This study's finding was consistent with that of Marston 
and Polei (2004), who reported that the lowest levels of disclosure on German companies' 
Websites were social and environmental disclosures. This suggests that social and 
environmental issues are not perceived as highly important by companies and thus not highly 
disclosed in developed and developing countries, although there is more public awareness of 
these issues in developed countries than in developing countries (Wood, 2003).
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Overall, companies in all three sectors focused on disclosing information related to their 
competition, profitability, and uncertainties that might affect a company's financial condition. 
The financial sector also focused on other information, such as investment portfolios, which 
are more relevant to the business nature of the sector.
Comparing the demand list and supply list of voluntary items, it can be seen that few 
companies in all three sectors disclosed the items demanded. Thus the following hypothesis 
cannot be rejected:
Hnb: Levels of voluntary disclosure in the current Omani annual reports do not reflect the informational 
needs of users.
For example, profit forecast was disclosed by only 8.20% of companies in the industrial 
sector, 2.60% in the service and 0.0% in the financial sector. There are many possible reasons 
for the gap between the supply and demand lists. First, there is no public pressure on listed 
companies to disclose such information. Second, easy access to internal information by main 
players in the market makes disclosure unnecessary. Third, the availability of information on 
the MSM website and MSM monthly issues makes disclosure unnecessary. Finally, the cost of 
disclosing voluntary information might exceed the benefit of disclosing it, especially when 
there are unlisted competitors.
234
T a b l e  8 .8 :  D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  V o l u n t a r y  D i s c l o s u r e  i n  D i f f e r e n t  S e c t o r  O m a n i  L i s t e d  
C o m p a n i e s .
■Mean N» % o f N *
Statement o f retained earnings 3.84 49 100
Sources of financing arranged but not yet used 3.59 2 100
Off-balance sh eet arrangements 3.80 11 100
Analysis o f a company's investm ent portfolio 3.74 25 92.0
Trend analysis on profitability 3.48 49 83.7
Uncertainties that are reasonably expected to affect financial condition 2.84 49 75.5
Company's com petitive pressures 2.92 49 73.5
Company’s technological developm ents 1.88 49 49.0
Corporate policy on em ployee training 1.16 49 38.8
Comparison o f a company's performance with sector's indicators 1.46 49 36.7
Impact of existing regulations on business operations 1.19 49 30.6
Comparison o f actual performance with plans 1.07 49 26.5
Effect o f interest rate on current results 0.69 49 18.4
Gross profit margin 0.72 49 18.3
Graph illustrating a company's market price in com parison to the broad based  
index o f Muscat Securities Market
0.64 49 16.3
Effect o f in terest rate on future results 0.56 48 14.6
Comparison o f actual company's performance with com petitors 0.51 49 12.2
Company's environm ental performance 0.41 49 12.2
Financial information for more than 2 years 0.49 49 12.2
Company's forward-looking statem ent 0.46 49 12.2
Profit forecast 0.33 49 8.20
Graph illustrating incom e of a company 0.25 49 6.10
Human resource training expenditure 0.18 49 6.10
Company’s health, safety and security 0.21 49 6.10
Current ratio 0.24 49 6.10
Stock statistics of a company's share 0.16 49 4.10
Company's insurance coverage 0.15 49 4.10
Cost o f safety m easures 0.07 49 2.00
% of Omani em ployees in different levels o f a company 0.06 49 2.00
Future cash flows 0.08 49 2.00
Price earnings ratio 0.00 48 0.00
Average w ages o f em ployees. 0.00 49 0.00
Graph illustrating impact o f a company's price changes on earnings per share 
over several years
0.00 49 0.00
Forecasted m arket share 0.00 49 0.00
A report on the ethical conduct of a company's officers. 0.00 49 0.00
Summary analysis o f cash flows by segm ent 0.00 30 0.00
a. N= Number of companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item
b. % of N = % of companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item
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Table 8.8 (continued): Description of Voluntary Disclosure in Different Sector Omani Listed Companies.
V o lu n ta ry  I t e m s S ervice S ector  (N=39)
Statem ent o f  re ta in e d  earnings 3.84 39 100
Sources o f  f in a n c in g  arranged but n o t  yet used 3.59 1 100
Analysis o f  a  com p an y's investm ent portfolio 4.06 15 100
Off-balance s h e e t  arrangem ents 3.80 4 100
U ncertainties th a t  are reasonably expected  to affect financial condition 2.80 39 74.4
Company’s co m p etit iv e  pressures 2.54 39 64.1
Trend a n a ly s is  o n  profitability 2.67 39 64.1
Impact o f  e x is t in g  regulations on business operations 1.70 39 43.6
Corporate p o lic y  on em ployee training 1.30 39 43.6
Company's tech n o lo g ica l developm ents 1.37 39 35.9
Comparison o f  actu al performance w ith  plans 1.45 39 35.9
Comparison o f  a  com pany's perform ance w ith sector's indicators 1.22 39 30.8
Company’s  h e a lth , safety  and security 0.95 39 28.2
Comparison o f  actu al company’s perform ance with com petitors 0.86 39 20.5
Company's en v iro n m en ta l perform ance 0.52 39 15.4
Effect o f in te r e s t  rate on future resu lts 0.49 39 12.8
Effect o f in te r e s t  rate on  current resu lts 0.48 39 12.8
Graph illu stra tin g  a com pany's m arket price in com parison to the broad-based 
index o f M u scat Securities Market
0.45 35 11.4
Human r e so u r c e  train ing expenditure 0.31 39 10.3
Cost o f sa fety  m e a su r e s 0.25 39 7.70
Gross profit m a rg in 0.32 39 7.70
Company's in su r a n c e  coverage 0.27 39 7.70
Summary a n a ly s is  o f cash flows by segm ent 0.28 28 7.10
Stock sta tis tic s  o f  a com pany's share 0.20 39 5.10
Future cash f lo w s 0.21 39 5.10
Price earn in gs ra tio 0.12 36 2.80
Financial in fo rm a tio n  for m ore than 2 years 0.11 37 2.70
Current ratio 0.10 39 2.60
Company's forw ard -look in g  statem ent 0.10 39 2.60
Profit forecast 0.10 39 2.60
Average w a g e s  o f  em ployees. 0.00 39 0.00
Graphs illu stra tin g  im pact o f a company's price changes on earnings per share 
over several y e a r s .
0.00 34 0.00
Graph illu stra tin g  incom e of a com pany 0.00 26 0.00
% of Omani e m p lo y e e s  in different levels o f  a company 0.00 39 0.00
Forecasted m a r k e t  sh are 0.00 38 0.00
A report o n  t h e  eth ica l conduct o f a com pany's officers. 0.00 39 0.00
a. N= X nnjfi^  o f companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item
b. % of PI s  o f  companies to which the item was applicable and disclosed the item
Table 8.8 (continued): Description of Voluntary Disclosure in Different Sector Omani Listed Companies.
Mean N * % 'ofN*
Analysis of a company's investm ent portfolio 4.06 21 100
Off-balance sh eet arrangements 3.80 5 100
Statement o f retained earnings 3.67 23 95.7
Trend analysis on profitability 3.80 23 91.3
Uncertainties that are reasonably expected to affect financial condition 2.45 23 65.2
Corporate policy on em ployee training 1.17 23 39.1
Company's technological developm ents 1.50 23 39.1
Effect o f interest rate on current results 1.28 22 36.3
Effect o f interest rate on future results 1.31 22 36.3
Company’s com petitive pressures 1.38 23 34.8
Impact o f existing regulations on business operations 1.36 23 34.8
Graph illustrating company's market price in com parison to the broad-based 
index of Muscat Securities Market
1.24 22 31.8
Financial information for more than 2 years 1.28 22 31.8
Comparison o f a company's performance with sector's indicators 1.21 23 30.4
Comparison o f actual performance with plans 0.88 23 21.7
Human resource training expenditure 0.52 23 17.4
Stock statistics o f a company's share 0.33 23 8.70
Comparison o f actual company's performance with com petitors 0.36 23 8.70
Graph illustrating incom e of a company 0.35 23 8.70
Price earnings ratio 0.20 22 4.50
Gross profit margin 0.18 23 4.30
Cost o f safety m easures 0.14 23 4.30
Company's forward-looking statem ent 0.16 23 4.30
Current ratio 0.00 23 0.00
Average wages o f em ployees. 0.00 23 0.00
%  of Omani em ployees in different levels o f  a company 0.00 23 0.00
Graph illustrating impact o f a company's price changes on earnings per share 
over several years.
0.00 23 0.00
Company's insurance coverage 0.00 23 0.00
Sources o f financing arranged but not yet used 0.00 23 0.00
Future cash flows 0.00 23 0.00
Forecasted m arket share 0.00 23 0.00
Profit forecast 0.00 23 0.00
Company’s health, safety and security 0.00 23 0.00
Company's environm ental performance 0.00 23 0.00
A report on the ethical conduct o f a company's officers. 0.00 23 0.00
Summary analysis o f cash flows by segm ent 0.00 _23__ 0.00
a. N= Number of companies to which the item  was applicable and disclosed the item
b. % of N = % of companies tn which the item  was applicable and disclosed the item
8.4 D escriptive Statistics o f  Overall A ggregate D isclosure in th e Omani Annual 
Reports
Table 8.9 presents the mean, median and mode of overall unweighted and weighted aggregate 
disclosure scores of Omani listed companies. It shows that, overall, Omani financial companies 
were providing more disclosure in their annual reports than industrial and service 
companies, since their overall unweighted and weighted indices means were the highest. The 
service sector had the lowest mean values of overall weighted disclosure indices. The 
weighted means of disclosure indices were, overall, higher than the unweighted ones for the 
whole sample. The results in Table 8.9 are affected by the results in Tables 8.1 and 8.5. The
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unweighted overall index ranged from 0.697 to 1.47, with a mean of 1.15. This index range 
was higher than that in Hossain and Taylor's [1988] study conducted in India, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan (22-59, 25-52 and 31-63, respectively]. However, the weighted overall index range 
from 0.73 to 1.49 was lower than in Hossain and Taylor's (1988] study, (74-191, 97-210 and 
116-231, respectively].
T a b l e  8 . 9  - . D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  O v e r a l l  A g g r e g a t e  D i s c l o s u r e  i n  O m a n i  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s .
Sector Descriptive Statistics Overall Index of 
unweighted  
Disclosure Scores
Overall Index of 
m ean-weighted  
Disclosure Scores
Overall Index of 
m edian-weighted  
Disclosure Scores
Industrial Mean 1.151 1.169 1.168
N = 49 Median 1.132 1.164 1.156
Std. D. 0.109 0.106 0.104
Minimum 0.926 0.939 0.947
Maximum 1.411 1.404 1.408
Service Mean 1.151 1.161 1.161
N = 39 Median 1.173 1.192 1.193
Std. D. 0.133 0.129 0.127
Minimum 0.697 0.728 0.736
Maximum 1.353 1.364 1.357
Financial Mean 1.155 1.172 1.174
N = 23 Median 1.175 1.194 1.197
Std. D. 0.141 0.139 0.139
Minimum 0.827 0.857 0.867
Maximum 1.466 1.490 1.494
Whole sample Mean 1.152 1.167 1.167
N = 111 Median 1.170 1.190 1.189
Std. D. 0.124 0.121 0.119
Minimum 0.697 0.728 0.736
Maximum 1.466 1.490 1.494
Table 8.10 shows differences between the rankings of the unweighted and weighted scores of 
the index of overall disclosure. As can be seen from Tables 8.9 and 8.10, the weighted values 
of the overall disclosure index of Omani annual reports were higher than the unweighted 
values of the overall disclosure index and thus the differences were significant for the whole 
sample. There were no significant differences between the rankings of the mean and median 
weighted scores of the service sector. This is because there were no differences in the mean 
values of the mean and median weighted indices of the service sector (see table 8.9].
Table 8.10: Level o f  Significance Between Unweighted and Weighted Voluntary
Disclosure Indices' Scores Using Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test.
Industrial Sector 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
N= 49 ■ ■ + + +
Service Sector 0.000** 0.000** 0.101
N= 39 + + +
Financial Sector 0.000** 0.000** 0.002**
N= 23 + + +
Whole sam ple 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
N= 111 + + +
• The scores are actual significance levels (**:a£.005,2-tailed test)
• The +,- and = signs indicates the location of value of the first nam ed index compared to the second (i.e. + sign indicates
tha t the first nam ed index has higher score than the second)
8.5 The Association Between Level of Mandatory Disclosure and Voluntary Disclosure 
in Omani Corporate Reports
In this research, the association between the level of mandatory disclosure and the level of 
voluntary disclosure was examined. Tested hypotheses are as follows:
H Ua: There is a significant positive association between the level o f unweighted mandatory and 
unweighted voluntary disclosures in Omani annual reports.
H ub: There is a significant positive association between the level of mean-weighted mandatory and 
mean-weighted voluntary disclosures in Omani annual reports.
H ]3c: There is a significant positive association between the level of median-weighted mandatory and 
median-weighted voluntary disclosures in Omani annual reports.
Table 8.11 reports the coefficient of correlation between unweighted mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure indices and their significance levels.24 Table 8.12 reports the coefficient 
of correlation between mean-weighted mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices and their 
significance levels. Table 8.13 reports the coefficient of correlation between median-weighted 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure indices and their significance levels. This study used the 
non-parametric Spearman's rho test to measure the correlation between the above indices.25
24 The total items data set reported similar results pertaining to the relationship between mandatory and voluntary disclosures, except for 
the financial sector which reported a m odest significant correlation betw een unweighted mandatory and voluntary disclosures, and 
between m ean-weighted mandatory and voluntary disclosures.
25 Spearman’s rho was used because there is no linear relationship betw een the various indices' values.
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Table 8.11: Correlation between Indices' Scores of Unweighted Mandatory and Voluntary 
Disclosure in Omani Annual Reports.
Industrial (N=49) Index of unweighted Voluntary Disclosure scores 0.395a
0.005**
Service (N=39) Index of unweighted Voluntary Disclosure scores 0.605
0.000**
Financial (N=23) Index of unweighted Voluntary Disclosure scores 0.503
0.014*
Whole Sample ( N = l l l ) Index of unweighted Voluntary Disclosure scores 0.474
0.000**
• a Spearman's rho correlation coefficient
• Significant at the 0.05 level
• * ’Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed test)
Table 8.12: Correlation between Indices' Scores of Mean-Weighted Mandatory and 
Voluntary Disclosure in Omani Annual Reports.
Industrial (N=49) Index of m ean-weighted Voluntary Disclosure 0.375a
scores 0.008**
Service (N=39) Index of m ean-weighted Voluntary Disclosure 0.568
scores 0.000**
Financial (N=23) Index of m ean-weighted Voluntary Disclosure 0.399
scores 0.059
Whole Sample (N = l 11) Index of m ean-weighted Voluntary Disclosure 0.445
scores 0.000**
• a Spearman's rho correlation coefficient
• Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
• * ’significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed test)
Table 8.13: Correlation between Indices' Scores of Median- Weighted Mandatory and 
Voluntary Disclosure in Omani Annual Reports.
Industrial (N=49) Index of m edian-weighted Voluntary Disclosure 0.394a
scores 0.005**
Service (N=39) Index of m edian-weighted Voluntary Disclosure 0.566
scores 0.000**
Financial (N=23) Index of m edian-weighted Voluntary Disclosure 0.482
scores 0.020*
Whole Sample ( N = l l l ) Index of m edian-weighted Voluntary Disclosure 0.460
scores 0.000”
• a Spearman's rho correlation coefficient
• ’Significant at the 0.0 5 level (2-tailed test)
• ** Significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed test)
Table 8.11 shows that the hypothesis H Ua cannot be rejected for all three sectors as well as
the whole sample. Overall, there is a modest positive correlation between the unweighted 
mandatory and voluntary indices (p<0.01, rho=0A7).26 This degree of correlation (0.47) is 
slightly lower than the one (r=0.53) reported by Al-Razeen and Karbhari (2004c). The highest
26 Strength of correlation: 0.19 and below is very low; 0.20 to 0.39 is low; 0.4 to 0.69 is modest; 0.70 to 0.89 is high; and 0.90-1 is very high 
(Bryman and Cramer, 2005, p. 219).
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association between unweighted mandatory and voluntary disclosure was found in the 
service sector (p<0.01, rho =0.61) and the lowest correlation was found in the industrial 
sector (r/?o=0.395).
Tables 8.12 and 8.13 indicate that the hypotheses H nb and Hl3c cannot be rejected for
companies in all sectors as well as for the whole sample, except for the correlation between 
the mean-weighted mandatory and voluntary indices of the financial sector. Table 8.12 shows 
there is a marginal low correlation between the above indices of financial companies 
(p=0.059). Overall, there is a modest correlation between the weighted indices of mandatory 
and voluntary disclosure.
The above results suggest there is a tendency for companies with a high level of mandatory 
disclosure to have a high level of voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. The correlation 
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Omani listed companies 
can be explained as follows. First, companies with large projects, especially in the industrial 
and service sectors, might voluntarily disclose extra information to attract potential investors 
or obtain a loan from a bank or government. Second, aggregate disclosure is provided to 
highlight high performance or explain poor performance. Third, some companies incur losses 
because of start-up expenses and thus they disclose additional information to ensure the 
going concern of the company and future profits. Finally, providing both mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures helps to explain the nature of a business to ordinary report users, 
especially in the financial sector.
The low marginal correlation between the mean-weighted mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure of Omani financial companies indicates there are external factors, such as 
competition, that affect the voluntary disclosure. A possible explanation for the low voluntary 
disclosure is that there is no standard format for voluntary disclosure and thus companies 
have discretion over this disclosure.
8.6 Summary and Conclusion
In summary, this study assessed the extent of aggregate disclosure in the annual reports of 
88.1% of Omani listed companies. This percentage is higher than that in the study of Al-Saeed 
(2005) (56%). The weighted scores of mandatory and voluntary indices were higher than the 
unweighted scores of these indices. In regard to mandatory disclosure, the sampled 
companies complied with the minimum disclosure requirements set by the CMA. The highest 
mean scores were found in the service sector and the lowest in the industrial sector. Although
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Omani listed companies complied with disclosure requirements, they provided low levels of 
voluntary disclosure in their annual reports. Companies in the industrial sector tended to 
provide more voluntary disclosure than the other sectors. Few companies in Oman disclosed 
those voluntary items perceived to be important by annual reports' users. This points to an 
information gap between the demand for and supply of corporate information.
This research reported a modest relationship between the levels of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in the annual reports of Omani listed companies in the industrial, financial and 
service sectors. The positive correlation between the mandatory and voluntary indices 
indicates the influence of the level of mandatory disclosure on the level of voluntary 
disclosure in Omani annual reports.
In conclusion there is an information gap between reports' preparers' supply of and users' 
demand for voluntary disclosure information. The behaviour of companies regarding 
voluntary disclosure is complex and difficult to explain based on one year's data. The 
assessment of companies' internal documents is essential to obtain a fuller picture of 
disclosure practices in Oman. A previous study conducted in Oman concluded that the 
disclosure in Omani annual reports was inadequate (Shankaraiah and Dabbeeru, 2002). 
Possible factors influencing the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure are the focus of 
the following chapter.
C H A P T E R  9 : P O SS IB L E E X PL AN A T O R Y  FACTORS F OR V A R I A T I O N S  IN 
T H E  LEVEL OF DI S CL OS URE  IN OMANI  A N N U A L  
R E P O R T S
9.1 Introduction
Chapter 8 reported variations in the level of aggregate disclosure in Omani annual reports. 
This chapter reports possible factors that might cause these variations using multiple 
regression models through SPSS software. In regression models, the independent variables 
are divided into two categories: continuous and categorical variables. The continuous 
variables are the company's size, performance, gearing ratio, liquidity and ownership 
structure, while the categorical variables present sector type and auditor type.
The following section provides a description of the continuous independent variables. Section
9.3 focuses on the categorical independent variables, Section 9.4 discusses the data 
examination, and Section 9.5 presents the correlations among variables. The multiple 
regression models are explained and reported in Section 9.6, while Section 9.7 discusses the 
regression results. Finally, Section 9.8 provides a summary and conclusion.
9.2 Description of the Continuous Independent Variables
In this study, the association between the continuous variables and the level of disclosure in 
Omani corporate reports was tested. Ten hypotheses were formulated as follows:
H [4a] •’ There is a positive association between the total assets of an Omani listed com pany and the
level of mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
H\4 a, ■' There is a positive association between the total assets of an Omani listed com pany and the 
level o f voluntary disclosure it provides in its annual reports. 
i4 *, •' There is a positive association between the market capitalisation o f an Omani listed  company 
and the level o f mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
Tl [ 4  b1 : There is a positive association between the m arket capitalisation o f an Omani listed  company 
and the level o f voluntary disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
H\5a ' There is a positive association between the debt ratio o f an Omani listed company and the level 
of mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
H is b ■ There is a positive association between the debt ratio o f an Omani listed company and the level 
of voluntary disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
H l6a: There is a positive association between the liquidity position of an Omani listed company and 
the level o f mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
Hm : There is a positive association between the liquidity position of an Omani listed company and 
the level o f voluntary disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
H xla: There is a positive association between the performance o f an Omani listed company and the 
level o f mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
Hxlb: There is a positive association between the performance o f an Omani listed company and the 
level o f voluntary disclosure it  provides in its annual reports.
f /18a: There is a negative association between the percentages o f shares held by major shareholders 
and the level o f mandatory disclosure provided in an Omani company's annual reports.
H m : There is a negative association between the percentages o f shares held by major shareholders 
and the level o f voluntary disclosure provided in an Omani company's annual reports.
H x9a: There is a positive association between the percentages o f shares held by minority shareholders 
and the level o f mandatory disclosure provided in an Omani company's annual reports.
H m : There is a positive association between the percentages o f shares held by minority shareholders 
and the level o f voluntary disclosure provided in an Omani company's annual reports.
H 2Qa • There is a positive association between the percentage o f government investment and the level 
of mandatory disclosure in an Omani company's annual reports.
H 20b: There is a negative association between the percentage o f government investment and the level 
of voluntary disclosure in an Omani company's annual reports.
H 2XaThere is a positive association between the percentage o f institutional investment and the level 
of mandatory disclosure in an Omani company's annual reports.
H 2Xb: There is a negative association between the percentage o f institutional investment and the level 
of voluntary disclosure in an Omani company's annual reports.
H 22a: There is a positive association between the percentage o f foreign investment and the level of 
mandatory disclosure in an Omani company's annual reports.
H22b: There is a positive association between the percentage of foreign investment and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in an Omani company's annual reports.
Before testing the above hypotheses, descriptive statistics of continuous variables and 
disclosure indices for the whole sample are presented in Table 9.1.27
27 Descriptive statistics pertaining to the total items data set m entioned in Chapter 8 are disclosed in Appendix G.
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Table 9.1: Descr ip t i ve  S ta t i s t ics  o f  Dependent and Independent Variables.
Unweighted m andatory index 0.932 0.929 0.056 0.640 1.000
Weighted m andatory index 0.940 0.940 0.051 0.661 1.000
Unweighted voluntary index 0.220 0.235 0.089 0.031 0.500
Weighted voluntary index 0.225 0.239 0.090 0.032 0.516
Overall unweighted index 1.152 1.170 0.124 0.697 1.466
Overall w eighted index 1.167 1.190 0.121 0.728 1.494
Total assets (Omani Rials; OR) 21,704,016.95 10,367,492 46,314,293 306,500 440,676 ,000
Market Capitalisation 13,282,663 6000000 21,326 ,757 1.00 154,185,000
Debt ratio 0.612 0.600 0.437 0.003 2.75
Current ratio 4.321 1.300 20.94 0.10 219.0
Return on Equity 0.104 0.115 0.600 -5.12 1.99
% of shares held by m ajor shareholders 14.30 0.000 20.932 0.000 99.21
% of shares held by m inority shareholders 49.795 48.950 24.16 0.794 100.0
% of governm ent ownership 5.879 0.000 15.088 0.000 92.30
% of institutional investm ent 28.142 23.720 23.246 0.000 85.0
% of foreign investm ent 1.885 0.000 6.772 0.000 38.0
Table 9.1 suggests that Omani listed companies surveyed were mostly owned by minority 
investors (Mean = 49.8] and institutional investors owned more shares in Omani listed 
companies than government and major shareholders (Mean = 28.1]. Moreover, Omani listed 
companies varied from small companies (OR. 306,500] to very large companies (OR. 
440,676,000].
9.3 Description of Categorical Independent Variables
In this study, the categorical independent variables were the sector type to which the 
company belonged and auditor type. The sample of listed companies was divided into three 
sectors: industrial (N = 49], service (N = 39] and financial (N = 23]. The sampled financial 
sector consisted of 21 listed investment companies and 2 listed insurance companies. Because 
there were no significant differences between the indices' scores of investment and insurance 
companies, they were combined into one group in order to reduce the number of categorical 
independent variables tested.28 The sample of listed companies was divided into two groups: 
companies audited by Big four (N=73] and companies audited by international affiliated audit 
firms (N=38].
'Other categorical variables, such as listing status, have been used in previous studies 
{Akhtaruddin, 2005; Wallace et al, 1994]. However, they were not applicable in this study 
(because of the unavailability of unlisted companies' annual reports. This study tested the 
M ow ing hypotheses:
8 The insurance and investm ent companies tested w ere the total number of respective com panies in MSM. Kruskal-Wallis and Mann- 
Whitney tests w ere used to test the differences betw een the mandatory and voluntary indices scores o f Omani insurance and investm ent 
companies. The resultant p-value w as greater than 0.05 (see Appendix F). The above tests are non-parametric tests which do not require a 
specific sam ple size (Field, 2005).
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H 23a: There is an association between the type o f sector to which an Omani listed company belongs and 
the level o f mandatory disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
H 23b ■' There is an association between the type o f sector to which an Omani listed company belongs and 
the level o f voluntary disclosure it provides in its annual reports.
H 24a: The mandatory disclosure compliance level o f a company audited by a Big- four audit firm is 
greater than that o f a company audited by a non-Big-four audit firm.
H 24b: Omani Listed companies audited by a Big-four audit firm tend to disclose more information than 
companies audited by a non-Big-four audit firm.
The hypotheses were tested using the Mann-Whitney U test. Table 9.2 reports the level of 
significance for differences between listed companies' level of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures29 in the three sectors. Table 9.3 reports the level of significance for differences in 
the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure between companies audited by Big four and 
companies audited by international affiliated audit firms.
Table 9.2: Level of Significance for  Differences between Different Sector Omani Listed 
Companies' Mandatory and Voluntary Disclosure in Annual Reports.
Industrial vs. 0.241* 0.926 0.674 0.190 0.788 0.997
Service _b + - - + +
Industrial vs. 0.286 0.708 0.933 0.282 0.722 0.933
Financial - + - - + +
Service vs. 0.924 0.896 0.994 .983 0.983 0.844
Financial + + + + - -
Note: a = significance level of the Mann-Whitney Test: (*:aS.05,2-tailed test) 
b = indicates the location of m ean value of first nam ed sector com pared to second one (i.e. + sign indicates tha t first nam ed sector
has a higher m ean value than second one)
Table 9.2 shows that the hypotheses are rejected for the extent of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in Omani corporate reports. All three sectors have similar patterns of disclosure 
and thus no significant differences between their levels of disclosure.
Table 9.3: Level of Significance for  Differences between Mandatory and Voluntary
Disclosure Levels in Annual Reports of Omani Listed Companies audited by 
Big four and Non-Big four Auditors.
Big four vs. Non- 0.000*a 0.057 0.006* 0.000* 0.001* 0.009*
Big four auditor +b + + + + +
Note: a = significance level of the Mann-Whitney Test: (*:a£.05,2-tailed test)
b = indicates the location of mean value of first nam ed sector com pared to second one (i.e. + sign indicates tha t first nam ed sector
has a higher m ean value than second one)
29 The total items data set reported similar results (see Appendix G).
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From Table 9.3 shows significant differences between mandatory and voluntary disclosure 
levels in the annual reports of Omani listed companies audited by Big four and non-Big four 
auditors. Such findings might explain the differences in perceptions of auditors from Big four 
and local and international affiliated audit firms regarding various aspects of annual 
corporate reports in Oman (see Sections 7.10-7.17).
In order to examine the effect of sector type and auditor type on the level of annual disclosure 
in Omani corporate reports, two dummy variables were created for sector type based on the 
rule of k -1, where k  is the number of categories (Allison, 1999; Hair et al, 1998) to be used in 
the multivariate analysis, and to avoid the multicollinearity problem. These variables were:
1. Industrial = 1 if company belonged to the industrial sector 
Industrial = 0 if company belonged to the other sector
2. Service = 1 if company belonged to the service sector 
Service = 0 if company belonged to the other sector
Similarly, a dummy variable was created for auditor type to be used in the multivariate 
analysis. The variable was:
1. Auditor type = 1 if a company was audited by a Big four audit firm 
Auditor type = 0 if a company was audited by a non-Big four audit firm
9.4 Data Exam ination
The first step in the data analysis process is data examination. Hair et al. (1998, p.39) 
identified separate phases of examining data: (1) a graphical examination of the data, (2) 
identifying outliers, and (3) testing the assumptions of multivariate analysis. Multivariate 
analysis techniques were applied in this study and critical insights were thus required into the 
characteristics of the data before applying it. This section explains the issues of the shape of 
data distribution, outliers, and normality.
9.4.1 Graphical Examination of Data
The shape of the data is examined in order to assess its normality, which is one of the main 
assumptions of multiple regressions. In this study, three approaches were applied to assess 
the normality of the data: (1) histograms, (2) stem and leaf diagrams, and (3) boxplots. These 
approaches were applied to each dependent and independent variable in the study. The 
indices of weighted and unweighted mandatory disclosure were not normally distributed, 
whereas the weighted and unweighted voluntary and overall disclosure indices were
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approaching the normality curve. All the independent variables were not normally 
distributed. The graphs and diagrams of one of the regression models are to be found in 
Appendix F. The solution to the non-normality is discussed in section 9.4.3.1.
9.4.2 Outliers
Outliers are observations that are well separated from the rest of the data and may or may not 
be influential (Bowerman and O'Connell, 2007, p.603). Hair et al. (1998, p.64) classified 
outliers into four classes: (1) data entry error, (2) an extraordinary event, (3) non- 
explanatory extraordinary observations, and (4) observations that fall within the ordinary 
range of values but are unique in their combination of values across the variables. This 
study's outliers fitted into the fourth class. There are three approaches to identify outliers: 
univariate, bivariate, and multivariate. This study applied the multivariate methods to assess 
the multiple variables. In addition to the stem and leaf diagrams and boxplots, multivariate 
detections were used to identify outliers: analysis of studentised residuals, partial regression 
plots, and Cook's distance measure D.30 Results revealed few influential outliers (see 
Appendix F). However, it was decided to retain all the observations as they represented a 
segment of the population. Hair et al. (1998) suggest that deleting outliers improves the 
multivariate analysis but limits its generalisability.
9.4.3 Assumptions of Multivariate Analysis
9.4.3.1 Normality
The final and most fundamental assumption in multivariate analysis is normality. There are 
two approaches to assess normality: (1) graphical analyses, and (2) statistical tests. Normality 
can be ascertained by graphical analyses such as histogram, stem and leaf display, and normal 
plots of residuals. Normality was also assessed by skewness and kurtosis and applying the 
Kolmogorv-Smirnov test. Table 9.4A presents the normality tests and reveals some 
problematic measures with significant skewness, kurtosis, and the Kolmogorv-Smirnov test.
All data transformations (i.e. logarithms, square root, and inverse) were applied to this study's 
data as remedies for non-normality. However, none of the transformations could improve the 
normality of some of the dependent and independent variables, except for total assets and 
debt ratio.
30 Discussions of these approaches have been presented in Chapter 6 .
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Other data transformation proposed and applied in the accounting literature by Cooke (1998) 
is the normal scores approach.31 The normal scores approach has been applied in disclosure 
studies, such as those of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Marston and Polei (2004). Cooke 
(1998, p.214) argued that the main advantage of the normal scores approach is that the 
resulting tests will have exact properties because the significance levels can be determined 
and the F and t-tests are meaningful. Also, he stated and proved that this approach offers a 
means whereby a non-normal dependent variable may be transformed into a normal one and 
thus meets the OLS regression assumptions. The present study employed the normal scores 
approach for treatm ent of the non-normality problem in each of the regression models. The 
transformation solved the non-normality problem of the dependent variables and some of the 
independent variables. It also reduced the non-normality of some of the independent 
variables, such as the percentage of shares held by government. Table 9.4B presents the 
normality tests of transformed data.
T a b le  9 .4 A : A s s e s s m e n t  o f  N o r m a l i t y  o f  U n tr a n s fo r m e d  Data.
'SZ^Zi
- ‘BBSS ..........
Unweighted m andatory index -1.860 6.640 0.000 Heavy tails w ith 
negative skewness
Weighted m andatory index -2.001 7.725 0.000 Heavy tails with 
negative skewness
Unweighted voluntary index 0.153 0.449 0.004 Positive skewness
Weighted voluntary index 0.102 0.451 0.057 Positive skewness
Unweighted overall disclosure index -0.542 0.915 0.011 Negative skewness
Weighted overall disclosure index -0.545 0.892 0.027 Negative skewness
Total assets 7.171 62.121 0.000 Heavy tails with positive 
skewness
Market capitalization 3.659 18.134 0.000 Heavy tails with positive 
skewness
Debt ratio 2.137 7.293 0.000 Heavy tails w ith positive 
skewness
Return on equity -5.696 53.500 0.000 Heavy tails with 
negative skewness
Current ratio 9.996 102.952 0.000 Heavy tails with positive 
skewness
% of shares held by governm ent 3.472 13.481 0.000 Heavy tails w ith positive 
skewness
% of shares held by institutions 0.639 -0.477 0.001 Heavy tails with positive 
skewness
% of shares held by m ajor 
shareholders
1.881 3.676 0.000 Heavy tails with positive 
skewness
%of shares held by minority 
shareholders
0.144 -0.925 0.077 Normal distribution
% of shares held by foreign investors 3.726 13.476 0.000 Heavy tails with positive 
skewness
1 Kolmogorv-Smirnov w ith significance >0.05 indicates that the distribution is approximately normal
31 This approach represents an extension of the rank transformation method proposed by Conover and Iman (1981). In the normal scores 
approach the ranks are substituted by scores on the normal distribution. The normal scores approach retains the advantages of using  
ranks but has other beneficial characteristics, particularly in hypothesis testing. Cooke (1998) argued that in disclosure indices studies 
there are two complications: ( 1) the theoretically correct form of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is not 
known and (2) disclosure m easures and independent variables are proxies for underlying constructs and, hence, while theory may specify  
a functional form for the underlying theoretical construct, it is unlikely to hold for empirical proxies. A remedy for these complications is 
to transform the data (p.209).
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Table 9.4B: Assessm ent  of  Normali ty  of  Transformed Data.
Shape Descriptors Test of Normality
Unweighted m andatory index -0.192 -0.590 0.033 Normal scores
Weighted m andatory index -0.191 -0.598 0.034 Normal scores
Unweighted voluntary index 0.000 -0.309 0.200* Normal scores
W eighted voluntary index 0.000 -0.304 0.200 Normal scores
Unweighted overall disclosure index 0.000 -0.303 0.200 Normal scores
Weighted overall disclosure index 0.000 -0.303 0.200 Normal scores
Total assets 0.000 -0.303 0.200 Normal scores
Market capitalization 0.040 -0.395 0.200 Normal scores
Debt ratio 0.003 -0.297 0.200 Normal scores
Return on equity -0.001 -0.304 0.200 Normal scores
Current ratio 0.008 -0.320 0.200 Normal scores
% of shares held by governm ent 1.671 1.418 0.000 Normal scores
% of shares held by institutions 0.240 -0.641 0.002 Normal scores
% of shares held by m ajor 
shareholders
0.804 -0.485 0.000 Normal scores
% of shares held by minority 
shareholders
-0.008 -0.324 0.200 Normal scores
% of shares held by foreign investors 3.271 9.291 0.000 Normal scores
a Kolmogorv-Smirnov w ith significance >0.05 indicates tha t the distribution is approximately norm al 
b Normal scores using the Van Der W aerden approach available in SPSS and recom mended by Cooke (1998). 
* This is a lower bound of the true  significance.
9.4.3.2 Homoscedasticity
Homoscedasticity occurs when the variance of the error terms appears constant over a range 
of predictor variables (Hair e ta l, 1998]. Heteroscedasticity is the case where the pattern of 
scatter points about the line shows no clear pattern (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). Similar to 
normality, homoscedasticity is identified by the analysis of residuals and boxplots. 
Heteroscedasticity can be remedied through data transformations similar to those discussed 
in the previous section. Once the transformations have been performed, the transformed data 
are tested to check that the desired remedy has been achieved (see Appendix F]. The analysis 
of residuals and box plots of transformed data indicated that homoscedasticity occurred 
where the pattern of scatter points about the line shows clear pattern.
9.4.3.3 Linearity
Scatter plots of the variables were applied in this study to identify any nonlinear patterns in 
the data. Nonlinearity was diagnosed by transforming data using normal scores. Cooke (1998] 
has argued that when there is non-linearity with data concentration, normal scores disperse 
that concentration. After the transformation, data was checked for linearity (see Appendix F].
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9.5 Correlation Among Variables
Table 9.5 reports the relationship between the transformed continuous independent variables 
and also between these variables and the different sets of transformed weighted and 
unweighted values of mandatory and voluntary indices and categorical variables using the 
non-parametric Spearman's rho coefficient. It also shows the correlation between categorical 
variables and transformed weighted and unweighted mandatory and voluntary indices.
A company's total assets and market capitalisation were the main explanatory factors of the 
variations in the level of mandatory disclosure in Omani annual reports, because they 
positively and significantly correlated with the weighted and unweighted indices of 
mandatory disclosure, although the degree of correlation was modest. Additionally, a 
company's return on equity ratio positively correlated with the mandatory indices. The 
percentage of shares held by major shareholders had a negative and low impact on the 
unweighted mandatory index, but not the weighted mandatory index. The variations in the 
weighted mandatory index can be also explained by a company's current and debt ratios. 
Table 9.5 shows that a company's debt ratio negatively and slightly influenced the mandatory 
disclosure. However, this will be proved later through the multivariate analysis.
Using bivariate analysis, the study shows that voluntary disclosure in Oman might be affected 
positively by a company's total asset and market capitalisation. Major shareholders might 
discourage the disclosure of additional information since they have access to private 
information. On the other hand, shares held by minority shareholders encourage voluntary 
disclosure because they do not have access to internal information. This will also be proved 
later through the multivariate analysis.
There are weak correlations between some of the independent variables reported in Table 
9.5. However, there are two high and significant correlations reported in the table. The first 
correlation is between total assets and market capitalisation (rho=0.S2S) and the second is 
between debt ratio and current ratio (rho=-0.707). A company's debt ratio significantly 
correlated with the market capitalisation and percentage of institutional investors. 
Consequently, caution must be exercised when applying multivariate analysis since there are 
significant and high correlations between some of the independent variables. These 
correlations could later negatively affect the multivariate analysis. This problem is called 
multicollinearity. Tolerance and variance inflation factors (VI F= 1/Tolerance) were used in 
this study to indicate the degree of multicollinearity among the independent variables.
251
With regard to the correlation between continuous and categorical independent variables, 
there was a negative relationship between industrial sector and a company's size and 
between industrial sector and a company's liquidity position. On the other hand, industrial 
sector correlated positively with a company's gearing level, confirming this study's findings 
that the highest debt ratios were reported by the industrial sector. While companies in the 
financial sector tended to be large, profitable, with a high liquidity position and diffused 
ownership, the service sector consisted of companies with high government ownership 
concentration. High government ownership was found in the service sector. A weak positive 
relationship was found between level of disclosure in annual reports and Big four auditor 
type. Findings reported in Table 9.5 suggest that large and profitable companies and 
companies with shares held by foreign investors hire Big four audit firms to verify their 
reports. This is to be expected since Big four audit firms have a reputation for providing 
quality audit services.
Table 9.6 shows the relationship between the categorical variables using Spearman's rho 
coefficient It can be seen that the industrial sector correlates with the service and financial 
sectors and auditor type. There is a weak correlation between the service and the financial 
sectors and they both correlate positively with Big four auditor type.
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T a b l e  9.5: C o r r e l a t i o n  a m o n g  D e p e n d e n t  a n d  I n d e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e s .
Normal 
scores of 
Index of 
unweighted 
mandatory 
disclosure
Normal 
scores of 
Index of 
unweighted 
voluntary 
disclosure
Normal 
scores of 
Overall 
Unweighted 
Disclosure
Normal 
scores of 
Index of 
mean- 
weighted 
mandatory 
disclosure
Normal 
scores of 
Index of 
mean- 
weighted 
voluntary 
disclosure
Normal 
scores of 
Overall 
mean- 
weighted 
disclosure
Normal 
scores 
of Total 
assets
Normal 
scores of 
Market 
capitalisa 
-tion
Normal
scores
of
Return
on
equity
Normal 
scores 
of Debt 
ratio
Normal
scores
of
Current
ratio
Normal 
scores of 
% of gov. 
ownership
Normal 
scores of 
%of 
institu­
tional - 
investor
Normal
of% of
major
Share-
huldcrs
Normal 
scores of 
%of 
minoniy 
shares
Normal 
■ scores of 
%of 
foreign 
• investors
Normal scores of 
Total assets
0.481=0.000** 0.4720.000** 0 535 0.000** 0.4710.000** 0.4590.000** 0.5080.000** -
Normal scores of 
Market capitalisation
0.4870.000** 0.3570.000**
0.448
0.000**
0.512
0.000**
0.342
0.000**
0.420
0.000**
0.825
0.000**
Normal scores of 
Return on equity
0.191
0.044*
0.093
0.330
0.139
0.147
0.203
0.033*
0.085
0.374
0.121
0.205
0.283
0.003**
0.3410.000**
Normal scores of 
Debt ratio
-0.150
0.115
0.046
0.631
-0.023
0.812
-0.192
0.043*
0.049
0.607
-0.011
0.906
-0.094
0.324
-0.395
0.000**
0.078
0.418
Normal scores of 
Current ratio
0.159
0.096
-0.062
0.519
0.010
0.919
0.191
0.044*
-0.069
0.471
0.014
0.882
0.084
0.378
0.3650.000** 0.0220.820 -0.7070.000** -
Normal scores of % 
of government 
ownership
0.081
0.396
-0.040
0.673
-0.015
0.873
0.067
0.487
-0.054
0.573
-0.042
0.659
0.059
0.536
0.076
0.425
0.057
0.551
-0.051
0.595
0.111
0.248
Normal scores of % 
of institutional 
investors
0.008
0.930
0.104
0.278
0.055
0.566
0.010
0.917
0.112
0.244
0.027
0.782
-0.179
0.060
-0.204
0.032*
0.049
0.607
0.282
0.003**
-0.231
0.015*
-0.227
0.017*
Normal scores of % 
of shares held by 
major shareholders
-0.198
0.037*
-0.262
0.006**
-0.248
0.006**
-0.175
0.066
-0.250
0.008**
-0.215
0.023*
-0.289
0.002**
-0.248
0.009**
-0.100
0.297
0.016
0.867
-0.051
0.595
-0.235
0.013*
-0.2390.12*
Normal scores of%  
of shares held by 
minority 
shareholders
0.145
0.129
0.207
0.029*
0.229
0.016*
0.142
0.137
0.201
0.034*
0.213
0.025*
0.297
0.002**
0.3550.000** 0.0070.940 -0.2150.024*
0.2200.020*
-0.146
0.127
-0.484
0.000**
-0.301
0.001**
Normal scores of % 
of major foreign 
investments
0.103
0.282
0.039
0.687
0.089
0.353
0.110
0.248
0.028
0.773
0.082
0.393
0.2180.021* 0.2020.033* 0.0100.917 -0.0080.935 -0.1640.085 0.1380.148 -0.0530.580 -0.0950.319 -0.1250.191
Industrial Sector -0.129=
0.177
0.024
0.804
-0.032
0.737
-0.139
0.146
0.035
0.717
0.004
0.965
-0.276
0.003**
-0.249
0.009**
-0.131
0.172
0.194
0.041*
-0.210
0.027*
-0.088
0.357
-0.096
0.315
0.180
0.058
-0.005
0.955
-0.130
0.175
Service Sector 0.086
0.369
-0.001
0.990
0.030
0.757
0.093
0.333
-0.020
0.837
-0.008
0.932
0.039
0.681
-0.031
0.747
-0.040
0.679
-0.045
0.640
-0.005
0.958
0.244
0.010**
0.172
0.072
-0.082
0.390
-0.284
0.003**
0.127
0.184
Financial Sector 0.057
0.554
-0.028
0.772
0.005
0.963
0.061
0.526
-0.019
0.840
0.005
0.963
0.295
0.002**
0.341
0.000** 0.2070.029* -0.1850.052 0.2640.005** -0.1800.059
-0.084
0.379
-0.124
0.195
0.3410.000**
0.010
0.921
Big four auditor 0.365
0.000** 0.1810.057 0.2630.005**
0.3770.000**
0.310
0.001**
0.249
0.008**
0.364
0.000**
0.3130.001** 0.1960.040*
-0.028
0.769
0.054
0.572
-0.074
0.442
0.114
0.234
-0.105
0.273
0.029
0.760
0.214
0.024*
Non-Big four auditor -0.3650.000** -0.1810.057 -0.2630.005** -0.3770.000**
-0.310
0.001**
-0.249
0.008**
-0.364
0.000**
-0.3130.001** -0.1960.040*
0.028
0.769
-0.054
0.572
0.074
0.442
-0.114
0.234
0.105
0.273
-0.029
0.273
-0.214
0.024*
* Spearman's rho correlation coefficient 
♦significant at the 0,05 level {2-tailed test)
* ♦significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test)
■ v; -/ a ■
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Table 9.6: Correlat ion among Categorical  Variables.
Categorical Variables Industrial
sector
Service Sector Financial sector Big four 
Auditor
Non-Big four 
Auditor
Industrial Sector -
Service Sector -0.654
0.000**
-
Financial Sector -0.454
0.000**
-0.376
0.000**
-
Big four auditor -0.276
0.003**
0.173
0.069
0.135
0.159
-
Non-Big four Auditor 0.276
0.003**
-0.173
0.069
-0.135
0.159
-1.000
0.000**
-
a Spearman's rho correlation coefficient 
* ’‘'significant a t  the 0.01 level f2-tailed test) *.
9.6 Multiple Regression Models and Analysis
In this study, there were six regression models: unweighted mandatory, mean-weighted 
mandatory, unweighted voluntary, mean-weighted voluntary, overall unweighted, and overall 
mean-weighted indices. Only the mean-weighted index was used in the regression models 
because the median does not use all of the values in a distribution. The transformed 
dependent and independent data using the normal scores approach were used in each 
regression model since the normal scores approach produced the best fit.32 Cooke (1998, 
p.214] has argued that changing only the dependent variable implies changing the 
relationship between the dependent variable and all independent variables.
Each model was regressed by entering one dependent variable and all the independent 
variables. However, because of the high correlation between total assets and market 
capitalisation, the coefficients of the explanatory variables were estimated using two models. 
The first was a full regression model that included all the independent variables. The second 
was the reduced regression model that dropped one of the two highly correlated corporate 
size variables (i.e. total assets and market capitalisation]. The following is the equation that 
provided the basis of the regression estimation:
32 Four separate regression models based on different transformations of the dependent and independent variables were run and the normal 
scores approach produced the best fit. The second best model used transformed dependent variables using normal scores and log total 
assets, square root of market capitalization, and square root o f debt ratio. Significant findings derived from regression m odels are to be 
found in Appendix H. An example of the regression models of the total items data set is provided in Appendix G.
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I  -  B0 + BlX u + B2X 2i + B3X 3i +... + B]0X ]0i + ei
W here /  = T ransfo rm ed  d isclosure index  using  norm al scores;
X x = T ransform ed to ta l assets;
X 2 -  T ransfo rm ed  m ark e t capitalisation;
X 3 = T ransfo rm ed  d eb t ratio;
X 4 = T ransform ed cu rre n t ratio;
X 5 = T ransfo rm ed  re tu rn  on equity  ratio ;
X 6 = T ransform ed percen tage  of sh ares  held  by m ajor sh areh o ld ers  w ho  ow n 10%  or m ore of Shares;
X 7 = T ransform ed percen tage of sh ares  held  by m inority  sh areh o ld ers
X8 = T ransform ed p ercen tag e  of g o v ern m en t ow nersh ip  of a com pany 's share;
X 9 = T ransfo rm ed  percen tage  of in stitu tio n al in v estm en t in a com pany;
X w = T ransfo rm ed  p ercen tage of m ajor foreign in v estm en t in a com pany;
X u = 1 if th e  com pany is in the  industria l sector; 0 if o therw ise;
X }2 = 1 if the  com pany is in the service sector; 0 if o therw ise;
X13 = 1 if the  com pany w as aud ited  by  a Big four au d it firm; 0 if o therw ise; 
ft = p aram eters; 
ei = e rro r term ; and  
i = the  ith observation
The final models appear in Table 9.7 through Table 9.14. Each regression model reports the 
regression coefficient (B), and standardised coefficient (Beta) which tell us how many 
standard deviations the dependent variable made with an increase of one standard deviation 
in the independent variable (Allison, 1999, p. 30). It also reports the R square and relative 
significance level which measures how well the model fits and can predict the dependent 
variable (Allison, 1999, p. 31). In this study, no multicollinearity problem existed since VIF 
was less than 10 (Hair etal., 1998, p. 193).
9.6.1 Unweighted Mandatory Disclosure Index Regression Model
In the full regression model, the transformed unweighted mandatory index was regressed 
against all the transformed independent variables. Table 9.7 presents the full regression 
results. The model is significant (p<.05) and explains 22.4% of the variation in the level of 
mandatory disclosure of Omani listed companies. The adjusted R square of 0.224 is higher 
than the adjusted R square reported by Cooke (1998) on his transformed Saudi Arabia data 
set using normal scores for both dependent and independent variables (-0.017). However, it is 
slightly lower than the adjusted R square (0.279) of a similar study conducted in Bangladesh,
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India, and Pakistan (Ali e ta l, 2004).33 Findings show that companies audited by Big four audit 
firms (p<0.05) complied with mandatory disclosure requirements and companies with high 
market capitalisation (p=0.087) marginally complied with disclosure requirements. The 
regression results indicated that the rest of the independent variables were not significant in 
explaining the variations in mandatory disclosure. A possible explanation is the high 
correlation between transformed total assets and market capitalisation.
T a b l e  9 . 7 :  Full Regres s ion  E s t im a te s  o f  Tr a n s form e d  Index o f  Un w e igh ted  
M a n d a to r y  Disc losure  on Firm Charac ter i s t i c s .
Source Sum of squares df Mean squares
Model 30.308 13 2.331
Residual 65.661 97 0.677
Total 95.969 110
F = 3.444; Probability > F = 0.000; R -  Square = 0.316; Adjusted R -  Square = 0.224
Independent
Variables
VTF Coefficient Standard t  -  Valu e 
Error
P>|t|
Transformed assets 3.549 0.202 0.153 1.278 0.204
Transformed market capitalisation 3.834 0.284 0.160 1.729 0.087
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.974 0.017 0.140 0.115 0.909
Transformed Current Ratio 2.803 0.066 0.136 0.467 0.642
Transformed Return on Equity 1.287 0.019 0.092 0.202 0.841
Transformed % Major SH 3.938 -0.012 0.189 -0.070 0.945
Transformed % of minority SH 4.565 0.038 0.173 0.210 0.834
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.586 0.041 0.182 0.301 0.764
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.635 0.067 0.182 0.372 0.711
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.404 -0.035 0.179 -0.352 0.725
Industrial Sector 2.284 0.177 0.238 1.391 0.167
Service Sector 2.325 0.167 0.249 1.300 0.197
Big four auditor 1.317 0.219 0.189 2.272 0.025*
Note: SH = Shareholders
*p-values are for two-tailed tests f0.05)
Table 9.8 reports the reduced regression where the transformed market capitalisation was 
dropped from the regression model. It shows that the model adjusted R square decreased to 
20.8% and was significant (p=.000). Similar to full regression results, large companies and 
companies audited by Big four auditor complied significantly with mandatory disclosure 
requirements (p<0.05). Other variables were not significant in this model. The reduced 
regression model was rerun using market capitalisation instead of total assets. The model 
reported similar results to the reduced asset-size regression with a higher adjusted R square 
(21.9%), and market capitalisation and Big four auditor were the only significant 
determinants of variations in mandatory disclosure.34
33 Wallace et  al. (1994, p.47) stated that, citing Cheng, Hopwood and Mckeown (1992), rank transformed data 
may reduce the levels of reported significance.
34 The results of the market capitalisation reduced regression models are to be found in Appendix F.
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Table 9.8: Reduced Regression Estimates  of  Transformed Index o f  Unweighted
Mandatory Disclosure on Firm Characteristics.
Source Sum of sq uares Df Mean squares
Model 28.285 12 2.357
Residual 67.684 98 0.691
Total 95.969 110
F = 3.413; Probability > F = 0.000; R - Square = 0.295; Adjusted R -  Square = 0.208
Independent
Variables
VIF Coefficient Standard
Error
t -  Value P>|t|
Transformed assets 1.554 0.407 0.102 3.851 0.000*
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.690 -0.061 0.135 -0.437 0.663
Transformed Current Ratio 2.753 0.098 0.136 0.697 0.488
Transformed Return on Equity 1.201 0.062 0.090 0.665 0.507
Transformed % Major SH 3.876 0.025 0.190 0.147 0.884
Transformed % of minority SH 4.397 0.097 0.172 0.546 0.586
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.542 0.071 0.183 0.527 0.600
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.461 0.128 0.181 0.713 0.477
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.375 -0.010 0.179 -0.105 0.917
Industrial sector 2.278 0.188 0.240 1.464 0.146
Service sector 2.311 0.150 0.251 1.159 0.249
Big four Auditor 1.316 0.213 0.191 2.190 0.031*
Note: SH = Shareholders 
*p-values are  for two-tailed tests
9.6.2 W eighted M andatory D isclosure Index R egression  M odel
Table 9.9 shows that the full weighted mandatory disclosure index regression model is 
significant (p=.000] and explains 23.9% of the variations in mandatory disclosure. The 
reported adjusted R square of 0.239 is lower than the adjusted R square of 0.36 reported in 
Adhikari and Tondkar's (1992] study. Unlike the unweighted mandatory full regression 
model, the level of significance for a company’s market capitalisation improves significantly. 
Also, companies audited by Big four audit firms complied more with mandatory disclosure 
requirements than other firms. The rest of the independent variables were not significant.
Table 9.10 summarises the results of the reduced regression model. In this model, positive 
and significant relationships were found between mandatory disclosure level and total assets 
and Big four auditor, and the adjusted R square dropped to 21.4%. The model was rerun using 
the market capitalisation variable. As a result, the adjusted R square and the model's 
significance increased to 24%. The only significant variables were market capitalisation and 
Big four auditor.
Table 9.9: Full Regression Estimates  of  Transformed Index of  Weighted Mandatory
Disclosure on Firm Characterist ics .
Source Sum of squares Df Mean squares
Model 31.655 13 2.435
Residual 64.595 97 0.666
Total 96.251 110
F = 3.657; Probability > F = 0.000; R - Square = 0.329; Adjusted R -  Square = 0.239
Independent Variables VIF Coefficient Standard Error t -  Value p> |t|
Transformed assets 3.549 0.144 0.151 0.920 0.360
Transformed market capitalisation 3.834 0.336 0.158 2.062 0.042*
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.974 -0.009 0.139 -0.062 0.951
Transformed Current Ratio 2.803 0.065 0.135 0.464 0.644
Transformed Return on Equity 1.287 0.036 0.091 0.386 0.701
Transformed % Major SH 3.938 0.017 0.188 0.104 0.917
Transformed % of minority SH 4.565 0.058 0.172 0.325 0.746
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.586 0.036 0.181 0.265 0.791
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.635 0.091 0.181 0.506 0.614
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.404 -0.022 0.177 -0.221 0.826
Industrial Sector 2.284 0.182 0.236 1.450 0.150
Service sector 2.325 0.182 0.247 1.432 0.150
Big four Auditor 1.317 0.227 0.187 2.375 0.020*
Note: SH = Shareholders
T a b l e  9 . 1 0 :  R e d u c e d  R e g r e s s i o n  E s t i m a t e s  o f  T r a n s f o r m e d  I n d e x  o f  W e i g h t e d  
M a n d a t o r y  D i s c l o s u r e  o n  F i r m  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
S ource Sum  o f  s q u a re s Df M ean s q u a re s
Model 28.824 12 2.402
Residual 67.427 98 0.688
Total 96.251 110
F = 3.491; P ro b a b ility  > F = 0.000; R -  S q u are = 0 .299; A d justed  R -  S quare = 0 .214
In d e p e n d e n t
V ariab les
VIF C oefficient S ta n d a rd
E rro r
t  -  V a lu e . P > |t|
Transformed assets 1.554 0.386 0.102 3.666 0.000*
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.690 -0.100 0.134 -0.724 0.471
Transformed Current Ratio 2.753 0.103 0.136 0.734 0.465
Transformed Return on Equity 1.201 0.087 0.090 0.937 0.351
Transformed % Major SH 3.876 0.060 0.189 0.360 0.720
Transformed % of minority SH 4.397 0.128 0.172 0.721 0.472
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.542 0.072 0.182 0.532 0.596
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.461 0.162 0.180 0.908 0.366
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.375 0.007 0.179 0.074 0.941
Industrial sector 2.278 0.195 0.239 1.531 0.129
Service sector 2.311 0.162 0.251 1.257 0.212
Big four Auditor 1.316 0.220 0.190 2.265 0.026*
Note: SH = S h a re h o ld e rs ; 
*p-values a r e  fo r  tw o -ta ile d  te s ts
9.6.3 Unweighted Voluntary Disclosure Index Regression Model
The third model represents the full regression of the transformed unweighted voluntary 
disclosure values in Table 9.11. It shows that the variations in the level of voluntary disclosure
in Omani annual reports are explained significantly (p<0.05) by 23.4%. The adjusted R square 
here is higher than the adjusted R square reported in Chow and Wong-Boren's (1987) study 
(15%), and Collett and Hrasky's (2005) study (21.4%) but slightly lower than Hossain and 
Taylor's (2007b) study (24%). Omani listed companies with large total assets (p<0.005) 
provided more voluntary disclosure in their annual reports than others. Moreover, listed 
industrial companies marginally (p=0.056) provided more voluntary disclosure than other 
sectors. This supports previous chapter results that industrial companies had the highest 
mean values of weighted and unweighted voluntary indices (see Table 8.5). Other 
independent variables were found to be insignificant in this model.
T a b l e  9 .1 1 : Full R egres s ion  E s t im a te s  o f  T r a n s fo rm e d  Index o f  U n w e igh te d  Vo lun tary  
Disc losure  on Firm Ch arac te r i s t i c s .
Source Sum of squares Df Mean squares
Model 33.294 13 2.561
Residual 69.302 97 0.714
Total 102.596 110
F = 3.585; Probability > F = 0.000; R -  Square = 0.325; Adjusted R -  Square = 0.234
Independent VIF Coefficient Standard t  -  Value P>|t|
. ^ Variables Error
Transformed assets 3.549 0.549 0.157 3.490 0.001*
Transformed market capitalisation 3.834 -0.055 0.164 -0.339 0.735
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.974 -0.035 0.144 -0.245 0.807
Transformed Current Ratio 2.803 -0.033 0.140 -0.239 0.811
Transformed Return on Equity 1.287 -0.029 0.094 -0.304 0.761
Transformed % Major SH 3.938 -0.033 0.194 -0.198 0.844
Transformed % of minority SH 4.565 0.247 0.178 1.385 0.169
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.586 -0.009 0.187 -0.065 0.949
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.635 0.263 0.187 1.463 0.147
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.404 -0.006 0.184 -0.062 0.950
Industrial sector 2.284 0.244 0.244 1.936 0.056
Service sector 2.325 0.111 0.256 0.872 0.385
Big four Auditor 1.317 -0.006 0.194 -0.063 0.950
Note: SH = Shareholders;
*p- values are  for two-tailed tests
Table 9.12 reports the reduced regression using total assets as the only size measure. It 
reveals that the model is highly significant (p=.000) and explained by 24.1%. The model 
indicates that in Oman, levels of voluntary disclosure are influenced by a company's total 
assets and the industrial sector. The reduced regression model was rerun using market 
capitalisation. In this model, the adjusted R square decreased to 14.7% and market 
capitalisation was the only significant factor (p=0.002).
Table 9.12: Reduced Regression Estimates  of  Transformed Index o f  Unweighted
Voluntary Disclosure on Firm Characteristics.
Source Sum o f squares df Mean squares
Model 33.211 12 2.768
Residual 69.384 98 0.708
Total 102.596 110
F = 3.909; Probability > F = 0.000; R - Square = 0.324; Adjusted R - Square = 0.241
Independent
Variables
VIF Coefficient Standard
Error
t-V a lu e P>RI
Transformed assets 1.554 0.509 0.103 4.911 0.000*
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.690 -0.020 0.136 -0.148 0.882
Transformed Current Ratio 2.753 -0.040 0.138 -0.288 0.774
Transformed Return on Equity 1.201 -0.037 0.091 -0.408 0.684
Transformed % Major SH 3.876 -0.040 0.192 -0.243 0.808
Transformed % of minority SH 4.397 0.235 0.174 1.351 0.180
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.542 -0.015 0.185 -0.111 0.912
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.461 0.251 0.183 1.431 0.156
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.375 -0.011 0.181 -0.113 0.911
Industrial sector 2.278 0.242 0.243 1.930 0.057
Service sector 2.311 0.114 0.254 0.905 0.368
Big four Auditor 1.316 -0.005 0.193 -0.051 0.960
Note: SH = Shareholders; 
*p-values are for two-tailed tests
9.6.4 Weighted Voluntary Disclosure Index Regression Model
The unweighted voluntary models were rerun using the indices of weighted scores. Table 9.13 
presents the full regression model of transformed weighted voluntary disclosure. This model 
explains 25.8% of the variations in the levels of voluntary disclosure in Omani annual reports. 
The adjusted R square of 0.258 is higher than similar studies using a weighted index (Botosan, 
1997; Francis etal., 2005). Omani companies with a large asset-size and audited by Big four 
auditors tended to disclose more voluntary disclosure items. This is inconsistent with the 
unweighted full regression model results. In the weighted voluntary disclosure regression 
model, the industrial sector variable was not significant probably because of the negative 
correlation between the industrial sector and Big four auditor type. Thus the Big four auditor 
variable captured the influence of the industrial sector (see Table 9.6). Other variables were 
not significant.
The reduced weighted regression model reported in table 9.14 reveals the same results as the 
previous model (i.e. weighted voluntary disclosure) with slightly higher power (adj R 
square=0.264). When the reduced regression model was rerun using market capitalisation, 
the adjusted R square dropped to 19.2% and the model was significant (p=0.001). The only 
factors shown to be significant were market capitalisation and Big four auditor.
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Table 9.13: Full Regression Estimates  of  Transformed Index o f  Weighted Voluntary
Disclosure on Firm Characterist ics .
Source Sum o f squares df Mean squares
Model 35.636 13 2.741
Residual 67.436 97 0.695
Total 103.072 110
F = 3.943; Probability > F = 0.000; R -  Square = 0.346; Adjusted R -  Square = 0.258
Independent
Variables
VIF Coefficient Standard
Error
t -  Value P>|t|
Transformed assets 3.539 0.482 0.154 3.117 0.002*
Transformed market capitalisation 3.830 -0.073 0.162 -0.454 0.651
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.955 -0.055 0.142 -0.390 0.697
Transformed Current Ratio 2.802 -0.037 0.138 -0.266 0.791
Transformed Return on Equity 1.297 0.010 0.094 0.104 0.918
Transformed % Major SH 3.893 -0.020 0.191 -0.123 0.902
Transformed % of minority SH 4.498 0.242 0.174 1.389 0.168
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.593 0.003 0.185 0.022 0.983
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.513 0.253 0.182 1.449 0.151
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.362 -0.027 0.179 -0.277 0.782
Industrial sector 2.306 0.198 0.242 1.588 0.115
Service sector 2.323 0.065 0.253 0.517 0.606
Big four Auditor 1.159 0.201 0.180 2.276 0.025*
Note: SH = Shareholders; 
*p-values are for two-tailed tests
Table 9.14: Reduced Regression Estimates of Transformed Index of Weighted 
Voluntary Disclosure on Firm Characteristics.
Source Sum o f squares df Mean squares
Model 35.493 12 2.958
Residual 67.579 98 0.690
Total 103.072 110
F = 4.289; Probability > F = 0.000; R -  Square = 0.344; Adjusted R - Square = 0.264
.Independent VIF Coefficient Standard 
Error
t -  Value p>jtj
Transformed assets 1.581 0.429 0.103 4.175 0.000*
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.676 -0.035 0.134 -0.265 0.792
Transformed Current Ratio 2.751 -0.045 0.136 -0.331 0.741
Transformed Return on Equity 1.214 -0.001 0.090 -0.012 0.991
Transformed % Major SH 3.834 -0.029 0.189 -0.181 0.857
Transformed % of minority SH 4.338 0.227 0.171 1.333 0.186
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.548 -0.005 0.183 -0.038 0.970
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.349 0.238 0.178 1.393 0.167
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.336 -0.033 0.176 -0.345 0.731
Industrial sector 2.300 0.195 0.241 1.573 0.119
Service sector 2.309 0.069 0.251 0.557 0.579
Big four Auditor 1.159 0.201 0.179 2.285 0.024*
Note: SH = Shareholders; *p-values are for two-tailed tests
9.6.5 Overall U nw eighted  D isclosure Index R egression  M odel
The full regression model of overall unweighted disclosure reveals that 25.6% of the 
variations in the overall disclosure are significantly explained by this model (p<.005). The
adjusted R square of 0.256 was higher than the adjusted R square of 0.12 reported in Hossain 
and Taylor’s (1998a) study in Bangladesh. The only explanatory indicators of the aggregate 
disclosure are total assets and industrial sector (p<0.05). Table 9.15 summarises the above 
findings.
Table 9.15: Full Regression Estimates of Transformed Index of Overall Unweighted 
Disclosure on Firm Characteristics.
Source Sum o f squares Df Mean squares
Model 35.404 13 2.723
Residual 67.669 97 0.698
Total 103.073 110
F = 3.904; Probability > F = 0.000; R -  Square = 0.343; Adjusted R - Square = 0.256
Independent
Variables
VIF Coefficient Standard
Error
t-V a lu e P>Jtl
Transformed assets 3.549 0.452 0.155 2.913 0.004*
Transformed market capitalisation 3.834 0.087 0.162 0.542 0.589
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.974 0.001 0.142 0.007 0.994
Transformed Current Ratio 2.803 -0.007 0.138 -0.052 0.959
Transformed Return on Equity 1.287 -0.018 0.093 -0.188 0.851
Transformed % Major SH 3.938 -0.035 0.192 -0.214 0.831
Transformed % of minority SH 4.565 0.210 0.176 1.196 0.235
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.586 -0.004 0.185 -0.030 0.976
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.635 0.189 0.185 1.068 0.288
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.404 -0.003 0.182 -0.034 0.973
Industrial sector 2.284 0.251 0.241 2.018 0.046*
Service sector 2.325 0.160 0.253 1.277 0.205
Big four Auditor 1.317 0.068 0.192 0.715 0.476
Note: SH = Shareholders 
*p-values are for two-tailed tests
The reduced model better explained the variations in level of disclosure (adj R square = 
26.1%). It is reported in Table 9.16. Total assets and industrial sector are the only significant 
determinants of the aggregate disclosure in Oman. Using market capitalisation in the reduced 
regression model decreased the adjusted R square to 19.9% and the significance level to 
0.001. The model indicated that market capitalisation is the only significant factor.
Table 9 .16: Reduced Regression Estimates  of  Transformed Index of  Overall
Unweighted Disclosure on Firm Characterist ics .
Source Sum of squares Df Mean squares
Model 35.200 12 2.933
Residual 67.873 98 0.693
Total 103.073 110
F = 4.235; Probability > F = 0.000; R - Square = 0.342; Adjusted R - Square = 0.261
Independent
Variables’
VIF Coefficient Standard
Error
t -  Value P>|t|
Transformed assets 1.554 0.514 0.102 5.035 0.000*
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.690 -0.023 0.135 -0.169 0.866
Transformed Current Ratio 2.753 0.003 0.136 0.021 0.983
Transformed Return on Equity 1.201 -0.004 0.090 -0.050 0.960
Transformed % Major SH 3.876 -0.024 0.190 -0.148 0.883
Transformed % of minority SH 4.397 0.228 0.172 1.329 0.187
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.542 0.005 0.183 0.042 0.967
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.461 0.208 0.181 1.201 0.233
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.375 0.004 0.179 0.044 0.965
Industrial sector 2.278 0.254 0.240 2.055 0.043*
Service sector 2.311 0.155 0.252 1.244 0.217
Big four Auditor 1.316 0.066 0.191 0.699 0.486
Note: SH = Shareholders 
*p-values are for two-tailed tests
9.6.6 Overall W eighted  D isclosure Index R egression  M odel
The full and reduced regression models were rerun using the transformed overall weighted 
scores. The models were very similar in all of the properties to the preceding models (i.e. 
overall unweighted disclosure models) with slightly lower power (adjusted R square = 21.8%, 
22.5%, respectively). The adjusted R squares of 0.22 and 0.225 were higher than the adjusted 
R squares of 0.19 and 0.06 reported in Zarzeski's (1996) study in Germany and Hong Kong, 
respectively. Tables 9.17 and 9.18 report the overall weighted disclosure index.35 The 
influence of Big four auditor type disappeared because of the relatively high correlations 
between size and auditor type on the one hand and auditor type and industrial sector on the 
other hand (See Table 9.6).
35 The regression results of the 6 models using the transformed dependent variable on normal scores, log asset and square root of both 
market capitalisation and debt ratio reported similar results. However, in these models the percentage o f shares held by major 
shareholders negatively affected voluntary and overall disclosure. A sample of regression results are reported in Appendix H.
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Table 9.17: Full Regression Est imates  of  Transformed Index of  Overall Weighted
Disclosure on Firm Characteristics .
Source Sum of squares Df Mean squares
Model 31.990 13 2.461
Residual 71.090 97 0.733
Total 103.080 110
F = 3.358; Probability > F = 0.000; R -  Square = 0.310; Adjusted R -  Square = 0.218
Independent VIF Coefficient Standard t-V alu e P>|t|
Variables Error
Transformed assets 3.549 0.469 0.159 2.953 0.004*
Transformed market capitalisation 3.834 0.051 0.166 0.309 0.758
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.974 0.019 0.146 0.129 0.898
Transformed Current Ratio 2.803 0.028 0.141 0.198 0.843
Transformed Return on Equity 1.287 -0.022 0.096 -0.233 0.816
Transformed % Major SH 3.938 -0.054 0.197 -0.326 0.745
Transformed % of minority SH 4.565 0.141 0.180 0.785 0.434
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.586 -0.050 0.190 -0.367 0.714
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.635 0.121 0.190 0.669 0.505
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.404 -0.015 0.186 -0.154 0.878
Industrial sector 2.284 0.263 0.247 2.065 0.042*
Service sector 2.325 0.136 0.260 1.061 0.291
Big four Auditor 1.317 0.074 0.197 0.766 0.446
Note: SH= Shareholders; *p-values are for two-tailed tests
Table 9.18: Reduced Regression Estimates of Transformed Index of Overall Weighted 
Disclosure on Firm Characteristics.
Source Sum of squares - » df Mean squares
Model 31.920 12 2.660
Residual 71.160 98 0.726
Total 103.080 110
F = 3.663; Probability > F = 0.000; R -  Square = 0.310; Adjusted R -  Square = 0.225
Independent
Variables
VIF Coefficient Standard 
Error
t-V a lu e P>|t|
Transformed assets 1.554 0.506 0.105 4.835 0.000*
Transformed Debt Ratio 2.690 0.005 0.138 0.035 0.972
Transformed Current Ratio 2.753 0.034 0.139 0.243 0.809
Transformed Return on Equity 1.201 -0.015 0.092 -0.159 0.874
Transformed % Major SH 3.876 -0.048 0.194 -0.290 0.772
Transformed % of minority SH 4.397 0.152 0.176 0.864 0.389
Transformed %Govt. Ownership 2.542 -0.044 0.187 -0.331 0.741
Transformed % of Institutional SH 4.461 0.132 0.185 0.747 0.457
Transformed % of Foreign SH 1.375 -0.011 0.183 -0.112 0.911
Industrial sector 2.278 0.265 0.246 2.093 0.039*
Service sector 2.311 0.133 0.258 1.045 0.299
Big four Auditor 1.316 0.073 0.196 0.759 0.450
Note: SH= Shareholders; *p-values are for two-tailed tests
9.7 D iscussion  o f R egression  M odels' R esults
This section discusses the regression outputs and how they relate to the predicted hypotheses 
and how they compare to previous disclosure studies. Each independent variable is discussed
separately. Also, a summary of this study's regression results in comparison to previous 
studies is provided in table form.
9.7.1 Company's Size
A company's size is measured by the total assets of the company and its market capitalisation 
in this study. The hypothesis that there is a positive association between the total assets and 
the level of aggregate disclosure cannot be rejected. There is a significant positive relationship 
between large size listed companies in Oman and the levels of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure in their annual reports (pc.005). This finding is similar to previous studies' findings 
(Hassan etal., 2006; Watson eta l, 2002] suggesting that the size of a company has an impact 
on its level of disclosure whether it is listed in a developed or developing market. Many 
reasons have been given for the positive relationship between a company's size and the level 
of disclosure in the accounting literature:
• Large companies are more complex and therefore are able to provide a more 
sophisticated reporting system.
• They are under public pressure to provide additional information.
• To minimise political costs and agency costs.
• To gain greater benefits by better disclosure in terms of easier marketability of 
securities as a result of reduced uncertainty.
The hypothesis that there is a positive association between a company's market capitalisation 
and the level of disclosure cannot be rejected. This study's finding is consistent with those in 
prior studies in developed (Marston and Polei, 2004] and developing markets (Hossain et. al, 
1994].
In Oman, large size companies tend to comply better with mandatory disclosure requirements 
and to also provide voluntary information in their reports. This might be because of the above 
reasons. Another possible reason is that it might be the way to obtain a government soft loan 
or attract foreign investments. Moreover, large size companies are involved in large projects 
that require a lot of financing and marketing in Oman and abroad. The only way to market 
themselves, their products and securities is to comply with the law and provide additional 
information. Also, it is a way to retain their major shareholders.
9.7.2 Company's Perform ance
The hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between ROE and the level of aggregate 
disclosure is rejected. This finding is similar to that reported in previous studies (Eng and
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Mak, 2003; Lakhal, 2005). In Oman, a company's return on equity ratio does not affect its 
disclosure of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. A possible explanation is that all the 
information needed to calculate the ROE is already given as part of the mandatory disclosure. 
And since companies are required to provide mandatory disclosure, the ROE ratio does not 
affect the mandatory disclosure. Any good or poor performance of a company can be provided 
through the financial statements and the notes to the financial statements, and thus Omani 
companies might feel that it is not necessary to provide voluntary information pertaining to 
their performance. Another possible reason is the inside flow of information between 
managers and main market participants.
9.7.3 Company's Gearing Level
No association was found between Omani listed companies' debt ratio and the level of 
aggregate disclosure. Therefore, the hypothesis is rejected. This is consistent with the results 
of Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) and Patton and Zelenka (1997). However, it contradicts the 
findings of some previous studies (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Hassan eta l, 2006). There are 
two possible reasons for the absence of the influence of debt ratio on disclosure. First, the 
details of debts are already provided as part of the mandatory disclosure and companies have 
to disclose such information regardless of their level of debt. Second, lenders, creditors, and 
major shareholders have already access to inside information and thus companies are not 
required to publish additional information in their annual reports.
9.7.4 Company's Current Ratio
This study found no association between the current ratio and levels of mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure. This finding is consistent with Al-Saeed's (2005) findings in Saudi 
Arabia. A company's current ratio does not affect the levels of disclosure in Oman. This is 
because companies in Oman are required to provide information related to their liquidity, 
regardless of their status. Another possible reason is that any justification given by a company 
regarding its liquidity position is done through internal sources.
9.7.5 Government Ownership
The hypotheses that there is a positive association between the percentage of government 
ownership and the level of mandatory disclosure and a negative association between 
government ownership percentage and voluntary disclosure are rejected. This is consistent 
with the findings of Makhija and Patton (2004).
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In Oman, the percentage of shares held by government does not appear to affect the level of 
disclosure for two reasons. First, government ownership does not impact on mandatory 
disclosure, since all listed companies are required to comply with regulations, otherwise they 
will be penalised. Second, government investment is a long-term investment and therefore 
government representatives know everything about a company and have access to its internal 
documents. Thus there is no necessity to control the disclosure in annual reports.
9.7.6 Institutional Ownership
The hypotheses that there is an association between disclosure and institutional investments 
are rejected for both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. This is consistent with Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002).
In conclusion, institutional investors do not influence the level of disclosure in the annual 
reports of the companies they invest in. Regarding mandatory disclosure, institutional 
investors have no control over such disclosure because by law companies have to comply with 
it. Further, these investors will not exercise any pressure on companies to disclose voluntary 
information because of the flow of private information to them. Al-Busaidi (2005) concluded 
that large institutional investors do not play an active role in Omani listed companies. This 
also might explain the absence of the influence of institutional investors on disclosure.
9.7.7 Major Shareholders
The hypotheses that there are negative associations between the levels of disclosure and the 
percentage of shares held by major shareholders are rejected. Similarly, Eng and Mak (2003) 
found no relationship between blockholder ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure.
Major shareholders have no influence on a company's disclosure for two reasons. First, by law 
companies have to comply with regulations and thus major shareholders have no control over 
the minimum required disclosure. Second, major shareholders have access to private 
information and thus they do not interfere with management decisions to disclose or not.36
9.7.8 Minority Ownership
The hypotheses that there are positive associations between minority ownership and the 
levels of mandatory and voluntary disclosure are rejected. This can be explained by two 
reasons. First, minority shareholders have no voting rights and thus their presence does not 
influence the management decisions of disclosure. Second, they are investors with short-term
36 The given reasons might explain the negative relationship betw een the percentage of shares held by major shareholders and voluntary  
disclosure reported in Appendix H.
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investment interests and therefore listed companies do not consider them when preparing 
annual reports.
9.7.9 Foreign Ownership
The hypotheses that there are positive associations between the percentage of foreign 
investors and the levels of mandatory and voluntary disclosure are rejected. This is 
inconsistent with Haniffa and Cooke's (2002) findings. The majority of Omani listed 
companies are held by Omanis and this might explain the absence of the influence of foreign 
investment on disclosures.
9.7.10 Sector Type
This study found no significant associations between the service and financial sectors and 
levels of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, there were significant 
associations between the industrial sector and the levels of voluntary and aggregate 
disclosure. In the case of weighted voluntary disclosure model, industrial sector was not 
significant might be because of the correlation between it and Big four auditor. This is 
consistent with findings reported in some prior studies (Cooke, 1992; Collett and Hrasky, 
2005; Hossain and Taylor, 1998a). The other sectors were not significant.
In Oman, unlike companies in other sectors, companies in the industrial sector seek external 
financing from banks or government in order to finance their operations and fixed assets. 
Thus, they provide more disclosure in their annual reports to obtain such financing. Also, 
annual reports are companies' means of attracting foreign funds and investors. Unlike 
domestic investors, foreign investors have no personal contacts and access to companies' 
private information and therefore corporate reports are their main source of corporate 
information. Omani listed companies in the industrial sector use their reports to market their 
products, especially those of a unique nature compared to other industrial companies. They 
explain more of the nature of their business and performance to internal and external 
investors and creditors to obtain funds. The above reasons explain the positive relationship 
between industrial sector and level of disclosure in Omani annual reports.
9.7.11 Auditor Type
The hypothesis that companies that are audited by Big four audit firms tend to comply better 
with disclosure requirements cannot be rejected (Naser et al., 2002; Owusu-Ansah, 2005; 
Patton and Zelenka, 1997). Regarding the voluntary disclosure model, the Big four auditor 
variable was only found to be significant in the case of the weighted voluntary disclosure
268
model. This is similar to findings reported in previous studies undertaken by researchers such 
as Craswell and Taylor (1992), Hossain and Taylor (2007b) and Raffournier (1995). 
However, the Big four auditor variable did not have an impact on the overall disclosure level 
in Omani listed companies' annual reports. This might be because of the high correlation 
between auditor type and size and auditor type and industrial sector.37 A number of studies 
have reported that the auditor type variable was not significant in their models (Chau and 
Gray, 2002; Hossain and Taylor, 1998; Wallace etal., 1995).
In Oman, companies audited by Big four audit firms were found to comply better with 
mandatory disclosure requirements. This is because these firms have a worldwide reputation 
for high quality audit services which they seek to protect by ensuring that the companies they 
audit comply fully with the regulations. This provides support to agency theory that auditors 
act as owners' agents which limits managers' ability to take full advantage of some profitable 
opportunities as well as limits their ability to harm shareholders while making themselves 
better off (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Additionally, Big four audit firms possibly put 
pressure on Omani listed companies to provide voluntary disclosure items (significant under 
the weighted voluntary model) in their reports in order to differentiate their audit services 
from those of non-Big four audit firms and to ensure best reporting practices within the 
capabilities of a company (Hossain and Taylor, 2007b). This might also explain why 73 Omani 
listed companies were audited by Big four audit firms in contrast to 38 companies audited by 
non-Big four audit firms and also for the reasons offered by Lennox (1999) who argued that 
big audit firms: (1) give more accurate reports, (2) are more competent at obtaining or 
interpreting audit evidence, (3) have more staff with client-specific knowledge, and (4) are 
more experienced in auditing large quoted companies. This present study found that the 
mean values of the mandatory and voluntary disclosure of companies audited by Big four 
audit firms of 0.95 and 0.25, respectively, were higher than those of companies audited by 
non-big audit firms, namely, 0.91 and 0.18, respectively. Also, companies audited by Big four 
were larger in size (a mean value of 2.7E+07) compared to companies audited by non-Big four 
(a mean value of 1.1E+07).
37 The correlation between size and auditor type affected influence and coefficient sign of Big four auditor variable in unweighted voluntary 
disclosure model and correlation between size and industrial sector and size and auditor type affected influence of auditor type in overall 
disclosure model. This assumption was confirmed by empirical evidence.
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9.8 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has presented the analysis of six regression models regarding factors that might 
explain variations in the overall level of disclosure in Omani annual reports. Table 9.19 
summarises the above results and the results of some previous studies.
In this study, large listed companies, companies with high market capitalization, and 
companies audited by Big four audit firms complied better with mandatory disclosure 
requirements than other companies. Regarding voluntary disclosure, large listed companies, 
companies audited by Big four audit firms, and companies in the industrial sector disclosed 
more information in their annual reports than other companies.
In conclusion, main explanatory factors for the variation in the disclosure in Omani annual 
reports are asset-size, market capitalisation, auditor type and industrial sector. The absence 
of the influence of the other tested variables suggests there are other factors that influence 
companies' disclosure decisions. One possible factor is competition. Competition discourages 
companies from disclosing voluntary information, especially when their competitors are 
unlisted. The high collinearity between asset-size and market capitalisation affected the 
explanatory power of each of the tested models. Dropping market capitalisation from 
regression models (reduced models) enhanced the explanatory power of the models and 
increased the level of significance of the asset-size variable. Also, the correlation between size 
and other variables resulted in size capturing most of the other influences.
Table 9.19: Summary of  R e g r e s s i o n  R e s u l t s  a n d  t h e  S i g n i f i c a n c e  S ig n s .
H H
ROE NS(+) NS(-) NS(-) NS(-) NSf-} NS(-) Singhvi and Desai, (1971); Naser and Al-Khatib 
(2000); Haniffa and Cooke, (2002); Eng and Mak, 
(2003); Patton et. al. (1997); Khanna et al. (2004), 
Akhtaruddin (2005)
Malone et al. (1993); McNally, Eng and 
Hasseldine, (1982), Eng and Mak 
(2003), Lakhal (2005)
Debreceny et al. (2005)
Total Assets SigW SigW SigW SigW SigW SigW Cerf, (1961); Singhvi, and Desai, (1971); Buzby, 
(1975); McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, (1982);Cooke, 
(1989, 1991, 1992); Wallace, Naser and Mora, 
(1994); Hossain, Perera, and Rahman, (1995); Gray, 
Meek and Roberts, (1995); Ahmed, (1996); Ahmed 
and Courtis, (1999); Naser and Al-Khatib, (2000); 
Watson, Shrives and Marston, (2002); Eng and Mak, 
(2003); Haniffa and Cooke, (2005), Inchausti 
(1997), Hassan, Giorgioni and Romilly (2006)
Malone et al. (1993); Patton et al. 
(1997), Ng and Koh (1994), Collett 
and Hrasky (2005), Ahmed (1996), 
Hossain and Taylor (1998a)
Jung and Kwon (2002)
Market
Capitalisation
Sig(+) SigW SigW SigW SigW SigW Firth (1980); Hossain e t  al., (1994), Williams 
(1999), Marston and Polei (2004)
Collett and Hrasky (2005), Wallace and 
Naser (1995),
-
Debt Ratio NS(-) NS(-) NS(-) NSC-)-' NS(-) NSW Ahmed and Courtis (1999); Watson, Shrives and 
Marston (2002), Khanna et al. (2004); Bhojraj et al. 
(2004), Zarzeski (1996)
Haniffa and Cooke (2002); Patton e ta l. 
(1997); Raffournier (1995), Ahmed 
(1996), Archambault et al. (2003), 
Wallaceetal. (1994)
Eng and Mak (2003), Hassan, 
Giorgioni and Romilly (2006)
Current Ratio NSW NSW NS(-) NS(-) NS(-) NSW Owusu-Ansah (2005) Ng and Koh (1994), Watson et al 
(2002), Al-Saeed (2005)
Wallace et. al. (1994), Naser et al. 
(2002)
%  o f gov. NSW NSW ■NSC-} NS(-) NS(-) NSC-} Naser and Al-Khatib (2000); Eng and Mak (2003) Makhijaetal. (2004)
% of institutional 
investment
NSW NSW NSW NS(+) NS(+} NS(+} - Haniffa and Cooke (2002); Eng and Mak 
(2003)
-
% of shares held 
by major 
shareholders
NSW NSW NS(-) NS(-) NS(-) NS(-) Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Jung and Kwon (2002), 
Brennan(2000)
Eng and Mak, (2003) Chau and Gray (2002); Hossain, 
Tan and Adams, (1994); Naser 
and Al Khatib, (2000), Scott 
(1994), Lakhal (2005)
% of shares held 
by minority 
shareholders
NSW NSW NSW NSW NSW NS(+} Jiang and Kim (2000), Mckinnon and Dalimunthe 
(1993), Hossain, Tan and Adams (1994), Chau and 
Gray (2002)
% of foreign 
investors
NSW NSW NS(-) NS(-) NS(+] NS(-) Haniffa and Cooke, (2002); Jung and Kwon (2002); 
Naser and Al-khatib, (2000)
- -
Auditor Type Sig
W
Sig
W
NS (-) Sig
W
NS
(+)
NS(+} Archambault and Archambault (2003), Craswell 
and Taylor (1992), Hossain and Taylor (2007b), 
Inchausti (1997), Malone et al. (1993), McNally et  
al. (1982), Naser etal.  (2002), Ng and Koh (1994), 
Owusu-Ansah (2005)
Ahmed and Courtis (1999), Al- 
Saeed (2005), Chau and Gray 
(2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Firth 
(1979), Hossain e t  a l .  (1994), 
Hossain and Taylor (1998), Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002)
Wallace and Naser (1995)
Sector type 
industrial
NSW NSW M W NSW SigW SigW Cooke (1991, 1992); Gray, Meek and Roberts, 
(1995); Collett and Hrasky (2005)
McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, (1982); 
Wallace, Naser and Mora, (1994), Gray,
Haniffa and Cooke, (2002); 
Watson, Shrives and Marston,
Service NSW NSW NSW NSW NS(+] NSW Meek and Roberts, (1995); Eng and Mak, (2003), Hossain and Taylor 
(1998a)
(2002)
Note: A = Unweighted mandatory; B = Weighted mandatory; C = Unweighted voluntary; D = Weighted voluntary; E= Overall unweighted disclosure; F = Overall weighted 
disclosure, NS = Not Significant; Sig = Significant; M= Marginal; ( 0  sign indicates negative relationship and (+ )  indicates positive relationship
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C H A PT ER  10  : THE I N T E R V I E W  RE SULT S AND ANALYSIS
10.1 Introduction
The research findings derived from the questionnaire survey, discussed in Chapter 7, 
highlighted the important issues as perceived by questionnaire respondents, and revealed the 
financial reporting pattern in Oman. Also, the analysis of Omani annual reports indicated the 
levels and determinants of disclosure. In an attempt to explore some of the highlighted issues 
further, a number of interviews were undertaken with managers of listed companies, 
auditors, financial analysts, government representatives, and regulators. The nature of 
interview questions and their sequence were based on questionnaire findings and annual 
report analysis. Details of interview schedules are provided in Tables 6.5 to 6.7. The main 
objective of the interview survey was to explore some of the issues raised by the 
questionnaire results in more depth.
The following section focuses on the financial reporting pattern in Oman. Section 10.3 
underlines the purpose of financial disclosure in Oman, while Section 10.4 presents the 
importance of various corporate information sources. Section 10.5 explains the importance of 
the management discussion and analysis section and Section 10.6 discusses some corporate 
governance issues in Oman. Section 10.7 addresses some items in financial statements. The 
association between audit firm classification and quality of reports is examined in Section 
10.8. Section 10.9 presents the determinants of voluntary disclosure level in Oman. The 
establishment of a national professional body governing the accounting profession in Oman 
and other corporate governance aspects are discussed in Sections 10.10 and 10.11, 
respectively. Section 10.12 concludes the chapter.
10.2 Financial Reporting Pattern in Oman
In this research, eight themes relating to the financial reporting system were explored: 
purpose of financial disclosure, importance of sources of corporate information, importance 
of management discussion and analysis disclosure and its nature, corporate governance in 
Oman, issues relating to financial statements' items, classification of audit firm and quality of 
financial reporting, voluntary disclosure issues, and the Omani accounting profession. Based 
on these themes, interview questions were prepared to obtain an in-depth understanding of 
the main findings of the first and second stages of this study. The following sections present 
only the significant findings derived from interviews. The list of interview questions is to be 
found in Appendix E.
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10.3 Purpose of Financial Disclosure
Question one: 'In your opinion why did a minority o f questionnaire respondents agree that the 
purpose o f financial reporting is to raise capital (11.6%) and predict future outcomes (18.9%)?’
Questionnaire findings indicated that 31.9% of respondents disagreed that raising capital was 
a reason for financial disclosure. The majority of interviewees (88.89%) confirmed this 
finding. Over a third (35.7%) of managers and 75% of government representatives contended 
that raising capital was not highly rated because it is not a frequent event in a company. An 
investment advisor from a governmental pension fund (respondent G3) commented:
"Raising capital comes as a seasonal business because you raise capital when you have an expansion 
or debt restructuring. Capital raising is an event. It is not the purpose o f disclosure."
On the other hand, raising capital was perceived as the main purpose of financial disclosure 
by 11.11% of interviewees (i.e. 100% of financial analysts; 25% of auditors). Results 
confirmed questionnaire findings. A financial analyst (FA1) from an investment company 
remarked:
"Raising capital is a very important factor for investment companies now. For example, I am in the 
investment department and I always look a t the financial statements o f the listed companies to look 
for opportunity...."
The second part of the above question asked respondents why only 18.9% of questionnaire 
respondents strongly believed that the purpose of financial disclosure is to predict a 
company's future outcome. A third (33.33%) of interviewees believed that predicting future 
outcome was not a reason for disclosure compared to 20.4% of the questionnaire 
respondents. They argued that it is difficult to predict future outcome from current corporate 
reports because of their limited information. A finance manager from an industry company 
(respondent M9) expressed the following opinion:
7  don't think financial statements as they are published today really give a great insight into future 
operations. Much o f what is said is historical in nature, except for a few  texts."
Interestingly, more than half of interviewees (59.3%) argued that financial disclosure is 
helpful in predicting a company's future outcomes, similar to questionnaire findings (i.e. 34% 
concurred with this). Most interviewed managers, government representatives, and all 
interviewed financial analysts and auditors believed that financial disclosure is the basis for 
analyses and predictions. A senior investment analyst and head of research from a brokerage 
company (respondent FA2) stated:
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"You can say that it is possible to predict by 80%. One report only is of no use; I might look a t four, five 
previous reports and see the credibility of management
10.4 Importance of Corporate Information Sources
Question two: 'Why did institutional investors select meetings with a company's management as 
the most important source o f information, whereas individual investors ranked it in 6th position 
in the questionnaire?'
Interviews explored the reasons for these rankings. Interviewees suggested that institutional 
investors or large shareholders likely highly rated meetings with a company's management 
because they have access to companies and their stake is large in size. Moreover, individual 
investors are small speculative shareholders and thus do not have access to companies' 
management. More than a third (37.04%) of interviewees stated that in Oman there is a direct 
relationship between the size of shareholding and access to companies and their internal 
information. A finance manager from a service company (respondent M6) remarked:
“Apart from the other sources, a most important source I would tend to agree is meeting the 
management. A company would because o f investment size entertain larger institutional 
investors....They have more access because o f their own investments and most institutional investors 
also have a lot o f clients who are individual investors. They are brokerage houses or whatever."
Interviewees were also asked about the reasons for meeting a company's management. The 
first group of respondents (i.e. 50% of financial analysts, 14.3% of managers, and 25% of 
government representatives) indicated that large investors meet management to obtain 
additional information that is not disclosed in corporate reports. This is consistent with the 
finding reported by Holland (1998). He interviewed managers in 30 large and 3 medium-sized 
listed UK companies and found that private meetings provided an opportunity for a precise 
summary by managers, plus the opportunity for questions and intensive dialogue. A 
government representative from a governmental body (respondent G4) commented:
"It is the only place you can g e t extra information that the rest don't know about and it is also more 
reliable compared to the rumors. Most o f the time the key source o f information is management"
Respondents also indicated that it is important to meet management in order to understand 
more about their future plans and decisions. Interviews also revealed that investors and 
creditors meet management to obtain details about the disclosed information. However, 
interestingly, 2 respondents (i.e. a financial analyst and auditor) argued that management as a 
source is biased and not reliable.
274
10.5 Importance of the Management Discussion and Analysis Report and the Nature of
its Information
Question three: 'In your opinion why did institutional investors rate the management discussion 
and analysis report higher than other reports' user groups in the questionnaire?'
Interviewed participants stated three main reasons. First, the MD&A report helps them 
evaluate and learn more about management plans. Second, it provides information about a 
company's future plans. Third, the MD&A report explains current performance and 
operations. A finance manager from an investment company (respondent M4) stated:
"For them, it is similar to meeting a company's management because it gives them an idea o f how 
management is operating and the company is performing and what are future projects."
Interviews also disclosed that the MD&A report is read to confirm users' analysis of financial 
statements and explain the figures disclosed. Additionally, 3 of 14 managers and 1 of 4 
government representatives believed that the MD&A report provides extra information that is 
not disclosed in financial statements. This is consistent with questionnaire findings and 
previous literature (see Chapters 7 and 4}. A finance and accounting manager from a service 
company (respondent M il)  expressed the following opinion:
"The MD&A report is important because it presents items related to a company's operations and 
future not disclosed in the financials. These items are shown and highlighted in this report. The 
prospective investor gets a broader view o f the company's present and future position. ”
This study's findings had indicated that the MD&A report is the least considered by individual 
investors. Interviewees suggested this is because such individuals are short-term investors 
and are only concerned with short-term profits. Two points are worth mentioning. First, more 
disclosure is needed in the MD&A section. Second, one of the interviewed auditors did not 
remember the contents of the MD&A report, indicating that some auditors might not look at 
the MD&A since they do not have to audit it.
10.5.1 The Nature of Information Included in the MD&A Report
Question four: 'In your opinion, why did 39.9% o f questionnaire respondents, mostly regulators, 
believe that the management discussion and analysis report provides information that focuses 
on good news more than bad news?'
The main reason given by 6 of 14 managers, 3 of 4 government representatives, and 1 of 3 
regulators was that this is human nature; nobody wants to give bad news and be pessimistic. 
A regulator (respondent Rl) contended:
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“It is human nature. When I win 1000fo r  example, I will say that I won 100,000 or 1 million. When I 
lose 1000,1 will ju st say O.K. On a personal level, good news is distributed quickly but bad news not."
The second reason given was to avoid losing shareholders and keep the share price high. 
Managers (3 of 14] believed that focusing on good news helps in maintaining a company's 
shareholders and share price. Similarly, a regulator (respondent R3] believed that Omani 
listed companies focus on good news because they are trying to avoid questioning. He stated:
“There are some shareholders, especially big ones, that check each point and analyse it in the MD&A 
report and ask management about it. Therefore because management don't won't to go down that 
road they focus on good news and show that theirs is one o f the best companies in case, in the future, 
they want to raise capital and to ensure they g e t w hat they require."
Ahead of research and senior investment analyst (respondent FA2] believed that companies 
provide good news and at the same time discuss bad news briefly, thus misleading the reader. 
He remarked:
“Good news is often disclosed and discussed in a whole page whereas a major problem is discussed in 
only half a line. People might not read that particular line or might think that the rest o f the page is 
also good news. You can present information in different ways."
Some interviewees (i.e. 14.29% of managers, 25% of government representatives, and 50% of 
financial analysts] disagreed with the regulators' opinion. They believed that disclosing bad 
news might not be in the best interests of a company because investors, especially small 
investors, might react negatively to the news. A financial controller from a bank (respondent 
M5] commented:
“Investors are often uneducated. If you give them a small piece o f bad news they are likely to react 
very violently. They will suddenly s ta rt selling, triggering probable panic among other investors."
An interviewed manager and a government representative pointed out that there is no list of 
details that should be disclosed in the MD&A report, thus managers are free to disclose 
whatever they want to disclose. A government representative (respondent G3] stated:
"Because the MD&A report is an open ended kind o f thing, there is no format, there is no list or 
anything. People tend to say the good things and forget the bad things."
A finance manager from a service company (respondent M6] remarked:
"It is difficult to do se lf appraisal and try to show bad things. It depends on who writes the report, 
management, the environment in which the company operates, the quality o f management, and 
what they decide to disclose."
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10.6 Corporate Governance Issues in Oman
The fourth interview theme was concerned with the corporate governance code, the 
corporate governance report and its importance, and the corporate governance report's 
contents. The following sub-sections discuss interviews findings on this theme.
10.6.1 Corporate Report Users' Perceptions of the Corporate Governance Report
Question five: In your opinion, why did 22.5% o f questionnaire respondents believe that the 
corporate governance report is o f very high importance compared to other annual report 
sections?'
Interviewees disclosed a number of reasons for the low importance attached to the corporate 
governance report. One reason given was that corporate governance is a new concept in 
Oman. This led to the second and third reasons: that people still do not understand the 
meaning of corporate governance and also are not aware of the importance of this report. This 
is consistent with previous studies' findings (Solomon etal., 2000b; Solomon etal., 2002). A 
regulator (respondent Rl) admitted that even the regulators themselves had not understood 
the corporate governance concept when it was first introduced in Oman. He commented:
"Corporate governance is a new issue. We are the first country in the Gulf and maybe in the region to 
apply corporate governance. When we started implementing and applying corporate governance, 
some of us regulators did not understand the code of corporate governance, what it means exactly 
and what were its ethics".
More than a quarter (28.57%) of interviewed managers also believed that investors are more 
concerned with a company's profits and returns. Moreover, 22.22% of interviewees argued 
that investors do not read the corporate governance report because it is not relevant to 
investment decisions.
Interestingly, a few interviewees (i.e. 1 of 14 managers, 1 of 4 government representatives) 
considered owners' attitudes to be the reason for the low importance attached to the 
corporate governance report compared to other report sections. In their view, some owners 
had transferred their companies from private companies to public ones without considering 
the consequences of this. A director of a governmental pension fund investment department 
(respondent G2) commented:
"Some owners have shifted the legal structure o f their companies from private to public without 
taking into consideration the responsibility that comes with it. They feel they have managed their 
company successfully for so long, so question why somebody should now tell them what to do."
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Additionally, an interviewed auditor and manager argued that most Omani companies are 
family owned and thus have access to the company's management which provides them with 
inside information about everything in the company and thus they do not have to look at the 
corporate governance report.
Interview findings confirmed the previous literature that institutional investors read and 
understand the corporate governance report more than individual small investors. A financial 
controller from a manufacturing company (respondent M13) commented:
"It is only I think institutional investors who will look a t it, individual investors will not g e t that far."
10.6.1.1 Importance of the Corporate Governance Report
Question six: 'In your opinion, is the corporate governance report important and why?'
More than a quarter (25.9%) of interviewees indicated that they used the corporate 
governance report to evaluate and learn more about a company's management, and 29.6% 
used it to learn about and evaluate a company's board of directors. A finance manager from a 
service company (respondent M6) said:
"This report conveys an idea about the quality of the board of directors. It should be read along with 
other sections. It shows the quality o f management operating the company and therefore the growth  
of the company."
Also, 11.11% of respondents argued that the corporate governance report minimises risk and 
protects investors. This is consistent with findings of Solomon etal. (2002). Interviews also 
indicated that the corporate governance report provides new information that is not disclosed 
in financial statements. Further, 2 of 14 managers and an auditor argued that the corporate 
governance report is important because it shows a company's compliance with disclosure 
requirements.
An interesting comment was made by a finance manager from an investment company. He 
compared management focus before and after corporate governance issue. He (respondent 
M4) remarked:
"Before corporate governance a company's management was more focused on daily operations and 
gaining profits. Corporate governance aspects direct management attention to other aspects that 
should be considered, because all aspects collectively affect a company's profits."
Some interviewees pointed out a limitation in the code of corporate governance in Oman. 
They argued that the code applies to all industries without considering differences in the
nature of industries. The Director of governmental pension fund investment department 
(respondent G2) expressed the following opinion:
“One of the shortcomings o f the corporate governance code is that it governs all industries, with no 
consideration given to the different backgrounds o f industries."
10.6.2 Achievement of the Code o f Corporate Governance
Question seven: 'In this study, 30.2% o f questionnaire respondents were neutral about the 
achievement o f the code o f corporate governance. How do you interpret this response?
Interviewees suggested that people were neutral because they were unaware of the purpose 
and importance of the code of corporate governance. More than a quarter (29.63%) of 
interviewees pointed to a lack of awareness of the code's purpose among investors and 
companies. This supported the comment of a previous interviewee who indicated that 
corporate governance is a new concept. A finance and administration manager from a 
manufacturing company (respondent M10) commented:
"Are they aware o f the corporate governance code? Many companies are not aware. Awareness is 
lacking."
Interviewees (22.22%) also argued that it is difficult to judge the level of disclosure in annual 
reports because there is no benchmark with which to compare current Omani reports. 
Additionally, respondents (i.e. 2 of 4 auditors, 3 of 14 managers, 1 of 4 government 
representatives) stated that while regulators set the minimum standards, companies and 
professional users do not know w hat exactly represents the minimum (i.e. one sentence or 5 
sentences). They suggested that companies with good governance practices should set the 
disclosure standards instead of regulators. A financial controller from the banking sector 
(respondent M5) expressed the following opinion:
“When the word 'minimum' is used somebody will feel they know what it means, that's it, that's all 
they need to know. They don't need to know anything else. Someone else will say 'no' what you mean 
by minimum is not what I mean by minimum. Because o f the differences in opinion and judgment, 
what constitutes 'minimum' has to be firmly established by a few  companies like, say, Shell, or 
somebody who already has a history o f good governance practices and of being very open and 
ethical."
Two interviewees (i.e. respondents G2 and M3) stated that companies do not believe in the 
code and just provide the corporate governance report in compliance with the law. This
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justifies the finding in Al-Busaidi's (2005) study that the appreciation of corporate 
governance requirements in Oman is not adequate.
10.6.3 The Importance of the Corporate Governance Report's Sections
Question eight: 'In your opinion, why did individual investors highly rate details o f non- 
compliance by a company disclosed in the corporate governance report?
Interviews disclosed three main justifications for individual investors' ratings. First, 33.33% 
of interviewees believed that the details of non-compliance by a company is the section where 
individual investors find out about existing problems in a company and thus decide whether 
to continue investing or not.
Second, the interviewed regulators, 75% of auditors and 14.3% of managers suggested that 
for individual investors it is a psychological issue. If a company complies with the law and 
regulations then it is a good company to invest in. An investment advisor from a governmental 
pension fund (respondent G3) argued:
"It is more o f a psychological risk management technique where you try to figure out if  there is 
something wrong with the company. If there appears to be nothing wrong you assume that all is right 
with company. You are trying to push your responsibilities onto a regulator and if  the regulator is 
happy with whatever is happening in the company you should be happy."
Third, 28.6% of managers, 50% of analysts, and 25% of government representatives indicated 
that individual investors used information disclosed about a company's non-compliance to 
evaluate the quality of that company's management. A head of business development in an 
investment company (respondent FA1) remarked:
"Take AGMs fo r example. Although the AGM doesn't have any kind o f financial substance it does 
convey some impression of the quality o f management, how strict they are, how organised they are, 
and, at some stage in the future, where the company is going will be reflected in its profits."
10.6.4 Current Performance of Corporate Governance within Omani Listed Companies
Question ten: 'How do you evaluate the current performance o f corporate governance within 
Omani listed companies?'
More than 70% of interviewees agreed that the current practice of corporate governance is 
good and has improved over time, but more information needs to be disclosed in corporate 
reports. This confirms this study's finding and a prior study finding (Shankaraiah and 
Dabbeeru, 2002) that the level of disclosure in Omani annual reports is inadequate.
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Three respondents (i.e. 2 of 4 auditors, 1 of 2 financial analysts) offered an explanation for the 
low disclosure in corporate reports. First, the majority of Omani public companies do not 
provide additional information in their reports because they are family owned businesses. 
This explanation confirms the finding in La Porta etal.’s (1999) study that the dominant form 
of controlling ownership in the world is families. Second, listed companies believed that the 
greater the disclosure in reports, the more questions will be raised by investors and other 
report users. A head of business development from an investment company (respondent FA1) 
remarked:
"If a company is a family owned business, its owners won't care about the impact of disclosure on 
share price if they don't want to sell their shares. So why should they disclose additional information 
which may benefit their competitors?"
Additionally, 2 of 14 managers, a government representative, a regulator, an analyst, and an 
auditor stated that companies comply with regulations, consistent with previous findings 
which indicated that listed companies comply with minimum disclosure requirements 
(mean=0.94). A regulator (respondent Rl) concluded:
"Around 80 to 90% of corporate governance requirements are complied with by most of the 
companies. This gives you an indication as to current performance of corporate governance within 
Omani listed companies."
One point worth mentioning is that 11.11% of interviewees stated that corporate governance 
should be kept within a voluntary framework. This is consistent with the responses of 97 
institutional investors in a study conducted in the UK (Solomon et al., 2000b).
10.7 Financial Statements' Items
This research indicated that a few of the questionnaire respondents believed that the 
voluntary disclosure of corporate policy on employee training, percentage of Omani 
employees in different levels of a company, cost of safety measures, and a company's 
environmental performance were of high importance. Moreover, questionnaire analysis 
indicated that respondents considered more income statement items than balance sheet items 
when making investment decisions. In order to better understand the logic behind the 
aforementioned questionnaire findings, interviews were conducted and results are presented 
in the following sub-sections.
10.7.1 Voluntary Disclosure of Policies Pertaining to Employee Training Safety and 
Environment Measures
Question eleven: 'In your opinion, why did only a few  respondents consider the following 
voluntary items to be o f high importance: corporate policy on employee training; % o f Omani 
employees; cost o f safety measures; and a company's environmental performance?'
During interviews, 9 of 27 respondents believed that the main reason for the low importance 
of employee training policy and percentage of Omani employees in different corporate levels 
was investors' primary concern with a company's returns, performance, and profitability. 
They therefore did not consider these voluntary issues when making a decision. This might 
explain managers' low disclosure of a company's policy on employee training (40%) and the 
percentage of Omani employees in different corporate levels (0.90%) in Omani listed 
companies' annual reports.
Also, 4 of 14 managers, 1 of 2 analysts, 1 of 3 regulators and 1 of 4 auditors indicated that 
these disclosures do not affect investment decisions. A finance manager from an investment 
company (respondent M4) remarked:
7  believe that corporate training policy and the percentage o f Omanisation are not important in 
making decision because all o f this is translated in the company's performance and its financial 
results."
An interviewed manager and a government representative indicated that investors know 
there are governmental and regulatory bodies concerned with companies' compliance with 
employee issues. A financial controller from a governmental pension fund (respondent Gl) 
commented:
"There are capable people in governmental bodies that deal with corporate training and the 
percentage o f Omanisation, so it is not that important to disclose these items."
Three interviewees disagreed with the other interviewees. In their view, disclosing corporate 
policy on employee training is important because it is one of a company's social 
responsibilities and this policy has an impact on a company's future.
10.7.1.1 Importance of Safety and Environmental Issues
This research had shown that cost of safety measures and a company's environmental 
performance were perceived to be of moderate importance by 33% of questionnaire 
respondents. Analysis of annual reports indicated that 4.50% of Omani listed companies
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disclosed their cost of safety measures and 10.8% discussed their environmental performance 
(see Chapter 8, Section 8.3.1.2).
One of the main reasons for the low importance of safety and environmental issues suggested 
by 22.22% of interviewees is that the importance of these issues depends on the nature of the 
sector. A regulator (respondent Rl) stated:
"Their importance depends on the nature of the company. For example, I will show a lot o f interest if  
the company works in the oil field. Such companies should have high standards o f safety. Companies 
who are working in other sectors are not concerned with this issue."
A further 22.22% of respondents reported that investors are not concerned with safety and 
environmental disclosure because there are regulatory authorities who ensure that no 
company is registered unless it engages in environmentally safe practices and who monitor 
companies' compliance with environmental issues. A senior research analyst from a 
governmental body (respondent G4) said:
"There are special bodies which are concerned with safety issues. Since the company exists, it means it 
complies with regulations, but if it is not complying, the special bodies will penalise it"
Interestingly, an interviewed auditor and a manager maintained that there is no rule in Oman 
governing safety and environmental issues. This contradicts the above quote and responses.
Interviewees also argued that in Oman people do not consider safety and environmental 
issues because they are unaware of the importance of these issues. Moreover, four 
interviewees stated that these issues have no influence on a company's future, financials, and 
on their decisions, therefore it is not important to consider them. Two government 
representatives and a manager also believed that the main reason for not considering or 
disclosing safety and environmental information is that safety and environmental measures 
add cost to the total costs of a company.
10.7.2 Issues on Importance of a Company's Income Statement and Balance Sheet
Question thirteen: ‘According to the questionnaire analysis, item s disclosed in the pro fit and loss 
account w ere m ore highly ra ted  by professional users than item s disclosed in the balance sheet. 
In yo u r  opinion, do y o u  agree, and i f  not, w h a t are the im portan t finan cia l s ta tem en ts  th a t are  
used in the analysis process?
More than a quarter (25.93%) of interviewees believed that the balance sheet is more 
important to consider than profit and loss account when making a decision about a company.
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Interviewed managers indicated that the balance sheet is more important than the profit and 
loss account for three reasons. First, the balance sheet shows the history of a company 
whereas the profit and loss account shows a company's one year results and performance. 
Second, the balance sheet shows liabilities and the relationship between these liabilities and 
equity whereas the profit and loss account sometimes gives wrong indications. Third, the 
balance sheet shows if a company still has room to grow and expand. However, professional 
users surveyed highly ranked items disclosed in the profit and loss account. The differences in 
opinion might be due to the fact that surveyed professional users were asked to consider 
individual items in the balance sheet and profit and loss account whereas interviewees were 
asked for their comments on the finding as whole, and did not have to consider items 
individually. The user and preparer groups of corporate reports in Oman expressed similar 
views as users and preparers in previous studies conducted in developed and developing 
countries.
Further, 3 of 14 managers and 2 of 4 government representatives argued that the balance 
sheet and the profit and loss account should be read in conjunction with each other in order to 
make decisions. Three additional managers and a financial analyst stated that in order to 
make a decision about a company, the whole corporate report should be read.
Interestingly, 3 of 27 respondents contended that the profit and loss account is more 
important than the balance sheet because it reflects a company's performance of an entire 
year. An audit manger from an international affiliated audit firm (respondent Al] remarked:
"I think the income statement is definitely o f more importance than the balance sheet, simply because 
of the fact that the income statem ent is a performance picture and analysis o f what has happened in 
the company throughout the previous 12 months rather than on one particular date."
An assistant general manager from a bank (respondent M12] argued that the nature of the 
sector determines which statement to look at. He commented:
"You need to look a t the balance sheet more closely for specific sectors, for example, banking and 
financial institutions, because basically it is the driver o f your growth. Loans' growth drives your  
profitability in the bank. But the industrial or service side is less balance sheet intensive and more 
profit intensive because you are trying to generate revenues which will have an impact on the 
company."
10.8 Audit Firm Classification and Quality of Financial Reporting
Question fourteen: 'This study's results identified significant differences in the questionnaire 
responses o f auditors o f Big four auditing firms compared to auditors from local companies and 
affiliated auditing companies. How do you interpret this finding?'
The main reason suggested by 62.96% of respondents is that audit methodologies, sources, 
training programmes, internal standards and management style are different and more 
advanced in Big four audit firms compared to local and international affiliated audit firms. 
Additionally, they described the Big four as more qualified, organised, having international 
experience and concerned with their reputation. Similar responses were elicited from 8 of 27 
interviewees, who stated that the Big four audit firms have more qualified, trained, and highly 
skilled staff than local firms who hire new graduates. This is consistent with the findings in Al- 
Omari etal.'s (1999) study that investors and creditors preferred Big four and international 
affiliated audit firms because of their reputation, experience and compliance with regulations. 
It also confirms arguments made in a number of studies (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995; Chow 
and Rice, 1982; Lennox, 1999). A head of operations from a service company (respondent Ml) 
stated:
"Style o f working and the management and procedures o f Big 4 auditing firm s are different. They 
have more exposure to big companies who are professional and multinational. They have professional 
staff. They have different procedures and training programmes."
Further, 18.52% of interviewees contended that Big four audit firms strictly apply 
International Accounting Standards, do not compromise, and are not influenced by the 
management of an audited company. A finance and accounting manager from a service 
company (respondent M il) remarked:
"The Big four very much apply International Accounting Standards, especially after the Enron case. 
They immediately disclose anything which is found not to be in order. Even if the company might feel 
it is a small thing and can be ignored, a Big four audit firm will not ignore it."
Three of 14 managers, 1 of 2 financial analysts, and 1 out of 4 government representatives 
interviewed pointed out that Big four audit firms deal with large, professional companies and 
have a legal obligation to comply with disclosure requirements and CMA regulations, whereas 
the rest of the auditing firms audit small and closed companies and are primary concerned 
with complying with tax requirements. This might explain why Big four audit firms do not 
compromise and their high involvement in auditing listed companies. This study also found
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that large size companies (with a mean value of 2.70E+07) have Big four as their auditors. A 
head of business development in an investment company (respondent FA1) commented:
"Because the Big four deal more with listed companies and large size companies they will have more 
problems with disclosure and compliance with CMA and tax requirements. Smaller audit companies 
will have few er smaller problems like disclosures relating to sales, revenue, and compliance with 
taxation requirements. Because their focus is different, their clients are different, the size of the 
companies they handle is different, and even the professionalism is different."
Questionnaire findings showed no significant differences in the perceptions of local and 
international affiliated audit firms regarding the quality of annual reports' aspects in Oman. 
These findings were confirmed by an assistant general investment department in a bank 
(respondent M12). He remarked:
"I would club international affiliates together with local audit firms because they only represent 
brand audit names, no more than that."
Interestingly, a financial controller from a bank and an ex-auditor (respondent M5) asserted 
that Big four auditing firms use global policies which are unsuitable for the local Omani 
economy. Her remarks contradicted other interviewees' responses. She stated:
7 have actually worked in a Big four. I was with 'A'for five and a half years. The Big four usually have 
their own audit methodology, their own audit policy and way o f looking a t a financial statement. The 
risk they assign to a financial statem ent is based on the global policy, which is based on America, 
Europe, more on the bigger economies. Sometimes I don't think such policy will work for a smaller 
economy like Oman."
10.9 Factors Influencing Voluntary Disclosures
<Question fifteen: 'What are the internal and external factors that affect voluntary disclosure in 
(Omani annual reports? Do they affect it positively or negatively?
Interviewees reported a number of internal factors influencing voluntary disclosure levels. 
First, 33.33% of interviewees indicated that management attitude, professionalism, and 
awareness of the importance of voluntary disclosure determine the level of disclosure in 
corporate reports. A finance manager from a service company (respondent M6) commented:
"Internal factors are the degree o f professional and independent management. Also, the level of 
awareness o f the importance o f disclosure within management."
Second, the nature of voluntary disclosure depends on its impact on a company's value and 
s;hare price according to 18.52% of interviewees. A regulator (respondent Rl] remarked:
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"The second thing voluntary disclosure depends on is the kind information disclosed. For example, 
does it have competitive advantage? I will publish it if it does since it will not affect my competitive 
position. In fact, publishing it will add value to my company. Some information might affect my 
competitive position and therefore I will not disclose i t "
Thirdly, 3 of 27 interviewees indicated that a company's willingness to disclose voluntary 
disclosure or not determines the level of its voluntary disclosure, since this kind of disclosure 
is not required. A finance and administration manager from a manufacturing company 
(respondent M10] stated:
"Mandatory disclosures have to be made, whether good or bad, but voluntary disclosure depends on 
the organisation, if they wish to disclose it or not."
Other internal factors presented during interviews were a company's owners, culture, 
operations, board of directors' attitude, and fear of legal responsibility. Additionally, a 
government representative and a service company manager pointed out that more disclosure 
means extra work for management and thus managers avoid disclosing additional 
information in reports.
Regarding external factors influencing voluntary disclosure, three main factors were reported 
in interviews. Almost half (48.15%) of respondents viewed the main external factor deterring 
companies from disclosing voluntary information as competition, especially from unlisted 
companies. This is inconsistent with interviewees' responses in Armitage and Marston's 
(2007) study that fear of competition is not a deterrent to disclosure. An assistant general 
manager investment banking (respondent M12) stated:
"For many companies that are listed, their main competitors are unlisted companies who do not have 
to publish their financials. Listed companies are therefore afraid that when they give out voluntary 
disclosure their competitors will know everything about them, while they, on the other hand, cannot 
g e t hold o f their competitors'financials."
An example of how competition deters a listed company from providing extra information 
was given by a finance and administration manager from a manufacturing company 
(respondent M10). He said:
"Take, for example, our company. If you read my segment analysis you will not find a product-wise 
segment indicating what products we sell. The reason is we are the only public limited mineral water 
company. All other beverage and mineral water companies are privately owned companies. If I 
disclose certain information it will be misused by somebody or used by somebody else and I will be
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disclosing vital information. So, in my report you might not find certain information which you might 
find in other reports."
More than a quarter (25.9%) of interviewees intimated that listed companies fear government 
regulations and outsiders' reaction to voluntary information and thus do not provide 
voluntary disclosures. Interviewees also suggested that lack of awareness of the 
accountability concept and lack of a system which rewards companies for good behaviour in 
the region are some of the other factors for the low levels of voluntary disclosure.
Interestingly, and surprisingly, two auditors working in one of the Big four audit firms stated 
that, in Oman, auditors prepare annual reports not companies' management and thus they 
decide what to disclose in these reports. This might explain the positive association between 
levels of disclosure and companies audited by Big four audit firms. It also might indicate the 
quality of audit services in Oman. In contrast, the other two interviewed auditors reported 
that a company's board of directors and management are the ones who decide what to 
disclose in corporate reports. An audit supervisor from one of the Big four auditing firms 
(respondent A3) commented:
"Honestly, here in Oman, management does not decide whether they need to add a disclosure or not. 
Because we who prepare the financial statements we make the disclosure according to IFRS 
standards and that's it."
10.10 The Omani Accounting Profession
In Oman, disclosure is governed by the Capital Market Authority since there is no accounting 
body in Oman. This research asked interviewees the following question: Do you think having a 
professional body governing the accounting profession in Oman would improve the financial 
reporting system in Oman in comparison to the current reporting system? I f  yes, why, and what 
are the benefits o f having a national accounting profession? If no, why?
The majority (88.89%) of interviewees believed it necessary to have professional body 
specifically governing the accounting profession in Oman. They provided six main advantages 
of having such a body in the country. First, 25.63% of respondents believed that, in addition to 
international standards, this body is necessary to set local policies that are suitable for the 
Omani culture and business environment needs. Respondents maintained that some 
international standards are difficult to implement in Oman and sometimes these standards 
are not applicable. A finance and administration manager from a manufacturing company 
(respondent M10) commented:
"...yes, it would be good to have a n a t io n a l  organisation specifically governing the Omani accounting 
profession which understands the w a y  b u s in e ss  is conducted here."
Second, 25.9% of interviewees v iew ed  a  body specifically regulating the national accounting 
profession as a good idea. It could r e v i e w  current reporting practices and suggest solutions to 
problems facing companies and re g u la to rs .  Third, six managers and an auditor believed that 
such a body would be useful for reg u la tin g  the training and improvement of Omani 
accountants' professional practice. F o u r th ,  14.8% of interviews regarded such a body as 
essential to monitor registered a u d i t in g  firms and evaluate whether their work is up to 
standards or not. A regulator ( re s p o n d e n t R2) expressed the following opinion:
"A body setting local accounting s ta n d a r d s  could closely watch the performance o f auditors. This is 
very important."
Fifth, five managers maintained tha t s u c h  a body would result in the exchange of experiences 
among professionals, improvements i n  the accounting profession, and improvements in 
accounting disclosures. A finance m a n a g e r  from an investment company (respondent M4) 
said:
"The existence o f such an accounting b o d y  would have a positive effect on the accounting profession 
through: (1) exchange o f experience w o r ld w id e ;  (2) improve the profession; (3) improve accounting 
standards and disclosure. The CMA c a r e s  about disclosure as part o f companies' work. It looks a t 
companies from a broader view. B u t a n  accounting body would be more specialised in disclosure 
regulations. "
Sixth, two auditors suggested that a n a t io n a l  accounting body would only benefit local firms 
and set standards for small and m e d iu m  size firms. Further, two interviewees (i.e. G2 and M2) 
argued that one of the disadvantages o f  a n  Omani accounting body would be the extra cost of 
membership of the profession.
An interviewed regulator, a g o v ern m en t representative, and an auditor maintained that there 
is no necessity to establish a body sp ec ifica lly  regulating the accounting profession in Oman 
because International Accounting S ta n d a rd s  cover all issues and companies are required to 
follow these standards to be accepted g lobally .
10.11 Other Corporate Governance I s s u e s
The final question in the interview s c h e d u le  was: 'Are there any corporate governance issues 
that you feel important and not part o f  t h e  current corporate governance framework in Oman?'
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Interviews presented four interesting responses. First, to have restrictions on the period a 
board member serves in a company. Also, more cooperation is needed between regulators 
and other interested parties. Third, to have more quality and in-depth disclosure in current 
required sections and reports. This supported prior research findings in this study that 
indicated Omani listed companies were complying with minimum mandatory disclosure 
requirements and providing less voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Finally, to have a 
disclosure benchmark against which corporate report users could compare current corporate 
governance framework with to see whether it is reaching the standards set or not.
10.12 Summary and Conclusion
In conclusion, the interviews disclosed interesting and important facts about the Omani 
business environment. One of the main facts was that most of the businesses in Oman are 
family owned and controlled, thus this indirectly affects the disclosure levels especially the 
voluntary disclosures. Another fact is that disclosure in the corporate governance report in 
Oman is not up to the required standard and more disclosures are needed. Moreover, some 
modifications are needed in this report. There should be a separate corporate governance 
report for each sector because of the unique nature of the sector. Also, corporate reports' 
users should be better educated about the importance of this report. One noticeable issue the 
researcher noted from interviews is that some professionals do not know what the report is 
or what it contains. For example, an auditor from one of the Big four auditing firms 
commented that he had not seen a corporate governance report.
This study has found that auditors from the Big four audit firms prepare the annual reports of 
listed companies, as claimed by the interviewed auditors. This might explain significant 
differences in levels of disclosure between companies audited by Big four and companies 
audited by non-Big four (see Table 9.3] and differences between the perceptions of auditors of 
the Big four and other auditor groups regarding various aspects of corporate annual reports 
in Oman. It also explains this study's failure to find a relationship between a company's 
performance, liquidity, gearing level, and ownership structure and disclosures.
The study has shown that it is necessary to have a professional body specifically regulating 
and governing the national accounting profession in Oman. Such a body would improve 
reporting and auditing practices in Oman. Also, it would solve accounting problems faced by 
listed and unlisted companies in the country. Additionally, this body would issue disclosure 
regulations that are suitable and applicable to the Omani business environment. To be
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efficient and effective, the Capital Market Authority should give full authority to this body so 
that it will have a sound influence on companies.
In conclusion, the quality of financial reporting in Oman needs to be improved in two ways: 
(1) disclosing more quality and in-depth information in corporate reports and (2) establishing 
a professional body with the specific purpose of regulating and governing the national 
accounting profession in Oman. Such a body would address local issues faced by companies 
and provide solutions for companies and regulators. This professional body could be the 
connection between regulators and international accounting bodies to clarify and modify any 
international standards in a way that suits the Omani business environment.
C H A P T E R  11  : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
11.1 Introduction
This study has empirically investigated the quality of annual financial reports of Omani listed 
companies by examining both the perceptions of users and preparers of annual reports and 
current disclosure practice. This chapter reviews the important findings and addresses the 
limitations of the research. This chapter also suggests areas for future research. The following 
section discusses the achievement of the research objectives. Section 11.3 provides a 
summary of the main findings relating to corporate reports' users' perceptions of the quality 
of reports. Section 11.4 highlights the findings with regard to disclosure practice in Oman and 
Section 11.5 presents the factors that might explain the variations in disclosure level. 
Interview analysis findings are reviewed in Section 11.6. Section 11.7 acknowledges the 
study's limitations and areas for future research are identified in Section 11.8. Section 11.9 
concludes the chapter.
11.2 Achievement of the Study Objectives
This research's six main objectives were highlighted in Chapter 1:
1. To identify the information needs of corporate reports' users in Oman. This was 
achieved by designing and distributing 500 questionnaires to seven user groups: 
individual investors, institutional investors, government representatives, financial 
analysts, accountants, auditors, and regulators. Respondents' perceptions were elicited 
regarding reporting objectives and the importance of the information sources, the 
annual report sections, and a list of voluntary disclosures. Also, 27 interviews were 
conducted in order to understand some of the main questionnaire findings.
2. To discover differences in the perceptions of three auditor groups regarding the quality 
of reporting practices in Oman. This was achieved by distributing 95 questionnaires to 
auditors from Big four audit firms, local audit firms, and international affiliated audit 
firms. Interviews were also conducted with four auditors from Big four audit firms in 
order to more fully understand the questionnaire findings.
3. To identify professional users' views of the importance of a list of mandatory disclosures 
in Omani annual reports. This was achieved by distributing 280 mandatory disclosure 
lists to three user groups: financial analysts, accountants, and auditors. Additionally, 
interviews were conducted to investigate the reasons behind the ratings of some of the 
mandatory disclosures.
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4. To measure the correlation between mandatory and voluntary disclosure in Omani 
annual reports. This was achieved by applying the Spearman correlation test.
5. To measure the extent of both mandatory and voluntary disclosure of Omani listed 
companies and whether it reflected users' needs. This was achieved by using descriptive 
statistics. Interviews were also conducted in order to better understand the reasons for 
the level of disclosure in Omani annual reports.
6. To identify which of a company's characteristics, namely, size, performance, liquidity, 
gearing level, auditor type, industry, and ownership structure, determined the levels of 
aggregate disclosure of Omani listed companies. This was achieved by applying 
regression analysis. In addition, interviews were conducted in order to investigate the 
views of Omani reports' users with regard to factors influencing voluntary disclosure in 
Omani annual reports.
11.3 Corporate Report Users' Perceptions of Omani Annual Reports
The perceptions of annual report users and auditors were measured using a questionnaire 
survey. Seven major groups of corporate stakeholders took part in this study: [1] individual 
investors, (2) institutional investors, (3) financial analysts, (4) government representatives, 
(5) accountants, (6) auditors, and (7] regulators.
The different respondent groups stated that the main objectives of financial disclosure in 
Oman are to assess a company's financial position and cash flow and to evaluate a company's 
performance. These findings are similar to those in prior studies in developed markets 
(Gniewosz, 1990] suggesting that reports' users in developed and developing markets rely on 
reports to assess a company's financial condition and performance. This study's findings also 
provide evidence to support agency theory that financial statements are one of the ways to 
monitor management. The main difference in perception was found between regulators and 
institutional investors regarding the disclosure purpose of evaluating a company's 
performance which can be explained based on agency theory. According to this theory, there 
is a conflict of interests between reports' preparers and reports' users and thus there were 
differences in their views about the importance and usefulness of the various aspects of 
reporting in Oman.
In Oman, various stakeholders perceived the annual report and its analysis to be the most 
important sources of corporate information. Also, corporate quarterly reports, sector 
information, and meeting with a company's management were considered important. These
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findings are similar to those reported in previous studies conducted in developed and 
developing markets, particularly other GCC countries (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004a; 
Anderson, 1981). However, they contradict other studies conducted in developed markets, 
such as Australia (Anderson and Epstein, 1995). Another highly perceived source of 
information by corporate users, especially institutional investors in Oman, was meeting with a 
company's management. This is consistent with the findings of a number of studies conducted 
in developed (Armitage and Marston, 2007; Barker, 1998) and developing countries (Abu- 
Nassar and Rutherford, 1996). The above findings suggest that although corporate reports are 
highly used in developed and developing markets, there is still inside flow of private 
information to main market participants in Oman as well as in developed markets.
The high importance attached to meeting with a company's management by institutional 
investors in Oman as a source of information provides evidence to support agency theory that 
investors benefit from inside flow of private information because it improves their welfare. 
Moreover, signalling theory offers an explanation for the selection of this source of 
information. It states that managers signal information to large shareholders and institutional 
investors in order to retain them and not lose them. On the other hand, this creates a conflict 
of interests between major investors and minority investors, since major investors have 
greater access to a company's management than minority investors. This explains the low 
rating of meeting with a company's management as an information source by individual 
investors in Oman. A point worth mentioning is that studies conducted in GCC countries, such 
as Saudi Arabia, cannot be generalised to other GCC countries. For instance, Omani 
institutional investors highly rated information obtained from a company's management 
whereas Saudi institutional investors rated this source lower than other user groups (Al- 
Razeen and Karbhari, 2004a).
When investigating differences between and among user groups, significant differences were 
found between individual investors and other user groups, except financial analysts, 
regarding the importance of corporate annual reports, meeting with a company's 
management, and the MSM link on the Internet. The use of different sources of corporate 
information in making decisions supports the stakeholder theory that the distribution of 
information through various channels creates a division of power with checks and balances to 
manage conflict of interests (Turnbull, 1997a).
This study indicated that the company's financial statements, notes to the financial 
statements, and auditors' report were the most important annual report sections when
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making an investment decision in Oman. The least important sections were the corporate 
governance report and the chairman's report. These findings are similar to those reported in 
the accounting literature for developed and developing countries (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 
2004b; Anderson and Epstein, 1996) suggesting that financial information is more highly 
regarded by reports' users in developed and developing markets than narrative information. 
Also, the findings revealed that the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) report was 
more highly rated by institutional investors than other groups. This contradicts the finding of 
a study conducted in the US (Hodge and Pronk, 2005), where professional users paid more 
attention to financial statements than to the MD&A report. This might be because, in Oman, 
institutional investors rely more on the MD&A report to confirm and check information 
obtained from their meetings with companies' management than US professional users who 
rated reports based on their importance in making decisions. The high importance assigned to 
the MD&A report by institutional investors provides evidence to support agency theory that 
financial reports reduce information asymmetry between managers and owners by explaining 
financial figures and providing forward-looking information to report users in the 
aforementioned report. Finally, this study found significant differences among different 
stakeholders, particularly professional users, regarding the importance of the various annual 
report sections. This is inconsistent with the findings of Hodge and Pronk's (2005) study. This 
might be because professional users in Oman come from different cultures and have different 
international experiences.
Annual reports' users indicated that the most important sections in the MD&A report were: 
(1) risks and concerns, (2) discussion on financial position, (3) opportunities and threats, and 
(4) discussion on operational performance. On the other hand, industry structure and 
Omanisation training sections were considered not useful when making investment decisions. 
There was agreement between user groups regarding the usefulness of MD&A disclosure. This 
supports the importance of the disclosure of such report, which is consistent with the findings 
reported in prior studies (Beattie and Pratt, 2002) suggesting that this report is important to 
consider when making investment decisions.
When investigating the nature of information disclosed in the MD&A report, user groups 
viewed the information disclosed as useful to evaluate managerial performance and to predict 
a company's future earnings. The present study's findings provide evidence that supports 
agency theory that financial statements are used to monitor managers since there is 
separation between ownership and management. Additionally, the study revealed that user 
groups, especially regulators, believed MD&A report focuses on good news more than bad
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news. According to signalling theory, managers signal good news to raise a firm's value and 
distinguish themselves from those with bad news. In general, user groups agreed in their 
ratings of the nature of the information of MD&A report.
The study showed that almost 50% of stakeholders believed that Omani listed companies 
provide enough disclosure in the corporate governance report. There are two possible 
explanations for this finding. First, user groups believed that Omani companies were 
providing high levels of disclosure in the corporate governance report compared to two years 
back when the corporate governance code was introduced. Second, the user groups surveyed 
might have feared an increase in regulations if they intimated there was insufficient 
disclosure in this report. This indicates that different stakeholders, especially accountants and 
managers, considered this present study to be of high importance to regulators, since it 
reports the informational needs of different user groups and their perceptions of reporting 
quality.
The most important sections of the corporate governance report in this study were: (1) 
disclosure policies, (2] details of a company's management, (3) composition and qualifications 
of the board of directors, and (4} distribution of shareholdings. The high importance attached 
to details of a company's management contradicts the findings of a number of studies 
conducted in developed (Firth, 1978) and developing markets (Ibrahim and Kim, 1994). In 
Oman, details of a company's management were highly rated because reports' users relate 
these details to that company's performance. This provides evidence that supports agency 
theory that corporate reports can be used by owners to monitor managers. On the other hand, 
the importance of details of the board of directors assigned by users in this study was 
consistent with findings reported in developed and developing markets (Bartlett and 
Chandler, 1997; Wallace, 1988) suggesting agreement between reports' users in developed 
countries regarding the importance of the details of board of directors.
Most of the sections of the corporate governance report were highly rated by accountants and 
regulators. This supports the earlier finding that user groups as a whole were not fully aware 
of the importance of the corporate governance report. A point worth mentioning is that 
individual investors highly rated the details of non-compliance by companies. This might be 
because this disclosure ensures that companies are complying with disclosure regulations and 
are being monitored by regulatory bodies. This provides evidence to support agency and 
stakeholder theories that monitoring managers via annual reports will reduce the inside flow 
of information and thus manage conflict of interests. Overall, there were significant
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differences in the perceptions of different user groups of the importance of various corporate 
governance report's sections, such as market price data, due to differences in level of 
awareness of their importance in making decisions.
Annual corporate reports' users demanded the disclosure of some of the voluntary 
information presented to them in the questionnaire. The most im portant voluntary items 
were, arranged in order of their importance: (1) price earnings ratio, (2) comparison of a 
company’s actual performance with competitors, (3) gross profit margin, (4) trend analysis on 
profitability (5] profit forecast, and (6) future cash flows. The above findings are consistent 
with the findings of a number of studies conducted in developed markets (McNally et al., 
1982), suggesting that voluntary financial information is highly regarded by reports' users 
worldwide when making investment decisions.
The study also showed that user groups attached low importance to a company's cost of 
safety measures, health, safety and security, environmental performance and percentage of 
Omani employees in different levels of a company. This is inconsistent with the findings in a 
study conducted in the UK (Beattie and Pratt, 2002), inferring that safety and environmental 
issues in Oman are not treated in the same way as in developed markets. There are two 
possible reasons for the low importance attached to safety and environmental issues. The first 
is that user groups are unaware of the importance and the impact of these issues on a 
company's current and future operations. The second reason is that user groups are aware of 
the importance of these issues but do not care because these issues do not directly affect a 
company's profitability and are monitored and checked by other regulatory bodies.
11.3.1 Differences in Auditor Groups’ Perceptions
This study investigated differences in auditor groups' perceptions of reporting objectives and 
aspects in Oman. In this study, auditors were classified into three groups: (1) local, (2) 
international affiliated and (3) Big four. The study revealed significant differences between 
the perceptions of auditors from Big four audit firms and auditors from local and international 
affiliated audit firms regarding the importance of the various annual report aspects presented 
to them in the questionnaire. A possible explanation is that Big four audit firms in Oman are 
more knowledgeable and experienced in this area than other audit firms since they have 
international experience in global markets and audit the majority of Omani listed companies. 
Also, Big four audit firms are responsible for providing their opinion regarding the 
compliance of listed companies with reporting and capital market regulations, since they act 
as the agents of these listed companies' owners, while local audit firms are involved with
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unlisted companies that are operated by their owners and are not required to comply with 
capital market regulations. Big four audit firms in Oman have established a reputation for 
integrity and thus protect this reputation by ensuring companies comply with disclosure 
requirements and upholding and maintaining the quality of information published.
The present study contributes to the accounting literature because it proves empirically that 
the perceptions of auditors working in various types of audit firms of the objectives and 
importance of corporate reports in making investment decisions are different and thus the 
level of disclosure in annual reports will differ. Previous research has demonstrated 
statistically that there is an association between the size and type of audit firm and the level of 
disclosure (Hossain and Taylor, 2007b; Makhija and Patton, 2004, Naser et a l, 2002). This 
study showed that auditors' perceptions differed based on the type of audit firm and this 
difference affected the quantity and quality of disclosure. For instance, if Big four auditors 
believe that details of bank loans are of very high importance compared to local auditors then, 
in the case of partial or no disclosure, they will not compromise and will require their clients 
to disclose such details.
11.3.2 Users' Perceptions of the Importance of Mandatory Disclosure
The present study revealed that annual reports' users considered most of the disclosure 
requirements in Omani annual reports to be im portant to their investment decision-making 
process. This is consistent with findings reported in developed markets (Hooks et al, 2002) 
and developing markets (Mirshekary and Saudagaran, 2005). Reports' users in the present 
research attached more importance to profit and loss account items such earnings per share 
and net profit or loss than to the balance sheet and notes to the financial statements' items. 
This suggests that different stakeholders are more concerned with the short-term 
performance of a company than the long-term. In general, there was agreement among user 
groups about the importance of mandatory elements. A possible explanation might be that 
user groups believe these items to be im portant since they are required by the Capital Market 
Authority.
11.4 Disclosure Practice in Oman
A sample of 111 annual reports, which represented 88% of the listed companies in the year 
2004, was employed to analyse annual disclosure practices in Oman. The study found that 
Omani listed companies complied with disclosure requirements. The level of mandatory 
disclosure in Omani annual reports ranged from 0.66 to 1.000. This suggests that although 
listed companies were complying with regulations they were not completely complying with
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regulations. The mean of mandatory index was 0.94, higher than the index mean reported in 
some developing countries (Hassan et al, 2006]. On the other hand, the index range scores 
was lower than the index range scores reported in some developed markets (Cooke, 1992], 
suggesting that level of mandatory disclosure is not yet up to the standards of developed 
countries and there is room for improvement.
When comparing the compliance of listed companies in different sectors, the highest 
compliance was found in the service sector and the lowest in the industrial sector. A possible 
reason is that service companies are more highly owned by government and institutional 
investors than other sectors and thus comply with regulations to set a good example and not 
be penalised. The industrial sectors comply less with regulations because they fear 
competition from unlisted industrial companies. Unlisted companies might take advantage of 
their published annual reports whereas listed companies have no access to unlisted 
companies' information. Companies in such cases have discretion over their disclosure and 
thus decide to disclose only the minimum disclosure requirements or to disclose additional 
information. This provides evidence to support signalling theory that managers fear 
competition, because if they signal good news to competitors they might lose their 
competitive advantage. It also supports agency theory that managers will not disclose 
information if disclosure costs exceed benefits. Regulators should set clear rules in such cases 
in order for companies to follow them without losing their competitive advantage.
Most of the items perceived by corporate reports' users to be important were disclosed by 
companies in various sectors. However, some highly rated ratios, such as net assets per share, 
were not disclosed by some of the listed companies. Only 31% of industrial companies, 8% of 
service companies, and 26% of financial companies disclosed this ratio. A possible 
explanation for the low disclosure of net assets per share is that this ratio and other ratios are 
disclosed by the Muscat Securities Market on its website and in its monthly issues, and thus 
companies feel that this ratio is already available and there is no need to disclose it. 
Regulators should act to correct this disclosure deficiency.
The disclosure of individual mandatory items in Omani annual reports was higher than the 
disclosure of these items in developing and developed countries, pointing to differences in the 
enforcement level of disclosure regulations in these countries. For instance, in Oman, 100% of 
companies disclosed related party transactions compared to 82% of New Zealand companies 
(Hooks eta l, 2002]. Moreover, mandatory disclosure in Oman had improved from the period 
2002 (Shankaraiah and Dabbeeru, 2002] to 2004 (present study].
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The mean value of voluntary disclosure indices of Omani listed companies in the present 
study was 0.225. This mean value is lower than the mean value reported in a recent study 
conducted in a developing country (Hassan et al, 2006), indicating that Omani corporate 
reports provide voluntary disclosure lower than that in reports of other developing countries. 
Few of the listed companies in Oman provided the highly rated voluntary items in their 
reports. For instance, profit forecast, one of the most important voluntary information to 
reports' users was disclosed by only 8% of industrial companies, 2.6% of service companies, 
and none of the financial companies. Another important item to external users, namely, 
comparison of actual company's performance with competitors, was disclosed by only 14% of 
listed companies. The levels of voluntary disclosure in Oman ranged from 3.2% to 51.6%. The 
aforementioned findings point to an information gap between w hat external users demand 
and what companies disclose in their reports.
In order to determine the reasons why companies did not disclose highly rated voluntary 
items, this study conducted interviews. Interview findings are reported in Section 11.6. The 
above discussion suggests low pressure from corporate reports' users on companies to 
disclose voluntary information. A possible reason is the inside flow of information between 
major investors and managers. Obtaining information using informal means benefits major 
investors who ensure that these benefits are not extended to other investors, such as minority 
investors. This supports market myopia theory that large shareholders take unfair advantage 
of other shareholders. Based on agency theory, managers of Omani listed companies provide a 
few voluntary items to convince regulators that there is no inside flow of information.
The present study also showed that only 6% of industrial listed companies disclosed safety, 
health and security issues and 12% disclosed environmental issues. This suggests that in 
Oman, safety and environmental issues are not of major concern to reports' users and thus 
companies are not disclosing these issues.
The study found a modest correlation between the levels of voluntary disclosure and 
mandatory disclosure. This is consistent with a study conducted in Saudi Arabia (Al-Razeen 
and Karbhari, 2004c). Sectorwise, a lower correlation was found between the voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure of industrial and financial companies than service companies, which 
reported a modest association between both disclosures. Such findings point to factors other 
than the level of mandatory disclosure influencing the amount of voluntary disclosure, such as 
competition and industry type.
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11.5 Factors Explaining Variations in Corporate Levels of Disclosure
This study identified reasons for variations in the corporate level of annual disclosure of a 
sample of 111 Omani listed companies. One of the main findings is that a company's degree of 
compliance with disclosure regulations tends to be significantly higher as the size (i.e. total 
assets and market capitalisation) of a company increases. A similar result was found 
regarding voluntary disclosure. This is consistent with findings of studies conducted in 
developed (Watson etal., 2002), developing countries (Hossain and Taylor, 2007a) and other 
GCC countries (Al-Saeed, 2005). The present study findings provide support for agency theory 
that the larger the firm the larger the total agency costs and wealth transfers. They also 
support the market myopia theory that larger companies are under market pressure to 
comply with regulations and disclose additional information.
This study found that auditor type influences the level of disclosure in Omani annual reports. 
Listed companies audited by Big four audit firms complied better with mandatory disclosure 
than companies audited by non-Big four audit firms (i.e. international affiliated). A similar 
result was found regarding voluntary disclosure. This is consistent with findings of studies 
conducted in developed and developing countries (Hossain and Taylor, 2007b; Malone eta l, 
1993, Naser eta l, 2002; Raffournier, 1995). The present study's findings provide support for 
agency theory that shareholders will select an external auditor with a reputation to limit 
managers' ability to harm them while making themselves better off. They also support 
signalling theory that Big four audit firms will put pressure on their clients to comply with 
regulations and provide more disclosure in annual reports to signal out the quality of their 
own audit services. Although this study found that Big four audit firms influence disclosure 
levels in Oman, such firms are not doing a good job in the case of voluntary disclosure since 
the voluntary disclosure level in Omani annual reports was found to be low. Accordingly, Big 
four audit firms should put more pressure on public companies to disclose more voluntary 
disclosure items and so doing will set a good example for companies audited by international 
affiliated audit firms.
It was also found in this study that companies in the industrial sector provided more 
voluntary disclosure in their annual reports than other sectors. This confirms the descriptive 
analysis of the level of voluntary disclosure where the highest mean values were found in the 
industrial sector (see Table 8.5). Based on market myopia theory, companies in the industrial 
sector are under market pressure to provide additional information in their reports in order 
for them to raise and obtain funds. This is because of the nature of the sector in that it
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requires more long-term assets than other sectors. It was also found that Omani industrial 
companies had the highest debt ratio among other sectors. However, no significant 
association was found between the industrial sector and mandatory disclosure. A possible 
explanation is that companies by law are required to comply with disclosure requirements 
regardless of their sector type.
The study indicated that a company's debt ratio, current ratio, return on equity, and 
ownership structure have no significant association with the level of annual corporate 
disclosure. This is consistent with the findings of a number of studies conducted in developed 
markets (Archambault and Archambault, 2003}, developing markets (Eng and Mak, 2003], 
and GCC markets (Al-Saeed, 2005}. A possible reason for the absence of the effect of the above 
variables on corporate mandatory disclosure is that, in Oman, companies by law are required 
to comply with the minimum disclosure requirements, otherwise they will be penalised by the 
Capital Market Authority. In regard to voluntary disclosure, the absence of the effect of debt 
ratio, current ratio and return on equity is due to the fact that the information needed to 
justify these ratios is part of the disclosure requirements and thus companies have to disclose 
it regardless of its effect. Another possible reason is that the Omani market is still young and 
having high ratios is expected since some of the companies are still in the early stage of their 
operations.
The absence of the influence of company ownership structure on corporate voluntary 
disclosure can be justified on two bases. First, some of the listed companies had been owned 
by families before listing them in the Muscat Securities Market and thus their management 
remained conservative when disclosing additional information, since this was the tradition in 
the old form of companies. Second, investors in Oman are more concerned with a company's 
profitability, therefore, are not concerned with the level of information disclosed. 
Additionally, major investors have access to a company's private information throughout the 
year and it is therefore not im portant to them whether the company discloses additional 
information or not in its annual reports because it is already historical information. It is 
suggested that regulators should take action to increase the awareness of the public and 
reports' preparers about the importance of voluntary disclosure in making decisions. This 
might encourage companies' management to be less conservative and more transparent.
This study used two scoring methods, as discussed in Chapter 6, to measure the level of 
annual corporate disclosure: unweighted and weighted disclosure indices. The disclosure 
indices integrated the importance assigned to an information item by corporate reports'
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users. The two scoring methods produced similar results, especially in the multivariate 
analysis, with one exception in the case of voluntary disclosure model. This study's 
similarities in results of scoring methods was similar to the findings reported in previous 
studies conducted in developed (Zarzeski, 1996) and developing countries, particularly GCC 
countries (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004c). There are two possible explanations for the 
similarity of results derived from the two scoring methods. The first explanation is that 
external users assigned high rates to m ost of the items presented to them in the 
questionnaire, and this resulted in similar weights to these items. The second explanation is 
that listed companies disclosed a mix of the m ost and least perceived im portant information 
items. The differences in results of weighted and unweighted voluntary disclosure models 
was due to high correlations betw een a company's size and auditor type in which size variable 
captured influence of auditor type. The differences in results between weighted and 
unweighted scoring method is similar to results of Hossain and Taylor's (1988) study.
11.6 Interview Findings
The present study employed sem i-structured interviews in order to better understand and 
confirm the findings derived from the questionnaire and secondary data analysis. A sample of 
27 reports' users was interviewed: financial analysts, auditors, managers, government 
representatives, and regulators. During interviews, eight themes were explored: purpose of 
financial disclosure, importance of corporate information sources, importance of management 
discussion and analysis disclosure and its nature, corporate governance in Oman, items in 
financial statements, the association betw een auditor firm classification and quality of 
financial reporting, voluntary disclosure issues, and the Omani accounting profession. These 
themes were developed based on questionnaire and annual reports' themes. The first six 
themes are related to questionnaire findings.
This study revealed that the main purposes of financial disclosure as perceived by 
interviewees were: to assess a company's position, to evaluate a company's performance, and 
to comply with regulations, confirming questionnaire and previous research findings. Also, 
the majority of interviewees agreed that raising capital is not a main disclosure purpose 
because it is not a frequent event. They also argued that investors cannot predict a company's 
future outcome from current annual reports because of the limited information disclosed in 
these reports.
Regarding the second theme, interviewees believed that meeting with a company's 
management was highly rated by questionnaire respondents because this source of
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information enables them to learn more about a company's future plans, management style, 
and information disclosed in corporate reports. Holland (1998, p.258) argued that by creating 
a common understanding of the company and confidence in its plan and management, the 
company hopes that this m arket segment will react in a well informed way and thus lead the 
rest of the securities m arket's reactions. This is the case in Oman where uneducated 
individual investors make investm ent decisions based on the investm ent decisions of main 
shareholders and institutional shareholders.
Interviewees also believed that institutional investors have access to a company's private 
information and can easily in terpret and analyse the obtained information and thus rely more 
on meeting with a company's management. On the other hand, individual investors do not 
have access to a company's m anagem ent and do not have the skills to analyse the information 
and thus rely more on published reports and independent agencies.
In addition, interviewees were asked about the reasons for the high ratings assigned by 
institutional investors to the m anagem ent discussion and analysis (MD&A) report when 
presented to them in the questionnaire. Interviewees indicated that the management 
discussion and analysis section is im portant for the following reasons: (1) to evaluate 
management, (2} to learn about a company's future plan, (3) to explain current performance, 
and [4] to confirm analysis of the financial statem ents. Interviewees also indicated that the 
reason for companies disclosing m ore good news than bad news in the MD&A report as 
reported in the questionnaire analysis is that managers try  to maintain high share prices and 
to avoid being questioned by the shareholders. Moreover, interviews showed that in some 
cases it is not in the best interest of companies, because small investors might negatively react 
to bad news. This provides support for agency, signalling, and m arket myopia theories and 
discretionary disclosure models. The aforem entioned findings indicate that in Oman, 
managers have discretion over the information disclosed in narrative reports, such as the 
MD&A, since there are no rules about the quantity and quality of information disclosed in 
these reports. It is suggested that regulators should specify the items that should be included 
in narrative reports instead of identifying the nature of information to be disclosed.
In respect of the corporate governance theme, the present study found that the reason for the 
low importance attached to the corporate governance report as reported in the questionnaire 
analysis is because this report is a new concept in Oman and thus corporate reports' users are 
not aware of its importance. Also, interviewees disclosed that investors are more concerned 
with profits and therefore this report is not relevant to their investment decisions.
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Additionally, major investors already have access to a company's management and board of 
directors and there is therefore no necessity to read the corporate governance report. In 
Oman, regulators should take action to increase public awareness of the importance of the 
corporate governance report. There w ere three main reasons for its importance disclosed by 
interviewees. The first reason is to evaluate a company's board of directors and management. 
The second reason is to minimise risks and protect investors. The third reason is to check any 
irregularities and non-compliances with regulations. Interviewees also indicated that the 
main users of the corporate governance report are regulators, investors, and analysts. This 
provides support for stewardship theory th a t managers are accountable to different 
stakeholders since they have private information.
The current performance of corporate governance in Oman was also investigated via the 
interview technique. Interviewees contended tha t listed companies disclosed a good amount 
of information but more needs to be disclosed in annual corporate reports. Additionally, they 
indicated that companies provide low levels of voluntary disclosure. This confirmed the 
descriptive analysis conducted in this study. Two reasons were given by interviewees for the 
non-disclosure of voluntary information: (1] listed companies are family owned businesses, 
and [2] more voluntary disclosure means m ore questions raised by different stakeholders.
In questioning the low importance attached by questionnaire respondents to some of the 
voluntary items, such as corporate policy on employee training, interviewees stated that 
investors are more concerned with investm ent returns and thus this voluntary item does not 
affect a company's performance and profitability. Interviewees were also asked about reasons 
for the low importance assigned to safety and environmental issues. They reported that in 
Oman people are not aware of the im portance of these issues and are not concerned with 
safety and environmental issues because these issues have no influence on a company's 
financials. Further, there are governmental bodies that are concerned with these issues.
Regarding the importance of the profit and loss account compared to the importance of the 
balance sheet, only 26% of interviewees agreed that the profit and loss account is more 
important than the balance sheet because it shows a company's performance. The rest 
believed that the balance sheet is m ore im portant because it shows the relationship between 
liabilities and equity and if a company still has room to expand and grow.
When investigating the sixth them e (auditor classification) via interviews, this study found 
that the Big four audit firms have m ore advanced audit methodologies, skilled employees, and 
strict working standards com pared to local and international affiliated audit firms.
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Interviewees also stated that auditors from the Big four do not compromise, because they are 
concerned with their reputation and legal obligations. This is consistent with the findings of a 
study conducted in Jordan (Al-Omari et al., 1999].
Through interviews, this study revealed internal and external factors influencing the amount 
of voluntary disclosure in Omani annual reports. Internal factors as stated by interviewees 
were: (1) companies' managem ent attitude, professionalism, and awareness of the 
importance of voluntary disclosure, (2] cost and benefit of disclosing voluntary disclosure, 
and (3] a company's culture, owners and fear of legal responsibility. This provides support for 
agency theory that managers will not disclose voluntary information if costs exceed benefits 
of disclosing voluntary information. Also, it supports stakeholder theory that a company's 
owners have influence on the level of disclosure. Some interviewees believed that there is no 
relationship between owners and level of voluntary information because the level of 
disclosure depends on m anagem ent attitude. This supported this study's regression analyses' 
findings. Management attitude might be the reason behind the absence of the major 
shareholders' effect, because m anagers believe that major investors have access to a 
company's private information and thus there is no need to disclose private information to 
minority investors and other stakeholders.
In addition, the study identified two main external factors influencing the amount of voluntary 
information as stated by interviewees: (1] competition, and [2] fear of regulations and 
outsiders' reaction. This supports signalling theory. The present study found that auditors in 
Oman prepare annual corporate reports. This might explain the absence of ratios and 
ownership structure effect on the level of voluntary disclosure in the country.
Finally, the present research reported  that the majority of interviewees believed it important 
to establish a professional body w ith the specific aims of regulating and governing the 
national accounting profession in Oman for several reasons: (1] to set local policies and rules 
which are suitable and applicable to the Omani culture, (2] to review current reporting and 
auditing practices, (3] to train  Omani accountants, and (4] to monitor auditing firms since 
they prepare the annual reports.
11.7 Study Limitations
There are several limitations in this study. First, the conservative characteristic of Omani 
culture affected the results of this study. In Oman, companies are very conservative and thus it 
was difficult to approach respondents and gain access to companies. Also, people in Oman are
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not aware of the importance of research and thus fear to participate in it. Moreover, they were 
afraid that the findings of this research would result in more disclosure regulations. This 
conservative culture resulted in only 500 questionnaires being distributed and 27 interviews 
being conducted.
This study employed a questionnaire survey to collect data which has inherent problems. 
First, there is response error. Error may result when respondents misunderstand the question 
or when the quality of questions is poor. Second, there is a social desirability response bias 
which results when respondents try  to respond in a way tha t shows them in a good light and 
which does not necessarily show their own beliefs and attitudes (Robson, 2002]. This leads to 
the third limitation of using a questionnaire survey, which is the inability to check the validity 
of answers since the researcher cannot observe the respondent's reactions. Also, respondents 
cannot ask for clarification.
The main limitation of using sem i-structured interviews is the flexibility in wording and 
sequencing of questions which, in turn, results in different responses. This reduces the 
comparability of responses and makes it difficult to analyse the data. Also, there is a likelihood 
of interviewer bias influencing responses tow ards finding justifications for questionnaire and 
annual reports' results. Another concern about this method is taping the interviews to 
produce accurate records. The disadvantage of tape recording interviews is that it might affect 
the relationship between the interviewee and researcher by focusing on the recorder. Also, it 
may inhibit interviewees' responses and reduce data reliability. Moreover, tape recording 
interviews necessitates a great am ount of time to be sent in transcribing tapes. Further, the 
interviewer might lose data because of a technical problem in the tape recorder. In this study, 
only 8 interviews were tape recorded and the researcher made notes during the remaining 
interviews. Some points were certainly left out although the researcher tried to note all the 
comments and reviewed interview contents with interviewees. In addition, five interviews 
were conducted in Arabic and then translated in English which might have contributed to 
errors.
In this study, only listed companies w ere investigated due to the data availability of their 
annual reports. It was difficult to obtain the annual reports of unlisted companies since they 
are not registered in the securities market. Also, because this study used one year data to 
measure the extent of disclosure in Omani annual reports, findings cannot be generalised to 
other periods and should be in terpreted with caution.
Moreover, listed banks in Oman w ere excluded from the sample because they are required to 
follow additional disclosure regulations set by the Omani Central Bank. Thus, the exclusion of 
banks from the statistical analyses may have biased the study's results and affected the 
research's generalisability of the level of disclosure in the annual reports of financial 
companies.
There is a limitation in the assignment of scores to companies. This limitation is the problem 
of distinguishing non-disclosure from non-applicability of disclosure to a specific company. 
Examples of items of this type are pending litigations, contractual obligations, and sources of 
financing not yet used. It was difficult to judge w hether listed companies intentionally did not 
disclose the above items or did not disclose them  because they w ere not applicable to them. 
Such limitation affected the scores assigned to companies and thus the study results which are 
only valid to the extent of the disclosure index used and time period investigated.
Finally, the study used ratios to m easure the extent of disclosure in Omani annual reports, 
such as liquidity, profitability, and leverage. A company's liquidity and profitability were 
measured based on two commonly used ratios, current and debt ratios. The study findings of 
the study might have changed if other ratios, such as quick ratio, had been applied. Therefore, 
the study's findings should be treated with caution when interpreting the results.
11.8 Research C ontributions
This thesis contributes significantly to the disclosure literature in a num ber of ways. First, and 
to the best knowledge of the researcher, this is the first comprehensive study conducted in 
Oman to investigate the quality of reporting practices of listed companies. Also, this study 
contributes to the disclosure literature of GCC countries. This is because the Omani securities 
market compared to other GCC capital m arkets is a well-regulated m arket and the only 
market with a code of corporate governance for listed companies (IIF and Hawkamah, 2006b). 
Accordingly, the findings of previous studies conducted in other GCC countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, cannot be generalised to Oman. Moreover, the questionnaire findings and especially 
the finding in respect of the im portance of the corporate governance report in making 
investment decisions add to the accounting literature in developing and GCC capital markets.
Second, this study proved empirically that there are differences in the opinions of auditors 
working in various audit firms: local, international affiliated and Big four. To the best 
knowledge of the researcher, this is the first study to investigate differences in the 
perceptions of various auditors of the importance of corporate reports in making investment
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decisions. Previous research has m easured the impact of the size of audit firm (Wallace et al., 
1994) or auditor type (Hossain and Taylor, 1998a) on the level of disclosure. Investigating the 
perceptions of auditors has reflected the reality and provided a true picture of the 
transactions of the capital m arket and might be m ore reliable than statistical measures of 
different company attributes.
Finally, to the best knowledge of the researcher, this is the first study in GCC and Middle East 
countries that has measured the usefulness of the sections of the management discussion and 
analysis (MD&A) report in making investm ent decisions. It reported similarities and 
differences between user and preparer groups' views regarding the usefulness of the MD&A 
report. Prior studies conducted in GCC and Middle East countries have focused their attention 
on either the importance of the readership, or the importance of the sections of the annual 
report, or the importance of a list of disclosure items. This study's findings will help regulators 
and managers assess the quality of current MD&A disclosure in Omani annual reports and 
consider other parties' views as to w hether to increase the quantity of information or not in 
this report. Also, other developing countries will learn about the usefulness and importance of 
the MD&A report in the decision-making process.
11.9 Future R esearch
This study has revealed several areas w here future research could be undertaken. First, it is 
suggested that future research investigate the perceptions of lenders of the quality of financial 
reporting practices and its relationship to lending decisions using a questionnaire survey. 
This would indicate the usage of corporate reports for lending decisions in comparison to 
investment decisions.
Also, it is suggested that future research employ a longitudinal study where the level of 
disclosure is measured before and after the introduction of the code of corporate governance 
in year 2002. This is in order to empirically assess changes in the level of disclosure in Omani 
annual reports and the effectiveness of application of the code. In order to achieve this 
objective, the research should investigate the period 1998-2008.
In addition, future research could employ regression analysis in order to identify possible 
determinants of the level of disclosure in the MD&A report. This could be achieved by 
measuring the association betw een MD&A disclosure and a company's characteristics. Also, 
future research could employ content analysis to study the nature of information disclosed in 
the MD&A report. This method would be used to quantify and analyse the presence and
309
meaning of words in such report and then make inferences about the message within the text, 
whether it is positive or negative. Such research would help regulators determine the level of 
disclosure and the need for additional disclosure. Interviewees in this study indicated the 
need to increase disclosure in the MD&A section.
Many parties affect the corporate disclosure process. Examples of parties involved in this 
process are the board  of directors and audit committee. Further research could measure the 
impact of the characteristics of the audit committee, such as size and independence, on the 
quality of a company's disclosure practice using regression analysis. This future study would 
indicate the effectiveness of the code of corporate governance in Oman.
As mentioned earlier, major shareholders have no significant effect on the level of corporate 
disclosure. Further research could investigate differences in the levels of disclosure between 
family owned companies and widely owned companies. This would indicate the main 
characteristics of both  types of company and the transparency of their reports.
The present research reported significant differences between auditors from Big four audit 
firms and auditors from local and international affiliated audit firms in their perceptions of 
various aspects of financial reporting in Oman. They highly rated  m andatory and voluntary 
items surveyed in the current study compared to other audit firms. This is understandable 
since Big four audit most of the listed companies. Additionally, interviewees stated that 
annual reports are prepared by auditors. Further research could investigate the perceptions 
of audit beneficiaries and auditors of auditing practice in Oman in order to discover the 
auditors' influence on the reporting system, especially Big four audit firms. This could be 
achieved by employing a questionnaire survey that investigates issues such as the role and 
objective of auditing function and auditor independence.
11.10 Research Conclusions
To conclude, this study has reported  the different perceptions of corporate reports' users 
regarding the objective and im portance of the various aspects of annual reports in making 
investment decisions in Oman. When comparing this study's findings with previous studies' 
findings, the study found a num ber of similarities and differences between Omani reports' 
users and reports' users in developed and developing markets. There are a num ber of 
possible factors behind these similarities and differences. First, the usefulness of various 
channels of corporate information and their impact on reports' users' decisions. Second, the 
level of access reports ' users have to these channels. Third, the awareness of reports' users of
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the importance of the various aspects of reporting in making decisions and the relevancy of 
these aspects to their short-term  and long-term  interests. It was also found that Omani listed 
companies complied with m andatory  disclosure requirem ents and provided low levels of 
voluntary disclosure. Main determ inants of the level of disclosure in Omani annual reports 
were the size of a company, auditor ty p e  and the industrial sector.
This study will be an im portant source of information to the Capital Market Authority since, to 
the best knowledge of the researcher, it is the first comprehensive study to focus on the 
different aspects of financial reporting practices in Oman. It is hoped that this study will help 
regulators to identify weaknesses in the  current reporting system. Also, the research has 
presented and discussed the needs of different stakeholders via questionnaire and interview 
methods. This will help regulators to  b e tte r  understand the informational needs of different 
market participants and thus make am endm ents to current disclosure requirements.
The study found that corporate stakeholders, as claimed by interviewees, were not able to 
judge the quality of disclosure in Om ani corporate reports because there is no clear-cut 
benchmark or good disclosure exam ple th a t users can use to compare current disclosure with. 
Therefore, levels of mandatory and vo lun tary  disclosures varied from company to another as 
found by the current study. The findings of this study can be used by regulators to set this 
benchmark or to encourage listed com panies to set a good example that could be used by 
other companies as a benchmark.
The study reported similarities and differences in the perceptions of different users of the 
various aspects of financial reporting  in Oman. For instance, the differences between 
preparers of corporate reports such as accountants and users of those reports such as 
analysts and investors were significant on the im portance of information disclosed in the 
outlook section of the MD&A report. Regulators will be able to consider these similarities and 
differences when issuing disclosure regulations. Additionally, managers of listed companies 
will be better able to focus on the inform ational needs of different stakeholders and become 
more open and less conservative w hen disclosing voluntary information.
Due to its role in the financial reporting  process, corporate governance is a major concern to 
regulators and other governmental bodies. The present study revealed that the corporate 
governance report is perceived as of low er im portance than other sections of the annual 
report. Additionally, interviews show ed that corporate governance report is of low 
importance because it is a newly req u ired  repo rt and corporate reports' users and preparers 
are not aware of its im portance to th e  decision making process. Accordingly, this study's
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findings in respect of the perceptions of reports' users should be of interest to the regulators. 
Also, interviewees stated that people are not aware of the importance of the corporate 
governance report because it is a new  concept. It is suggested that regulators in Oman should 
raise awareness of the im portance of the corporate governance report in making decisions. 
Moreover, people should be educated on corporate governance disclosure and its importance 
to the going concern of companies.
Interviewees in this study revealed th a t in some instances a company will not disclose certain 
information such as segmental information, because it is not in the best interest of that 
company to do so. This is confirmed by the analysis of reports which showed that only 81% of 
companies disclosed segmental information. This is because of the unfair competition 
between listed and unlisted companies in the same industry. It is suggested that regulators 
should set clear rules for those instances w here it is not in the best interests of companies to 
disclose. This is in order for companies to follow the regulations without losing their 
competitive advantage. Also, it is suggested that regulators should specify clearly the items 
that should be included in narrative reports, such as the m anagem ent discussion and analysis 
report.
The study reported that safety and environmental issues were perceived of lower importance 
than other voluntary disclosure issues. Moreover, it was found that few companies disclosed 
these issues. This is a major problem  that regulators in Oman should consider and require 
listed companies to disclose m ore about environmental issues. Also, regulators should 
educate different stakeholders about the im portance of environmental accounting and 
reporting and the influence of such reporting on the going concern of a company.
In this study, interviews indicated tha t in Oman there is lack of communication between 
regulators and market participants regarding disclosure requirem ents and their applicability 
to listed companies. The present study's results may provide investors, managers, and 
regulators with valuable information that can be utilised to produce optimal disclosure 
policies and result in the harm onisation of efforts of interested parties to establish good 
corporate governance and reporting practices.
Finally, the present study investigated the necessity of establishing a professional body with 
the specific aims of regulating and governing the accounting profession in Oman in order to 
improve the quality of financial reporting practices. Such a body was widely welcomed by 
those presented with the idea. Its establishm ent would improve the quality of reporting 
practices in Oman through the setting of local disclosure policies and monitoring of the
312
reporting and auditing practices of listed and unlisted companies. It is suggested that policy­
makers should consider its establishm ent in the near future. This body should also be given 
the authority to issue regulations to prom ote sound and effective practice and enforce the law.
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Part One; The Use of Annual Reports
1. "Financial disclosure is defined as "any deliberate release of financial information, whether numerical or 
qualitative, required or voluntary, or via formal or informal channels". To w h a t e x te n t d o  you  agree w ith  each  
of th e fo llow in g  s ta te m e n ts  reg a rd in g  th e  p u r p o se  o f  d isc lo s in g  in fo rm a tio n  in  th e  an n u al report? Please 
circle the appropriate number using the following scale.
In my view, th e  p u rp o se  o f fin an c ia l d is c lo su re  is  to S trong ly
D isag ree
D isag ree N eu tra l A gree S trongly
A gree
assess a company's financial position. 1 2 3 4 5
assess a company's compliance with regulations 1 2 3 4 5
assess a company's cash flow 1 2 3 4 5
enhance a company’s value 1 2 3 4 5
evaluate a company's performance 1 2 3 4 5
predict a company's future outcomes 1 2 3 4 5
fulfill statutory and legal requirements 1 2 3 4 5
raise capital 1 2 3 4 5
Others (please specify]: 1 2 3 4 5
2. On what basis do you normally make your decisions about a company? P le a se  in d ica te  th e  im p ortan ce  o f  each  
source o f in form ation  w h e n  m a k in g  a n  in v e s tm e n t d ec is io n  by circling the appropriate number using
following scale.
In fo rm atio n  S ources No L ittle M o d e ra te High V ery High
Im p o rta n c e Im p o rta n c e Im p o rta n c e Im p o rta n c e Im p o rtan c e
Company's annual report 1 2 3 4 5
Company’s quarterly reports 1 2 3 4 5
Company’s annual general meeting 1 2 3 4 5
Company’s Website. 1 2 3 4 5
Financial analysis of a company's annual reports 1 2 3 4 5
Meeting with a company’s Management 1 2 3 4 5
Muscat Security Market link on the internet 1 2 3 4 5
Stockbroker's advice 1 2 3 4 5
Trading units in commercial banks 1 2 3 4 5
Other investors 1 2 3 4 5
Sector information 1 2 3 4 5
Muscat Security Market issues 1 2 3 4 5
Other sources (Please specify]: 1 2 3 4 5
Part Two: Im p o r ta n c e  o f  t h e  V a r io u s  S e c t io n s  o f  A n n u a l  R e p o r t
1. What im portan ce w o u ld  you  g iv e  to  th e  fo llo w in g  s e c t io n s  o f  com p an y 's an n u a l report?  Please rank each of 
the following sections by circling the appropriate number using the following scale.
A nnual R ep o rt 's  S ection No
Im p o rta n c e
L ittle
Im p o rta n c e
M o d era te
Im p o rta n c e
High
Im p o rta n c e
V ery High 
Im p o rtan c e
Chairman's report 1 2 3 4 5
Corporate governance report 1 2 3 4 5
Management Discussion and Analysis 1 2 3 4 5
Summary of Performance 1 2 3 4 5
Auditor report 1 2 3 4 5
Auditor report on corporate governance practice 1 2 3 4 5
Balance sheet 1 2 3 4 5
Profit and loss account 1 2 3 4 5
Statement of cash flows 1 2 3 4 5
Statement of changes in shareholders' equity 1 2 3 4 5
Statement of principal accounting policies 1 2 3 4 5
Notes to the financial statements 1 2 3 4 5
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Part Three: Management D iscussion and Analysis
1. Listed below are information items required by the O m ani Capital M arket A u thority  to be disclosed in the 
Management Discussion and Analysis section of an annual report. P lea se  in d ica te  h o w  u sefu l th o se  item s are  
to you  w h en  m ak in g  an  in v e s tm e n t d e c is io n  by referring to the following scale and circling the appropriate 
number.
In fo rm a tio n  Item s N ot U seful 
At All
Of L ittle  
U se
Of M o d era te  
Use
U seful V ery
Useful
Industry structure and development 1 2 3 4 5
Investment portfolio 1 2 3 4 5
Opportunities and threats 1 2 3 4 5
Analysis of segment and product Performance 1 2 3 4 5
Outlook 1 2 3 4 5
Risks and concerns 1 2 3 4 5
The adequacy of internal control systems 1 2 3 4 5
Discussion on financial performance 1 2 3 4 5
Discussion on operational performance 1 2 3 4 5
Omanisation training 1 2 3 4 5
2. To w hat ex ten t d o  you  a g ree  w ith  th e  fo llo w in g  s ta te m e n ts  regard in g  th e  M an agem ent D iscu ssio n  and  
Analysis (MD&A) se c t io n  o f  th e  O m ani a n n u a l rep o r ts?  Please refer to the following scale to answer the 
question by circling the appropriate number.
MD&A section  p ro v id es in fo rm a tio n  tha t... S tro n g ly
D isag ree
D isag ree N eu tra l A gree S trongly
A gree
focuses on good news more than bad news 1 2 3 4 5
is not available from outside sources 1 2 3 4 5
is not available from financial statements and 
footnotes
1 2 3 4 5
is useful to evaluate managerial performance 1 2 3 4 5
is useful to predict a company’s future earnings 1 2 3 4 5
Part Four: C o rp o ra te  G o v e rn a n c e  R e p o r t
1. The Code of Corporate Governance in Oman became effective in June 2002 to "promote a culture of compliance, 
transparency and accountability". As a result, companies in Oman are now required to disclose a "Corporate 
Governance Report". To w h a t e x te n t  d o  y o u  a g r e e  th a t  O m ani lis te d  co m p a n ies  are d isc lo s in g  en ou gh  
inform ation in  th e  a b o v e  re p o r t to  a c h ie v e  th e  p u r p o se  o f  th e  Code? Please circle the appropriate number 
using the following scaled.
Strongly D isagree D isag ree N eu tra l A gree S trong ly  A gree
1 2 3 4 5
2. Listed below are items that are required by the Omani Capital Market Authority to be disclosed in the Corporate 
Governance Report. P le a se  in d ica te  h o w  im p o r ta n t each  o f  th e  fo llo w in g  item s is  to  you  w h en  m akin g  an  
in vestm ent d ec is io n  by circling the appropriate number using the following scale.
In fo rm a tio n  Item s No L ittle M o d era te High Very High
Im p o rta n c e Im p o rta n c e Im p o rta n c e Im p o rtan c e Im p o rtan ce
Company's philosophy 1 2 3 4 5
Composition and qualifications of board of 
directors
1 2 3 4 5
Meetings of board of directors 1 2 3 4 5
Details of Audit Committee 1 2 3 4 5
Process of nomination of directors 1 2 3 4 5
Remuneration matters 1 2 3 4 5
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In fo rm a tio n  Item s No
Im p o rta n c e
L ittle
Im p o rta n c e
M o d era te
Im p o rta n c e
High
Im p o rtan c e
V ery High 
Im p o rtan ce
Details of company’s management 1 2 3 4 5
Details of non-compliance by a company 1 2 3 4 5
Means of communication with shareholders 1 2 3 4 5
Distribution of shareholdings 1 2 3 4 5
Disclosure policies 1 2 3 4 5
Market price data 1 2 3 4 5
Profile of external auditor 1 2 3 4 5
Part Five: V o lu n ta ry  D is c lo s u re s
1. Listed below are items that might be disclosed voluntarily by companies in their annual financial reports. P lease  
indicate you r v ie w  o n  th e  im p o r ta n ce  o f  th o s e  ite m s  w h e n  m ak in g  an  in v e stm e n t d ec is io n  regard less th e  
sector by circling the appropriate number using the following scale.
In fo rm a tio n  Item s No L ittle M o d era te High V ery High
Im p o rta n c e Im p o rta n c e Im p o rta n c e Im p o rtan c e Im p o rtan ce
Statement of retained earnings 1 2 3 4 5
Current ratio 1 2 3 4 5
Price earnings ratio 1 2 3 4 5
Gross profit margin 1 2 3 4 5
Financial information for more than 2 years 1 2 3 4 5
Corporate policy on employee training 1 2 3 4 5
Average wages of employees. 1 2 3 4 5
% of Omani employees in different levels of a 1 2 3 4 5
company
Human resource training expenditure. 1 2 3 4 5
Graphs illustrating:
a. impact of price changes on earnings per share 1 2 3 4 5
over several years.
b. income of a company 1 2 3 4 5
c. company’s market price in comparison to broad
based index of Muscat Security Market 1 2 3 4 5
Trend analysis on profitability 1 2 3 4 5
Company’s insurance coverage 1 2 3 4 5
Company's technological developments 1 2 3 4 5
Company’s forward-looking statement 1 2 3 4 5
Company’s competitive pressures 1 2 3 4 5
Stock statistics of company's share 1 2 3 4 5
Comparison of actual performance with plans 1 2 3 4 5
Comparison of actual company's performance with 1 2 3 4 5
competitors
Comparison of company’s performance with 1 2 3 4 5
sector’s indicators
Sources of financing arranged but not yet used 1 2 3 4 5
Off-balance sheet arrangements 1 2 3 4 5
Analysis of company’s investment portfolio 1 2 3 4 5
Impact of existing regulations on 1 2 3 4 5
business operations
Effect of interest rate on current results 1 2 3 4 5
Effect of interest rate on future results 1 2 3 4 5
Future cash flows 1 2 3 4 5
Forecasted market share 1 2 3 4 5
Profit forecast 1 2 3 4 5
Cost of safety measures 1 2 3 4 5
Company's health, safety and security 1 2 3 4 5
Company’s environmental performance 1 2 3 4 5
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In fo rm a tio n  Item s No
Im p o rta n c e
L ittle
Im p o rtan c e
M o d era te
Im p o rta n c e
High
Im p o rtan c e
V ery High 
Im p o rtan ce
A report on ethical conduct of company's officers. 1 2 3 4 5
Uncertainties that are reasonably expected to 
affect financial condition
1 2 3 4 5
Summary analysis of cash flows by segment 1 2 3 4 5
2. Please list down any a d d itio n a l in fo rm a tio n  ite m s  th a t  you  th in k  w ou ld  b e  usefu l w h en  m aking  an  
investm en t decision  re g a rd in g  a  c o m p a n y  other than those listed above.
Part Six: R e s p o n d e n t 's  B a c k g ro u n d  I n f o r m a t io n
This section is strictly confidential and would help me in making my analysis more meaningful. Please tick the appropriate
box.
1. What is you r gender?
□ Male □ Female
2. What is  th e h ig h est le v e l o f  e d u ca tio n  y o u  h a v e  co m p leted ?
□ High School □ Diploma
G Bachelor's degree □ Master’s degree
G PhD G  Other (i.e. CPA,CMA]:___________________________
3. P lease in d icate you r p rim ary  r o le  w h e n  m a k in g  a d e c is io n  reg a rd in g  a com p any?
G Individual investor □ Institutional investor
G Financial Analyst G  Government representative
G  Auditor □ Regulator
G  Accountant
4. P lease in d icate n u m b er o f  y ea r s  o f  y o u r  e x p e r ie n c e  in  th e  in v e stm e n t field .
□ <5 G  5-10 □ 11-15 □ 16-20 □ >20
[ 1 Please tick this box if you would like a summary of the research findings. Please provide your name and address in the following space
Name:
Address:
Telephone number:
E-mail address:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND EFFORT IN COMPLETING THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF M A N D A T O R Y  DI SCL OS URE ( C H A P T E R S  6 & 7)
Q. Listed below are items that are required by Capital Market Authority to be disclosed in the 
annual reports of the Omani listed companies. Please indicate the importance of each of these items 
in making investment decisions by referring to the following scale and circling the appropriate 
number.
Of No 
Im portance
Of V ery L ittle  
Im p ortan ce
Of M od erate  
Im p ortan ce
Of Great 
Im p ortan ce
Of V ery Great 
Im portan ce
1 2 3 4 5
In form ation  Item s A nsw er
Cash 1 2 3 4 5
Current assets 1 2 3 4 5
Non-current assets 1 2 3 4 5
Current liabilities 1 2 3 4 5
Longterm liabilities 1 2 3 4 5
Net assets per share 1 2 3 4 5
Share capital 1 2 3 4 5
Retained earnings 1 2 3 4 5
Amount of revenues 1 2 3 4 5
Administration and general expenses 1 2 3 4 5
Depreciation and am ortization expenses 1 2 3 4 5
Profit from operations 1 2 3 4 5
Profit/loss before incom e tax and m inority in terest 1 2 3 4 5
Income tax 1 2 3 4 5
Profit after tax 1 2 3 4 5
Net profit/loss 1 2 3 4 5
Earnings per share 1 2 3 4 5
Description of nature and effect of any change in accounting policies 1 2 3 4 5
Details of bank loans and overdrafts 1 2 3 4 5
Details of related parties and holders o f 10%  of com pany's share 1 2 3 4 5
Investments in quoted securities 1 2 3 4 5
List of major shareholders 1 2 3 4 5
Dividend policy 1 2 3 4 5
Segmental information 1 2 3 4 5
Details of contingent liabilities 1 2 3 4 5
Calculation of taxation 1 2 3 4 5
Number of em olovees 1 2 3 4 5
Percentage of Omanisation 1 2 3 4 5
Disclosure of contractual obligations 1 2 3 4 5
Details of any pending litigation 1 2 3 4 5
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AP P EN D IX  C: SCORING S H E E T S  OF I NDICES OF M ANDATORY AND 
V O L U N T A R Y  D I S C L O S U R E S  AND S AMPLE OF LISTED 
C O M P A N I E S  IN OM AN  ( C H A P T E R S  6, 8 & 9)
Table 1: Index of Mandatory Disclosure
C o m p a n y  n a m e :__________________________________________________Y ear:__________S e c to r :_________
Ite m s  U n w e ig h te d  W e ig h te d
s c o r e s   s c o re s
M e a n  M e d ia n
Cash_______________________________________________________________
Current assets______________________________________________________
Non-current assets_________________________________________________
Current liabilities___________________________________________________
Longterm liabilities________________________________________________
Net assets per share________________________________________________
Share capital_________________________________________________
Retained earnings________________________________________ _________
Amount of revenues________________________________________________
Administration and general expenses_______________________________
Depreciation and am ortization exp en ses____________________________
Profit from operations______________________________
Profit/loss before incom e tax and m inority in terest_________________
Income tax_____________________________
Profit after tax____________________________
Net profit/loss_______________________________
Earnings per share_____________________________
Description of nature and effect of any change in accounting policies
Details of bank loans and overdrafts________________________________
Details of related parties and holders of 10%  of com pany's share
Investments in quoted securities______________
List of major shareholders______________________
Dividend policy_______________________ ______ ______________________
Segmental information______________________
Details of contingent liabilities_________________
Calculation of taxation________________ _____________________________
Number of em ployees__________________
Percentage of Omanisation___________ ______________________________
Disclosure of contractual o b l i g a t i o n s ___________________________
Details of any pending litigation__________________________ __________
Total _______
Total possible scores
Index of mandatory disclosure
Table 2: Index of Voluntary Disclosure
Statement of retained earnings 
Current ratio
Price earnings ratio_____________________________________________
Gross profit margin
Financial information for more than 2 years 
Corporate policy on employee training 
Average wages of employees.
% of Omani employees in different levels of a company 
Human resource training expenditure.
Graphs illustrating:
a. impact of price changes on earnings per share over several years.
b. income of a company
c. company's market price in comparison to broad based index of
Muscat Security Market_________________________________________
Trend analysis on profitability___________________________________
Company's insurance coverage___________________________________
Company's technological developments__________________________
Company's forward-looking statement___________________________
Company’s competitive pressures________________________________
Stock statistics of company's share_______________________________
Comparison of actual performance with plans_____________________
Comparison of actual company's performance with competitors 
Comparison of company's performance with sector's indicators
Sources of financing arranged but not yet used____________________
Off-balance sheet arrangements________________________________ _
Analysis of company's investment portfolio_______________________
Impact of existing regulations on business operations_____________
Effect of interest rate on current results__________________________
Effect of interest rate on future results ______________________
Future cash flows____________________________ _____ _____________
Forecasted market share________________________________________
Profit forecast_______________________________ ___________________
Cost of safety measures____________________________
Company's health, safety and security________________________
Company's environmental performance__________________________
A report on ethical conduct of company's officers._________________
Uncertainties that are reasonably expected to affect financial
condition______________________________ ________________________
Summary analysis of cash flows by segm ent
Total ________________ _______________
Total possible scores _______ ________________
Index of voluntary disclosure ________ _ _ _ _ _
348
Table 3: Scoring Sheet of Index of Mandatory Disclosure.
■HU
Cash 3.93 4
Current assets 4.27 4
Non-current assets 4.09 4
Current liabilities 4.30 4
Longterm liabilities 4.38 4
Net assets per share 4.32 4
Share capital 4.24 4
Retained earnings 4.39 5
Amount of revenues 4.57 5
Administration and general exp en ses 4.02 4
Depreciation and am ortization exp en ses 3.91 4
Profit from operations 4.54 5
Profit/loss before incom e tax and m inority in terest 4.32 4
Income tax 3.85 4
Profit after tax 4.41 5
Net profit/loss 4.60 5
Earnings per share 4.64 5
Description of nature and effect o f any change in accounting policies 4.20 4
Details of bank loans and overdrafts 4.23 4
Details of related parties and holders o f 10%  of com pany’s share 4.10 4
Investments in quoted securities 4.06 4
List of major shareholders 3.94 4
Dividend policy 4.08 4
Segmental information 3.81 4
Details of contingent liabilities 3.98 4
Calculation of taxation 3.40 3
Number of em ployees 3.11 3
Percentage of Omanisation 3.06 3
Disclosure of contractual obligations 3.74 3
Details of any pending litigation 4 4
T o ta l 1 2 6 .4 7 1 2 6
T o ta l p o s s ib le  s c o r e s 1 2 6 .4 7 1 2 6
In d e x  o f  m a n d a to r y  d i s c lo s u r e 1 1
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Table 4: Scoring Sheet of Index of Voluntary Disclosure.
■ O H
Statement of retained earnings 3.84 4
Current ratio 3.98 4
Price earnings ratio 4.30 4
Gross profit margin 4.13 4
Financial information for more than 2 years 4.01 4
Corporate policy on employee training 2.98 3
Average wages of employees. 2.94 3
% of Omani employees in different levels of a company 2.99 3
Human resource training expenditure. 3 3
Graphs illustrating:
a. impact of price changes on earnings per share over several years.
b. income of a company
c. company's market price in comparison to broad based index of MSM
3.78
4.01
3.90
4
4
4
Trend analysis on profitability 4.16 4
Company's insurance coverage 3.55 4
Company's technological developments 3.83 4
Company's forward-looking statement 3.77 4
Company’s competitive pressures 3.97 4
Stock statistics of company's share 3.84 4
Comparison of actual performance with plans 4.04 4
Comparison of actual company's performance with competitors 4.17 4
Comparison of company's performance with sector's indicators 3.98 4
Sources of financing arranged but not yet used 3.59 4
Off-balance sheet arrangements 3.80 4
Analysis of company's investment portfolio 4.06 4
Impact of existing regulations on business operations 3.90 4
Effect of interest rate on current results 3.74 4
Effect of interest rate on future results 3.83 4
Future cash flows 4.07 4
Forecasted market share 3.78 4
Profit forecast 4 4
Cost of safety measures 3.30 3
Company's health, safety and security 3.36 3
Company's environmental performance 3.35 3
A report on ethical conduct of company’s officers. 3.43 4
Uncertainties that are reasonably expected to affect financial condition 3.76 4
Summary analysis of cash flows by segm ent 3.86 4
Total 135 137
Total possible scores 135 137
Index of voluntary disclosure 1 1
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Table 5: List of sampled listed companies in Oman.
I In d u stria l S ecto r
1. Oman Flour Mills Co SAOG. 0.8293 0 .2504 1.0797
2. Oman filters Industry Co SAOG. 0 .8030 0.1761 0.9893
3. Construction Materials Industry and Contracting Co 
SAOG.
0.8763 0 .2330 1.1093
4. Keema Oman SAOG. 0.8767 0 .0619 0.9386
5. National Packaging Factory SAOG. 0 .8971 0 .1807 1.0778
6. Gulf Stone Co SAOG. 0.8899 0.1892 1.0791
7. National Pharmaceutical industries Co SAOG. 0.8969 0.2551 1.152
8. Gulf Plastic Industries Co SAOG. 0.8892 0 .2391 1.1283
9. Al Anwar Ceramic Tiles Co SAOG. 0.9404 0.2232 1.1636
10. National Beverages Co Ltd SAOG. 0 .9024 0 .2228 1.1252
11. Al Hassan Engineering Co SAOG. 0.9318 0.2840 1.2158
12. Oman Chlorine Co SAOG. 0.9303 0 .3780 1.3083
13. National Mineral W ater Co SAOG. 0.9401 0.2396 1.1797
14. Muscat Gases Co SAOG. 0.9292 0.1908 1.12
15. Oman Cables Industry SAOG. 0.9401 0.3435 1.2054
16. Dhofar Cattle Feed Co SAOG. 0.948 0 .1160 1.064
17. Packaging Co Ltd SAOG. 0 .9334 0 .0919 1.0253
18. Omani Packaging Co SAOG. 0 .9456 0 .2813 1.2269
19. Dhofar Beverages and Food Stuff Co SAOG. 0.9733 0 .0945 1.0678
20. Majan Glass Co SAOG. 0.8892 0 .2068 1.096
21. Oman Ceramics Co SAOG. 0 .9188 0.1543 1.0722
22. Cement Gypsum Products Co SAOG. 0.9043 0.0862 0.9905
23. Oman Chemical Industries Co SAOG. 0 .9241 0 .4795 1.4036
24. Al Ahlia Detergent Co SAOG. 0 .9188 0.1911 1.1099
25. Oman Refreshm ent Co SAOG. 0 .9315 0 .2066 1.1381
26. Oman Chromite Co SAOG. 0 .9231 0.2063 0.8034
27. National Gas Co SAOG. 1 0.3142 1.3142
28. Bausher Chemicals SAOG. 0 .9724 0 .1164 1.0888
29. National Biscuit Industries Ltd SAOG. 0 .9378 0.1552 1.093
30. Areej Vegetable Oil and Derivatives SAOG. 0.9401 0 .2946 1.235
31. Oman National Dairy Products Co Ltd SAOG. 0 .9729 0 .2817 1.255
32. Salalah Mills Co SAOG. 0.9733 0.2418 1.2151
33. Al Anwar Holdings SAOG. 1 0.2297 1.2297
34. Raysut Cement Co SAOG. 0.9742 0.3278 1.302
35. Al Khaleej Polypropylene Products Co SAOG. 1 0 .2307 1.2307
36. Computer Stationery Industry SAOG. 1 0.2903 1.2903
37. Gulf Mushroom Products Co SAOG. 0 .9606 0.2892 1.2498
38. Gulf International Chemicals SAOG. 0.9632 0.2493 1.2125
39. Al Jazeera Tube Mills Co SAOG. 1 0.2236 1.2236
40. National Detergent Co SAOG. 1 0.2682 1.2682
41. National Aluminium Products Co SAOG. 1 0.2702 1.2702
42. Oman Fiber Optic Co SAOG. 1 0.3205 1.3205
43. Oman Textile Holding Co SAOG. 0 .9844 0.2736 1.258
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44. Oman Cement Co SAOG. 0 .9886 0 .2588 1.2256
45. Al Sallan Food Industries Co SAOG. 0.9631 0 .3126 1.2757
46. Sweets of Oman SAOG. 0.9355 0 .2128 1.1483
47. Dhofar Marble and Granite Co SAOG. 0.8848 0.0600 0.9448
48. National Rice Mills SAOG. 0 .8564 0.2502 1.1066
49. Flexible Industrial Packages Co SAOG. 0.8229 0.2614 1.0843
[S e rv ice  S ec to r I
1. Al Fajar Al Alamia 0.6609 0 .06684 0.7277
2. Al Buraimi Hotel 0 .8926 0.1315 1.0241
3. Oman International Marketing Co SAOG. 0.9076 0 .0638 0.9714
4. Sahara Hospitality Co SAOG. 0 .9423 0.2569 1.1992
5. Al Jazeira Services Co SAOG. 0.9733 0.2386 1.2119
6. Topaz Energy and Marine SAOG. 0.9733 0 .2671 1.2404
7. Shell Oman Marketing Company SAOG. 0.9701 0.2523 1.2224
8. National Hospitality Institute SAOG. 0.9693 0.2817 1.251
9. Dhofar University SAOG. 0 .9249 0 .2940 1.219
10. Hotels Management Company International SAOG. 0 .9397 0.2523 1.192
11. Sohar Poultry Co SAOG. 0.9011 0.2081 1.1092
12. Oman Educational and Training Investm ent 0 .9122 0.0641 0.9763
13. Dhofar Tourism SAOG. 0 .9305 0.0638 0.9943
14. Dhofar Fisheries Industries Co SAOG. 0 .9336 0 .2077 1.1413
15. Salalah Hilton Co SAOG. 0 .9009 0.1205 1.0214
16. Dhofar Poultry Co SAOG. 0.9011 0 .1607 1.0618
17. Majan College (University College). 0 .9254 0.0321 0.9575
18. Oman Agriculture D evelopm ent SAOG. 0.8974 0.0615 0.9589
19. Al Batinah International SAOG. 0.9376 0 .2548 1.1924
20. AES Barka SAOG. 0.9250 0 .3207 1.2457
21. Modern Poultry Farms Co SAOG. 0.9355 0 .2546 1.1901
22. United Power Co SAOG. 0.9713 0.1903 1.1616
23. Oman Medical Projects Co SAOG. 0.9399 0.2473 1.1872
24. Al Batnah Hotels Co SAOG. 0.9733 0.1833 1.1566
25. Oman Fisheries Co SAOG. 0.9723 0.2401 1.2124
26. Interior Hotels Co SAOG. 0.9733 0 .2144 1.1877
27. Oman Hotels and Tourism Co SAOG. 0.9733 0 .2090 1.1823
28. Gulf Hotels (Oman). 0 .9742 0 .3096 1.2838
29. Al Kamil Power Co SAOG. 1 0.3297 1.3297
30. Salalah Port Services Co SAOG. 1 0.2458 1.2458
31. Renaissance Services SAOG. 1 0 .3636 1.3636
32. Bander Al Rowdha Co SAOG. 0 .9618 0 .1364 1.0982
33. Oman National Electric Co SAOG. 1 0.3251 1.3251
34. Oman Aviation Services Co SAOG. 0 .9656 0.3021 1.2677
35. A'Safaa Poultry Farms SAOG. 0.9618 0.2638 1.226
36. Oman ORIX Leasing Co SAOG. 1 0.2764 1.2764
37. Al Maha Petroleum  Products M arketing Co SAOG. 1 0.2697 1.2697
38. Oman Oil Marketing Co SAOG. 0 .9297 0.2652 1.1949
39. Port Services Corporation SAOG. 1 0.2390 1.2390
I Financial S ec to r — I
1. Musandam Investm ent and Marketing Co SAOG. 0.7864 0.0706 0.857
2. Global Financial Investm ents SAOG. 0 .8934 0.1119 1.005
3. United Finance Co SAOG. 0.9337 0.3848 1.3205
4. Al Batinah D evelopm ent and Investm ent Holding Co 0.9107 0.1251 1.0358
SAOG.
5. Shurooq Investm ent Services Co SAOG. 0.8920 0.1240 1.016
6. Muscat National Holding Co SAOG. 0.9462 0 .1784 1.1246
7. Oman and Emirates Investm ent Holding Co SAOG. 0.9480 0.1545 1.1025
8. Oman National Investm ent Corporation Holding Co SAOG. 0.9357 0 .3506 1.2863
9. Oman International D evelopm ent and Investm ent Co 0.9421 0 .3054 1.2475
SAOG.
10. National Securities Co SAOG. 0.9378 0.1245 1.0623
11. National Finance Co SAOG. 0.9377 0 .2666 1.2043
12. Financial Services Co SAOG. 0.9742 0 .5159 1.4901
13. Dhofar Insurance Co SAOG. 0.9719 0 .3001 1.272
14. Transgulf Investm ent Holding Co SAOG. 0.9380 0 .1244 1.0624
15. Al Omaniya Financial Services SAOG. 0.9379 0 .1570 1.0949
16. Oman Investm ent and Finance Co SAOG. 0.9622 0 .2314 1.1162
17. Dhofar International D evelopm ent and Investm ent 0.9726 0 .3028 1.2754
Holding Co SAOG.
18. Gulf Investm ent Services Co SAOG. 0.9733 0 .2514 1.2247
19. Financial Corporation Co SAOG. 0.9726 0.2271 1.1997
20. Oman United Insurance Co SAOG. 0.9733 0 .3789 1.3612
21. Oman Holding International Co SAOG. 0.9733 0 .1207 1.094
22. Muscat Finance Co SAOG. 1 0.2696 1.2696
23. A’Sharqiya Investm ent Holding Co SAOG. 1 0.1473 1.1473
APPENDIX D: Q U E S T I O N N A I R E  F I N D I N G S  ( C H A P T E R  7]
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Table 1, Section 7.3.1.2, Chapter 7: The level of significance for, and direction of, the differences among user groups and between each pair of user groups regarding
their ratings of the purposes of financial disclosure in annual reports.
H n B
w M ■ I I
Assess Financial Position .97 .69 .98 .36 .60 .80 .85 .71 .59 .82 .97 .67 .37 .61 .82 .85 .86 .66 .44 .82 .59 .74
■ - - - - + + - - + + - - - + + + + + + +
Asses Company's Compliance with .73 .56 .30 .64 .64 .94 .60 .12 .93 .34 .65 .83 .17 .71 .50 .30 .39 .69 .78 .78 .42 .66
Regulations + - + - - + - - - - + + + + + - - + + + +
Assess Company's Cash Flow .91 .68 .45 .60 .49 53 .82 .26 .36 .38 .39 .68 .83 .86 .93 .85 .79 .81 .93 .90 .80 .85
+ - - - - - ■ - - .... + - + - - ■ ; + + + +
Enhance Company's Value .80 .69 .87 .88 .20 .63 .86 .78 .82 .12 .85 .67 .99 .15 .71 .76 .19 .72 .80 .17 .47 .63
+ + + - + - - - - + - - - + - - + - + + -
Evaluate Company's Performance .41 .78 .16 .84 .22 .80 .79 .11 .67 .34 .96 .93 .28 .02* .19 .26 .19 .68 .70 .55 .55 .95
- + + - - - + + - - - * - - - - - - + +
Predict Company's Future outcomes .34 .60 .72 .16 .56 .38 .19 .38 .31 .88 .56 .10 .10 .35 .27 .26 .44 .88 .047 .65 .11 .11
+ - + + + - - + + + - + + + - - - - + - -
Fulfil Statutory and Legal .82 .76 .47 .42 .73 .83 .85 .27 •57 .94 .58 .69 .13 .33 ■72 .75 .69 .33 .45 .58 .67 .96
Requirements + - + + - - - + + - - + + + + - - - - +
Raise Capital .74 .87 .12 .42 .25 .77 .45 .20 .56 .35 .89 .54 .46 .90 .52 .80 .58 .95 .81 .72 .87 .77
- - - - - - - - - - - + + + + - + - - - -
.'................................................................................................................
All groups* Asymp.sig. levels of Kruskal-Wallis H  test o f all groups: (*) a£.05; (**) as.01.
The other columns are the Asymp.sig. levels of M a n n - W h i t n e y  U  test o f pairs of user groups: (*): aS.025; (**) a£.005(one-tailed test) 
The + or -  signs under p*values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + sign means larger mean)
*A= Individual Investors vs. Financial analysts
B= Individual Investors vs. Auditors
C= Individual Investors vs. Accountants
D= Individual vs. Institutional investors
E= Individual Investors vs. Government representative
F= Individual Investors vs. regulators
G= Financial Analysts vs. auditors
H= Financial Analysts vs. accountants
1= Financial Analysts vs. Institutional investors
J= Financial Analysts vs. Government representatives
K= Financial Analysts vs. regulators 
La Auditors vs. accountants 
M= Auditors vs. Institutional investors 
Ns Auditors vs. Government representatives 
0= Auditors vs. regulators 
Pa Accountants vs. Institutional investors 
Qa Accountants vs. Government representatives 
Ra Accountants vs. regulators
Sa Institutional Investors vs. Government representatives
Ta Institutional Investors vs. Regulators
U= Government Representatives vs. regulators___________
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Table 2, Section 7.6.1.2, Chapter 7: The Level o f Significance fo r , and direction of, the Differences among User Groups and between each pair o f User
Groups Regarding their Ratings o f the Agreement on the Nature o f Disclosed Information in Management Discussion and Analysis.
h b h h i h I I ■ ■ m m ■
Focuses on Good news More .11 .39 .29 .16 .55 .88 .029 .74 .041 .95 .54 .086 .036 .75 45 .22 .12 .49 .009* .63 13 .12
than Bad news . ' - + - + - ■ ■ + + + + + + - -T " - +
Is not available from .39 .30 .19 .52 .12 .97 .299 .64 .13 .54 .57 .71 .099 .92 41 .89 .055 .67 .16 .33 .89 .45
outside source - - + - - - - + - + + - + - - - - + + -
Is not available from .059 .43 .88 .13 .027 .29 .97 .55 .031 .15 .68 .69 .11 .054 .42 .98 .011* .028 35 .36 .17 .53
Financial Statements - - + - - - + + : - - + + - - • ■ ■+ :'-: - - - + + +
Is not useful to Evaluate .55 .73 .72 .39 .37 .27 .45 .95 .24 .26 .19 .64 .24 .26 .19 .67 .88 .71 .18 .799 .17 .12
Managerial Performance - - + + + - - + + + + + + - + + - + - -
Is not useful to predict .74 .43 .49 .093 .79 .897 .86 .96 .35 .68 .71 .56 .33 .74 .76 .60 .25 30 23 .91 .65 .84
Future Earnings + + + + + - - - ■- - ":■■ + . . . - ; - - ■ • v; -
All groups= Asymp.sig. levels of Kruskal-Wallis H  test of all groups: (*) a<.05; (**) a<.01.
The other columns are the Asymp.sig. levels of Mann-Whitney U test of pairs of user groups: (*): a<.025; (**) a<.005(one-tailed test)
+ , -  or = signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + sign means larger mean)
*A= Individual Investors vs. analysts 
B= Individual Investors vs, Auditors 
C= Individual Investors vs. Accountants 
D= Individual vs. Institutional investors 
E= Individual Investors vs. Government 
F= Individual Investors vs. regulators 
G= Financial Analysts vs. auditors______
H= Financial Analysts vs. accountants
1= Financial Analysts vs. Institutional investors
J- Financial Analysts vs. Government
K= Financial Analysts vs. regulators
L= Auditors vs. accountants
M= Auditors vs. Institutional investors
N= Auditors vs. Government
0= Auditors vs. regulators 
P= Accountants vs. Institutional investors 
Q- Accountants vs. Government 
R= Accountants vs. regulators 
S= Institutional Investors vs. Government 
T= Institutional Investors vs. Regulators 
U= Government vs. regulators___________
Table 3, Section 7.6.2.2, Chapter 7; The Level of Significance for, and Direction of, the Differences among User Groups and betw een each Pair o f User 
Groups Regarding their Perceptions about Extent o f Information Disclosed in Corporate Governance Report.
All A* 
Groups*
M N O
Corporate Governance code 
Achievement
All groups- Asymp.sig. levels of Kruskal-Wallis H  test of all groups: (*) a<.05; (**) a<.01.
The other columns are the Asymp.sig. levels of M a n n - W h i t n e y  U  test of pairs of user groups: (*): a£.025; (**) aS.OO 5 (one-tailed test) 
The + or -  signs under p-values indicate the location of the first group mean compared to second group (i.e. + sign means larger mean)
*A= Individual Investors vs. Financial analysts 
Individual Investors vs. Auditors
C= Individual Investors vs. Accountants 
D= Individual vs. Institutional investors 
E= Individual Investors vs. Government representatives 
F= Individual Investors vs. regulators 
G= Financial Analysts vs. auditors___________________
H= Financial Analysts vs. accountants
1= Financial Analysts vs. Institutional investors
)= Financial Analysts vs. Government representatives
K= Financial Analysts vs. regulators
L= Auditors vs. accountants
M= Auditors vs. Institutional investors
N= Auditors vs. Government representatives________
0= Auditors vs. regulators 
P= Accountants vs. Institutional investors 
Q= Accountants vs. Government representatives 
R= Accountants vs. regulators
S= Institutional Investors vs. Government representatives
T= Institutional Investors vs. Regulators
U= Government Representatives vs. regulators__________
3 5 6
Table 4, Section 7.18.2, Chapter 7: The level o f  significance for, and direction o f  the differences among
user groups and between each pair o f  user groups regarding their ratings o f the importance o f the list
o f mandatory items
Cash R ating .264 .559 (+} .261(-1 .125 (-1
Current assets Rating .158 .445 (-1 .061 f-1 .282 f-1
Non-current assets Rating .094 .299 f-1 .028 f-1 .355 f-1
Current liabilities Rating .574 .733 (-) .304 f-1 .523 f-1
Longterm  liabilities R ating .647 .419 (+1 .988 f-1 .404 f-1
Net assets per share Rating .521 .314 (+] .976 f-1 .314 f-1
Share capital Rating .399 .527 f+1 .422 (-1 .189 f-1
Retained earnings Rating .126 .597 (+) .124 f-1 .059 (-)
Amount of revenues R ating .668 .989 (-1 .423 f+1 .483 (+1
Administration and general expenses Rating .887 .619 (+) .894 f+1 .734 f-1
Depreciation and am ortization 
expenses
Rating .528 .397 (+) .792 (-} .274 (-1
Profit from operations Rating .668 .376 (+) .796 f+1 .522 f-1
Profit/loss before income tax and 
minority in terest
Rating .159 .060 (+} .365 (+} .248 (-1
Income tax Rating .289 .658 f-1 ■ 115 f-1 .345 f-1
Profit after tax Rating .568 .315 f+1 .456 f+1 .686 f-1
Net profit/loss Rating .034* .010* f+1 .127 f+1 .197 f-1
Earnings per share R ating .079 .033 f+y .457 f+ | .109 f-1
Description of nature  and effect of any 
change in accounting policies
Rating .713 .461 (-) .501 (-1 .953 f+)
Details of bank loans and overdrafts R ating .523 .930 r+y .296 f-1 .375 f-1
Details of related parties and holders 
of 10% of company’s share
Rating .600 .667 (0 .303 (-1 .653 f-1
Investments in quoted securities R ating .269 .892 f+1 .159 f-1 .177 f-1
List of major shareholders Rating .494 .724 (-) .225 f-1 .522 f-1
Dividend policy Rating .950 .834 f-1 .950 f+1 .736 ( + )
Segmental information Rating .164 .294 f+1 .342 f-1 .063 f-1
Details of contingent liabilities Rating .784 .985 f-1 .517 f-1 .597 f-1
Calculation of taxation Rating .377 .342 (-1 .177 f-1 .803 f-1
Number of employees R ating .581 ■572 (-1 .283 f-1 .773 f-1
Percentage of Omanisation Rating .920 .876 f+1 .651 f-1 •912 f-1
Disclosure of contractual obligations R ating .551 .314 H .375 f-1 .991 f+1
Details of any pending litigation Rating .778 .631 (-] .787 f+1 .495 f+1
All g ro u p s a  S ign ifican t lev e ls  o f  K ru sk a l-W a llis  H  t e s t  o f  a ll g ro u p s : (*): cc£.05; (**): a< .0 1
The o th e r  co lu m n s a re  s ig n ific a n t lev e ls  o f  M ann-W hitney U t e s t  o f  p a ir s  o f  u s e r  g ro u p s : (*): a s  ,025 ; {**}: a< .005  
(one-ta iled  te s t) ;  + o r  -  s ign  in d ic a te s  th e  lo c a tio n  o f  th e  f i r s t  g ro u p  m e a n  c o m p ared  to  seco n d  g ro u p  (i.e. + sign
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Consent Form - Anonymous data
I understand that my participation in this project will involve answering interview questions about 
my opinion toward the previously distributed questionnaire's findings which will require an hour 
of my time. And these answers are supplementary background for the previous findings.
I understand that participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I can withdraw from the 
study at any time without giving a reason and w ithout loss of payment [or course credit}.
I understand that I am free to ask any questions at any time. If for any reason I experience 
discomfort during participation in this project, I am free to w ithdraw  or discuss my concerns with 
my supervisor.
I understand that the information provided by me will be held totally anonymously, so that it is 
impossible to trace this information back to me individually. I understand that, in accordance with 
the Data Protection Act, this information may be retained indefinitely.
I also understand that at the end of the study I will be provided with additional information and 
feedback about the purpose of the study.
I,_________________________ consent to participate in the study conducted by Marwa Al-Kalbani, a
PhD student of Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University with the supervision of Prof. Mike Jones 
and Dr. Yusuf Karbhari.
Signed:
Date:
INTERVIEW  QUESTIONS
• Introduction by the researcher.
• I would like to thank you for your time.
• Remind the interviewee about the nature of the research, give hi, /h er a copy of the 
previously distributed questionnaire, and emphasise the importance of interview 
questions.
• Assure interviewee of absolute anonymity.
Interviewee Background Information_______________________________________________
Name of the organisation and sector type:
Name of interviewee [optional) and position:
Qualification and no. of years of experience:
The study indicated the following results; in your opinion what are the reasons behind these
results?
1. A minority of respondents agreed that the purpose of financial reporting is to raise capital 
[11.6%) and predict future outcomes [18.9%).
2. Institutional investors selected meeting with a company's management as the most important 
source of information, whereas, individual investors ranked it in 6th position.
3. Institutional investors rated the management discussion and analysis section higher than 
other report user groups.
4. 39.9% of respondents, mostly regulators, believed that the management discussion and 
analysis report provides information that focuses on good news more than bad news.
5. 22.5% of respondents believed that the corporate governance report is of very high 
importance.
6. In your opinion, is the corporate governance report im portant and why?
7. In this study, 30.2% of respondents were neutral about the achievement of the code of 
corporate governance. How do you in terpret this response?
8. Individual investors highly rated details of non-compliance by a company which is disclosed 
in the corporate governance report.
9. Disclosure policies were more highly rated by financial analysts than government
representatives.
10. How do you evaluate the current performance of corporate governance within Omani listed 
companies?
11. A few respondents considered the following voluntary items to be of high importance: 
corporate policy on employee training; % of Omani employees; cost of safety measures; and a 
company's environmental performance.
12. The present study found that more than 40% of respondents considered short-term and long­
term liabilities to be of high importance when making investment decisions. How do you 
interpret this conclusion?
13. According to the questionnaire analysis, items disclosed in the profit and loss account were 
more highly rated by professional users than items disclosed in the balance sheet. In your 
opinion, do you agree, and if not, w hat are the im portant financial statements that are used in 
the analysis process?
14. This study's results revealed significant differences between the responses of auditors of Big 
four auditing firms and auditors from local companies and affiliated auditing companies.
15. What are the internal and external factors that affect voluntary disclosure in the Omani 
annual reports? Do they affect it positively or negatively?
16. Do you think establishing a professional body regulating and governing the accounting 
profession in Oman would improve the financial reporting system in Oman in comparison to 
the current reporting system?
a) If yes, why and w hat would be the benefits of establishing such a body?
b] If, no, why?
17. Are there any corporate governance issues that you feel im portant and not part of the current 
corporate governance framework in Oman?
APPENDIX F: DATA E X A M I N A T I O N  AND R E D U C ED  REGRES SION 
MODEL S U S I N G  M A R K E T  C A P I T A L I S A T I O N  RESULTS 
( C H A P T E R  9 )
• Differences between Insurance and Investment companies (Section 9.3)
T e s t S ta tis t ic s  (b )
Index of Index o f Index of Index of Overall Overall
Unweighted Mandatory Unweighted Voluntary Unweighted Weighted
Mandatory D isclosures Voluntary Disclosures Index Index by
Disclosures Scores Disclosures Scores Mean
Scores W eighted by 
Mean
Scores W eighted by 
Mean
Mann-Whitney U 11.500 11.000 5.500 6.000 5.500 5.000
WilcoxonW 242.500 242.000 236.500 237.000 236.500 236.000
Z -1.046 -1.093 -1.699 -1.637 -1.692 -1.746
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .295 .274 .089 .102 .091 .081
Exact Sig. [2*(l-tailed Sig.)] .332(a) .332(a) .095(a) .126(a) .095(a) .095(a)
a. Not correct for ties.
b. Grouping Variable: Sector Type.
Test Statistics (a and b)
Index of 
Unweighted 
Mandatory 
Disclosures 
Scores
Index o f  
Mandatory 
Disclosures 
Scores 
W eighted by 
Mean
Index of 
Unweighted  
Voluntary 
Disclosures 
Scores
Index of 
Voluntary 
Disclosures 
Scores 
W eighted by 
Mean
Overall
Unweighted
Index
Overall 
Weighted 
Index by 
Mean
Chi-Square 1.095 1.195 2.886 2.679 2.863 3.048
df 1 1 1 1 1 1
Asym. Sig .295 .274 .089 .102 0.091 .081
a. Kruskal Wallis Test.
b. Grouping Variable: Sector Type.
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• Data Examination (Section 9.4)
1. Index of Weighted Mandatory
index of m an d a to ry  d isc lo s u re s  s c o re s  w e igh ted  by m ean
Index of m andatory disclosures sco res weighted by mean
Index of mandatory disclosures scores weighted by mean Stem-and-Leaf 
Plot
Frequency Stem and Leaf
5.00 Extremes (=<.829)
1.00 85 . 6
.00 86
2.00 87 . 66
4 .00 88 . 4999
6.00 89 . 223677
6.00 90 . 011247
4.00 91 . 0288
7 .00 92 3445599
18 .00 93 . 001133555577777899
10.00 94 . 0000225688
.00 95
9.00 96 . 011233569
21.00 97 . 011222223333333333444
1.00 98 . 4
.00 99
17.00 100 . 00000000000000000
Stem width: 0100
Each leaf: 1 case(s)
NORMAL of indw m m  u s in g  VW
Mean = -0.01 
Std. Dev. = 0 
N = 111
-3.0000 -2 0000 -1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2.0000
NORMAL of indwmm using VW
NORMAL of indwmm using VW Stem-and-Leaf Plot
Frequency Stem and Leaf
2.00 -2 . 13
5.00 -1 . 56689
10.00 -1 . 0011123344
17.00 -0 . 55556666777889999
22.00 -0 . 0000011112222333334 44 4
21.00 0 . 000011112222233334444
17.00 0 . 55577777777779999
17.00 1 . 44444444444444444
3711 
.9354178
!»■
Stem width: 1.0000
Each leaf: 1 case(s)
364
E x p ec te d  Norm alDev from Normal
M'
05TI
«
<0a
<«
c
®
O'
365
Index of mandatory disc losures scores
weighted by mean g
o o
Index of m andatory d isc losures sco res 
weighted by mean
Expected Cum Prob
3a
$0'5
NORMAL of indwmm using VW NORMAL o f indwmm using VW
ZOc*
>P
a
|
cHi
3
(0
M-
»■
Expected Cum Prob
0,0
0.
0:i
I tta
0:
3
D
0V
oa
o
366
In d ex  o f m a n d a to ry  d is c lo s u r e s  s c o re s  
w e ig h te d  by  m e anIndex of m andatory d isclosures scores weighted by mean weighted by mean
oc
03
n■I
9)
NORMAL of indwmm using VW NORMAL o f  indw m m  u s in g  VWNORMAL of indwmm using VW
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2. Index of W eighted Voluntary
H M m M i wmemmm
Index of voluntary  d isc lo su re s  s c o re s  w eigh ted  by m ean
Index of voluntary d isclosures scores weighted by mean
Normal Q-Q Plot of Index of voluntary disclosures scores weighted t>y mean
Observed
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
Dependent Variable: Index of voluntary disclosures scores weighted by mean
£
Observed Cum Prob
Exp
ecte
d N
orm
al
NORMAL of indw vm  u s in g  VW
I I | I I  [ I  I I I l a .
> - 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2 
NORMAL of indwvm using VW
Normal Q-Q Plot of NORMAL of indwvm using VW
Observed Vali
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residual 
Dependent Variable: NORMAL of indwvm using VW
o
Observed Cum Prob
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• Reduced R egression M odels using Market Capitalisation (Sections 9.6.1-9.6.6) 
1. Transformed unweighted Mandatory Index
M odel Sum m ary
Model I  R R Square AdjustedRSquare Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics
R Square Change F Change d fl - df2 Sig. F Change
1 .552(a) .304 .219 .8254032 .304 3.572 12 98 .000
a Predictors: (Constant), NORMAL of capital using VW, service sector, NORMAL of institut using VW, NORMAL of foreign using VW, NORMAL of roe using VW, NORMAL of govern using VW, 
NORMAL of curratio using VW, Big audit firm, NORMAL of sharehld using VW, industry sector, NORMAL of debt using VW, NORMAL of Minority using VW
C oefficients (a)
Model Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) -.561 .228 -2.459 .016
NORMAL of capital using VW .429 .106 .442 4.047 .000 .596 1.679
NORMAL of roe using VW .010 .092 .010 .107 .915 .781 1.280
NORMAL of debt using VW .053 .138 .055 .387 .700 .351 2.846
NORMAL of curratio using VW .030 .134 .031 .225 .822 .370 2.701
NORMAL of govern using VW .026 .182 .019 .144 .886 .393 2.547
NORMAL of institut using VW .005 .176 .005 .029 .977 .233 4.301
NORMAL of sharehld using VW -.065 .185 -.058 -.352 .725 .266 3.755
NORMAL of Minority using VW .006 .172 .007 .037 .971 .223 4.480
NORMAL of foreign using VW -.065 .179 -.036 -.360 .720 .712 1.404
industry sector .280 .235 .149 1.190 .237 .450 2.220
service sector .321 .250 .165 1.283 .202 .430 2.324
Big audit firm .479 .185 .244 2.582 .011 .793 1.262
a Dependent Variable: NORMAL of induwm using VW
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2. Transformed Weighted Mandatory Index
M odel Sum m ary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics
R Square Change F Change d fl ,<H2„ ■, Sig. F Change
1 .568(a) .323 .240 .8154026 .323 3.897 12 98 .000
a Predictors: (Constant), NORMAL of capital using VW, service sector, NORMAL of institut using VW, NORMAL of foreign using VW, NORMAL of roe using VW, NORMAL of govern using VW, 
NORMAL of curratio using VW, Big audit firm, NORMAL of sharehld using VW, industry sector, NORMAL of debt using VW, NORMAL of Minority using VW
C oefficients (a)
Model Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients :.t;< t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B | Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) -.589 .225 -2.613 .010
NORMAL of capital using VW .436 .105 .448 4.162 .000 .596 1679
NORMAL of roe using VW .029 .091 .030 .318 .751 .781 1.280
NORMAL of debt using VW .018 .136 .018 .132 .895 .351 2.846
NORMAL of curratio using VW .039 .132 .040 .294 .770 .370 2.701
NORMAL of govern using VW .028 .179 .020 .154 878 .393 2.547
NORMAL of institut using VW .047 .174 .046 .269 .788 .233 4.301
NORMAL of sharehld using VW -.018 .183 -.015 -.096 .924 .266 3.755
NORMAL of Minority using VW .034 .170 .036 .202 .840 .223 4.480
NORMAL of foreign using VW -.040 .177 -.022 -227 .821 .712 1.404
industry sector .306 .232 .163 1.316 .191 .450 2.220
service sector .352 .247 .180 1.424 .158 .430 2.324
Big audit firm .480 .183 .245 2.621 .010 .793 1.262
a Dependent Variable: NORMAL of indwmm using VW
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3. Transformed Unweighted Voluntary Index
M odel Sum m ary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics
R Square Change F Change d fl Sig. F Change
1 .490(a) .240 .147 .8921535 .240 2.575 12 9 8 .005
a Predictors: (Constant), Big audit firm, NORMAL of curratio using VW, NORMAL of govern using VW, NORMAL of roe using VW, NORMAL of foreign using VW, NORMAL of sharehld using VW, 
service sector, NORMAL of institut using VW, NORMAL of capital using VW, industry sector, NORMAL of debt using VW, NORMAL of Minority using VW
C oefficients (a)
Model Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) -.289 .247 -1.172 .244
NORMAL of capital using VW .374 .115 ,372 3.260 .002 .596 1.679
NORMAL of roe using VW -.053 .099 -.053 -.535 .594 .781 1.280
NORMAL of debt using VW .069 .149 .069 .463 .645 .351 2.846
NORMAL of curratio using VW -.127 .145 -.127 -.876 .383 .370 2.701
NORMAL of govern using VW -.093 .196 -.066 -.472 .638 .393 2.547
NORMAL of institut using VW .098 .190 .094 .517 .606 .233 4.301
NORMAL of sharehld using VW -.185 .200 -.157 -.921 .359 .266 3.755
NORMAL of Minority using VW .162 .186 .162 .870 .386 .223 4.480
NORMAL of foreign using VW -.016 .194 -.008 -.081 935 .712 1.404
industry sector .330 .254 .170 1.299 .197 .450 2.220
service sector .214 .270 .106 .793 .430 .430 2.324
Big audit firm .127 .200 .063 .633 .528 .793 1.262
a Dependent Variable: NORMAL of induwv using VW
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4. Transformed Weighted Voluntary Index
M odel Sum m ary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics
R Square Change F Change d fl Sig. F Change
1 .529(a) .280 .192 .8700881 .280 3.179 12 98 .001
a Predictors: (Constant), Big audit firm, NORMAL of debt using VW, service sector, NORMAL of sharehld using VW, NORMAL of roe using VW, NORMAL of foreign using VW, NORMAL of govern 
using VW, NORMAL of institut using VW, NORMAL of capital using VW, industry sector, NORMAL of curratio using VW, NORMAL of Minority using VW
C oefficients (a)
Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients v" t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) -.475 .228 -2.088 .039
NORMAL of capital using VW .301 .113 .300 2.673 .009 .584 1.711
NORMAL of roe using VW .007 .098 .007 .073 .942 .771 1.297
NORMAL of debt using VW .031 .145 .031 .214 .831 .352 2.842
NORMAL of curratio using VW -.120 .141 -.120 -.851 .397 .371 2.696
NORMAL of govern using VW -.062 .192 -.044 -.321 .749 .391 2.559
NORMAL of institut using VW .124 .184 .119 .673 .502 .236 4.239
NORMAL of sharehld using VW -.137 .195 -.117 -702 484 .267 3.750
NORMAL of Minority using VW .183 .181 .183 1.014 .313 .225 4.445
NORMAL of foreign using VW -.040 .186 .... . -.213 .832 .734 1.362
industry sector .229 .247 .118 .927 .356 .453 2.208
service sector .124 .264 .061 .470 .640 .430 2.323
Big audit firm .520 .184 .256 2.832 .006 .898 1.114
a Dependent Variable: NORMAL of indwvm using VW
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5. Transformed Overall Unweighted Index
M odel Sum m ary
Model v-R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error o f the Estimate Change Statistics
R Square Change F Change d fl df2 Sig. F Change
1 .535(a) .286 .199 .8665535 .286 3.272 12 98 .001
a Predictors: (Constant), Big audit firm, NORMAL of curratio using VW, NORMAL of govern using VW, NORMAL of roe using VW, NORMAL of foreign using VW, NORMAL of sharehld using VW, 
service sector, NORMAL of institut using VW, NORMAL of capital using VW, industry sector, NORMAL of debt using VW, NORMAL of Minority using VW
C oefficients (a)
Model Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) -.427 .239 -1.781 .078
NORMAL of capital using VW .4-42 .111 .439 3.971 .000 .596 1 679
NORMAL of roc using VW -.038 .097 -.038 -.391 .697 .781 1.280
NORMAL of debt using VW .087 .144 .087 .602 .549 .351 2.846
NORMAL of curratio using VW -.084 .140 -.084 -.598 .551 .370 2.701
NORMAL of govern using VW -.072 .191 -.051 -.377 .707 .393 2.547
NORMAL of institut using VW .053 .185 .051 .286 .775 .233 4.301
NORMAL of sharehld using VW -.162 .195 -.137 -.831 .408 .266 3.755
NORMAL of Minority using VW .141 .181 .141 .778 .439 .223 4.480
NORMAL of foreign using VW -.010 .188 -.005 -.052 .959 .712 1.404
industry sector .369 .247 .190 1.496 .138 .450 2.220
service sector .316 .263 .157 1.203 .232 .430 2.324
Big audit firm .252 .195 .124 1.294 .199 .793 1.262
a Dependent Variable: NORMAL of ouwindx using VW
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6. Transformed Overall Weighted Index
M odel Sum m ary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate , . \ v ’•'< ' v* ' / ! > Change Statistics" * '*/ V  * V
R Square Change F Change df2 Sig. F Change
1 .498(a) .248 .156 .8891673 .248 2.698 12 98 .003
a Predictors: (Constant), Big audit firm, NORMAL of curratio using VW, NORMAL of govern using VW, NORMAL of roe using VW, NORMAL of foreign using VW, NORMAL of sharehld using VW, 
service sector, NORMAL of institut using VW, NORMAL of capital using VW, industry sector, NORMAL of debt using VW, NORMAL of Minority using VW
Coefficients (a)
Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients : t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
f S K W B I i Beta . .. Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) -.421 .246 -1.713 .090
NORMAL of capital using VW .419 ,114 .417 3.671 .000 .596 1 679
NORMAL of roc using VW -.043 .099 -.043 -.436 .664 .781 1.280
NORMAL of debt using VW .108 .148 .108 .729 .468 .351 2.846
NORMAL of curratio using VW -.052 .144 -.052 -.360 .720 .370 2.701
NORMAL of govern using VW -.139 .196 -.099 -.709 .480 .393 2.547
NORMAL of institut using VW -.024 .190 -.022 -.124 .902 .233 4.301
NORMAL of sharehld using VW -.189 .200 -.161 -.949 .345 .266 3.755
NORMAL of Minority using VW .069 .186 .069 .373 .710 .223 4.480
NORMAL of foreign using VW -.032 ■ :'VV:)i93;:7r-' -.017 -.168 .867 .712 1.404
industry sector .388 .253 .200 1.534 .128 .450 2.220
service sector .268 .270 .133 .993 .323 .430 2.324
Big audit firm .270 .200 .133 1.350 .180 .793 1.262
a Dependent Variable: NORMAL of owindm using VW
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APP ENDI X G: D E S CR I P T I V E  S T A T I S T I C S  A N D  ANA LY SI S  OF TOTAL  
ITEM D A T A T  SET ( C H A P T E R S  8 & 9 )
• Statistics and Tests Pertaining to the Overall Omani Corporate Compliance with  
Mandatory D isclosure (Chapter 8, Section 8.2)
Table! : Description o f the overall Index o f  M andatory Item s Disclosed in Omani Reports
Industrial (N=49) Mean 0.830 0.843 0.850
Median 0.833 0.845 0.853
Std. D. 0.085 0.078 0.077
Minimum 0.633 0.664 0.672
Maximum 0.983 0.984 0.984
Service (N=39) Mean 0.838 0.848 0.853
Median 0.833 0.846 0.853
Std. D. 0.085 0.082 0.081
Minimum 0.533 0.555 0.566
Maximum 0.967 0.970 0.975
Financial (N=23) Mean 0.859 0.872 0.880
Median 0.867 0.885 0.893
Std. D. 0.065 0.063 0.060
Minimum 0.633 0.656 0.672
Maximum 0.933 0.945 0.951
Whole sample Mean 0.839 0.851 0.857
(N = ll l) Median 0.867 0.870 0.877
Std. D. 0.081 0.077 0.075
Minimum 0.533 0.555 0.566
Maximum 0.983 0.984 0.984
Table 2: Level o f significance o f  differences b e tw een  unw eigh ted and w eigh ted  m andatory disclosure 
indices' scores _________________
In d ex  o f  m e a n -w e ig h te d  In d ex  o f  m e d ia n -w e ig h te d  In d ex  o f  m e d ia n -w e ig h te d
m a n d a to ry  d is c lo s u r e  v s. m a n d a to r y  d isc lo su r e  v s. m a n d a to ry  d isc lo su r e  vs.
in d e x  u n w e ig h te d  in d e x  u n w e ig h te d  in d ex  m e a n -w e ig h ted
m a n d a to ry  d is c lo s u r e  m a n d a to r y  d isc lo su r e  m a n d a to ry  d isc lo su re
sc o r e s
Industrial
0.000** 0.000** 
+ +
0.000**
+
Service
0.000** 0.000** 
+ +
0.000**
+
Financial
0.000** 0.000** 
+ +
0.000**
+
Whole sam ple
0.000** 0.000** 
+ +
0.000**
+
*■ The scores are actual significance levels (*:cc<0.025; **:a:S0»005 2-tailed test)
.  The +,. and -  signs indicates the location o f value o f first named index compared to second one (i.e. + 
sign indicates that first nam ed index has higher value than second one)------------------------------------------- —
Table 3 (Section 8.2.1.2): Descriptive statistics o f  the index value fo r  each o f the mandatory disclosure
item.
Cash 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
C u rren t a sse ts 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
N on-cu rren t a s s e ts 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
C u rren t liab ilities 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Share cap ita l 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.095 0.00 1.00 111 100
A m ount of re v e n u e s 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
A dm in is tra tio n  a n d  g en e ra l 
expenses 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
D eprecia tion  an d  
am o rtiza tio n  ex p en ses 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Profit from  o p e ra tio n s 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
P ro fit/lo ss  b e fo re  incom e 
tax  an d  m in o rity  in te re s t 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Profit a f te r  ta x 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
Net p ro f it/lo s s 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 lo o
R etained  e a rn in g s 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 111 100
D etails o f re la te d  p a r tie s  
and  h o ld e rs  o f 10%  of 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.00 1.00 111 99.1
com pany’s s h a re
E arn ings p e r  s h a re 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.00 1.00 111 99.1
D escrip tion  o f n a tu re  a n d  
effect o f an y  ch an g e  in  
accounting  po lic ies
0.99 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.00 1.00 111 99.1
List o f m a jo r sh a re h o ld e rs 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 111 98.2
Long te rm  liab ilitie s 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 111 94.6
D etails o f b a n k  lo a n s  an d  
o v erd ra fts 0.88
1.00 1.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 111 88.3
N um ber o f em p lo y ees 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 111 84.7
0,79 1.00 1.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 111 79.3
Net a sse ts  p e r  s h a re 0.78 1.00 1.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 111 78.4
C alculation o f ta x a tio n 0.77 1.00 1.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 111 77.5
Segm ental in fo rm a tio n 0.70 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 111 70.3
D etails o f c o n tin g e n t 
liab ilities 0.65
1.00 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 111 64.9
Dividend policy 0.57 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 111 56 8
In v estm en ts in  q u o te d  
secu ritie s 0.54
1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 111 54.1
%  of O m an isa tion 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 111 34.2
D etails o f a n y  p e n d in g  
litigation
0.26 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 111 26.1
D isclosure o f c o n tra c tu a l 
obligations
0.14 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 111 14.4
a. M inim um  = 0  i f  co m p an y  d id n 't  d isc lo se  th e  item .
b. M axim um  = 1 if  c o m p a n y  fu lly  d isc lo se d  th e  item .
c. N = n u m b e r  o f  c o m p a n ie s  to  w h ic h  th e  ite m  is  a p p lic a b le  to  a n d  d isclose so m e  o f th e  item s.
d. % of  N = %  o f  c o m p a n ie s  d is c lo se d  th e  ite m  th a t  is a p p licab le  to  th em .
Statistics and Tests Pertaining to the Overall Voluntary D isclosure in the Omani 
Annual Reports (Chapter 8, Section 8.3)
Table 4: Description o f  Overall voluntary disclosure in Omani annual reports
Industrial Mean 0.209 0.215 0.215
-j'v' ' Median 0.222 0.226 0.226
Std. D. 0.075 0.076 0.075
Minimum 0.056 0.057 0.058
Maximum 0.444 0.439 0.438
Service
N = 39 Mean 0.195 0.199 0.197
Median 0.222 0.226 0.226
Std. D. 0.080 0.080 0.079
Minimum 0.028 0.028 0.029
Maximum 0.333 0.344 0.336
Financial Mean 0.209 0.215 0.215
N = 23 Median 0.194 0.208 0.204
Std. D. 0.106 0.108 0.108
Minimum 0.056 0.059 0.058
Maximum 0.472 0.490 0.489
Whole sam ple Mean 0.204 0.209 0.209
N = 111 Median 0.222 0.225 0.226
Std. D. 0.083 0.084 0.084
Minimum 0.028 0.028 0.029
Maximum 0.472 0.490 0.489
Table 5: Level o f  significance betw een  unw eigh ted  an d  w eigh ted  voluntary disclosure index scores 
using Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test.
0.000** 0.000** 0.874
Industrial + + +
0.001** 0.018* 0.206
Service + + -
0.000** 0.000** 0.648
> Financial + + -
0.000** 0.000** 0.268
Whole sam ple + + -
■ The scores are aclcual significance levels (*:cts;.025; **:a^.005 2-tailed test}
- The +,- and -  signs indicates the location o f value o f  the first named index compared to the second [i.e.
♦  sign indicates that the first nam ed index has higher value than the second) |
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Table 6 (Section 8.3.1.1): Descriptive statistics o f  index value fo r each voluntary disclosure item.
Statement o f retained earnings 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 111 99.1
Trend analysis on profitability 0.78 1.00 1 00 0.41 0.00 1 00 111 78.4
Uncertainties that are reasonably 
expected to  affect financial condition 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 111 73.0
Company's com petitive pressures 0.62 1.00 1 00 0 49 0 00 1.00 111 62.2
Analysis o f company's investm ent 
portfolio
0.53 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 111 53.2
Company's technological developm ents 0.42 0.00 0 00 0 50 1 00 1.00 111 42.3
Corporate policy on em ployee training 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 111 40.5
Impact of existing regulations on 
business operations 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
111 36.0
Comparison o f company's perform ance 
with sector's indicators 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
111 33.3
Comparison o f actual performance with  
plans 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00
111 28.8
Effect o f  interest rate on current results 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 111 19.8
Effect of interest rate on future results 0.18 0.00 0.00 0 38 0 00 1 00 111 18.0
Off-balance sheet arrangem ents 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 1.00 111 18.0
Graph illustrating company's m arket 
price in comparison to broad based  
index of Muscat Security Market
0.17 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 111 17.1
Comparison o f actual company's 
performance w ith com petitors 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 111 14.4
Company's health, safety and security 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 111 12 6
Financial information for more than 2
years’.' . .. . 0.13
0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 1.00 111 12.6
Gross profit margin 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 111 11 7
Company's environm ental perform ance 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 111 10.8
Human resource training expenditure. 0.10 0 00 0.00 0.30 0 00 1.00 111 9 9
Com pany's forward-looking statem ent 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 111 7.20
Stock statistics o f company's share 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 111 5.40
Cost o f  sa fe ty  m e a s u re s 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 111 4.50
Graph illustrating incom e of a company 0.05 0.00 0 00 0 21 0.00 1 00 111 4.50
Company's insurance coverage 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 111 4.50
Profit forecast 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 111 4.50
Current ratio 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 1.00 111 3.60
Future cash flows 0.03 0.00 0 00 0 16 0 00 1.00 111 2.70
Sources of financing arranged but not 
yet used 0.03
0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 1.00 111 2.70
Summary analysis o f cash flows by 
segment
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 111 1.80
Price earnings ratio 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 111 1.80
% of Omani em ployees in different 
levels of a company
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00 111 0.90
Average wages o f em ployees. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 111 0.00
Forecasted market share 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 00 0.00 0.00 111 0 00
A report on ethical conduct of 
company's officers.
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 111 0.00
Graph illustrating impact of a 
company’s price changes on earnings 
per share overall several years
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 111 0.00
a. Minimum -  0  if  com pany didn’t  d isclose  th e  item
b. Maximum = 1 if  com pany fully d isclosed  th e  item
c. K s number o f  com panies to w hich the item  is  applicable to  and disclose it.
d. % of N — % o f  com panies disclosed th e  item  that is applicable to  them . .....................................
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• The Association Between the Level of Mandatory Disclosure and Voluntary 
Disclosure in the Omani Corporate Reports (Section 8.5)
Table 7: Correlation betw een  Indices' scores o f  m ean- w eigh ted  m andatory and voluntary disclosure 
o f Omani annual reports
In d u stria l (N=49) Index of mean-weighted voluntary 0.379a
, disclosure scores 0.007**
Service (N=39) Index of mean-weighted voluntary 0.607
disclosure scores 0.000**
Financial (N=23) Index of mean-weighted voluntary 0.506
s disclosure scores 0.014*
W hole Sam ple ( N = l l l ) Index of mean-weighted voluntary 0.466
disclosure scores 0.000**
■ a S p ea rm an 's  rh o  c o rre la tio n  co e ffic ien t
a * S ignificant a t  0 .05  level (2 - ta ile d )
■ * ^sign ifican t a t  0 .01  level (2  ta i le d  te s t)
• Association between Sector Type and Levels of Disclosure
Table 8: level o f  significances fo r  differences b e tw een  Omani listed companies in different sectors 
regarding their level o f  m andatory and voluntary disclosure in annual reports
Industrial 0 .523a 0.677 0 .674 0.656 0.504 0.920
vs. Service _b + - - + +
Industrial
vs.
Financial
0 .119 0 .7 3 4
+
I l l l l g l l l l l j 0 .076 0.804
+
0.422
Service vs. 0 .386 0.820 0.484 .224 0.678 0.386
Financial - - - - -
Note: a = significance level o f M a n n - W h i t n e y  Test: (*:a< .05,2-tailed  test)
b = indicates the location o f m ean value o f first named sector compared to second one (i.e. + sign indicates that
1 first named sector has higher m ean value than second one) 1
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• Association between Auditor Type and Levels of Disclosure
Table 9: level o f significances fo r  differences b e tw een  Omani listed companies in different sectors 
regarding their level o f  m andatory and voluntary disclosure in annual reports.
Big four vs. 
Non-Big four
0.000*3 0.047* 0.002* 0.000* 0.045* 0.002*
+b + +
Note: a = s ig n ifica n ce  le v e l o f  M a n n - W h i t n e y  T e s t :  (* :a < .0 5 ,2 - ta ile d  test)
b -  in d ica tes  th e  lo ca tio n  o f  m e a n  v a lu e  o f  f ir s t  n a m e d  se c to r  co m p a red  to  se co n d  o n e  (i.e. + sign  
in d icates th a t f ir s t  n am ed  se c to r  h a s  h ig h e r  m e a n  v a lu e  th a n  se c o n d  o n e)
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Table 10: C orrela tion  a m o n g  D e p e n d e n t a n d  In d e p e n d e n t V ariab les (SECTION 9.5)1
Normal 
scores of 
Total assets
0.505
0.000**
0.497
0.000**
0.572
0.000**
0.501
0.000**
0.469
0.000**
0.568
0.000**
Normal 
scores of 
Market 
capitalisation
0.483
0.000**
0.387
0.000**
0.496
0.000**
0.489
0.000**
0.365
0.000**
0.494
0.000**
0.825
0.000**
Normal 
scores of 
Return on 
equity
0.160
.094
0.100
0.297
0.140
0.144
0.153
0.110
0.094
0.327
0.140
0.144
0.283
0.003**
0.341
0.000**
Normal 
scores of 
Debt ratio
-0.106
0.267
0.034
0.727
-0.041
0.666
-0.130
0.173
0.037
0.703
-0.039
0.683
-0.094
0.324
-0.395
0.000**
0.078
0.418
Normal 
scores of 
Current ratio
0.079
0.409
-0.062
0.517
-0.005
0.957
0.078
0.417
-0.064
0.502
-0.014
0.886
0.084
0.378
0.365
0.000**
0.022
0.820
-0.707
0.000**
Normal 
scores of % 
of
government
ownership
0.007
0.940
-0.052
0.589
-0.035
0.713
-0.025
0.796
-0.065
0.495
-0.052
0.591
0.059
0.536
0.076
0.425
0.057
0.551
-0.051
0.595
0.111
0.248
Normal 
scores of % 
of
institutional
investors
-0.005
0.961
0.074
0.438
0.009
0.924
-0.021
0.831
0.095
0.322
0.015
0.873
-0.179
0.060
-0.204
0.032*
0.049
0.607
0.282
0.003**
-0.231
0.015*
-0.227
0.017*
-
Normal 
scores of % 
of shares 
held by 
major
shareholders
-0.170
0.075
-0.254
0.007**
-0.221
0.020*
-0.481
0.121
-0.245
0.010**
-0.217
0.022*
-0.289
0.002**
-0.248
0.009**
-0.100 
0 297
0.016
0.867
-0.051
0.595
-0.235
0.013*
-0.239
0.12*
Normal 
scores of % 
of shares 
held by 
minority 
shareholders
0.184
0.054
0.235
0.013*
0.256
0.007**
0.202
0.033*
0.220
0.021*
0.261
0.006**
0.297
0.002**
0.355
0.000**
0.007
0.940
-0.215
0.024*
0.220
0.020*
-0.146
0.127
-0.484
0.000**
-0.301
0.001**
Normal 
scores of % 
of major 
foreign 
investments
0.084
0.381
0.025
0.793
0.078
0.413
0.077
0.422
0.011
0.909
0.073
0.449
0.218 
0 021*
0.202
0.033*
0.010
0.917
-0.008
0.935
-0.164
0.085
0.138
0.148
-0.053
0.580
-0.095 
0 319
-0.125
0191
Industrial
Sector -0.087=0.364
0.047
0.625
-0.025
0.792
-0.073
0.444
0.053
0.581
-0.012
0.901
-0.276
0.003**
-0.249
0.009**
-0.131
0.172
0.194
0.041*
-0.210
0.027*
-0.088
0.357
-0.096
0.315
0.180
0.058
-0.005
0.955
-0.130
0.175
Service
Sector
0.007
0.945
-0.079
0.408
-0.050
0.603
-0.029
0.760
-0.101
0.292
-0.069
0.469
0.039
0.681
-0.031
0.747
-0.040
0.679
-0.045
0.640
-0.005
0.958
0.244
0.010**
0.172
0.072
-0.082
0.390
-0.284
0.003**
0.127
0184
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1Financial
Sector 0.099 0.036 0.090 0.124 0.054 0.096 0.295 0.341 0.207 -0.185 0.264 -0.180 -0.084 -0.124 0.341 0.010
0303 0.708 0.349 0.193 0.574 0.315 0.002** 0.000** 0.029* 0.052 0.005** 0.059 0.379 0.195 0.000** 0.921
Big four 0.351 0.190 0.300 0.351 0.191 0.302 0.364 0.313 0.196 -0.028 0.054 -0.074 0.114 -0.105 0.029 0.214
auditor 0.000** 0.046* 0.001** 0.000** 0.045* 0.001** 0.000** 0.001** 0.040* 0.769 0.57Z 0.442 0.234 0.273 0.760 0.024*
Non-Big four -0.351 -0.190 -0.300 -0.351 -0.191 -0.302 -0.364 -0.313 -0.196 0.028 -0.054 0.074 -0.114 0.105 -0.029 -0.214
auditor 0.000** 0.046* 0.001** 0.000** 0.045* 0.001** 0.000** 0.001** 0.040* 0.769 0.572 0.442 0.234 0.273 0.273 0.024*
3 Spearman's rho correlation coefficient 
*significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed test)
* ^ significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed test) / : ' V "
lf|lf|lf§|§I||§P - . - -- ,'
Table 11: C o rre la tio n  a m o n g  C a te g o r ic a l V a r ia b le s  (S ec tio n  9 .5 )
Industrial Sector
Service Sector -0,654
0,000**
Financial Sector -0.454
0.000** 1
-0,376
0.000**
-
Big four auditor -0.276
0.003**
0.173
0.069
0.135
0.159
Non-Big four Auditor 0.276
0.003**
-0.173
0.069
-0.135
0.159
-1.000
0.000**
■
a Spearman’s  rho correlation coefficient
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• Normality Tests and Regression Models (Sections 9.4-9.6)
1. Index of Weighted Mandatory
Index of w eigh ted  m an d a to ry NORMAL of index of w eighted 
m andato ry
N
Skewness
Std. E rror of Skew ness 
Kurtosis
Std. E rror of K urtosis
111
-0.915
0.229
1.072
0.455
111
-0.009
0.229
-0.319
0.455
NORMAL of indwmm using VW Stem-and-Leaf Plot 
Frequency Stem and Leaf
2.00 -2 . 13
4.00 -1 . 6689
11.00 -1 . 00111223444
17.00 -0 . 55556667777888999
22.00 -0 . 00000111122222333344 4 4
21.00 0 . 000011111222233334 444
16.00 0 . 5555667777778999
11.00 1 . 00011123333
6.00 1 . 666999
1.00 2 . 3
Stem width: 1.0000
Each leaf: 1 case (s)
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Model Summary (b)
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics
RSquare Change F Change d fl Sig. F Change
1 .546(a) .298 .204 .8623744 .298 3.165 13 97 .001
a Predictors: (Constant), Big audit firm, NORMAL of curratio using VW, NORMAL of govern using VW, NORMAL of roe using VW, NORMAL of foreign using VW, NORMAL of sharehld using VW, 
service sector, NORMAL of totasst using VW, NORMAL of institut using VW, industry sector, NORMAL of debt using VW, NORMAL of capital using VW, NORMAL of Minority using VW 
b Dependent Variable: NORMAL of indwmm using VW
C oefficients (a)
Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
I l i i H R i S i Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) -.326 .238 -1.368 .175
NORMAL of totasst using VW .258 .160 .258 1.611 .110 .282 3.549
NORMAL of capital using VW .242 .167 .241 1.447 .151 .261 3.834
NORMAL of roe using VW -.032 .096 -.032 -.331 .741 .777 1.287
NORMAL of debt using VW -.100 .147 -.100 -.680 .498 .336 2.974
NORMAL of curratio using VW -.112 .142 -.112 . : -.787 .433 .357 2.803
NORMAL of govern using VW .015 .191 .010 .077 .939 .387 2.586
NORMAL of institut using VW .099 .191 .095 .518 .606 .216 4.635
NORMAL of sharehld using VW .048 .198 .041 .244 .808 .254 3.938
NORMAL of Minority using VW .100 .182 .100 .548 .585 .219 4 565
NORMAL of foreign using VW -.032 .188 -.017 -.170 .866 .712 1.404
industry sector 167 .249 .086 .670 .505 .438 2.284
service sector -.004 .261 -.002 -.015 .988 .430 2.325
Big audit firm .378 .198 .186 1.909 .059 .759 1.317
a Dependent Variable: NORMAL of indwmm using VW
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2. Index of Weighted Voluntary
j l | j | M
Index of weighted mandatory NORMAL of index of weighted 
mandatory
N i Valid : ' ' 111 .> > / i i t v -
: Missing : '0 ; " " ; . 0 '-V -
Skewness .143 ' '".002'"'-".... .. "
Std. Error of Skewness .229 - •. .229 ,
Kurtosis .567 -.306
Std. Error of Kurtosis .455 .455
Model Summary (b)
* ■ “  ■
R Square Adjusted R Square
: .... . .  „ ..
1 .565(a) .319 .228 .8503107 .319 3.498 13 97 .000 |
a Predictors: (Constant), Big audit firm, NORMAL of curratio using VW, NORMAL of govern using VW, NORMAL of roe using VW, NORMAL of foreign using VW, NORMAL of sharehld using VW, 
service sector, NORMAL of totasst using VW, NORMAL of institut using VW, industry sector, NORMAL of debt using VW, NORMAL of capital using VW, NORMAL of Minority using VW
387
Coefficients (a)
Model Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. ; Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta 1
.
1 Tolerance i VIF
1 (Constant] -.254 .235 -1.082 .282
NORMAL of totasst using VW .501 .158 .501 3.173 .002 .282 3 549
NORMAL of capital using VW -.005 .165 -.005 -.032 .975 .261 3.834
NORMAL of roc using VW -.036 .095 -.036 -.374 .710 1.287
NORMAL of debt using VW -.056 .145 -.056 -.388 .699 .336 2.974
NORMAL of curratio using VW -.055 .140 -.055 -.395 .694 .357 2.803
NORMAL of govern using VW -.023 .189 -.016 -.122 .903 .387 2.586
NORMAL of institut using VW .254 .188 .243 1.349 .180 .216 4.635
NORMAL of sharehld using VW -.046 .196 -.039 -.233 .816 .254 3.938
NORMAL of Minority using VW .210 .179 209 1170 .245 .219 4.565
NORMAL of foreign using VW -.056 .185 -.030 -.301 .764 .712 1.404
industry sector .438 .246 .226 1.783 .078 .438 2.284
service sector .071 .258 .035 .277 .783 .430 2.325
Big audit firm .059 .195 .029 .302 .764 .759 1.317
a D ependent Variable: NORMAL of indw vm  using VW
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A P P EN DI X : R EG R E S S I ON  A N A L Y S I S  OF ONLY T R A N S F O R M E D  
D E P E N D E N T  V A R I A B L E S  B AS E D ON NORMAL  
SCORES ( C H A P T E R  9 ]
1. Transformed Weighted Mandatory Index
M odel Sum m ary (b)
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics ............................... - ...........:
R Square Change F Change d fl df2 Sig. F Change
1 .569(a) .324 .234 .8188903 .324 3.579 13 97 .000
a Predictors: (Constant), Big audit firm, % of m inority sh a re h o ld er s, Company's Return on Equity as perform ance m easure, current ratio, % of governm ent ow nersh ip  in a com pany, % of 
foreign investors in a com pany, debt ratio, industry sector, sqrcap, % of major shareholders in a com pany, serv ice sector, logasset, sqrdebt 
b D ependent Variable: NORMAL of indwm m  using VW
Coefficients (a)
Model Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t ...Sig:.. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) -1.926 1.560 -1.235 .220
logasset .161 .250 .096 .642 .522 .312 3.204
sqrcap .000 .000 .263 1.796 .076 .325 3.079
sqrdebt .618 1.360 .173 .455 .650 .048 20.861
Company's Return on Equity as performance measure .095 .135 .061 .709 .480 .937 1.067
debt ratio -605 .770 -.283 -.786 .434 .054 18.579
current ratio -.005 .005 -.118 -1.113 .269 .615 1.626
% of government ownership in a company -.002 .006 -.039 -.396 .693 .721 1.386
% of major shareholders in a company -.005 .005 -.105 -.999 .320 .636 1.572
% of minority shareholders 6.015E-05 .004 .002 014 .989 .545 1.836
% of foreign investors in a company -.001 .012 -.006 -.068 .946 .856 1.169
industry sector .237 .236 .126 1006 317 .441 2.266
service sector .239 .245 .122 .975 .332 .443 2.257
Big audit firm .441 .185 2.377 .019 .781 1.281
a D ependent Variable: NORMAL of indwm m  using VW
390
2. Transformed Weighted Voluntary Index
M odel Sum m ary (b)
Model R RSquare Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics
R Square Change F Change d fl ^ ;d f2 - : ‘-Mg! FXIaftge7^ '
1 .592(a) .351 .264 .8306298 .351 4.030 13 97 .000
a Predictors: (Constant), Big audit firm, % of m inority sh a re h o ld er s, industry sector, Company's Return on Equity as perform ance m easure, % o f foreign investors in a com pany, % of  
governm ent ow nersh ip  in a com pany, current ratio, debt ratio, % of major shareholders in a com pany, sqrcap, service sector, logasset, sqrdebt 
b D ependent Variable: NORMAL of indwvm  using VW
C oefficients (a)
Model Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error
", ,
Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) -4.828 1.577 -3.061 .003
logasset .609 .252 -V'- -3S2:-: :- 2.417 .018 .316 3,161
sqrcap 1.811E-05 .000 .042 .290 .772 .326 3.071
sqrdebt .518 1.379 ) .i 4q .376 .708 .048 20.847
Company's Return on Equity as performance measure .129 .139 .080 .931 .354 .907 1.102
debt ratio -.305 .779 -.138 -.391 697 ,054 18.484
current ratio .000 .005 -.004 -.042 .967 .615 1.626
% of government ownership in a company -.009 .006 -.147 -1.521 .132 .717 1.395
% of major shareholders in a company -.011 .005 -.238 -2.332 .022 .641 1.561
% of minority shareholders ,001 .004 .014 .122 903 .542 1.845
% of foreign investors in a company -.017 .013 -.118 -1.337 .184 .863 1.159
industry sector .394 .239 .203 1.647 .103 .439 2.275
service sector .165 .249 .082 .662 .509 .440 2.272
Big audit firm .460 .179 ■|:v 2.572 .012 .862 1.160
a D ependent Variable: NORMAL of indwvm  using VW
391
3. Transformed Overall Weighted Index
M odel Sum m ary (b)
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Change Statistics
R Square Change F Change d fl df2 Sig. F Change
1 .566(a) .320 .229 .8498617 .320 3.517 13 97 .000
a Predictors: (Constant), Big audit firm, % of minority shareholders, Company's Return on Equity as performance measure, current ratio, % of government ownership in a company, % of 
foreign investors in a company, debt ratio, industry sector, sqrcap, % of major shareholders in a company, service sector, logasset, sqrdebt
C oefficients (a)
Model Unstandardised Coefficients Standardized Coefficients " t Sig. Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) -4.818 1.619 -2.976 .004
logasset .591 .260 2.275 .025 .312 3 204
sqrcap 5.463E-05 .000 .125 .854 .395 .325 3.079
sqrdebt .660 1.411 .179 .468 .641 .048 20.861
Company's Return on Equity as performance measure .088 .140 .055 .632 .529 .937 1.067
debt ratio -.428 .799 -.193 -.536 .593 .054 18.579
current ratio -.003 .005 -.075 -.701 .485 .615 1.626
% of government ownership in a company -.008 .006 -1,325 .188 | | | 1.386
% of major shareholders in a company -.007 .005 -.159 -1.517 .132 .636 1.572
% of minority shareholders .002 .005 .049 .429 .669 -545 1.836
% of foreign investors in a company -.008 ,013 -.057 -.625 .534 .856 1.169
industry sector .470 .245 1.922 .058 .441 2.266
service sector .255 .254 .126 1.004 .318 .443 2.257
Big audit firm .148 .192 .073 771 442 .781 1.281
Dependent Variable: NORMAL of owindm using VW
